JUDGMENT : S. MANU, J. 1. The Appellant Bank is aggrieved by the judgment dated 4 November 2024 of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 38607/2024. 2. W.P. (C) No. 38607 of 2024 was filed seeking the following prayers: “(I) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the 1st respondent bank to close the loan accounts of the petitioner by allowing him to pay the outstanding amounts in monthly installments. (II) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondent banks not to proceed further under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002 or under any other law against the petitioner. (III) To dispense with the translation of documents from vernacular language to English on the undertaking that the same shall be produced as and when directed by the Hon'ble Court.” 3. The Respondent had availed a Cash Credit Open Loan (CCOL) for an amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- and a term loan under the Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS) for an amount of Rs. 7,80,000/- from the Appellant Bank, by creating an equitable mortgage of 20.25 Ares (50.04 Cents) of land along with his residential building in Survey No. 180/20 A 182 of Mannarkad Village. Since there was default in paying the amounts, the Bank classified the accounts as Non-Performing Assets (NPA) and proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were also initiated. The learned counsel for the Bank submitted that the total outstanding amount is Rs. 51,83,719.18 as on 02.11.2024. 4. The learned Single Judge disposed the writ petition directing the petitioner to pay the upfront amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- on or before 20.11.2024 and the remaining outstanding amount along with future interest, if any, in 12 equal monthly installments. The first installment was directed to be paid on or before 20.12.2024 and the remaining 11 installments on or before 20th day of each succeeding month. Further, the petitioner was directed that in case of failure to make payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- or any subsequent installments as directed above, the bank shall be free to proceed further against the petitioner for realizing the outstanding amount. Further, the petitioner was directed that in case of failure to make payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- or any subsequent installments as directed above, the bank shall be free to proceed further against the petitioner for realizing the outstanding amount. The Bank is deeply aggrieved by the impugned judgment and it contends that the same is opposed to the principles laid down and reaffirmed in a catena of judgments by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 5. In writ petitions under Article 226 pertaining to the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act if reliefs are granted, it would frustrate the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and facilitate bypassing of the adjudicatory mechanism under the Act. Scope of intervention in such cases has been analyzed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in numerous judgments and in unmistakable terms the Apex Court has declared that it is improper for the High Courts to entertain such challenges. 6. We advert to the statement of objects and reasons of the SARFAESI Act also in this context and extract it hereunder: “Statement of Objects and Reasons - The financial sector has been one of the key drivers in India's efforts to achieve success in rapidly developing its economy. While the banking industry in India is progressively complying with the international prudential norms and accounting practices, there are certain areas in which the banking and financial sector do not have a level playing field as compared to other participants in the financial markets in the world. There is no legal provision for facilitating securitisation of financial assets of banks and financial institutions. Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have power to take possession of securities and sell them. Our existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions has not kept pace with the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. This has resulted in slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimham Committee I and II and Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of examining banking sector reforms have considered the need for changes in the legal system in respect of these areas. These Committees, inter alia, have suggested enactment of a new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and to sell them without the intervention of the court. These Committees, inter alia, have suggested enactment of a new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and to sell them without the intervention of the court. Acting on these suggestions, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Ordinance, 2002 was promulgated on the 21st June, 2002 to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The provisions of the Ordinance would enable banks and financial institutions to realise long-term assets, manage problem of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery by exercising powers to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. The purpose of enacting the special legislation is abundantly clear from the statement of objects and reasons. The SARFAESI Act provides for a special mechanism of adjudication of disputes before the Debt Recovery Tribunal as also the appellate forum. When the special legislation puts in place a special scheme of adjudication of disputes, can the intention of the legislature be defeated by passing orders in exercise of the writ jurisdiction is an issue. Answer can be only in the negative as otherwise the court will be facilitating bypassing of the statutory scheme. 8. The Hon'ble Apex Court has recurrently deprecated the practice of High Courts entertaining writ petitions challenging proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and granting reliefs. We deem it appropriate to refer to some of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard. 9. We refer to the following observations of the Apex Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this Rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy Under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the Rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the Rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a Rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed Under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the Petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/ instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order. ............................................. 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 10. In Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 626 it was held thus: “33. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the writ court as also the appellate court were justified in dismissing the appellant's writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative statutory remedy of filing an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act before the Tribunal concerned to challenge the action of PNB in forfeiting the appellant's deposit under Rule 9(5). We find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment [Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, 2016 SCC Online Del 3004 : (2016) 230 DLT 218 ] of the High Court.” 11. In South Indian Bank Ltd. and Ors v. Naveen Mathew Philip and Ors. 2023 SCC Online SC 435 it was held thus: “18. We find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment [Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, 2016 SCC Online Del 3004 : (2016) 230 DLT 218 ] of the High Court.” 11. In South Indian Bank Ltd. and Ors v. Naveen Mathew Philip and Ors. 2023 SCC Online SC 435 it was held thus: “18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.” 12. In G. Vikram Kumar v. State Bank of Hyderabad, 2023 SCC Online SC 549 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus: “21............................................. Therefore, in view of the availability of the alternative statutory remedy available by way of proceedings/appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in which the e-auction notice was under challenge.......” 13. In Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd. (2024) 2 SCC 1 it was held thus: “101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon, it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.” 14. It is further to be noted that of late, in PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, (2024) 6 SCC 579 it was held that: “23. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. It has been held that, though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are of widest amplitude, still the courts cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court. The Court further held that though the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 15. In the light of the judgments noted above, it is abundantly clear that in writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court will not be justified in interfering with proceedings initiated under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Keeping in mind the principles as pointed out above, we are of the considered opinion that the writ petition ought not to have been entertained. 16. Writ Appeal is therefore allowed. The impugned judgment dated 4 November 2024 in W.P. (C) No. 38607/2024 of the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside.