JUDGMENT : Apurba Sinha Ray, J. 1. The instant application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by one of the sons of one of the decree-holder alleging that the compromise decree passed by the Hon’ble Court is a nullity since the same was obtained by the parties to the said decree on misrepresentation and also on the basis of suppression of material facts. The brief fact as the petitioner has narrated is as follows:- i. Three sons of the deceased Ramesh Chandra Bhattacharjee claimed 1/3rd share each in all the properties of their father in the partition suit as per Will dated 15.09.1965 which was duly probated on 16.04.1993. The deceased Ramesh Chandra Bhattacharyya had appointed his three sons as executors and trustees for the management of the two Trusts and the said three sons are also the residuary legatees to 1/3rd equal share of all his properties as set out in paragraph 6 of the Will dated 15.09.1965. ii. On 08.03.2005 the parties represented before the Court that they had amicably agreed to accept 1/3rd equal share and accordingly Learned Commissioner was appointed to demarcate the properties in metes and bounds. iii. On 18.12.2007 the report of the Commissioner was filed and the terms of settlement was signed by the parties and their learned advocates-on-record. iv. On 19.12.2007 the suit was decreed in preliminary form. According to the present petitioner it is evident that the Hon’ble Court did not exercise its mind or undertake the arduous task to verify whether the Terms of Settlement were lawful or not as mandated under order XIII Rule (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, because two of the three parties were advocates of the Hon’ble Court and one of whom was the senior advocate of this court. v. Admittedly, the original parties to the suit filed several applications before the Execution Court, including application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The said applications were disposed of but the disputes remained unresolved in respect of the property at 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata, the dwelling house of the parties. vi. The original parties to the partition suit died and their legal heirs were brought on record. 2. The learned counsel Mrs. Mookherjee appearing for the petitioner, Mr. The said applications were disposed of but the disputes remained unresolved in respect of the property at 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata, the dwelling house of the parties. vi. The original parties to the partition suit died and their legal heirs were brought on record. 2. The learned counsel Mrs. Mookherjee appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Prasun Bhattacharya has argued that the alleged fraud was not unnoticed by the Hon’ble Suit Court since at that time defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 were practicing advocates of high repute and the latter being a designated senior advocate. The Hon’ble Court acted in absolute trust and faith cast upon the parties and decreed the suit on compromise without applying its mind to the mandate under order XIII Rule (3) of the Code i.e. to satisfy itself as regards the lawful before recording a compromise. 3. By the judgment dated 02.03.2023, passed in Execution Case no. 171 of 2014, the parties were directed to, inter alia, execute and register a deed of conveyance, in respect of the south west tenanted portion of the property at 88/2 Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata. According to the learned counsel, being a practicing chartered accountant, the applicant was surprised at such direction and to the best of his knowledge a family settlement requires to be registered and not the individual apportionment of the properties as per terms. Since 2005, the father of the applicant and upon his demise on 15.03.2019 the second son i.e. the defendant no. 1(b), an advocate of this Hon’ble Court, was conducting the case, the applicant did not involve himself in the nitty gritty of the case at any stage. On receipt of the copy of the judgment dated 02.03.2023 the applicant for the first time apprised himself with the details of the case. The applicant was further intrigued to note that direction to register the specific south west tenanted portion of 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata was not a part of the original judgment dated 02.03.2023. It was the outcome of the act of the plaintiffs’ legal heirs seeking modification of the said judgment dated 29.04.2023. 4. The applicant was further intrigued to note that direction to register the specific south west tenanted portion of 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata was not a part of the original judgment dated 02.03.2023. It was the outcome of the act of the plaintiffs’ legal heirs seeking modification of the said judgment dated 29.04.2023. 4. According to the learned counsel of the petitioner misappropriation of the Terms of Will was done by not disclosing that the south west tenanted portion of 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata had been allocated to a trust namely, “Jyotish Samrat Trust Estate” and for the purpose of housing the “All India Astrological and Astronomical Society”. Clause 2 & 3 of the Will and the sub clause therein made exhaustive provisions, creating annuities in favour of students of Sanskrit College and directed construction of a floor on the roof of the south west tenanted portion at 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata for housing the “All India Astrological and Astronomical Society”. Non-disclosure of existence of “Jyotish Samrat Trust Estate” in the south west portion of 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata was nothing but fraud committed upon the Hon’ble Suit Court. 