JUDGMENT : Hon. Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J. 1. Heard Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel and Shri Ashish Mohan Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for State-respondents-appellants and Shri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for petitioner-respondent no.1. 2. This Court vide order dated 23.5.2024 has condoned the delay in filing the appeal and has directed to accord regular number to the appeal. 3. Present intra court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules has been preferred assailing the validity of the judgment and order dated 9.5.2022 passed by learned Single Judge in Manoj Kumar Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors. Writ-A No.13182 of 2019, whereby the writ petition was allowed; orders dated 21.5.2019 and 9.7.2019 passed by District Inspector of Schools (DIOS), Aligarh have been quashed; the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Assistant Clerk in the institution has been upheld and the respondent no.3 was directed to grant financial sanction to the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Assistant Clerk and to make payment of arrears of salary w.e.f. 3.7.2018, the date of first disapproval of selection of the petitioner and to pay his month to month salary forthwith. For ready reference, the operative portion of the judgment and order dated 9.5.2022 is reproduced as under:- “The orders impugned passed by District Inspector of Schools, Aligarh, are hereby quashed. The appointment of the petitioner on the post of Assistant Clerk in the institution is upheld and the respondent no.3 is directed by means of a positive mandamus as per the judgement of Apex Court in case of Comptroller And Auditor General of India & Another Vs. K.S. Jagannathan & Another, (1986) 2 SCC 676 to grant financial sanction to the appointment of the petitioner on the aforesaid post, within three months from today and make payment of arrears of his salary w.e.f., 3.7.2018, the date of first disapproval of selection of the petitioner, within same period and pay his month to month salary forthwith. In case arrears of salary payable to the petitioner is not paid to him within the time provided by this Court, the petitioner would be entitled to get 12% interest on the arrears of the amount due. The State Government shall be free to recover the amount of interest from the public servant/servants, who is/are found responsible for the delay. The writ petition is allowed. FACTS 4. The State Government shall be free to recover the amount of interest from the public servant/servants, who is/are found responsible for the delay. The writ petition is allowed. FACTS 4. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal is that there is an educational institution known as ‘Shri Udai Singh Jain Kanya Inter College, Udai Singh Jain Road, Aligarh’,[ institution in question], which is a minority institution and is governed by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 [Act, 1921] and the various Regulations framed thereunder from time to time. The institution also received grant-in-aid from the State Government and as such the Payment of Salary Act, 1971 is also applicable upon the institution. The clerical cadre of the institution comprises one post of Head Clerk and four posts of Asstt. Clerks. It is claimed that the sanctioned strength has already been determined in view of the Government Order dated 15.6.2012, which was issued in compliance of the direction dated 22.5.2012 passed by this Court in the case of Dhruv Narain Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., Writ Petition No.26307 of 2010. Therefore, it is claimed that the sanctioned strength of teaching and non-teaching staff in the institution has been determined. After superannuation of one Suresh Chandra Saxena, Head Clerk, substantive vacancy occurred on 28.8.2017 and on the said post promotion was accorded to one Adan Kumar Jain. Consequently, one substantive vacancy (direct recruitment) of Asstt. Clerk fell vacant in the institution. 5. It is claimed that the advertisement of the said post was published in the newspaper ‘Amar Ujala’ on 10.12.2017 inviting applications from eligible candidates for the post of Clerk. The petitioner-respondent claiming to be fully qualified and eligible applied in pursuance of the said advertisement. He had also participated in the interview, which was scheduled on 15.1.2018 and he was selected as best suited candidate. Consequently, the Committee of Management passed a resolution on 19.1.2018 for granting appointment to the petitioner-respondent. The Manager of College had also issued an appointment letter dated 22.1.2018 to the petitioner. Pursuant to the said appointment letter, the petitioner also joined the institution on 27.1.2018 and it is claimed that since then he has been continuously working. 6. Thereafter, all relevant papers pertaining to the selection of the petitioner has been forwarded to DIOS for according financial sanction. Pursuant to the said appointment letter, the petitioner also joined the institution on 27.1.2018 and it is claimed that since then he has been continuously working. 6. Thereafter, all relevant papers pertaining to the selection of the petitioner has been forwarded to DIOS for according financial sanction. On the paper so submitted the DIOS by communication dated 17.2.2018 made certain queries from the management. The query so raised was forthwith replied by the Manager of the institution on 27.3.2018. Eventually on 3.7.2018 reiterated on 11.9.2018 the DIOS has declined to accord financial sanction upon an allegation of the contravention of Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act, 1921. 7. The said orders dated 3.7.2018 and 11.9.2018 were challenged by the petitioner in Manoj Kumar Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors., Writ-A No.20601 of 2018, which was allowed by learned Single Judge on 26.3.2019 with following observations:- “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri K. M. Asthana, learned counsel for the Managing Committee and learned Standing Counsel for the State authorities. Petitioner claims to have been appointed as a Class III employee in Shri Udai Singh Jain Kanya Inter College, Aligarh, which is a recognized intermediate institution under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the provisions of U.P. Act No.24 of 1972 are also applicable. The institution also is a minority institution. It is alleged that appointment of petitioner has been made after the vacancy was duly advertised in newspaper 'Amar Ujala'. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner states that vacancy was also advertised in newspaper 'Times of India' which meets the requirement of a valid publication of vacancy itself. It is also stated that there exists a vacancy and a fair procedure has been followed, and therefore, mere non obtaining of prior permission from the Director in terms of regulation 101 would not be fatal. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of this Court in Abhishek Tripathi v.s State of U.P. and others, 2016 (1) ADJ 603 to contend that claim of appointment ought to have been examined on merits by the authority concerned. Although time was allowed to learned Standing Counsel to file a counter affidavit way back on 25.9.2018, but no counter affidavit has been filed as yet. Although time was allowed to learned Standing Counsel to file a counter affidavit way back on 25.9.2018, but no counter affidavit has been filed as yet. Considering the nature of order proposed to be passed, no further opportunity is liable to be granted to learned Standing Counsel to file a counter affidavit. The order impugned in the present writ petition would go to show that there is no conscious determination by the authority concerned with regard to legality of petitioner's appointment in terms of the applicable provisions of law. The authorities were expected to determine as to whether there existed any vacancy; a fair procedure for recruitment was followed and; petitioner possessed requisite qualification etc. Since this has not been done, the order of the authority concerned refusing to grant approval to petitioner's appointment cannot be sustained. Writ petition, accordingly, succeeds and is allowed. Orders dated 3.7.2018 and 11.9.2018 stands quashed. The matter is remitted to respondent no.3 for passing a fresh order, keeping in view the observations made in the case of Abhishek Tripathi (supra), after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, within a period of three months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order.” 8. The aforesaid order was served upon the DIOS, who in turn issued notices upon the Manager of the institution on 9.4.2019 fixing date of hearing on 16.4.2019. Consequently, the order dated 21.5.2019 was passed by the DIOS rejecting the claim of the petitioner for grant of financial sanction on the post of Asstt. Clerk in the institution. Thereafter, the Manager of the institution moved a representation before the DIOS on 27.5.2019 requesting therein to reconsider the decision with regard to grant of approval to the appointment of the petitioner. However, the same was also rejected by the DIOS vide order dated 9.7.2019. 