ORDER : K. Babu, J. The challenge in this Criminal Revision Petition is to the judgment, dated 18.06.2024 in Crl.Appeal No.208 of 2018 passed by the Additional Sessions Court-V, Thiruvnanathapuram, that set aside the order dated 24.09.2018 in CMP 16371 of 2014 in CC 629 of 2009 passed by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Neyyattinkara. 2. The Secretary-in-charge of the Kanjiramkulam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd, Thiruvananthapuram filed a complaint before the Judicial First Class Magistrate-III Neyyatinkara, against the former Secretary of the Co-operative society, a member of the Co-operative Society and the Administrator appointed by the Government alleging offences punishable under Sections 464, 468 and 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant alleged that the persons arraigned as accused committed forgery, cheating and criminal breach of trust. The specific allegation was that, in furtherance of their common intention, the accused misappropriated a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- from the Co-operative Society. The acts of the accused adversely affected the goodwill of the society. 3. The learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Kanjiramkulam Police registered FIR No.195 of 2007, conducted investigation and submitted the final report against the three accused. In response to the summons, the accused appeared. The learned Magistrate framed charges against the accused. Thereafter, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted a petition under Section 321 Cr.P.C. seeking withdrawal of the prosecution. The learned Magistrate allowed the application, consenting the prosecution to withdraw the prosecution of the offences against the accused and acquitted them under Section 321(b) of the Cr.P.C. 4. The Co-operative Society challenged the order granting consent to withdraw the prosecution by filing Crl.Appeal No.208 of 2018 before the Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed CMP No.16371 of 2014 and directed the Trial Court to dispose of the case on merits as early as possible. This judgment is under challenge in this Revision Petition. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the Revision petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. 6. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed CMP No.16371 of 2014 and directed the Trial Court to dispose of the case on merits as early as possible. This judgment is under challenge in this Revision Petition. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the Revision petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner raised two contentions: (i) A statutory appeal was not maintainable challenging the order allowing an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. (ii) The Sessions Judge committed an error by entering into the merit of the allegations as the duty of the Court in an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C was only to see whether the Assistant Public Prosecutor has applied his mind while seeking withdrawal of the prosecution. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that an order under Section 321 Cr.P.C. is appealable at the instance of the victim under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the finding of the learned Magistrate granting consent to withdraw the prosecution is legally sustainable. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that as the order under Section 321 Cr.P.C does not have the status of an order of conviction or acquittal, it is not appealable. The learned counsel relied on paragraph 91 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Others [1983 KHC 434] in support of her contention. It is advantageous to extract Section 321 Cr.P.C., which reads thus: “321. Withdrawal from prosecution. The learned counsel relied on paragraph 91 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Others [1983 KHC 434] in support of her contention. It is advantageous to extract Section 321 Cr.P.C., which reads thus: “321. Withdrawal from prosecution. - The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal, - (a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences; (b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences: (i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, or (ii) was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or (iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government, or (iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, and the Prosecutor in charge of the case has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution.” 9. As per Section 321 Cr.P.C, with the withdrawal of the prosecution, the accused shall be discharged in respect of the offence/offences if it is made before a charge has been framed and if it is made after a charge has been made, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence/offences. In the present case, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused under Section 321(b) Cr.P.C. It appears that the Co-operative society challenged the acquittal by filing appeal invoking the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. Section 372 reads thus; “372. In the present case, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused under Section 321(b) Cr.P.C. It appears that the Co-operative society challenged the acquittal by filing appeal invoking the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. Section 372 reads thus; “372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.- No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force: [Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.]” 10. As per the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C, the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner has a contention that the Co-operative Society cannot be treated as a victim. Victim is defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. “2. (wa) "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression “victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir.” 11. As per the definition of the victim as extracted above, a victim includes a person who suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged. In the complaint, the Society alleged that the acts of the accused affected its goodwill and caused embarrassment to its customers. It cannot be said that the Society sustained/suffered no injury due to the acts alleged. Therefore, the Co-operative Society against which forgery, cheating and criminal breach of trust were committed is a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. In Sheonandan Paswan (supra), in paragraph 91, the Supreme Court held thus:- “91. It cannot be said that the Society sustained/suffered no injury due to the acts alleged. Therefore, the Co-operative Society against which forgery, cheating and criminal breach of trust were committed is a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C. In Sheonandan Paswan (supra), in paragraph 91, the Supreme Court held thus:- “91. An order under S.321 of the Code, in our opinion, does not have the same status as an order of conviction or acquittal recorded by a trial or appellate Court in a criminal prosecution, inasmuch as the former has not been made appealable. An order under S.321 of the Code has a narrower scope. As an order under S.321 of the Code recorded by the Trial Court is judicial, what the Trial Court is expected to do is to give reasons for according or refusing its consent to the withdrawal. As stated above, the duty of the Court is to see that the grounds of withdrawal are legally valid and the application made by Public Prosecutor is bona fide and is not collusive. In revision of an order under S.321 of the Code, the duty of the High Court is to see that the consideration by the Trial Court of the application under S.321 was not misdirected; and that the grounds of withdrawal are legally valid. In this case, the Trial Court elaborately considered the grounds of withdrawal and found them to be valid and accordingly accorded its consent for withdrawal. In revision the High Court affirmed the findings of the Trial Court.” 12. The question of whether a victim is entitled to file an appeal was not under consideration in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). The Supreme Court held that an order under 321 Cr.P.C does not have the same status as an order of conviction or acquittal recorded by a Trial Court or Appellate Court after trial. The remedy of appeal by the victim was included as proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C by way of Act 5 of 2009. The Supreme Court pronounced the judgment in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) in 1983. The question of whether an order under Section 321 Cr.P.C is appealable or not was not directly under consideration of the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). The proviso to Section 372 that provides a provision of victim appeal was not in the statute book when the Supreme Court decided Sheonandan Paswan (supra). The question of whether an order under Section 321 Cr.P.C is appealable or not was not directly under consideration of the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan (supra). The proviso to Section 372 that provides a provision of victim appeal was not in the statute book when the Supreme Court decided Sheonandan Paswan (supra). As there is a specific statutory provision under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. which permits the victim to file an appeal, the contention that the appeal is not maintainable cannot be sustained. 13. Coming to the scope of section 321 Cr.P.C. The section enables the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case to withdraw from the prosecution of any person at any time before the judgment is pronounced, but the application for withdrawal has to get the consent of the court. The outer limit for the exercise of this power is “at any time before the judgment is pronounced”. The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor, and what the court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. The judicial function implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. However, the consent of the court is not a matter of course. When the Public Prosecutor makes the application for withdrawal after taking into consideration all the materials before him, the court exercises its judicial discretion by considering such materials, and, on such consideration, either gives consent or declines consent. It is necessary for the public prosecutor to satisfy himself in each case that the case is fit for withdrawal from prosecution. Though the Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that the public interest will be served by his withdrawal from the prosecution. Though the Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that the public interest will be served by his withdrawal from the prosecution. The application under Section 321 must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant material, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. The material that the Public Prosecutor has considered must be set out, briefly but concisely, in the application or in an affidavit annexed to the application or, in a given case, placed before the court, with its permission, in a sealed envelope. The court has to give an informed consent. The central question is whether the Public Prosecutor has really applied his mind to all the relevant materials on record and satisfied himself that the withdrawal from the prosecution would sub-serve the cause of public interest or not. {Vide : Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [ (1987) 1 SCC 288 ], R.M.Tewari v. State (NCT of Delhi) [ (1996) 2 SCC 610 ], Abdul Karim v. State of Karnataka [ (2000) 8 SCC 710 ] and Bairam Muralidhar v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ (2014) 10 SCC 380 ]}. 14. In Abdul Wahab K. v. State of Kerala and others [ (2018) 18 SCC 448 ], the Supreme Court held that the Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, has a vital role under the statutory scheme and is expected to act as an independent person. He/she has to apply his/her mind and consider the effect of withdrawal on society in the event such permission is granted. 15. In State of Kerala v. K.Ajith [ (2021) 17 SCC 318 ], the Supreme Court observed thus:- “67. The test which has been laid down in the decisions of this Court commencing with Ram Naresh Pandey [State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 22 : AIR 1957 SC 389 ] in 1957, spanning decisions over the last 65 years is consistent. The test which has been laid down in the decisions of this Court commencing with Ram Naresh Pandey [State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 22 : AIR 1957 SC 389 ] in 1957, spanning decisions over the last 65 years is consistent. The true function of the court when an application under Section 321 is filed is to ensure that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. The court will grant its consent if it is satisfied that it subserves the administration of justice and the purpose of seeking it is not extraneous to the vindication of the law. It is the broad ends of public justice that must guide the decision. The Public Prosecutor is duty-bound to act independently and ensure that they have applied their minds to the essential purpose which governs the exercise of the powers. Whether the Public Prosecutor has acted in good faith is not in itself dispositive of the issue as to whether consent should be given. This is clear from the judgment in Sheonandan Paswan [Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]. In para 73 of the judgment, V. Khalid, J. has specifically observed that the court must scrutinise “whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law”. Good faith is one and not the only consideration. The court must also scrutinise whether an application suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given.” 16. A perusal of the application submitted by the Assistant Public Prosecutor in the present case shows that he has applied his mind to the materials available. 17. It is relevant to note the gist of the allegations in the complaint filed by the Co-operative Society: On 13.12.2004 while accused No.1 was the Secretary and accused No.3 was the Administrator of the Bank, accused No.2 filed an application seeking a loan by falsely submitting the property of one Kuttappan as security for the said loan. Accused No.2 did not execute a separate security bond but used the security bond executed by the said Kuttappan on 24.12.2004. Accused No.2 did not execute a separate security bond but used the security bond executed by the said Kuttappan on 24.12.2004. Thereby, accused Nos.1 and 2 falsely created documents and issued a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- to the accused No.2 and thereby cheated the Society. 18. The Trial Court found that there are materials to show that Kuttappan had willfully stood as surety for the transaction. He had executed a consent letter on 13.12.2004 for the said purpose. There were two security bonds, one dated 13.12.2004 and the other dated 31.12.2004. The complainant has no case that signature of Sri.Kuttappan was forged. Sri.Kuttappan had a valid title over the property offered as security. There were no materials to show that a forgery was committed. 19. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, therefore, submitted in the application that the chances of successful prosecution for the offences under Section 468 or 420 IPC against any of the accused are remote. 20. The fundamental function of the Court, when an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. is filed, is to ensure that the executive function of the Assistant Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. The Trial Court found that granting consent subserves the administration of justice. Therefore, this Court finds no reason to hold that the order passed by the learned Magistrate granting consent to withdraw prosecution is illegal. The learned Sessions Judge did not consider the core question as to whether the Assistant Public Prosecutor has improperly exercised his jurisdiction or there was any attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons. The learned Sessions Judge did not consider the relevant materials. There is palpable misreading of records. 21. I am of the view that this Court has to exercise its power to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The finding of the Sessions Court is untenable in law. Therefore, it requires interference. The judgment passed by the Sessions Court in Crl.Appeal No.208 of 2018 stands set aside. The order passed by the learned Magistrate is restored. The order of acquittal passed under Section 321(b) Cr.P.C. against the accused is restored. The Criminal Revision Petition is allowed as above.