5. The three sons of the testator had breached the trust and faith reposed upon them by their father. The Hon’ble Suit Court was also taken for granted and the trust and faith of the Hon’ble Suit Court on its officers had also been breached by the original plaintiff and defendants including the father of the present applicant. Accordingly, this application was filed by the present applicant being guided by his own conscience and sentiments that the said compromise decree should be set aside and no effect should be given to such decree since fraud vitiates all judicial acts, whether ecclesiastical or temporal. It is a well settled principle of law that judgment and order obtained from the court of law by playing fraud upon it is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. In this regard the following judgments have been referred to by the learned counsel of the petitioner:- (i) 2023 SCC OnLine 1395: Pradeep Mehra vs Harijivan J. Jethwa [since deceased) by his legal heirs (Para 9,10,11,12, 14) (ii) 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 621 : [2023] 2 AIR BOM R 25 [Manoj Kumar Omprakash Dalmia vs. Omprakash Dalmia & Ors. In this regard the following judgments have been referred to by the learned counsel of the petitioner:- (i) 2023 SCC OnLine 1395: Pradeep Mehra vs Harijivan J. Jethwa [since deceased) by his legal heirs (Para 9,10,11,12, 14) (ii) 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 621 : [2023] 2 AIR BOM R 25 [Manoj Kumar Omprakash Dalmia vs. Omprakash Dalmia & Ors. {Page 11 paragraphs 48 onwards.} (iii) 2015 SCC OnLine All 4980 [Kishan Lal Barwa vs Sharda Saharan & Another] [Para 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 & 18,] (iv) [2007] 4 SCC 221 [A.V. Papayya Sastry & Ors vs. Govt. of A.P & Ors. {Head Note A & B, para 22, 26 & 39} (v) [1994] 1 SCC 1 [ S.P. Chegalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagganath [dead] by legal heirs & Ors. {Para 5&6} 6. When the petitioner examined the Terms of Settlement and the WILL to justify the direction sought for by the Plaintiffs seeking modification of the judgment dated 02.03.2023 for direction upon the Defendants No. 1[a], [b] & [c] to execute a Deed of conveyance in respect of the South West tenanted portion of the property at 88/2 Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata, the FRAUD was discovered. Therefore, the present application being GA 8 of 2023 is not barred under the law of limitation. The following judgments have been cited:- (i) 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 621 : [2023] 2 AIR BOM R 25 [Manoj Kumar Omprakash Dalmia vs. Omprakash Dalmia & Ors [Page 13 quotes 'Para 13 of Tribeni Mishra vs. Ram Pujan Mishra] (ii) 2015 SCC OnLine All 4980 [Kishan Lal Barwa vs Sharda Saharan & Another] [para 15] 7. It is also argued by Mrs. Mookherjee that there is no estoppel against fraud. The principle of Res judicata will not be a defence against fraud, which can be set up at any time at any stage of the proceedings. She has relied upon the following decisions. (i) 2023 SCC OnLine 1395: Pradeep Mehra vs Harijivan J. Jethwa (since deceased) by his legal heirs (Para 9,10,11,12, 14) (ii) 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 621:[2023] 2 AIR BOM R 25 [Manoj Kumar Omprakash Dalmia vs. Omprakash Dalmia & Ors. (iii) Page 14 to page quotes 'Case of Bishnunath Tewari vs. Mst. She has relied upon the following decisions. (i) 2023 SCC OnLine 1395: Pradeep Mehra vs Harijivan J. Jethwa (since deceased) by his legal heirs (Para 9,10,11,12, 14) (ii) 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 621:[2023] 2 AIR BOM R 25 [Manoj Kumar Omprakash Dalmia vs. Omprakash Dalmia & Ors. (iii) Page 14 to page quotes 'Case of Bishnunath Tewari vs. Mst. Mirchi] [Case of Khirod Chandra Mohanty vs Banshidhar Khatua] [Page 21 quotes 'American Jurisprudence', case of Paranpe Vs Kanade] (iv) 2015 SCC OnLine All 4980 [Kishan Lal Barwa vs. Sharda Saharan & Ors.] (Para 15 [ii] page 8 Quotes Khirod Chand Mohanty, para 18) 8. According to Mrs. Mookherjee, a family settlement is not required to be registered, if only the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing; only such property or portion of the property which is outside the sphere of the family arrangement, requires to be registered. 9. The South West tenanted Portion did not belong to the Testator [Ref: clause 6 and 10 of the WILL] It could not be a part of the family settlement. The testator did not bequeath the same to his legal heirs, i.e. the original parties to the suit. Hence the requirement for execution of Deed of Conveyance in respect of the same was sought for by way of seeking an innocuous order for modification of the judgment dated 02.03.2023. In this regard, she has placed reliance on the following judicial decisions:- Ref: [1976] 3 SCC 119 [Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.] [2020] 9 SCC 706: Ravindra Kaur Grewal & Ors. vs. Manjit Kaur & Ors. (1st, & 2nd. Head Notes) 10. The learned counsel has drawn the attention of this court to Order XXIII Rule (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which contemplates recording of a Compromise by the court can only be done if the court satisfies itself as to the lawfulness of the agreement. 11. In the instant case the Court proceeded to blindly record the Compromise without much ado. Terms of Settlement recorded on 18.12.2007 was reduced to a Compromise Decree on 19.12.2007, which in itself evidences total non application of mind and also the mandate under Order XXIII Rule (3) of the Code. 12. 11. In the instant case the Court proceeded to blindly record the Compromise without much ado. Terms of Settlement recorded on 18.12.2007 was reduced to a Compromise Decree on 19.12.2007, which in itself evidences total non application of mind and also the mandate under Order XXIII Rule (3) of the Code. 12. Parties to the original suit claiming their right, legacy from the WILL, as legal heirs of their father Late Ramesh Chandra Bhattacharyya, played most fraudulently with the faith and trust reposed in the parties, the Plaintiff and Defendant no. [1], in their individual capacity being Advocates of Repute. In fact the original Defendant no. 2 was a Designated Senior Advocate who was regularly practicing not only at the High Court at Calcutta but also at Bombay and Supreme Court of India. Para 4[1] of Affidavit-in-Opposition of defendants no. 2(a), (b) & (c) has been referred to. Reference [2020] 6 SCC 629: Triloki Nath Singh vs. Anirudh Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. 13. The learned counsel Mr. Deep Narayan Mukherjee appearing for the plaintiff/decree holder has submitted that in terms of the relevant final decree, the original plaintiff (Sukumar Bhattacharyya) became the sole and absolute owner of Premises No. 88/2A/1, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road formerly (Lot A of Premises No. 88/2A, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata-700013) being a scheduled property, whereas Lot B & C were allotted to the original defendant nos. 1 & 2 (Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya and Sunil Kumar Bhattacharyya, since deceased, respectively.) The original plaintiff Sukumar Bhattacharyya made over a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-(Ten Lakhs) in favour of Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya in accordance with the terms of the settlements for obtaining the south-west tenanted portion of the said premises by way of cheque, which was duly encashed by Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya. The original plaintiff Sukumar Bhattacharyya also made over a sum of Rs.67,883/- in favour of Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya for purchasing Ghum and Kurseong properties. The said Sukumar Bhattacharyya had also paid a sum to the tune of Rs.1,86,611/- to the said Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya, the father of the present petitioner being defendant no. 1(a), as owelty money for construction of kitchen, stair case, toilet and underground water reservoir in Lot B as per the terms of settlement which culminated into a consent decree passed by the Hon’ble Court on 19.12.2007. 14. 1(a), as owelty money for construction of kitchen, stair case, toilet and underground water reservoir in Lot B as per the terms of settlement which culminated into a consent decree passed by the Hon’ble Court on 19.12.2007. 14. After the final decree having been passed, Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya filed an application being G.A. No. 1361 of 2008 for appointment of receiver and/or special officer to obtain sanction to building plan in respect of Premises No. 88/2A, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road (formerly Lot B of 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road), Kolkata700013 and in the said application Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya also prayed for an order of injunction against the original plaintiff, Sukumar Bhattacharyya and the original defendant no. 2, Sunil Kumar Bhattacharyya so that no construction work could be carried out by the said original plaintiff and the original defendant no. 2 in their respective lots. It is also submitted on behalf of the plaintiff/decree holder that in June, 2009 the original defendant no. 1 i.e. Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya filed another application being G.A. no. 1493 of 2009 praying for, inter alia, recalling of the order and decree dated 19.12.2007 on the basis of the terms of settlement and to restore the suit in its file. The said application along with the prayer for interim order was refused on several occasions. Finally, the said application for setting aside the consent decree being G.A. No. 1493 of 2009 came up for hearing before the Hon’ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee (as His Lordship then was). On 11.01.2010 when His Lordship was pleased to observe that the opinion of Kolkata Municipal Corporation is necessary for determining the issue whether the staircase and other proposed construction as mentioned in paragraph C thereafter can be made to make Lot B of 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata 700013 habitable. 15. On 27th August, 2010 the Hon’ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee while deciding G.A. No. 1493 of 2009 and G.A. No. 1361 of 2008 directed the original defendant no. 1, Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya to make an application before the Kolkata Municipal Corporation for sanction of the building plan relating to the construction of proposed Lot B. 16. On 14.09.2010 a review application against the said order was filed but the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Court. 17. 1, Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya to make an application before the Kolkata Municipal Corporation for sanction of the building plan relating to the construction of proposed Lot B. 16. On 14.09.2010 a review application against the said order was filed but the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Court. 