9. The petitioner challenged the orders passed by the DIOS on 21.5.2019 and 9.7.2019 by means of Writ Petition No.13182 of 2019. The DIOS has rejected the claim of the petitioner mainly on four grounds, which are averred in para 28 of the writ petition as under:- I. No prior permission in terms of Chapter -III Regulation 101 was taken by the Principal of the Institution before initiating the selection proceedings which culminated in the appointment of the petitioners. II. The DIOS has rejected the claim of the petitioner mainly on four grounds, which are averred in para 28 of the writ petition as under:- I. No prior permission in terms of Chapter -III Regulation 101 was taken by the Principal of the Institution before initiating the selection proceedings which culminated in the appointment of the petitioners. II. The selection committee did not comprise of one nominee of the District Magistrate and one nominee from the reserved category. III. Applications were to be received from the candidates via registered speed post but on the contrary in the selection proceedings which culminated into the appointment of the petitioners, the applications were not received by registered speed post and no further information has been given so as to how the petitioners were served with the appointment letters. IV. In the selection process rather than awarding quality points marks grading system was adopted by the Appointing Authority and further no waiting list was prepared, consequently the selection proceedings were not carried out in accordance with law. 10. The above writ petition was allowed by learned Single Judge by the order impugned dated 9.5.2022, which has been assailed in the present intra Court appeal. Learned Single Judge had considered the aforementioned four grounds taken by the DIOS while rejecting the financial approval and answered the aforesaid objections. Learned Single Judge has answered the first objection with following observation:- Regarding the first ground of lack of permission before initiation of selection proceedings of the petitioner as per Chapter III, Regulation 101 of the Act of 1921, this Court finds that in the earlier round of litigation before this Court in Writ-A No. 20601 of 2018 decided on 26.3.2019, this Court examined the issues and found that mere non-obtaining of permission from the District Inspector of Schools in terms of Regulation 101 would not be fatal. This Court directed the District Inspector of Schools to pass a fresh order after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. District Inspector of Schools has ignored the observations of this Court dated 26.3.2019. District Inspector of Schools has simply reiterated his earlier stand, which was turned down by this Court in the earlier ground of litigation. In the case of Mohd. District Inspector of Schools has ignored the observations of this Court dated 26.3.2019. District Inspector of Schools has simply reiterated his earlier stand, which was turned down by this Court in the earlier ground of litigation. In the case of Mohd. Faizan and others (supra) this Court has clearly held that there is no specific provisions for applying Regulation 101, Chapter III of the Intermediate Education Act to the minority institution. Even assuming that it is regulatory in nature, it does not means prior approval as explained by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jagdish Singh vs. State of U.P. and others, (2006) 2 UPLBEC 1851 . Hence it is reiterated that prior permission for conducting the selection process of the petitioners in the minority institution was not required in terms of Regulation 101, Chapter III of the Intermediate Education Act. 11. Learned Single Judge has also answered the second objection with following observations:- The second ground for rejecting the claim of the petitioner is that one nominee of the District Magistrate and one nominee from reserved category concerned was not included in the selection Committee. In minority institution, there was no such requirement as held by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Harpal Singh Vs. State of U.P., reported in 2015 (3) ADJ Pg. 236. Such procedure was applicable for non minority institution. The constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of T.M.A. Pal Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2002 (8) SCC Pg. 481 and another constitution Bench Judgement in the case of P.A. Inamdar Vs. State of Maharastra, reported in 2005 Vol-VI SCC Pg. 537 has laid down certain guidelines with regard to the functioning of a minority institution. A perusal of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court would indicate the fact that inter alia it has explicitly been held that the State Government is not empowered to interfere with the functioning of the minority institution in the matters relating to appointment of teaching staff and also non teaching staff. The State Authority cannot under the garb of adopting regulatory measure destroy the administrative autonomy of a minority educational institution or start interfering with the administration and the management of the institution so as to render the right of administration of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory. The State Authority cannot under the garb of adopting regulatory measure destroy the administrative autonomy of a minority educational institution or start interfering with the administration and the management of the institution so as to render the right of administration of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory. The State Government cannot regulate the method or procedure for appointment of teachers of a minority educational institution. Once the teacher possessing the requisite qualification prescribed by the State or the University has been selected by the management of the minority education institution by adopting the procedure of selection, the State Government or the University would have no right to vitiate the selection of such teacher. Even the U.P. Secondary Education Service Section Board Act, 1982 is also not applicable upon a minority institution in terms of Section 30 of the said Act. In view of the aforementioned examples it can be concluded that the the Staff Rules of 1985 with regard to the procedure for appointment of Class -III and IV employees in a recognized intermediate institution even though would apply on a non-minority institution in terms of the Full Bench pronouncement of this Court in the case of Harpal Singh (supra) but would not apply upon a minority institution which enjoys certain privileges in terms of Articles 29 & 30 of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise the position of law is that as to whether any order or statutory provision would apply in a particular set of institution, there has to be a specific mention in the Statute itself that it shall apply upon a minority institution and that a provision ipso facto shall not be deemed to apply upon a minority institution in terms of Article 29 and 30 of the Constitution. Thus it can be held that the District Inspector of Schools has manifestly erred in returning a finding that there was no nominee of the District Magistrate from the reserved category in the selection committee which proceeded to appoint the petitioner on Class-III post in the institution. 12. Thus it can be held that the District Inspector of Schools has manifestly erred in returning a finding that there was no nominee of the District Magistrate from the reserved category in the selection committee which proceeded to appoint the petitioner on Class-III post in the institution. 12. Learned Single Judge has considered and answered third objection with following observations:- Coming to the third ground taken in the impugned order in regard to receiving of the application, it is held that the said ground is hyper-technial and that no prejudice was caused to any other candidates who took part in the selection proceedings due to the fact that the application of the petitioner was not received vide registered post. Many candidates applied pursuant to the advertisement published in news paper and after due consideration of merit by the duly constituted selection committee, a decision was taken to appoint the petitioner on Class III post. 13. Learned Single Judge has answered fourth objection with following observations:- Regarding the fourth and final ground, with regard to the fact whether quality points were allotted in the selection proceedings or not, it is appears that the selection would not be vitiated on the face of it as the job of the selection committee was of consideration the merits of all the eligible candidates and that no prejudice was caused to any candidate in the way in which the selection proceedings were carried out by the selection committee. SUBMISSIONS OF STATE-APPELLANTS 14. Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned counsel for State-respondents- appellants has vehemently urged that the provisions of Regulation 101 and other Regulations framed under the Act, 1921 are for regulating appointments and conditions of service and disciplinary proceeding framed for non-teaching staff and are applicable to all aided and recognised institutions including minority institutions. The institution in question is admittedly aided and recognised minority institution. He submits that the object of the Act, 1921 is to regulate and supervise the High School and Intermediate institutions. Sub-section 4 of Section 9 of the Act, 1921 empowers the State Government to pass appropriate orders or to take adequate action consistent with the provisions of the Act. He has also placed reliance upon Section 16G of the Act, 1921, which deals with the conditions of service of the head of the institutions, teachers and other employees. Sub-section 4 of Section 9 of the Act, 1921 empowers the State Government to pass appropriate orders or to take adequate action consistent with the provisions of the Act. He has also placed reliance upon Section 16G of the Act, 1921, which deals with the conditions of service of the head of the institutions, teachers and other employees. For ready reference, Section 16G is reproduced as under:- “Section 16G-Conditions of Service of Head of Institutions, teachers and other employees (1) Every person employed in a recognized institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by regulations and any agreement between the management and such employee insofar as it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or with the regulations shall be void. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), regulations may provide for- (a) the period of probation, the conditions of confirmation and the procedure and conditions for promotion and punishment 2[(including suspension pending or in contemplation of inquiry or during the pendency of investigation, inquiry or trial in any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude)] and the emoluments for the period of suspension and termination of service with notice; (b) the scales of pay and payment of salaries; (c) transfer of service from one recognized institution to another; (d) grant of leave and Provident Fund and other benefits; and (e) maintenance of record of work and service.” 15. He submits that Regulation 101 was inserted on 28.8.1992 and the same was notified by the State Government on 30.7.1992, which provides, “Appointing Authority except with prior approval of Inspector shall not fill up any vacancy of non-teaching post of any recognized aided institution.” The subsequent notification was issued on 2.2.1995, which provides as under:- “Appointing Authority except with prior approval of Inspector shall not fill up any vacancy of non-teaching post of any recognized aided institution: Provided that filling of the vacancy on the post of Jamadar may be granted by the Inspector.” 