JUDGMENT : G. NARENDAR, J : Heard the learned Standing Counsel for the appellants and the learned Counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner. 2. The short point that arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether in a case of an enquiry being vitiated by non-observance with the principles of natural justice or denial of opportunity of being heard, the High Court is entitled to absolutely quash the proceedings? 3. The brief facts are that the respondent was visited with a show-cause notice alleging certain misconduct. The merits of which this Court is not delving into in view of the short point on which the appeal is sought to be addressed. 4. The respondent effected his reply to the show-cause notice. The appellants, without directing the conduct of an enquiry, straightaway proceeded to impose the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. Aggrieved by the order, dated 26.11.2004, imposing the penalty, the writ petition came to be preferred in the year 2012 i.e., almost after the lapse of eight years. The said writ petition ultimately came to be considered and disposed of by the learned Single Judge, by order, dated 26.04.2024. While disposing of the writ petition and quashing the punishment imposed, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the ruling rendered in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 504. The learned Single Judge has been pleased to hold that imposition of the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect amounts to a major punishment and that imposition of major punishment without an enquiry amounts to non-observance with the principles of natural justice and the same vitiates the punishment imposed and holding that no major penalty can be imposed without conducting a detailed enquiry, was pleased to quash the punishment imposed and was pleased to allow the writ petition. 5. The law in this regard is no more res integra. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the ruling rendered in Inspector of Panchayats and District Collector, Salem v. S. Arichandran, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1282, has been pleased to observe and hold in Paras 14, 15 and 16 as under : . 5. The law in this regard is no more res integra. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the ruling rendered in Inspector of Panchayats and District Collector, Salem v. S. Arichandran, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1282, has been pleased to observe and hold in Paras 14, 15 and 16 as under : . At the outset, it is required to be noted that the learned Single Judge has set aside the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority on the ground that the same was in breach of principles of Natural Justice, inasmuch as, the copy of the Inquiry Officer's Report was not furnished to the delinquent and his comments were not called for on the Inquiry Officer's Report. It is to be noted that the respondent-delinquent was facing the departmental inquiry with respect to a very serious charge of misappropriation. Therefore, the High Court ought to have remitted the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct the inquiry from the point that it stood vitiated. 15. At this stage, a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Rajit Singh, (2022) 15 SCC 254 , in which this Court had considered its earlier decision in the case of L.I.C. v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 = (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 608, is required to be referred to. In Paragraph 15, it is observed and held as under : "15. It appears from the order passed by the Tribunal that the Tribunal also observed that the enquiry proceedings were against the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the documents mentioned in the charge-sheet were not at all supplied to the delinquent officer. As per the settled proposition of law, in a case where it is found that the enquiry is not conducted properly and/or the same is in violation of the principles of natural justice, in that case, the Court cannot reinstate the employee as such and the matter is to be remanded to the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority to proceed further with the enquiry from the stage of violation of principles of natural justice is noticed and the enquiry has to be proceeded further after furnishing the necessary documents mentioned in the charge-sheet, which are alleged to have not been given to the delinquent officer in the instant case. In the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 = (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 608, which was also pressed into service on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, it is observed in Paragraph 16 as under :-- "16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to the Disciplinary Authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 ; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls, (2002) 10 SCC 293 ; U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, (2005) 8 SCC 264 and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu, (2008) 12 SCC 30 )." 16. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and as the order of dismissal has been set aside on the ground that the same was in breach of principles of Natural Justice, the High Court ought to have remitted the case concerned to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct the inquiry from the point that it stood vitiated and to conclude the same after furnishing a copy of the Inquiry Report to the delinquent and to give opportunity to the delinquent to submit his comments on the Inquiry Officer's Report." 6. In S. Arichandran's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to place reliance on the law enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in L.I.C. v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 = (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 608. Para 18 of the said judgment reads as under : . The Court/Tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the Court/Tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the Court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. In the event that the Court/Tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the Court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question have to be examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the Court must take into consideration all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 179 = (1987) 3 ATC 319 = AIR 1987 SC 943 ; State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 (Supp.) SCC 738 = 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 = (1991) 16 ATC 514 = AIR 1990 SC 1308 ; Union of India v. