JUDGMENT : RAVI NATH TILHARI, J : Heard Smt. Sodum Anvesha, learned Counsel representing Sri Murali Krishna for the appellant (husband) and Sri Sandhya Deepthi Maddala, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, "the H.M. Act") has been filed by the husband challenging the dismissal of petition for divorce vide judgment dated 16.06.2010, passed in OP No.28 of 2007 on the file of Court of Senior Civil Judge, Proddatur, (in short, the Trial Court) filed by the petitioner-husband. OP was filed under Section 13(1) of the H.M. Act on the ground of desertion and mental cruelty. 3. Henceforth, parties shall be referred as arrayed in OP. 4. The case of the petitioner (husband) was that the marriage with the respondent had taken place on 17.08.1994 at Sri Ramana Maharshi Asramam, Tadipatri as per Hindu Rites and customs. They lived happily for six months and thereafter the dispute arose. The wife left the matrimonial home and went to her parents house against the wish and will of the husband. Later on panchayat was held but again they started living together. A son and a daughter namely Pavan Sai and Aparna respectively were born. After the birth of the daughter on 21.12.2000, the wife again left the company of the husband with her gold ornaments. On 01.01.2002. The husband was transferred to Proddatur from Simhadripuram on 11.06.2002, the wife and her parents kidnapped the petitioner. A police complaint was lodged in Muddanur P.S. against them. Again a panchayat was held in the presence of the prominent persons where the matter was settled and the wife agreed to divorce on payment of a sum of Rs.50,000/- but the said amount was not received. The case of the petitioner husband, was that there was desertion by the wife without any cause and also causing mental cruelty. 5. The respondent wife filed counter. She denied the material averments, which were pleaded for divorce. The Panchayat proceedings were admitted but any settlement in those proceedings was denied. The wife also sent a legal notice dated 18.03.2006 to the husband that she never agreed for mutual divorce. The averments of desertion and mental cruelty were also denied. 6. The learned Trial Court framed the following points for consideration : "1. The Panchayat proceedings were admitted but any settlement in those proceedings was denied. The wife also sent a legal notice dated 18.03.2006 to the husband that she never agreed for mutual divorce. The averments of desertion and mental cruelty were also denied. 6. The learned Trial Court framed the following points for consideration : "1. Whether the petitioner could establish the alleged cruelty caused by the respondent in this case? 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the grant of divorce as prayed for? 3. To what relief?" 7. The petitioner examined himself as PW1 and one S. Sivaganga Bhai as PW2. Exs.A1 and A2 were marked. The wife examined herself as RW1 and one P. Krishna Murthy as RW2. No documentary evidence were marked on her behalf. 8. The learned Trial Court arrived at the finding that the petitioner failed to establish the cruelty against the wife. It observed that the wife was justified in desertion and that the desertion alone would never come under the definition of cruelty and dismissed the petition for divorce by judgment dated 16.06.2010. 9. The present appeal was referred to the Lok Adalat by order dated 17.03.2017. But the matter was not settled on account of the absence of the parties. Thereafter on 09.07.2024 on the joint request of the learned Counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned to next date to enable them to obtain instructions from the respective parties with respect to the possibility of resolution with the process of mediation at Mediation Centre. On 23.07.2024, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no chance for mediation. The parties were not willing for mediation after the process before the Lok Adalat did not succeed. Matter was heard finally and judgment was reserved. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the wife deserted without any reasonable cause. The parties are living separately since 2000. The son is with the petitioner and the daughter is living with the respondent. There are no chances of re-conciliation, re-union or any settlement. He submitted that long separation, even if there may be no desertion amounts to cruelty. The learned Court therefore was not right in not granting the decree of divorce. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance in Dr. Vikas Gupta v. Dr. Rajni Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine Del. 2442 and Charu Chug v. Madhukar Chugh, 2024 SCC OnLine All. He submitted that long separation, even if there may be no desertion amounts to cruelty. The learned Court therefore was not right in not granting the decree of divorce. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance in Dr. Vikas Gupta v. Dr. Rajni Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine Del. 2442 and Charu Chug v. Madhukar Chugh, 2024 SCC OnLine All. 158. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the cruelty was not proved. The finding of the learned Court that there was no cruelty suffered from no infirmity. Desertion was also not proved. The wife had a reasonable cause for living separately from the petitioner for the reason as recorded in the order that the petitioner used to suspect the wife. She also submitted that irretrievable break down is no ground for divorce. 13. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material on record. 14. The following points arise for our consideration and determination : (i) Whether the desertion and cruelty was proved so as to grant the decree of divorce? (ii) Whether the judgment of the learned Trial Court deserves to be set aside? 15. Before proceeding further, we observe that in civil cases, it is settled in law that, the burden of proof is discharged on preponderance of probabilities. In Smt. Roopa Soni v. Kamalnarayan Soni, 2023 SCC Online SC 1127, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held on the question of burden of proof that, in a petition for divorce, it lies on the petitioner. However, the degree of probability is not one beyond reasonable doubt, but is of preponderance of probabilities. 