16. He submits that later on there was again an amendment in Regulation 101 made on 31.12.2009, which reads as under:- “The appointing authority shall not fill any vacancy of the non-teaching staff of recognised aided institutions, except with the approval of Inspector, subject to a restriction that District Inspector of Schools shall make available total number of vacancies to Director of Education (Secondary Education), and showing the number of students put forth justification for the filling of the vacancies. On receipt of order from the Director of Education (Secondary Education), the District Inspector of Schools shall, for filling said vacancies, give permission to the appointing authority; and while giving such permission he shall ensure to follow the reservation rules specified by the government and the prescribed norms in justification for the posts. The aforesaid amendment in the Regulation shall come into force immediate effect.” 17. Taking into consideration the recommendations made by the Sixth Central Pay Commission, Government Orders were passed on 8.9.2010 and 6.1.2011 making it applicable to all Government Departments and aided schools, thus, deciding not to go for fresh recruitment of Class-IV employees and further directing that any arrangement concerning the post to be vacated may be made only through ‘Outsourcing’. The communications, in this regard, were sent to all the stakeholders intimating them of the decision taken. Following the said decision, Regulation 101 was once again amended by Government Order dated 4.9.2013, which was accordingly notified on 24.4.2014. The effect of the said amendment is to make the post of Class-IV employees, which was hitherto supposed to be filled up by the institutions through ‘Outsourcing’. Therefore, the permanent posts were accordingly abolished, thereby, replacing the method of appointment by way of ‘Outsourcing’. An exception has been carved out only for the dependents of those employees died in harness during employment. The amended Regulation 101 (as applicable on date) is reproduced hereunder:- AMENDED REGULATION: “101. The appointing authority, except for the prior approval of the inspector, shall not fill any vacant post of non-teaching staff (clerical cadre) in any recognised, aided institution; with the restriction that the District Inspector of Schools shall make available the total number of vacancies to the Director of Education (Secondary Education) and also put forth justification for filling of the posts, showing the strength of the students in the institution. On receipt of the order from Director of Education (Secondary Education), the District Inspector of Schools shall give permission to the appointing authority for filling the said vacancies (except the vacancies of Class-IV posts) and while giving the permission, he shall ensure compliance of the reservation rules specified by the government as also of the prescribed norms in justification for the posts. With respect to the Class-IV vacancies, arrangements shall be made by way of outsourcing only; but the relevant rules, 1981, as amended from time to time, for recruitment of dependants of teaching or non-teaching staff of the non-government aided institutions dying in harness shall be applicable in relation to the appointments to be made on the vacant posts of Class-IV category.” 18. Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel invited attention of this Court to the terms ‘any recognised, aided institution’ used in Regulation 101. He submits that the term ‘recognition’ has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Act. The term ‘institution’ has been defined in Section 2 (b) of the Act. He submits that there is no exception carved out in the Regulation 101 regarding its non-applicability upon a minority institution in as much as the term used in Regulation 101 is ‘any recognised, aided institution’. And all the institutions recognised and/ or aided will come under the ambit of Regulation 101. 19. He further submitted that the term ‘minority institution’ although used in Section 16FF of the Act, has not been defined anywhere in the Act. He, therefore, submitted that the savings available to minority institutions are referable to Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 20. To elaborate his submissions, Shri Ansari, learned Standing Counsel next submitted that Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India only deals with right to establish and administer minority institutions and in no way preclude them from the regulatory measures undertaken by the State Government to efficiently regulate the abovesaid rights. 21. Learned Standing Counsel also drawn our attention to the following Regulations 102, 103 and 104 of the Chapter III of the Act, which all contains the same terminology i.e. ^fdlh ekU;rk ÁkIr lgk;rk ÁkIr laLFkk* i.e. ‘any recognised, aided institution’. He further drawn our attention to Regulation 110, which starts from ^vYila[;d laLFkkvksa dks NksM+dj* i.e. ‘apart from the minority institution’. He further drawn our attention to Regulation 110, which starts from ^vYila[;d laLFkkvksa dks NksM+dj* i.e. ‘apart from the minority institution’. Hence he submits that wherever the applicability of the regulations are saved upon the minority institution, it has been expressly given in the Act. For example Section 16FF and Regulation 110. 22. Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel, therefore, submitted that once it is apparent from the plain reading of Regulation 101 read with Section 16FF and Regulation 110, there is no scope of doubt that Regulation 101 does apply upon the minority institutions and the procedure given therein has to be strictly adhered to without any classification or distinction as to minority or non-minority institutions. 23. Learned Standing Counsel has vehemently submitted that in the instant case there is no such material on record to show that the alleged appointment was made by the appointing authority after obtaining prior approval from the DIOS. He submitted that the amendment in Regulation 101 dated 24.4.2014 was held as unconstitutional by the Division Bench of this Court in Principal Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. Writ Petition No.45060 of 2015 vide order dated 19.11.2018. The same was subjected to challenge by the State Government before Hon’ble the Apex Court in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Principal Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors., Civil Appeal No.865 of 2021. Hon’ble the Apex Court vide judgment dated 27.9.2021 had approved the entire Regulation 101. 24. Shri Ansari, learned Standing Counsel emphatically submitted that while approving the amendment in Regulation 101, Hon’ble the Apex Court has held that in case institution is aided, there is no need for any sub-classification by separating them as minority and non-minority institutions and held that the Regulation is sought to be enforced against all aided institutions. Learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon para 53 of the said judgment, which is reproduced as under:- “53.The counsel appearing for the respondents did place reliance upon few decisions of this Court. Having gone through the said decisions and in the light of our discussion, we do not find any help flowing from them, strengthening the contentions raised by them. Reliance has been made on the decision rendered by this Court in Matankara Syrian Catholic College vs. T. Jose, (2007) 1 SCC 386 . Having gone through the said decisions and in the light of our discussion, we do not find any help flowing from them, strengthening the contentions raised by them. Reliance has been made on the decision rendered by this Court in Matankara Syrian Catholic College vs. T. Jose, (2007) 1 SCC 386 . Having gone through the said judgment, we do not find that the same has got any application to the case at hand. The said decision deals with the right of the minor institutions to choose the Principal of its choice. We have already held that we are dealing with the case of aided institutions and, therefore, there is no need for any sub-classification by separating them as minority and non-minority institutions. The impugned regulation is sought to be enforced against all the aided institutions. It is also to be noted that this decision was taken into consideration by this Court in S.K. Md. Rafique’s case (supra).” 25. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that the Regulation 101 of Chapter-III of the Act, 1921, therefore, applies with full force on minority institutions as well. The framers have not carved out any distinction or classification between minority and non-minority institution under the Act, 1921. 26. He has also placed reliance upon Section 16FF of the Act, 1921, which for ready reference is quoted as under:- 16-FF. Savings as to minority institutions- (1) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (4) of section 16-E, and section 16-F, the Selection Committee for the appointment of a Head of Institution or a teacher of an institution established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (I) of Article 30 of the Constitution shall consist of five members (including its Chairman), nominated by the Committee of Management : Provided that one of the members of the Selection Committee shall — (a) in the case of appointment of the Head of an Institution, be an expert selected by the Committee of Management from a panel of experts prepared by the Director ; (b) in the case of appointment of a teacher be the Head of the Institution concerned. (2) The procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee referred to in subsection (1) shall be such as may be prescribed. (2) The procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee referred to in subsection (1) shall be such as may be prescribed. (3) No person selected under this section shall be appointed, unless — (a) in the case of the Head of an Institution the proposal of appointment has been approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education ; and (b) in the case of a teacher such proposal has been approved by the Inspector. (4) The Regional Deputy Director of Education or the Inspector, as the case may be, shall not withhold approval for the selection made under this section where the person selected possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed and is otherwise eligible. (5) Where the Regional Deputy Director of Education or the Inspector, as the case may be, does not approve of a candidate selected under this section, the Committee of Management may, within three weeks from the date of receipt of such disapproval, make a representation to the Director in the case of the Head of Institution, and to the Regional Deputy Director of Education in the case of a teacher. (6) Every order passed by the Director or the Regional Deputy Director of Education on a representation under sub-section (5) shall be final. 