Ghanshyam Singh, S/o Sonsai Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh
2024-02-15
RAJANI DUBEY
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of disciplinary authority dated 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1) whereby the punishment of reduction of one salary increment with cumulative effect was imposed upon the petitioner. He also challenged the order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2) whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service and further challenged the order dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure P/3) passed by respondent No.2 by which the mercy appeal of the petitioner was dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case as projected by the petitioner, are that in the year 2008, the petitioner was posted on the post of Head Constable at P.S. Somani, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.). A written complaint was made by the Up-Sarpanch of Village Somani to the S.P. making certain allegation of demanding money. Thereafter, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the C.S.P. Rajnandgaon and the report was submitted to respondent No.4 who passed an order on 18.08.2008 (Annexure P/4) whereby the petitioner and one constable namely Rajesh Sahu were punished by stoppage of one salary increment for the period of one year with non-cumulative effect. 3. A revised order dated 29.12.2008 (Annexure P/5) was passed by the former Inspector General of Police whereby the punishment imposed by the S.P. dated 18.08.2008 was cancelled and a direction was issued to conduct regular enquiry against the petitioner and another constable Rajesh Sahu. 4. In compliance with the order dated 29.12.2008, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner and explanation was called. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet and after receiving reply, departmental enquiry was conducted by Additional Superintendent of Police, District- Rajnandgaon. After completion of departmental enquiry, report was submitted by the enquiry officer on 29.07.2010 (Annexure P/6) to the Superintendent of Police against the petitioner and another constable. On 03.08.2010, a notice was issued by respondent No.4 to the petitioner relating to the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer. On 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1), order was passed by the respondent No.4 whereby the petitioner was punished with reduction of one salary increment with cumulative effect. 5. On 27.04.2011, a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Inspector General of Police (respondent No.3) with the proposed punishment “dismissal from service”.
On 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1), order was passed by the respondent No.4 whereby the petitioner was punished with reduction of one salary increment with cumulative effect. 5. On 27.04.2011, a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Inspector General of Police (respondent No.3) with the proposed punishment “dismissal from service”. The petitioner submitted his reply to the notice issued by respondent No.3, after receiving the reply of the petitioner, the petitioner was dismissed from the service by order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2). Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority which was also dismissed by the order dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure P/3) passed by respondent No. 2. Hence, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner for the following reliefs:- “10.1. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue writ of mandamus as to quash the impugned order dated 29.10.2010 (Annexure P-1), by which the petitioner has been punished by the respondent No. 4 after departmental enquiry reduction of one salary increment with cumulative effect, order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P-2) passed by the respondent No.3 by which the petitioner has been dismissed from the service and order dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure P-3) passed by the respondent No.2 by which the appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. 10.2. The Hon’ble Court further be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in his service with all consequential benefit. 10.3 The Hon’ble Court further be pleased to grant such other relief(s) as may be deemed fit and proper in the interest of justice and fair play.” 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned orders dated 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1), 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2) and 21.11.2012 (Annexure P/3) are arbitrary, illegal and passed malafidely and, therefore, deserve to be quashed. The petitioner has been punished three times for one charge/allegation which is against the Article 22 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner can not be punished three times for the one offence or guilt. Respondent No.3 exercised his power of review after the prescribed period as provided in Rule 22 (3) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The order of punishment was passed on 29.10.2010 and the revised order was passed by respondent No.3 on 28.07.2011.
Respondent No.3 exercised his power of review after the prescribed period as provided in Rule 22 (3) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The order of punishment was passed on 29.10.2010 and the revised order was passed by respondent No.3 on 28.07.2011. Respondent No.3 did not comply with the mandatory provision that if the order of punishment was required to be reviewed then a proper notice should be given to the petitioner giving the complete reason of enhancement or change in the punishment but the notice has been given with proposed punishment as dismissal from service which is illegal and arbitrary. The issuance of notice itself shows that the decision was already taken by respondent No.3 and only for formalities, the notice with proposed punishment was issued. Therefore, the order passed by the respondent No.3 deserves to be quashed. Respondent No.2 did not consider the grounds as raised by the petitioner in his appeal while challenging the order passed by the respondent No.3 and dismiss the appeal of the petitioner. Petitioner cannot be punished tries for the one allegation. Therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 7. Reliance has been placed on the order passed by High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench) in the matter of Angad Singh Rathore Vs. State of M.P. and others; (2010) 1 MPLJ 171 passed in W.P. (S) No. 5918/2007 decided on 09.06.2009 and this Court’s order dated 30.01.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 2894 of 2005 in the matter of Indrani Shrivas Vs. State of Chhattisgarh; (2017) LIC 1964. 8. Learned counsel for the State/ respondents opposes the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the instant petition is misplaced and misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. During departmental enquiry, every procedure has been duly followed at all stages. The allegation of the petitioner that his case has not been considered properly on merits, is also absolutely baseless as all authorities have duly considered the averments of the petitioner, which would be clear from the records which are annexed as Annexure R/1, R/2, R/3 and R/4. Petitioner being found unfit for continuing in duty in a disciplined institution like the police force, hence administrative order of dismissal from service was passed. 9. Petitioner was posted as Head Constable at P.S. Somani, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.).
Petitioner being found unfit for continuing in duty in a disciplined institution like the police force, hence administrative order of dismissal from service was passed. 9. Petitioner was posted as Head Constable at P.S. Somani, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.). On a written complaint, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by C.S.P. Rajnandgaon and enquiry report was submitted before S.P. Rajnandgaon i.e. Respondent no.4, who passed an order on 18.08.2008 (annexure P/4), whereby a penalty of stoppage of one increments with non- cumulative effect was imposed upon the petitioner. Now vide order dated 15.10.2008, Office of Director General informed respondent no.3, that the quantum of punishment is not sufficient as the charge against the petitioner is very serious, thus the respondent no. 3 take suo-moto revision under clause 270 (1) (a) of police regulation and quashed the order of punishment imposed by S.P. on 18.08.2008 and ordered to initiated full- fledged departmental enquiry against the petitioner and another constable. A charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 09.01.2009. Thereafter, a full-fledged enquiry was initiated against the petitioner in which ample opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Duuring the departmental enquiry, as many as 6 witnesses were examined and ample opportunity of cross examination was given to the petitioner wherein, witnesses in their deposition proved the charges against the petitioner. The enquiry report was forwarded to the higher authority and higher authority i.e. respondent no. 4 gave an opportunity to the petitioner to make representation and after being dissatisfied with the same, a final order Annexure-P/1 was passed on 29.10.2010 imposing punishment for reduction of one salary increments with cumulative effect. The respondent no. 3, after due contemplation and perusal of record held that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is not in accordance with Clause 226 of Police Regulation and decided to take the matter in suo-moto revision under the provision of 270 of police regulation and before passing final order, issued a show cause notice on 27.04.2011 (Annexure P/7) to the petitioner proposing penalty for dismissal from service and being dissatisfied with the reply of the petitioner, final order was passed on 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2) imposing punishment for dismissal from service. Against the order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2), the petitioner preferred mercy appeal before respondent no.2 and the said mercy appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed vide order dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure-P/3).
Against the order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2), the petitioner preferred mercy appeal before respondent no.2 and the said mercy appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed vide order dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure-P/3). Before dismissal of mercy appeal, respondent no.2 evaluated the previous record of the petitioner and it was found that thirty seven miner punishments, and one major punishment were already imposed upon the petitioner during his service tenure. Looking to the gravity of the act of indiscipline, misconduct and adamant attitude exhibited by the petitioner in a disciplined wing of the Government like the Police Force, it cannot even be said that the punishment is shocking to the conscience. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to seek any indulgence from this Court and, thus the petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 11. It is an admitted fact in this case that the petitioner was posted as Head Constable in the year 2008 at Police Station Somani, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.). A written complaint was made by Up-Sarpanch of Village Somani to the S.P. making certain allegations of demanding money. A preliminary enquiry was conducted by the C.S.P. Rajnandgaon and the report was submitted to respondent No.4. Thereafter, respondent No.4 passed an order on 18.08.2008 by which the petitioner and another constable namely Rajesh Sahu were punished by stoppage of one salary increment for the period of one year with non-cumulative effect. Further, it is also not disputed that after passing of this order on 18.08.2008, a revised order was passed by the former Inspector General of Police by which the punishment imposed by the S.P. Dated 18.08.2008 was cancelled and a direction was issued to conduct regular enquiry against the petitioner on 29.12.2008 (Annexure P/5) and after completion of departmental enquiry, impugned order dated 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1) was passed by which the petitioner was punished with reduction of one salary increment with cumulative effect. On 27.04.2011, a notice was issued to the petitioner by the I.G. police (respondent No.3) with the proposed punishment “Dismissal from Service”. By order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2), the petitioner was dismissed from the service. Against the order of dismissal from service, the petitioner preferred an appeal which was also dismissed by respondent No. 2 vide order dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure P/3). 12.
By order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2), the petitioner was dismissed from the service. Against the order of dismissal from service, the petitioner preferred an appeal which was also dismissed by respondent No. 2 vide order dated 21.11.2012 (Annexure P/3). 12. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner is a member of disciplined police force and respondent authorities has power to review. Thus, the impugned order was passed in accordance with rules and regulations. 13. Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench) in the matter of Angad Singh Rathore Vs. State of M.P. and others; (2010) 1 MPLJ 171 passed in W.P. (S) No. 5918/2007 decided on 09.06.2009 observed and held in operative para as under:- It is not disputed that in view of Regulation 262 of the Regulations against the penalty order dt. 15-5-2006 passed by the third respondent Inspector General of Police, Ujjain the appellate authority would be is the second respondent Director General of Police. Regulation 270 empowers any authority superior to the authority making the order of penalty to review the order suo motu. This being the position and the Director General of Police being the superior authority as well as appellate authority against the order of penalty sought to be reviewed the provisions contained in Rule 29 Sub Clause (iii) of the Rules would get attracted. Rule 29(iii) provides that the appellate authority may review the order proposed to be reviewed within six months. In the present case the second respondent appellate authority sought to review the order after more than eight months. In the circumstances the action to take the order of penalty in review having been taken after six months is barred by limitation. The contention of learned Government Advocate that the second respondent being the Head of the department no period of limitation is provided for taking the matter in suo motu revision is misconceived. Police Regulation 270 provides that the review shall be made by any authority superior to the authority making order. In view of Regulation 262 the appellate authority against the order of penalty passed by the Inspector General of Police, Ujjain is Director General of Police being the authority superior to the authority making the order.
Police Regulation 270 provides that the review shall be made by any authority superior to the authority making order. In view of Regulation 262 the appellate authority against the order of penalty passed by the Inspector General of Police, Ujjain is Director General of Police being the authority superior to the authority making the order. In the circumstances proposed action of review by the Director General of Police is in the capacity of the appellate authority and therefore the suo motu powers could not have been exercised by him after the prescribed period of limitation of six months in view of Rule 29 (iii) of the Rules, 1966. 14. This Court vide order dated 30.01.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 2894 of 2005 in the matter of Indrani Shrivas Vs. State of Chhattisgarh; (2017) LIC 1964 held in paras 10, 11 & 12 as under:- 10. A careful perusal of the order impugned would show that while enhancing the punishment from reduction of one increment to compulsory retirement no reasons have been recorded by the revisional authority except holding that charges are serious in nature. The disciplinary authority has already considered the charges proved against the petitioner and only awarded punishment of reduction of pay of one increment for one year, therefore, specific reasons have to be recorded by the revisional authority while remitting, varying or enhancing the punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 270(4) of the CGPR, which has not been done in this case. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kranti Associates Private Limited and another v. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 while considering the question reasons to be recorded. It was observed as under:- "47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or rubber- stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process". 12. In the light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgment, I hold that the revisional authority is absolutely unjustified in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority as no valid reasons have been recorded while interfering with the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 15.3.2002 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent No.2 is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to respondent No.2 to consider afresh as to whether punishment of reduction of pay by withholding one increment by the disciplinary authority is justified or not in the light of Regulations 225, 226 and 270(4) of the CGPR and take a fresh decision within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 15. Thus, it is clear from the facts of this case that first order of disciplinary authority was passed on 18.08.2008 (Annexure P/4) imposing punishment of stoppage of one salary increment for the period of one year with non-cumulative effect against the petitioner. Second punishment order was passed on 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1) by which the petitioner was punished with reduction of one salary increment with cumulative effect and after that on 27.04.2011, a notice was issued to the petitioner with proposed punishment i.e. dismissal from service and, thereafter the order of dismissal was passed on 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2).
Second punishment order was passed on 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1) by which the petitioner was punished with reduction of one salary increment with cumulative effect and after that on 27.04.2011, a notice was issued to the petitioner with proposed punishment i.e. dismissal from service and, thereafter the order of dismissal was passed on 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2). The time gap between these two orders is about 9 months which is beyond maximum period of 6 months provided in Rule 22 (3) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and after departmental enquiry, final order was passed on 29.10.2010 and revised order was passed on 28.07.2011. It is not disputed that after preliminary enquiry, petitioner was punished on 18.08.2008 and after that the departmental enquiry was initiated against him. 16. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, looking to the principles and provisions of rules and regulations, the impugned orders are not sustainable. 17. Consequently, the order dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P/2) is set aside. 18. It is directed that the order dated 29.10.2010 (Annexure P/1) whereby the punishment of stoppage of one salary increment for the period of one year with cumulative effect was imposed, shall be resurrected and the petitioner would have to undergo the said punishment, if not already suffered. 19. The petition, thus stands disposed of in above terms.