16. In Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur, (2009) 1 SCC 422 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the expression "cruelty" includes both (i) physical cruelty and (ii) mental cruelty. It may be intentional and unintentional. Paras 34, 35, 39 and 43 of Suman Kapur's case (supra), deserve reproduction as under : "34. In Sirajmohmedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan, (1981) 4 SCC 250 = 1981 SCC (Cri.) 829, this Court stated that the concept of legal cruelty changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. It was further stated that to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous cessation of marital intercourse or total indifference on the part of the husband towards marital obligations would lead to legal cruelty. It was further stated that to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous cessation of marital intercourse or total indifference on the part of the husband towards marital obligations would lead to legal cruelty. 35. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 = 1988 SCC (Cri.) 60, this Court examined the concept of cruelty. It was observed that the term "cruelty" has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. It has been used in Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act in the context of human conduct and behaviour in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties or obligations. It is a course of conduct of one spouse which adversely affects the other spouse. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of degree which is relevant. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the other spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. 39. Mental cruelty has also been examined by this Court in Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706 , thus : (SCC Pp.716-17, Para 21) "21. Cruelty for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a) is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other. Unlike the case of physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct evidence. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The inference has to be drawn from the attending facts and circumstances taken cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty it will not be a correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other." 43. Recently, in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 , this Court held : "101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty'. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive. (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental Cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (iv) Mental Cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty". 17. In Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 497, the Hon'ble Apex Court on "cruelty" has held in Paras 18 and 19 as under : "18. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. All the same, the context where it has been used, which is as a ground for dissolution of a marriage would show that it has to 7 Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 be seen as a "human conduct" and "behaviour" in a matrimonial relationship. While dealing in the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 , this Court opined that cruelty can be physical as well as mental : "46...If it is physical, it is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. 18. Cruelty can be even unintentional: "...The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or willful ill-treatment." 19. Intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or willful ill-treatment." 19. Recently, in Roopa Soni's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the word "cruelty" under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the H.M. Act, 1955 has got no fixed meaning, and therefore, gives a very wide discretion to the Court to apply it liberally and contextually. Paras 5 and 6 of Smt. Roopa Soni's case (supra), are as under : "5. The word "cruelty" under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955 has got no fixed meaning, and therefore, gives a very wide discretion to the Court to apply it liberally and contextually. What is cruelty in one case may not be the same for another. As stated, it has to be applied from person to person while taking note of the attending circumstances. 6. In Vishwanath Sitaram Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 , this Court sufficiently sets out : "22. The expression "cruelty" has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status. 25. After so stating, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 = 1988 SCC (Cri.) 60, about the marked change in life in modern times and the sea change in matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been observed that : (SCC P.108, Para 5) "5. ... when a spouse makes a complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance." 26. Their Lordships in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (supra), referred to the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon, 1966 P.62 = (1966) 2 WLR 993 = (1966) 2 All ER 257 (CA), wherein Lord Denning stated, "the categories of cruelty are not closed". It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance." 26. Their Lordships in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (supra), referred to the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon, 1966 P.62 = (1966) 2 WLR 993 = (1966) 2 All ER 257 (CA), wherein Lord Denning stated, "the categories of cruelty are not closed". Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state thus : (Shobha Rani's case (supra), SCC P.109, Paras 5-6) "5. ........... Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty. 6. These preliminary observations are intended to emphasise that the Court in matrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life. The Court has only to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and consider their particular grievance. As Lord Reid observed in Gollins v. Gollins, 1964 AC 644 = (1963) 3 WLR 176 = (1963) 2 All ER 966 (HL), (All ER P.972 G-H) "... In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the reasonable woman). We are dealing with this man or this woman." 32. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 , this Court, after surveying the previous decisions and referring to the concept of cruelty, which includes mental cruelty, in English, American, Canadian and Australian cases, has observed that : (SCC Pp.545-46, Paras 99-100) "99. ... The human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in the other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system. 100. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in the other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system. 100. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system, etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any straitjacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances...." (Emphasis supplied) 20. The parties are living separately for the last about 24 years. It can be reasonably said that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is broken down. As mentioned above, the efforts of conciliation through Lok Adalat failed. The mediation could also not be possible because of the parties unwillingness to go for mediation after such a long time of their living separately. During the period of such separate living also, nothing has been brought on record to show that, any efforts were made by the parties for any kind of reunion, negotiation or settlement. The children have grown up. Son is living with the petitioner and the daughter is living with the respondent. 21. In Rakesh Raman's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the long separation and absence of cohabitation and the complete breakdown of all meaningful bonds and the bitterness between the two has to be read as "cruelty" under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the H.M. Act. 22. In Rakesh Raman's case (supra), the married couples were living separately for last 25 years with multiple Court cases between them, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the continuation of such a marriage would only mean giving sanction to cruelty which each is inflicting on the other. Para 21 of Rakesh Raman's case (supra), reads as under : "21. We have a married couple before us who have barely stayed together as a couple for four years and who have now been living separately for the last 25 years. Para 21 of Rakesh Raman's case (supra), reads as under : "21. We have a married couple before us who have barely stayed together as a couple for four years and who have now been living separately for the last 25 years. There is no child out of the wedlock. The matrimonial bond is completely broken and is beyond repair. We have no doubt that this relationship must end as its continuation is causing cruelty on both the sides. The long separation and absence of cohabitation and the complete breakdown of all meaningful bonds and the existing bitterness between the two, has to be read as cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the 1955 Act. We therefore hold that in a given case, such as the one at hand, where the marital relationship has broken down irretrievably, where there is a long separation and absence of cohabitation (as in the present case for the last 25 years), with multiple Court cases between the parties; then continuation of such a "marriage" would only mean giving sanction to cruelty which each is inflicting on the other. We are also conscious of the fact that a dissolution of this marriage would affect only the two parties as there is no child out of the wedlock." 23. In Roopa Soni's case (supra), the parties were living separately for a decade and half. It was observed that the marriage did not survive any longer, and the relationship was terminated otherwise except by a formal decree of divorce. The status quo continued, awaiting an approval from the Court. 24. In Dr. Vikas Gupta's case (supra), the Delhi High Court referred to the case of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511 and held that a prolonged period of continuous separation could lead to the irreparable breakdown of the matrimonial bond, constituting mental cruelty and cessation or deprivation of cohabitation and conjugal relationships, is an act of extreme cruelty. 25. In Charu Chug's case (supra), where the parties were living separately for last 13 years, the Allahabad High Court observed that itself amounted to cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the H.M. Act. The Allahabad High Court referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Raman's case (supra). 26. 25. In Charu Chug's case (supra), where the parties were living separately for last 13 years, the Allahabad High Court observed that itself amounted to cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the H.M. Act. The Allahabad High Court referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rakesh Raman's case (supra). 26. In the present case also when the divorce petition was filed, parties were living separately. They were away from each other for the last seven years, in the year 2007 itself. 17 more years have passed and they are living separately. In our view, the marriage does not survive, except for a formal decree of divorce. 27. The cause as stated to justify separate living of the wife from the husband, as in Para 9 of the order of the learned Trial Court, in our view cannot be termed as a reasonable cause for separate living for such a long period. Initially, the respondent left matrimonial home in the year 2000. There was some settlement through Panchayat. The parties again started living. Children were born but again the wife left the company on 21.12.2002 and since then they are away from each other. The learned Trial Court has stated the reason that the petitioner used to suspect the character of the wife and observed that, that would be the justified reason for the wife living separately and consequently the desertion was not made out. 28. We have seen the evidence of RW1. In the chief-examination though she stated that the petitioner was suspecting the character, but there is no corroboration of the said evidence of the wife by any other witness. In fact, no other witness was produced by her. The petitioner is the cousin of the mother of the respondent. In the absence of any corroboration, we are of the view that the learned Trial Court was not justified in holding that the petitioner used to suspect the character of the wife and consequently she was justified in her desertion. 29. In view of the aforesaid consideration, we are of the view that the wife deserted the petitioner husband. In the absence of any corroboration, we are of the view that the learned Trial Court was not justified in holding that the petitioner used to suspect the character of the wife and consequently she was justified in her desertion. 29. In view of the aforesaid consideration, we are of the view that the wife deserted the petitioner husband. We also hold that the long separation between the husband and the wife amounted to cruelty as the same has to be read as "cruelty" in the Section 13(1)(i-a) of the H.M Act in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rakesh Raman's case (supra). 30. On Point No.1, we hold that the grounds of desertion and cruelty are established to grant divorce. On Point No.2, we hold that the judgment of the learned Trial Court deserves to be set aside. 31. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed setting aside the order dated 16.06.2010 passed in OP No.28 of 2007 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Proddatur. The case for grant of divorce is made out. The OP No.28 of 2007, is decreed granting the decree of divorce and dissolving the marriage of the appellant and the respondent. 32. No order as to costs. 33. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.