27. He submitted that the framers have consciously nowhere made any distinction in the entire Act qua minority and non-minority institutions but only provided savings clause as to Minority Institution in Section 16FF of the Act, 1921. He also vehemently submitted that various regulatory provisions are contained in Chapter-III of the Regulations safeguarding the interest of teachers/ employees against the arbitrary actions of the management. The Regulation clearly demonstrates that there are sufficient guidelines to the DIOS for according or refusing to grant approval in the matter of appointment. Even the regulatory provision of termination is also provided under Section 16 G (3) (a) of the Act, which applies to the minority institution as well. 28. Shri Ansari, learned Standing Counsel, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance upon paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the judgment in Udai Veer Singh & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools Deoria & Anr. 28. Shri Ansari, learned Standing Counsel, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance upon paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the judgment in Udai Veer Singh & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools Deoria & Anr. 2001 All.L.J. 122, wherein the Court has held that the regulatory provisions under Section 16G of the Act and Chapter III of the Regulations, Regulation 2 (1), 21, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39 (2), 40, 41, 44, 44-A, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 68, 99, 100 and other regulation applied by it, 101 and 102 would apply to non-teaching staff of a minority institution. The Court also held that as per Regulation 101 prior approval of the DIOS for appointment of non-teaching staff in the aided minority institution is mandatory. Merely obtaining prior approval from DIOS for making appointment does not infringe the minority status of the institution. 29. He submits that nowhere the framers have made any such provisions under the Act or its Regulations to curtail the liberty to appoint any suitable employee by the management in the minority institution. Even after appointment of non-teaching staff (Class-III), papers have to be forwarded to the DIOS for according financial approval, if the post is sanctioned and the candidate possesses essential qualifications and the appointment has been made in accordance with law. He submitted that in absence of any financial approval accorded by DIOS, no salary can be disbursed. It is not in doubt that the DIOS does not control the selection and appointment made by appointing authority or the management of a minority institution and the management is absolutely free to select and find out best suitable person and appoint him in the institution but the regulatory measures provided in Regulation 101 has to be followed. 30. He has also drawn our attention to the alleged publication made in ‘Amar Ujala’ dated 10.12.2017. For ready reference, the same is reproduced as under:- 31. Reliance has also been placed on the alleged appointment letter dated 22.1.2018, which for ready reference, is reproduced as under:- 32. He submits that the alleged publication dated 10.12.2017 is an eye wash. In the said advertisement, age, qualification, pay scale or any other essential qualifications were not mentioned to substantiate the claim that the said publication was made as per law with categorical information. All the relevant information were missing. He submits that the alleged publication dated 10.12.2017 is an eye wash. In the said advertisement, age, qualification, pay scale or any other essential qualifications were not mentioned to substantiate the claim that the said publication was made as per law with categorical information. All the relevant information were missing. Surprisingly, the alleged appointment letter was issued without any address. Even the said document was also fabricated. These aspects have been considered by the DIOS while passing the order dated 21.5.2019. The relevant portion of the order dated 21.5.2019 is reproduced as under:- 33. Shri F.A. Ansari, learned Standing Counsel while placing reliance upon the judgment in Udai Veer Singh & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools Deoria & Anr. (Supra) submitted that the petitioner has not filed any material on record to show that his appointment has been made by the appointing authority after obtaining prior approval from the DIOS. He relied upon the decision of this Court in Amit Kumar v. District Inspector of Schools, JaunpurCivil Misc. Writ Petition No.50286 of 2000 decided on 21.11.2000, wherein it has been held that Regulation 101 is mandatory. He further argued that for direct recruitment on non-teaching post the rules applicable to Government institutions would be applicable as provided under Regulation 2 (1) of Chapter III of the Act. He submits that the Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985 would apply to direct recruitment of Class-III employees and for Class-IV employees the Group ‘D’ Employees Service Rules, 1985 was applicable prior to its amendment, now it is through outsourcing . In support of his submissions he has placed reliance upon Paras 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Udai Veer Singh & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria & Anr. (Supra). 34. Shri F.A. Ansari, learned Standing Counsel, in support of his submissions, has also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. v. Rachna Hills & Ors. 2023 (41) LCD 1291, wherein Hon’ble the Apex Court while considering the Regulation 16FF regarding appointment of teachers in minority institution has held that without obtaining mandatory approval of DIOS, there is no vested right of a candidate to be appointed. He has heavily relied upon paras 19, 20, 23, 29, 32 and 33 of the said judgment. 35. 2023 (41) LCD 1291, wherein Hon’ble the Apex Court while considering the Regulation 16FF regarding appointment of teachers in minority institution has held that without obtaining mandatory approval of DIOS, there is no vested right of a candidate to be appointed. He has heavily relied upon paras 19, 20, 23, 29, 32 and 33 of the said judgment. 35. He has also placed reliance upon the judgment in Krishna Kant v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2018 (11) ADJ 419 , wherein the Court had considered Chapter III Regulation 2 (1) and held that Rule of promotion as prescribed for under the Regulation are applicable to the minority institution. The Court in the said judgment has also relied upon the Full Bench judgment in Committee of Management, Swami Lila Shah Adarsh Sindhi Inter College & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2017 (2) ADJ 377 (FB), wherein it is held that the permissible regulations are always applicable and can be framed in respect of minority institution. Learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon para 6 of the judgment in Krishna Kant v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Supra). He submitted that the objection of the petitioner-respondent that for Class-III post no procedure is prescribed, is not tenable as Regulation 2 (1) provides that for appointment on Class-III post in the institution, minimum educational qualification would be the same as laid down for Class-III employees of Government Higher Secondary School time to time. 36. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that there is no vacuum as the Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985 would apply to direct recruitment of Class-III employees. Later on Government Orders dated 25.11.2021 and 7.12.2023 had also been issued, wherein detailed procedure is provided for appointment of Class-III employees. 37. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment in State of U.P. v. Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. 2021 (15) SCC 600 , (Para 7, 8, 10, 12 and 32). He submits that learned Single Judge has erred in law while holding that DIOS has ignored the distinction between minority and non-minority institution and neglected the privileges, which are enjoyed by the institution in question in terms of Art.29 and 30 of the Constitution of India. 2021 (15) SCC 600 , (Para 7, 8, 10, 12 and 32). He submits that learned Single Judge has erred in law while holding that DIOS has ignored the distinction between minority and non-minority institution and neglected the privileges, which are enjoyed by the institution in question in terms of Art.29 and 30 of the Constitution of India. He has further submitted that learned Single Judge has relied upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Harpal Singh v. State of U.P. 2015 (3) ADJ 236 , wherein the Full Bench has held that in the minority institution there is no requirement that in the selection committee there should be one nominee of the District Magistrate and one nominee from reserved category concerned. He submits that in the present matter even the petitioner has not pleaded such relief. Therefore, there was no reason or occasion to adjudicate the said issue in view of law propounded by Hon’ble the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Principal, Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. (Supra) and State of U.P. & Ors. v. Rachna Hills & Ors. (Supra). The only question for consideration before learned Single Judge was whether the mandatory provisions of Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act, 1921 was followed or not. The issue of applicability of Regulation 101 upon minority institution is no more res integra and as such the judgment passed by learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT 38. Per contra, Shri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for petitioner-respondent no.1 has vehemently opposed the present appeal and submitted that no prior permission as per Chapter III Regulation 101 of the Act, 1921 is required before making selection on the post of Asstt. Clerk in the institution in question. In support of his submissions, he has heavily placed reliance upon the judgment in Abhishek Tripathi v. State of U.P. 2014 (4) ADJ 270 . He submits that the petitioner had applied against the vacancy, which was duly advertised in ‘Amar Ujala’ and it is not in dispute that the vacancy was in existence. It is also not in dispute that the sanctioned strength of the institution has already been determined by the Director in pursuance of G.O. dated 15.6.2012, which was issued in compliance of the direction issued in Dhruv Narain Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. It is also not in dispute that the sanctioned strength of the institution has already been determined by the Director in pursuance of G.O. dated 15.6.2012, which was issued in compliance of the direction issued in Dhruv Narain Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Supra). In view of the law laid down in Abhishek Tripathi (Supra), there was no such requirement for getting any prior permission for initiation of selection process. Moreover, the said objection is not available to the respondents-appellants in view of the judgment and order dated 26.3.2019 passed in Writ-A No.20601 of 2018. 39. Shri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent next submitted that in the said writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the validity of the order dated 3.7.2018 and 11.9.2018 on the ground that the post was duly advertised and fair procedure was adopted, therefore, mere non-obtaining prior approval from the DIOS in pursuance of Regulation 101 would not be fatal. In the said proceeding, inspite of time accorded to the respondent-appellants no counter affidavit was filed and the Court opined that there was no conscious determination by the authority concerned with regard to legality of the petitioner’s appointment in terms of the applicable provisions of law. The Court also observed that the Authorities were expected to determine as to whether there existed any vacancy; a fair procedure for recruitment was followed and the petitioner possessed requisite qualification etc. The Court observed that since this has not been done and as such the order of the authority concerned refusing to grant approval to the petitioner’s appointment was not sustainable. Therefore, at the said stage, the matter was relegated to the respondents-appellants for passing fresh order keeping in view of the observations made in Abhishek Tripathi (Supra) after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. 40. In this backdrop, he further submitted that subsequently the respondents-appellants could not take objection that the vacancy was not there or the advertisement was not in accordance with law. He submitted that the parties are bound by earlier judgment, which attained finality. Even erroneous decision can operate as resjudicata. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 65 (SC) and State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee AIR 1966 SC 1061 . He submitted that the parties are bound by earlier judgment, which attained finality. Even erroneous decision can operate as resjudicata. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 65 (SC) and State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee AIR 1966 SC 1061 . He submitted that the appointment of an employee can only be questioned on the ground of lack of requisite qualification. In the order, which was impugned in the writ petition, nowhere the DIOS has observed that the petitioner was not having requisite qualification qua the post. In support of his submissions, reliance has also been placed on State of U.P. v. Manager, Committee of Management, Islamia Inter College & Ors., 2022 (2) AWC 1788 and Sister Meera v. State of U.P. 2013 (10) ADJ 310 . 41. Shri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent has vehemently submitted that the DIOS has erred in law with regard to seek prior permission before initiation of selection process in terms of Chapter III Regulation 101 of the Act, 1921. In the previous round of litigation, said objection was taken by DIOS while non-suiting the claim of the petitioner for grant of approval. However, while remanding the matter to DIOS, fresh decision was required to be taken in the light of judgment in Abhishek Tripathi (Supra). But even thereafter the DIOS has again erred in law and neglected the categorical observation made by the writ Court. It is submitted that even for the sake of argument it is presumed that the selection proceedings were carried out without seeking prior permission but at the time of grant of approval to the appointment of such employee, all such questions with regard to validity of appointment, the post on which such appointment was being sought and all such relevant issues can be gone into by the DIOS. Therefore, in view of ratio laid down by this Court in Abhishek Tripathi (Supra) and Mohd. Faizan v. State of U.P. 2013 (5) ADJ 471 , it may be concluded that the provisions regarding seeking prior permission in terms of Chapter III rule 101 is not mandatory provisions so far as minority institutions are concerned. ANALYSIS 42. Heard rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and respectfully considered the judgments cited at Bar. ANALYSIS 42. Heard rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and respectfully considered the judgments cited at Bar. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the mandatory provision of Regulation 101 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act, 1921 applies to a minority institution or not? 43. Hon’ble the Apex Court in Rachna Hills & Ors. v. Rachna Hills & Ors. (Supra) has considered the appointment of teachers in minority institution without obtaining mandatory approval of District Inspector of Schools under Section 16FF of the Act, 1921. The question that arose for consideration before Hon’ble the Apex Court that once the management forwarded names for approval to the DIOS, whether selection process concluded and candidates acquired vested right to be appointed before amendment of the Regulations. The Supreme Court held ‘No’. It further observed that sub-section (3) of Section 16 FF says that no person selected and proposed to be appointed as a teacher by Management shall be appointed unless proposal is approved by DIOS. Hon’ble the Apex Court has framed three issues for consideration, which are reproduced as under:- “(i) Whether the selection process concluded, and the candidates acquired a vested right to be appointed before the amendment of the Regulations? (ii) Whether the Act, read with the Rules and Regulations made thereunder, contemplates ‘deemed appointment’ if the approval of the DIOS is not given within a period of 15 days? (iii) Whether the posts of teachers could be filled as per the Rules and Regulations that existed when the vacancies arose and not as per the amended Regulations?” 44. So far as issue no.1 is concerned, the same is answered by Hon’ble the Apex Court in paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21, which for ready reference, are reproduced as under:- “18. To consider the submissions of the Respondents that the candidates whose names are recommended by the Management for approval by the DIOS acquire a vested right to be appointed as Teachers, it is necessary to examine Section 16FF: “16-FF. To consider the submissions of the Respondents that the candidates whose names are recommended by the Management for approval by the DIOS acquire a vested right to be appointed as Teachers, it is necessary to examine Section 16FF: “16-FF. Savings as to minority institutions (1) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (4) of section 16-E, and section 16F, the Selection Committee for the appointment of a Head of Institution or a teacher of an institution established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (I) of Article 30 of the Constitution shall consist of five members (including its Chairman), nominated by the Committee of Management: Provided that one of the members of the Selection Committee shall — (a) in the case of appointment of the Head of an Institution, be an expert selected by the Committee of Management from a panel of experts prepared by the Director; (b) in the case of appointment of a teacher be the Head of the Institution concerned. (2) The procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee referred to in subsection (1) shall be such as may be prescribed. (3) No person selected under this section shall be appointed, unless — (a) in the case of the Head of an Institution the proposal of appointment has been approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education; and (b) in the case of a teacher such proposal has been approved by the Inspector. (4) The Regional Deputy Director of Education or the Inspector, as the case may be, shall not withhold approval for the selection made under this section where the person selected possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed and is otherwise eligible. (5) Where the Regional Deputy Director of Education or the Inspector, as the case may be, does not approve of a candidate selected under this section, the Committee of Management may, within three weeks from the date of receipt of such disapproval, make a representation to the Director in the case of the Head of Institution, and to the Regional Deputy Director of Education in the case of a teacher. (6) Every order passed by the Director or the Regional Deputy Director of Education on a representation under sub-section (5) shall be final.” (emphasis supplied)” 19. (6) Every order passed by the Director or the Regional Deputy Director of Education on a representation under sub-section (5) shall be final.” (emphasis supplied)” 19. Sub-section (3) of Section 16-FF of the Act provides that no person selected and proposed to be appointed as a teacher by the Management shall be appointed till the proposal is approved by the DIOS. If the expressions ‘no person’, ‘shall be appointed’, and ‘unless’ employed in sub-section (3) are given their ordinary meaning, which is the foremost of the linguistic canons of construction of legislation, we have no hesitation in holding that appointment is subject to the mandatory approval of DIOS. The process of appointment cannot be said to have been concluded without obtaining the mandatory approval of the DIOS, and as such, there is no right, much less a vested right, of the candidate to be appointed. 