JUDGMENT Manish Kumar, J. Heard learned counsel for petitioner as well as Shri. Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State Counsel. 2. The present writ petition has been preferred with the following main prayers:- "(i) A writ order or direction in the nature of CERTIORARI thereby quashing the impugned order dated 06.03.2024 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation Bahraich and also quash the order dated 17.10.2017 passed by the opp. Party No.1 in revision No.706/2017530815000022 (Jhhabbu Lal v. Shiv Parsan and others) and also against and order dated 23.10.2000 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation Bahriach in Revision No. 430-T/64 under Section 48 of U.P.C.H. Act and also quash the order dated 4.02.1993 passed by the Consolidation Officer Bahraich in case No.449 under Section 9A(2) of U.P.C.H. Act. (ii) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS thereby commanding opposite parties not to disturb the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the land in dispute.'' 3. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that when the village had come under consolidation, Jhabbu Lal i.e. father of respondent no. 4 filed an objection under Section 9A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 with regard to Gata no. 226 for his co-tenancy right on the said gata and opposing the co-tenancy rights of Shivparsan. The objection of Jhabu Lal i.e. father of respondent no. 4 was rejected, against which Jhabu lal preferred an appeal on 30.05.1994. During the pendency of appeal, Shivparsan had executed a registered sale deed on 18.04.1997 in favour of petitioner for Gata no. 226 and since then, the petitioner was in possession of the said land. 4. It is further submitted that the appeal was decided on 23.10.2000 and in the appeal no interim order was granted in favour of Jhabbu Lal for staying the order passed by the Consolidation Officer while rejecting the objection under Section 9A(2), hence the property was in the name of Shivparsan when it was purchased by the petitioner. 5. 4. It is further submitted that the appeal was decided on 23.10.2000 and in the appeal no interim order was granted in favour of Jhabbu Lal for staying the order passed by the Consolidation Officer while rejecting the objection under Section 9A(2), hence the property was in the name of Shivparsan when it was purchased by the petitioner. 5. It is further submitted that the petitioner had no knowledge about the pendency of the appeal and the revision and when he had come to know about the same, the petitioner had filed a recall application dated 27.05.2022 for recalling the order dated 23.10.2000 and 17.10.2017 passed by the Revisional Court along with the delay condonation application and the Revisional Court had rejected the recall application of the petitioner for recalling the order dated 23.10.2000 & 17.10.2017 with a finding that the Revisional Court has no jurisdiction or power to review its own order. 6. It is further submitted that the petitioner is the affected, necessary and proper party who had to be heard prior to the passing of any order regarding Gata No. 226, which he had purchased by a registered sale deed on 18.06.1997. 7. On the other hand, learned State Counsel as well as Shri. M.A Siddiqui, learned counsel for respondent no. 4 have submitted that the petitioner had purchased the said property from Shivparsan. during the pendency of the revision filed against the appellate order dated 06.05.1994 and the petitioner has no claim as per section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the records of the case, it is not disputed between the parties i.e. the petitioner and the respondent no. 4 that the property (Gata no. 226) was purchased by the petitioner by a registered sale deed dated 18.06.1997, executed by Shivparsan. The said sale deed executed by Shivparsan on 18.06.1997 was during the pendency of the revision preferred by Jhabbu Lal i.e. father of respondent no. 4, which is against the law as per section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. For convenience, section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is quoted hereinbelow: "52. The said sale deed executed by Shivparsan on 18.06.1997 was during the pendency of the revision preferred by Jhabbu Lal i.e. father of respondent no. 4, which is against the law as per section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. For convenience, section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is quoted hereinbelow: "52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto:- During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force." 9. From the perusal of Section 52 of the Act, 1882 along with its explanation, the position which emerges out is that during the pendency, a suit or proceedings are pending in any court in which any right of immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the said property cannot be transferred and the learned counsel for petitioner has failed to dispute this fact that in the revision, Gata No. 226 was directly and specifically the subject matter of the revision. The submission of learned counsel for petitioner that at the time of purchase of the property by registered sale deed from late Shivparsan, no adverse order against him was in existence nor any interim order was passed in the revision preferred by Jhabbu Lal. The submission of learned counsel for petitioner that at the time of purchase of the property by registered sale deed from late Shivparsan, no adverse order against him was in existence nor any interim order was passed in the revision preferred by Jhabbu Lal. The said submission is also not tenable in the eyes of law for the reason that Section 52 does not distinguish on the ground that if there is no interim order, the property can be transferred. Rather, explanation to Section 52 shows that the suit or proceedings shall be deemed to have been initiated from the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceedings in a Court of competent jurisdiction and shall continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by final decree and order. 10. In view of the facts, circumstances and discussion made hereinabove, the present writ petition is devoid of merit hence dismissed.