JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C. J. I.A No. 11166 of 2023 in L.P.A No.575 of 2023 This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 63 days in preferring L.P.A No. 575 of 2023. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and considering the facts and circumstances of this case and also after going through the cause shown in this interlocutory application seeking condonation of delay, we find sufficient grounds to condone the delay of 63 days and, accordingly, I.A No. 11166 of 2023 is allowed. I.A No. 11367 of 2023 in L.P.A No. 600 of 2023 3. This interlocutory application has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing L.P.A No. 600 of 2023. 4. However, Registry has reported that this Letters Patent Appeal has been filed in time. 5. Accordingly, I.A No. 11367 of 2023 is disposed of. L.P.A Nos. 462 of 2023, 497 of 2023, 575 of 2023, 580 of 2023, 600 of 2023, 611 of 2023, 619 of 2023, 621 of 2023, 662 of 2023, 663 of 2023, 664 of 2023, 679 of 2023 6. In this batch of Letters Patent Appeals, the grievance raised by the appellants is that the writ Court did not even advert to their grievance that the wrong committed by the respondents in not granting pay-protection to them was a continuing cause of action; and, thereafter, the writ petition could not have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. 7. For the sake of convenience, we would refer to the pleadings in W.P.(S) No. 1119 of 2023. The appellant was appointed in clerical grade-IV in 1977. Later, having passed the written test conducted in 1982 the appellant was appointed as Correspondence Clerk on 22nd February 1983. He claims that he passed the departmental examination on 30th September 1989 and promoted in the rank of Head Clerk vide Office Order No. 1381 dated 8th August 2007. According to the appellant, he was getting Rs. 21,890/- while working as Correspondence Clerk till 31st March 2004 but on being promoted as Head Clerk his pay was reduced and fixed to Rs. 20,030/- in contravention of Rule 78(a)(i) of the Jharkhand Service Code. 8. According to the appellant, he was getting Rs. 21,890/- while working as Correspondence Clerk till 31st March 2004 but on being promoted as Head Clerk his pay was reduced and fixed to Rs. 20,030/- in contravention of Rule 78(a)(i) of the Jharkhand Service Code. 8. Rule 78(a)(i) of the Jharkhand Service Code provides as under: “(i) when appointment to the new post involves the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance (as interpreted for the purposes of Rule 89) than those attaching to such permanent post, he will draw as initial pay the stage of the time-scale next above his substantive pay in respect of the old post.” 9. WP(S) No. 1119 of 2023 filed by the appellant was based on the decision rendered on 8th February 2013 in the case of “Ishwari Prasad Mandal” wherein it was held that disallowing the benefit of three advance increments on promotion shall violate Rule 78(a)(i) and that this decision has attained finality. However, we find that except stating that “Ishwari Prasad Mandal was granted all consequential benefits” the appellants have not said a word for not raising the grievance after 31st March 2004 till they retired. The appellants have also not offered any reason for the delay in approaching this Court about a decade after their superannuation from service. In these facts, the writ Court referred to the decisions in “Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass v. Union of India” AIR 1977 SC 1979 , “Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. v. T.T. Murali Babu” (2014) 4 SCC 108 , “Union of India” and “M.L. Patil (Dead)”and formed an opinion that the writ petitions filed by the appellants were liable to be dismissed. 10. Assailing the action of the respondents in not counting three advance increments while fixing pay-scale of the appellants, Mr. Ninpun Bakshi, the learned counsel for the appellants refers to the judgments in “Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation” 2022 SCC OnLine SC 641, “M.R. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors.” (1995) 5 SCC 628 , “Union of India & Ors. v. Tarsem Singh” (2008) 8 SCC 648 , “M. L. Patil (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. State of Goa & Anr.” (2023) 1 SCC 660 , “Hiralal Chamar v. The Union of India & Ors.” (L.P.A No. 299 of 2021) and “State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Tarsem Singh” (2008) 8 SCC 648 , “M. L. Patil (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. State of Goa & Anr.” (2023) 1 SCC 660 , “Hiralal Chamar v. The Union of India & Ors.” (L.P.A No. 299 of 2021) and “State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors.” (2015) 1 SCC 347 , to submit that the denial of pay-protection to the appellants on account of which they were paid less salary gave rise to continuing cause of action and the writ petition seeking payment of differential amount of wages was maintainable. The learned counsel has also referred to the orders passed by this Court in “Ishwari Prasad Mandal v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board & Ors.” [W.P.(S) No. 6166 of 2008] and “Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.” [L.P.A No. 220 of 2019], to submit that similarly situated Clerks/Correspondence Clerks were given pay-protection while the appellants have been illegally deprived of such benefit of pay-protection. 11. The writ Court held as under: 6. This Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not protect the interest of a persons who sleep over their right. Admittedly, after a gross delay of about 12 years, the petitioners woke-up from deep slumber and filed the present writ petition challenging the reduction of their pay that too when they were accepting the said pay-scale and continued to discharge their duties and thereafter, after retirement also, they were enjoying the pensionary benefits on the basis of last pay drawn by them. Thereafter, after 10 years from the date of their retirement, i.e. in the year 2023, they filed the present writ petitions, which is barred by limitation and as such, no interference is required 7. This issue has already been decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1979 , in which while dismissing the writ petition, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that “for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated 21.12.1966. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1979 , in which while dismissing the writ petition, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that “for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated 21.12.1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , has held as under: “Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 8. The reliance of the petitioners in the case of Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 is of no help to him. The further reliance of the learned counsel in the case of M.L. Patil (dead) through Legal Representatives Vs. State of Goa & Anr., reported in (2023) 1 SCC 660 is also not applicable since in the said case delayed payment of pension was involved whereas in the case in hand, the reduction of pay-scale is under challenge. 9. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal proposition and judicial pronouncement, no other view can be taken as to what has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 10. Resultantly, the writ petitions merits dismissal and the same are hereby dismissed.” 12. After having gone through the writ pleadings and other materials on record, we have also gathered a similar impression and find that the appellants who failed to offer any plausible explanation for the inordinate delay in approaching the writ Court do not deserve any indulgence of the writ Court. After having gone through the writ pleadings and other materials on record, we have also gathered a similar impression and find that the appellants who failed to offer any plausible explanation for the inordinate delay in approaching the writ Court do not deserve any indulgence of the writ Court. Before the writ Court, the appellant in L.P.A No. 462 of 2023 took the following stand: “9. That on being promoted to the post of Head Clerk, the Petitioner’s pay was fixed by adding one increment; however, the three advance increments that have been allowed pursuant to his passing Departmental Examination were deducted, resulting in reduction in pay. This would be evident from the Office Order No. 288 dated 31.3.2014. The pay was re-fixed as Rs.20,030/- (Basic pay) on 01.07.2008 which is apparent from the pay fixation chart enclosed with the aforesaid office order. Resultantly, the petitioner suffered reduction in pay even though he had been promoted to the post of Head Clerk which was anomaly which violates pay protection statutory recognized in Rule 78(a)(i) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Service Code.” 13. A similar stand was taken by the appellant in L.P.A No. 497 of 2023 who in W.P.(S) No. 1497 of 2023 pleaded as under: “7. That prior to promotion, the Petitioner was drawing a substantive monthly basic pay of Rs. 8,050/-; however, after promotion, the Petitioner was given one increment as promotional benefit, but the three increments were deducted and his pay on promotion was fixed as Rs. 7,720/-. This is evident from the Office Order No. 143 dated 01.09.2004 issued by the Respondent No. 05 as it records the decision of deduction of three advance increments which is an apparent anomaly and which violates pay protection statutorily recognized in Rule 78(a)(i) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Service Code.” 14. As it would appear on a glance at the above statements made before the writ Court, the claim of the appellants was that their pay was required to be refixed by taking into account three advance increments granted to them on their promotion to the post of Head Clerk. However, the appellants in this batch of Letters Patent Appeals approached the writ Court in the year 2023 about a decade after they superannuated from service. However, the appellants in this batch of Letters Patent Appeals approached the writ Court in the year 2023 about a decade after they superannuated from service. This is also a matter of record that the appellants did not approach the writ Court soon after a decision was rendered in “Ishwari Prasad Mandal” and they came before this Court after inordinate delay and, that too, without an explanation much less any plausible and acceptable explanation for the delay in approaching this Court. The submission made on behalf of the appellants that denial of pay-protection to them gave a continuing cause of action is bereft of merits and is liable to be rejected summarily. There was no concluded right in favor of the appellants on the basis of which they can claim that the action of the respondents gave rise to a continuing cause of action. The cause of action for the appellants to approach the writ Court arose on 31st March 2004 but without even a representation they accepted the pay fixed on their promotion as Head Clerk and approached the writ Court in the year 2023, about two decades thereafter. In “M.R. Gupta” the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “so long as the employee is in service” a fresh cause of action would arise every month when they are paid their salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to the rules. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the wages should be calculated and paid as long as they have not become time-barred. 15. And, “Tarsem Singh” lays down as follows: “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 16. “E. Parmasivan v. Union of India” (2003) 12 SCC 270 is a case on the subject wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when the government employee retired from service he could have made the claim for pay fixation but he did not take any step in the matter and approached the Court after inordinate delay and, therefore, he was not entitled for the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This is by now well-settled that the writ Court shall exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to promote justice and in public good and not otherwise. 17. In “Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak” the respondent-Corporation adopted and implemented the scheme in the modified form. The said scheme envisaged grant of pay-scale to the next promotional post on completion of certain years of service. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the law recognizes a continuing cause of action which may give rise to a recurring cause of action as in the case of salary and pension. The said scheme envisaged grant of pay-scale to the next promotional post on completion of certain years of service. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the law recognizes a continuing cause of action which may give rise to a recurring cause of action as in the case of salary and pension. However, the judgment in “Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak” has to be understood in the context of the fact that the entitlement of the employees for the higher grade of pay-scale of the next promotional post was accepted by the Bhav Nagar Municipal Corporation and the grievance of the employees was against restricting of the said benefit from the date of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It was in the light of the pronouncements in “M. R. Gupta” and “Tarsem Singh” that the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the employees were entitled for the higher grade of pay-scale of the next promotional post for 3 years before the date of filing of the writ petitions. 18. In “State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal” (1986) 4 SCC 566 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing of writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In “Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board” the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot lightly brush aside the doctrine of latches and delay and entertain the writ petition after a lapse of four years. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 19. For the foregoing reasons, we are not inclined to interfere in these matters and, accordingly, this batch of Letters Patent Appeals is dismissed.