20. This Court had the occasion to examine the effect of approval by the DIOS in Raj Kumari Cecil (Smt.) v. Managing Committee of Laxmi Narain Bhagwati Devi Vidya Mandir Girls’ High School, (1998) 2 SCC 461 , while holding that the appointment of the petitioner therein was unsustainable and incomplete, as the statutory pre-condition for the appointment, i.e., approval from the DIOS, was not obtained, it was observed: “4. There is no dispute that the appellant did not possess the qualifications for being appointed as a Principal of the Higher Secondary School. It is also not disputed that the appointment is subject to approval of the competent authority under the Intermediate Education Act. It is correct that the competent authority has power to relax the qualification but then again it is not disputed that the competent authority did not relax the qualification for the appointment of the appellant as Principal of the Higher Secondary School of the respondent…. .... 13. … The appellant ceased to be Headmistress on upgradation of school of the respondent to the Higher Secondary School as the post was upgraded. She did not possess qualifications to be appointed as Principal of the Higher Secondary School. Her qualifications were not relaxed. The competent authority under the Intermediate Education Act did not grant approval for her appointment as a Principal which is a precondition under the law. She did not possess qualifications to be appointed as Principal of the Higher Secondary School. Her qualifications were not relaxed. The competent authority under the Intermediate Education Act did not grant approval for her appointment as a Principal which is a precondition under the law. Since the appointment itself was not approved it was not necessary for the Managing Committee of the school to get consent of the authority concerned for the termination of her services as a Principal.” (emphasis supplied) 21. In view of the clear statutory mandate under Section 16-FF (3) of the Act, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the Respondent nos. 1 to 3 have acquired a vested right to be appointed.” 45. So far as issue no.2 is concerned, the same is answered by Hon’ble the Apex Court in paragraphs 22 to 27, which are also reproduced as under:- “22. Respondents have relied on Regulation 18 to argue that if the DIOS fails to grant his approval within 15 days of the proposal made by the Management, the proposed candidates shall be deemed to have been appointed. Regulation 18, is as under: “(1) Within fifteen days of the receipt of the recommendation of the Selection Committee constituted under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 16-F, and in case of an institution referred to in Section 16-FF, the approval of the authority specified therein, the Manager shall, on authorisation under resolution of the Committee of Management, issue an order of appointment by Registered Post to the candidate in the form given in Appendix 'B' requiring the candidate to join duty within ten days of the receipt of such order, failing which the appointment of the candidate will be liable to cancellation. (2) In case of promotions and ad hoc appointments also a formal order of promotion or appointment in the form as near as possible to the form referred to in Clause (1) shall be issued to the person concerned under the signature of the Manager. (3) A copy of every order referred to in Clauses (1) and (2) shall be sent to the Inspector and in case of appointment of the head of institution, a copy thereof shall also be sent to the Regional Deputy Director of Education.” 23. (3) A copy of every order referred to in Clauses (1) and (2) shall be sent to the Inspector and in case of appointment of the head of institution, a copy thereof shall also be sent to the Regional Deputy Director of Education.” 23. We have noticed that appointments are to be made under Section 16-E of the Act. Section 16-F of the Act provides for the constitution and recommendation of Selection Committees and Section 16-FF therein specifically relates to minority institutions. Regulation 18 (1) provides for the time within which an order of appointment is to be issued by a Manager to the selected candidate. According to which, where the recommendation is made by a Selection Committee constituted under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 16-F of the Act, an order of appointment is to be issued within 15 days of the receipt of the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Whereas, in the case of an institution referred to in Section 16-FF of the Act, i.e., a minority institution, as in the instant case, it is to be issued within 15 days of the receipt of the approval of the authority specified therein. Neither Section 16-FF of the Act nor Regulation 18 provides the period within which approval is to be accorded. Further, neither of the two provisions provide for deemed appointment in the event of delay in granting approval. Therefore, unless the approval contemplated under Section 16-FF(3) is accorded, no appointment could take place. 24. In any case, when the relevant statutory provision, i.e. Section 16-FF(3) itself makes approval by DIOS mandatory for appointment to the post of teacher, a Regulation made under the Act could not have provided for a ‘deemed appointment’. Subordinate legislation cannot transcend the prescription of a statutory provision. 25. Additionally, sub-section (4) of Section 16-FF of the Act has to be read in conjunction with Section 16-FF(2) therein, which provides that “[t]he procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee referred to in sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed”. It is only in the cases where the selection procedure, as prescribed in the Regulations, is followed, that there cannot be a disapproval unless there is a lack of requisite eligibility and qualifications. Thus, the question of deemed appointment does not arise under Section 16-FF (4) of the Act. 26. It is only in the cases where the selection procedure, as prescribed in the Regulations, is followed, that there cannot be a disapproval unless there is a lack of requisite eligibility and qualifications. Thus, the question of deemed appointment does not arise under Section 16-FF (4) of the Act. 26. If the statutory provisions read with relevant Regulations were to provide for ‘deemed appointment’, there would not have been a further remedy against an order of disapproval by the DIOS. Sub-section (5) of section 16-FF provides the remedy to the College Management in the event the DIOS does not grant an approval. As per this, the Management can within three weeks from the date of receipt of disapproval, make a representation to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. 27. In view of the legal provision as obtained under Section 16-FF of the Act, read with Regulation 18, we reject the submissions of the Respondents’ that there is a ‘deemed appointment’ of selection under Regulation 18.” 46. So far as issue no.3 is concerned, the same is answered by Hon’ble the Apex Court in paragraphs 28 to 33, which for ready reference, are reproduced as under:- “28. The Division Bench, as well as the Single Judge of the High Court, accepted the submission of the selected candidates that the vacancies to the post of teachers could be filled only as per the Rules and Regulations that operated when the vacancies arose and not as per the Regulations that came to be amended thereafter. 29. We have already held that approval of DIOS is mandatory and that the Act injuncts the appointment of a Teacher without such approval. We have also held that the legal regime concerning the appointment of Teachers does not contemplate any concept of deemed appointment if the DIOS does not decide upon the proposal within 15 days. Under these circumstances, the reference to and reliance on the principle that Rules that existed at the time when vacancies arose will govern the appointments is misplaced. 30. In any event, it is now a settled principle of law that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of existing Rules, which implies Rules in force as on the date of consideration. This principle is affirmed by this Court in Deeepak Agarwal and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 725 , as below: “26. This principle is affirmed by this Court in Deeepak Agarwal and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 725 , as below: “26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “rule in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V.Rangaiah case lays down any particular time-frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment.” 31. While reaffirming the above referred principle, in a subsequent case of Rajasthan State Sports Council and Anr. v. Uma Dadhich and Anr. (2019) 4 SCC 316 , (in which one of us was a member Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., as he then was). This Court noted: “5. There is merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the respondent had no vested right to promotion but only a right to be considered in accordance with the rules as they existed on the date when the case for promotion was taken up. This principle has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court. (See H.S. Grewal v. Union of India, Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty and Union of India v. Krishna Kumar.” (emphasis supplied) 32. In a recent decision, in State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Raj Kumar and Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680, after reviewing a number of decisions on the same subject, this Court formulated the following principles: “70. A review of the fifteen cases that have distinguished Rangaiah would demonstrate that this Court has been consistently carving out exceptions to the broad proposition formulated in Rangaiah. v. Raj Kumar and Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680, after reviewing a number of decisions on the same subject, this Court formulated the following principles: “70. A review of the fifteen cases that have distinguished Rangaiah would demonstrate that this Court has been consistently carving out exceptions to the broad proposition formulated in Rangaiah. The findings in these judgments, that have a direct bearing on the proposition formulated by Rangaiah are as under: 1. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose, Rangaiah's case must be understood in the context of the rules involved therein. 2. It is now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of the existed rules, which implies the “rule in force” as on the date consideration takes place. The right to be considered for promotion occurs on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. 