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 180 = 1995 SCC (L&S) 374 = (1995) 29 ATC 145 ; Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157 = 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 = (1996) 33 ATC 745 ; State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 = 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 = AIR 1998 SC 1833 ; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88 = 2006 SCC (L&S) 919 = AIR 2006 SC 3475 ; Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 = (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304 and Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565 = (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 121 = AIR 2012 SC 2250 )." and the law stood affirmed by it in State of U.P. v. Rajit Singh, (2022) 15 SCC 254 , Paras 12 to 14 of the said judgment read as under : "12. In LIC v. A. Masilamani [LIC v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 = (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 608], which was also pressed into service on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, it is observed in Para 16 as under : (SCC P.536) "16. In LIC v. A. Masilamani [LIC v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 = (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 608], which was also pressed into service on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, it is observed in Para 16 as under : (SCC P.536) "16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide ECIL v. B. Karunakar [ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 = 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184]; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls [Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls, (2002) 10 SCC 293 = 2003 SCC (L&S) 1033]; U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey [U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, (2005) 8 SCC 264 = 2006 SCC (L&S) 78] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu [Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu, (2008) 12 SCC 30 = (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 126].)" 13. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that when the aforesaid submission and the aforesaid decision was pressed into service, the High Court has not considered the same on the ground that the other officers involved in respect of the same incident are exonerated and/or no action is taken against them. Applying the law laid down in A. Masilamani [LIC v. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 = (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 608], to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal as well as the High Court ought to have remanded the matter to the disciplinary authority to conduct the enquiry from the stage it stood vitiated. Therefore, the order passed by the High Court in not allowing further proceedings from the stage it stood vitiated i.e., after the issuance of the charge-sheet, is unsustainable. 14. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, the findings recorded by the Tribunal as well as the High Court quashing and setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority by applying the doctrine of equality is hereby quashed and set aside. 14. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, the findings recorded by the Tribunal as well as the High Court quashing and setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority by applying the doctrine of equality is hereby quashed and set aside. However, as the enquiry is found to be vitiated and is found to be in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it is alleged that the relevant documents mentioned in the charge-sheet were not supplied to the delinquent officer, we remand the matter to the disciplinary authority to conduct a fresh enquiry from the stage it stood vitiated i.e., after the issuance of the charge-sheet and to proceed further with the enquiry after furnishing all the necessary documents mentioned in the charge-sheet and after following due principles of natural justice. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of six months from today." 7. In Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra), it was a charge that originated in 1976 and the matter came up before the Hon'ble Apex Court in 1991 and the Hon'ble Apex Court, taking note of the long passage of time, deemed it not appropriate to consider remitting the matter back. The law in this regard has now been clearly set out as noted hereinabove. The delay cannot be attributed to the appellants. In fact, the initial delay of eight years is due to the respondent himself. The respondent has squatted on his rights for eight long years and thereafter approached this Court and to compound matters, has allowed the writ petition, belatedly filed, to lie idle for another dozen years. 8. The delay cannot be attributed to the appellants. In fact, the initial delay of eight years is due to the respondent himself. The respondent has squatted on his rights for eight long years and thereafter approached this Court and to compound matters, has allowed the writ petition, belatedly filed, to lie idle for another dozen years. 8. In that view, we deem it appropriate to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority subject to : The disciplinary authority shall appoint an Enquiry Officer within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment; (ii) The Enquiry Officer shall complete the enquiry and submit his report and the disciplinary authority shall issue show-cause notice and complete the process of imposition of punishment within six months thereafter; (iii) The respondent/writ petitioner shall not seek any adjournment and shall participate in the enquiry either physically or virtually on all dates of hearing; (iv) In the event the respondent fails to participate in the enquiry without sufficient cause, then the time stipulated will not be binding on the appellants; (v) In the event, the enquiry is not completed by the appellants within the stipulated time, the appellants shall release 50% of the retiral benefits in favour of the respondent/writ petitioner and if the enquiry is not completed within a further period of six months, and for no fault of the respondent, the entire retiral benefits shall be released in favour of the respondent/writ petitioner. In the event of such an eventuality, the appellants shall identify the persons responsible for the delay and initiate disciplinary proceedings against such persons, who have been delinquent in complying with the above directions issued by this Court. 9. The order, dated 26.04.2024, passed in WP No.33996 of 2012, is set aside. 10. The writ appeal stands allowed in part, in the above terms. No order as to costs. 11. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.