3. The Government is entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up the vacancies arising prior to the amendment of the rules. The employee does not acquire any vested right to being considered for promotion in accordance with the repealed rules in view of the policy decision taken by the Government. There is no obligation for the Government to make appointments as per the old rules in the event of restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient working of the unit. The only requirement is that the policy decisions of the Government must be fair and reasonable and must be justified on the touchstone of Article 14. 4. The principle in Rangaiah need not be applied merely because posts were created, as it is not obligatory for the appointing authority to fill up the posts immediately. 5. When there is no statutory duty cast upon the State to consider appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the amendment, the State cannot be directed to consider the cases.” (emphasis supplied) 33. In view of the clear enunciation of the law, we have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made by the learned counsels for the Respondents, that the vacancies that existed prior to the amendment of Regulation 17 of Chapter II, must be governed by unamended rules.” 47. In State of U.P. & Ors. In view of the clear enunciation of the law, we have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made by the learned counsels for the Respondents, that the vacancies that existed prior to the amendment of Regulation 17 of Chapter II, must be governed by unamended rules.” 47. In State of U.P. & Ors. v. Principal Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. (Supra), the State of U.P. had challenged the judgment of Division Bench of this Court dated 19.11.2018 holding that Regulation 101 framed under the Act, 1921 as amended is ‘unconstitutional’. Hon’ble the Apex Court has considered the entire Regulation 101 and held that in case the institution is on grant-in-aid, then there is no difference between minority and non-minority institution. The relevant paragraphs 32, 33 and 53 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- “……...32.When it comes to aided institutions, there cannot be any difference between a minority and non-minority one. Article 30 of the Constitution of India is subject to its own restrictions being reasonable. A protection cannot be expanded into a better right than one which a non-minority institution enjoys. Law has become quite settled on this issue and therefore does not require any elaboration. 33.Thus, on the aforesaid issue we have no hesitation in reiterating the principle that an institution receiving aid is bound by the conditions imposed and therefore expected to comply. Once we hold so, the challenge made on various grounds, falls to the ground…….. 53.The counsel appearing for the respondents did place reliance upon few decisions of this Court. Having gone through the said decisions and in the light of our discussion, we do not find any help flowing from them, strengthening the contentions raised by them. Reliance has been made on the decision rendered by this Court in Matankara Syrian Catholic College vs. T. Jose, (2007) 1 SCC 386 . Having gone through the said judgment, we do not find that the same has got any application to the case at hand. The said decision deals with the right of the minor institutions to choose the Principal of its choice. We have already held that we are dealing with the case of aided institutions and, therefore, there is no need for any sub-classification by separating them as minority and non-minority institutions. The impugned regulation is sought to be enforced against all the aided institutions. We have already held that we are dealing with the case of aided institutions and, therefore, there is no need for any sub-classification by separating them as minority and non-minority institutions. The impugned regulation is sought to be enforced against all the aided institutions. It is also to be noted that this decision was taken into consideration by this Court in S.K. Md. Rafique’s case (supra)…….” (emphasis supplied) 48. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble the Apex Court has approved the entire Regulation 101 as amended. Therefore, at this stage, it is not in dispute that Regulation 101 would also be applicable to the minority institutions, which are on grant-in-aid list of the State Government. 49. In the aforesaid circumstances, the question is whether the mandatory provisions of Regulation 101 would mandatorily apply to aided minority institution or not. This Court in Amit Kumar v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur (Supra) has held that Regulation 101 is mandatory. For direct recruitment on non-teaching post (Class-III) the Rules applicable to Government institutions would be applicable. The Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985 would apply to direct recruitment of Class-III employees. In the present matter, it is not in dispute that the appointing authority/ Management did not obtain prior approval of DIOS for alleged appointment of petitioner-respondent on Class-III post. The argument of Shri Sankalp Narain, learned counsel for petitioner-respondent that there being no guidelines for DIOS in the matter of grant of prior approval, the Regulation 101 would not apply to minority institutions, does not appear to have any substance. Regulation 101, as mentioned above, provides that the appointing authority should not fill any vacancy of non-teaching staff except with prior approval of DIOS. The judgment of Abhishek Tripathi (Supra), which has been heavily relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent is also distinguishable as the same was decided in the light of sanctioned strength determined by the Joint Director of Education pursuant to G.O. dated 14.6.2012, which was issued in compliance of the direction dated 22.5.2012 issued by this Court in Dhruv Narain Singh (Supra). Learned Single Judge in para 16 of the judgment in Abhishek Tripathi (Supra) has held that before appointment of an incumbent on a non-teaching post, information is required to be given to the DIOS concerned regarding the sanctioned strength, who is under obligation to examine the sanctioned strength in the institution and report the same to the Director of Education (Madhyamik). Only after satisfying itself to the sanctioned strength and the vacancy position, the DIOS can grant approval for initiating the process of selection for filling up the vacancy. The judgment in Abhishek Tripathi (Supra) was passed under the backdrop that no serious efforts were made by the respondents to determine the cadre for about 39 years. Only to meet out that exigency, the judgment of Dhruv Narain Singh (Supra) was passed and later on physical survey was conducted and cadre strength of the institutions district wise in the entire State of U.P. has been determined. The judgment in Abhishek Tripathi (Supra) nowhere gives an impression that the Regulation 101 has been diluted. 50. The Division Bench of this Court in Principal Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. V State of U.P. & Ors. (Supra) while dealing with the matter of outsource employees for Class-IV post, had held the Regulation 101 qua Class-IV as ‘unconstitutional’. Later on Hon’ble the Apex Court in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Principal Abhay Nandan Inter College & Ors. (Supra) vide judgment and order dated 27.9.2021 had approved the entire Regulation 101. Regulation 101 provides that Appointing Authority should not fill any vacancy of non-teaching staff except with the prior approval of the DIOS. The only requirement under the Regulation is that the appointing authority shall apply to the DIOS intimating him that the vacancy in non-teaching post is to be filled by the appointing authority for which permission be granted. We find the reason for obtaining prior approval is that a person appointed in the aided institution is entitled for salary from grant-in-aid received from the Government sanctioned for the institution. The basic reason behind the said provision is that the DIOS must have information that the non-teaching post is to be filled up by appointing authority after prior approval is granted by DIOS and thereafter the appointing authority proceeds to fill up Class-III post. The basic reason behind the said provision is that the DIOS must have information that the non-teaching post is to be filled up by appointing authority after prior approval is granted by DIOS and thereafter the appointing authority proceeds to fill up Class-III post. The minority institution is free to advertise the post in accordance with law and make selection and appoint the candidate, who according to appointing authority is the most suitable candidate. Therefore, Article 29 and 30 (1) of the Constitution of India, which deal with the right to establish and administer minority institution, do not preclude the State to regulate the conditions of employment. For ready reference, Articles 29 and 30 (1) of the Constitution of India are reproduced as under:- “Article 29 – Protection of Interests of Minorities This article is intended to protect the interests of minority groups. Article 29(1):This provides any section of the citizens residing in India having a distinct culture, language, or script, the right to conserve their culture, language and script. Article 29(2):The State shall not deny admission into educational institutes maintained by it or those that receive aid from it to any person based only on race, religion, caste, language, or any of them. Article 30(1):All religious and linguistic minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.” 51. Regulation 101 provides for the DIOS to find out whether the post is created or not, to verify the sanctioned strength in the institution and to verify whether as per the standards fixed by the department teaching and non-teaching staff is surplus in the institution or not. We are of the opinion that merely obtaining prior approval from the DIOS for making appointment does not infringe the minority status of the institution. The said provisions nowhere infringe the right of the minority institution to appoint any suitable employee by obtaining prior approval for appointment. This Court in Udai Veer Singh & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria & Anr. (Supra) has considered Regulation 101 and 16FF. The relevant paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- “……..7. There is another reason for holding that Regulation 101 applies to minority institutions. This Court in Udai Veer Singh & Anr. v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria & Anr. (Supra) has considered Regulation 101 and 16FF. The relevant paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- “……..7. There is another reason for holding that Regulation 101 applies to minority institutions. In Section 16FF of the Act, it has been provided that a teacher or head of a minority institution can be appointed by the management committee of the institution but such an appointment, in case of head of institution, has to be approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education and in case of teachers. It has to be approved by the D.I.O.S. If further provides that approval shall not be withheld where the person selected possesses minimum qualification prescribed and is otherwise eligible. After a person is appointed, the D.I.O.S. has to grant financial approval to the appointment as the salary is paid from government fund. He has to be satisfied that appointment is made of a qualified person and the post is a sanctioned post. The D.I.O.S. does not control the appointment nor he has got any say in the matter of appointment. But after the appointment, the papers have to be forwarded to the D.I.O.S. for grant of financial approval. If post is sanctioned and the candidate possesses the essential qualifications and appointment has been made in accordance with law, financial approval would be granted by the D.I.O.S. The D.I.O.S. does not control the selection and appointment made by the appointing authority or the management of a minority institution, which is free to select and find out the best suitable person and appoint him in the institution. The appointment of such employees is totally at the discretion of the management. Same principle applies to employees. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner lastly urged that the provisions of Act and Regulations would not apply in matters of recruitment as there is no provision either in the Act or Regulations, which provide the mode and the manner of direct recruitment. Regulation 2 (1) of the Regulations provides that for appointment on a Class-III or IV post in an institution, the minimum educational qualification would be the same as laid down for Class-III and IV employees of Government Higher Secondary Schools from time to time. Regulation 2 (1) of the Regulations provides that for appointment on a Class-III or IV post in an institution, the minimum educational qualification would be the same as laid down for Class-III and IV employees of Government Higher Secondary Schools from time to time. Regulation 2 (1) of the regulations is extracted below : 2- ¼1½ fdlh laLFkk esa fu;qfDr gsrq fyfid ,oa prqFkZ oxhZ; deZpkfj;ksa dh u;wure 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk ogh gksxh tks jktdh; mPprj ek/;fed fo|kky;ksa ds led{kh; deZpkfj;ksa ds fy, le;≤ ij fy/kkZfjr dh xbZ gks A** It is true that neither under the regulations nor in the Act detailed procedure has been prescribed laying down the manner of direct recruitment, selection and appointment. Apart from Regulation 2 (1) and 101 of the regulations, there is no other provision either under the Act or the regulations which provides the criteria for recruitment of a Class-III or Class-IV employee in an aided institution. The question is, if there is no provision either in the Act or the regulations providing the mode of direct recruitment to Class-III or IV posts, what method of recruitment should be followed. Regulation 2 (1) clearly provides that educational qualification for appointment of Class-III or Class IV employee would be the same as of similar category of employees in the Government Higher Secondary Schools. The learned additional chief standing counsel has rightly pointed out that in absence of any statutory rule either in the Act or regulation, the direct recruitment rules framed by the State Government which are applicable to similar Class-III and IV employees working in the Government Higher Secondary Schools would apply to general institutions as well as to minority institutions. "The Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985" would apply to direct recruitment of Class-III employees. And for Class-IV employees "The Group 'D' Employees Service Rules, 1985" would be applicable. Both the rules are general rules. They have an overriding effect. They provide detailed procedure for direct recruitment. The language of both the rules are wide and comprehensive enough to include all State and subordinate services and posts except to the extent otherwise expressly provided by the rules. Therefore, in appointments of nonteaching posts in aided institutions recognised under the Act. The Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985 would apply to recruitment of Class-III employees. The language of both the rules are wide and comprehensive enough to include all State and subordinate services and posts except to the extent otherwise expressly provided by the rules. Therefore, in appointments of nonteaching posts in aided institutions recognised under the Act. The Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985 would apply to recruitment of Class-III employees. And The Group 'D' Employees Service Rules, 1985 would be applicable for Class-IV employees……...” 52. Similarly in the matter of Krishna Kant v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Supra) the Court was dealing with the matter of promotion in the minority institution. In the said judgment, reliance has also been placed on the judgment of this Court in Committee of Management, Swami Lila Shah Adarsh Sindhi Inter College & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2017 (2) ADJ 377 (FB). The Court had also taken note of judgment passed by Hon’ble the Apex Court in Sindhi Education Society & Anr. v. Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 49 , which deals with linguistic minority institution. The relevant paragraphs 6 and 7 of Krishna Kant v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Supra) are reproduced as under:- “……...6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Committee of Management, Swami Lila Shah Adarsh Sindhi Inter College & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors, 2017 (2) ADJ 377 (FB), wherein, this Court has held that the permissible regulations are always applicable and can be framed in respect of minority Institution. The principle laid down by Full Bench is sound principle of law in terms of service jurisprudence where the employees of same department or same Institution are to attain the benefits of promotion and those employees having been appointed by Committee of Management or working under the Management cannot be denied incidental benefits and other service conditions which definitely includes promotion as well. Full Bench referred relevant para 97 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sindhi Education Society & Anr v. Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 49 reads as under: "It is not necessary for us to examine the extent of power to make regulations, which can be enforced against linguistic minority institutions, as we have already discussed the same in the earlier part of the judgment. No doubt, right conferred on minorities under Article 30 is only to ensure equality with the majority but, at the same time, what protection is available to them and what right is granted to them under Article 30 of the Constitution cannot be diluted or impaired on the pretext of framing of regulations in exercise of its statutory powers by the State. The permissible regulations, as afore-indicated, can always be framed and where there is a mal-administration or even where a minority linguistic or religious school is being run against the public or national interest, appropriate steps can be taken by the authorities including closure but in accordance with law. The minimum qualifications, experience, other criteria for making appointments etc. are the matters which will fall squarely within the power of the State to frame regulations but power to veto or command that a particular person or class of persons ought to be appointed to the school failing which the grant-in-aid will be withdrawn, will apparently be a subject which would be arbitrary and unenforceable." 7. In view of above, now the legal position stands settled that rule of promotion as prescribed for under the regulation are applicable to the institution in question herein this case, out of five posts, therefore, three posts would fall in quota of promotion and since only two persons are working by way of promotion, the third position will definitely be taken as a vacancy under promotional quota and therefore, I am of the considered opinion that in case if the petitioner is otherwise eligible to be considered for promotion, his claim is liable to be considered within the framework of the regulations and other eligibility criteria……….” CONCLUSION 53. Since the selection process was initiated without any prior approval from DIOS as mandated in Regulation 101, the selection process stood vitiated since its inception. We have discussed in detail about the alleged publication, which was made in ‘Amar Ujala’ dated 10.12.2017 and the appointment letter dated 22.1.2018. From bare perusal of the said publication dated 10.12.2017, it is apparent that the same was bereft of necessary information. The said publication nowhere provides for any educational qualification, pay scale or any other essential qualifications and the same is absolutely an eye wash. The relevant information were missing there. 54. From bare perusal of the said publication dated 10.12.2017, it is apparent that the same was bereft of necessary information. The said publication nowhere provides for any educational qualification, pay scale or any other essential qualifications and the same is absolutely an eye wash. The relevant information were missing there. 54. We also find that the appointment letter does not contain even the address of the petitioner, which also creates doubt regarding genuineness of such appointment. Therefore, we hold that the publication was not in accordance with law. We also hold that the entire exercise of appointment is doubtful and as such the same is unsustainable in the eyes of law. 55. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we find that learned Single Judge has erred in law in holding that the provisions of Regulation 101 Chapter III of the Act, 1921 would not be applicable on the minority institution. Therefore, in view of the above, we hold that Chapter III Regulation 101 is fully applicable on the aided, recognised institutions without any classification of minority or non-minority. Accordingly, the judgment and order impugned passed by learned Single Judge is set aside. 56. The special appeal stands allowed accordingly.