17. On 2nd February, 2011 an appeal being A.P.O. No. 423 of 2010 has been preferred against the order dated 14.09.2010 when the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court was pleased to direct the original defendant no. 1 Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya to submit an application for mutation of his allotted Lot in terms of the consent decree before the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 18. On 7th March, 2011 Hon’ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee was pleased to dispose of G.A. No. 1361 of 2008 and also G.A. No. 1493 of 2009 in view of the appeal Court’s order dated 2nd February, 2011. On 21st March, 2011, the order dated 07.03.2011 was challenged in A.P.O.T No. 106 of 2011 and the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court was pleased to dismiss the said appeal without interfering with the order dated 07.03.2011. 19. It is also pointed out that on 10.12.2012 the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court was pleased to dismiss the A.P.O. No. 423 of 2010 filed by the original defendant no. 1, Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya holding, inter alia, that the order dated 07.03.2011 dismissing G.A. No. 1493 of 2009 filed for setting aside the compromise decree dated 19.12.2007 puts at rest the question of setting aside the consent decree and therefore, the same question does not arise further. It has also been observed in the order dated 10.12.2012 that the original defendant no. 1, Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya filed two contrary applications, one seeking implementation of the consent decree and the other was for setting aside the compromise decree and therefore, the original defendant no. 1 had taken a dual stand. The Hon’ble Division Bench by order dated 10.12.2012 dismissed the A.P.O. No. 423 of 2010 after holding that the question as to whether the compromise decree is unlawful or cannot be reopened and in view of such observation the present defendant no. 1(a), Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya, the eldest son of Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya since deceased, is estopped from challenging the consent decree on the ground that the same is unlawful. 1(a), Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya, the eldest son of Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya since deceased, is estopped from challenging the consent decree on the ground that the same is unlawful. The learned counsel for the decree holder has further submitted that in April, 2014 the original plaintiff Sukumar Bhattacharyya filed the instant execution application being no. E.C. 171 of 2014 before the Hon’ble Court for execution of the consent decree dated 19.12.2007 in respect of his portion at 88/2A/1 Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata -700013 and also in respect of other properties mentioned in the tabular statement of the instant execution application. On 16th November, 2015 an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed by the original defendant no. 1, Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya alleging, inter alia, that the consent decree is not a final decree but a preliminary decree. By an order dated 16.11.2015, this executing Court dismissed the said first application filed under Section 47 of the Code and no appeal has been preferred from the said order. Thus, the same subject has become final and binding on the heirs of deceased defendant no. 1. According to the learned counsel of decree holder the substituted defendant no. 1 series is estopped from filing subsequent applications which is a clear bar under Explanation VII of the Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Even entertaining the application by the Executing Court shall be a gross violation of the trite law mentioned in Explanation VII of the Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Executing Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this application and hence any order passed in this application will be nullity. On 2nd March, 2023 after being satisfied, the Executing Court of this Hon’ble court directed the substituted defendant nos. 1(a) to 1(c) (legal heirs and successors of the original defendant no. 1, Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya) to satisfy the prayers (a) and (b) appearing in column no. 10 of the tabular statements filed in the execution case being no. E.C. 171 of 2014. An appeal has been preferred by the substituted defendant no. 1(B) Pratik Bhattacharyya (who has been appearing in person before this Court) and while deciding the appeal being A.P.O.T No. 78 of 2023 the Hon’ble Division Bench categorically observed that where there is a lawful final decree, the substituted defendant no. E.C. 171 of 2014. An appeal has been preferred by the substituted defendant no. 1(B) Pratik Bhattacharyya (who has been appearing in person before this Court) and while deciding the appeal being A.P.O.T No. 78 of 2023 the Hon’ble Division Bench categorically observed that where there is a lawful final decree, the substituted defendant no. 1 series i.e. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) are categorically restrained by the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure from raising any objection in respect of the decree, particularly when the same has been confirmed by another Division Bench of this Hon’ble High Court in an earlier appeal being A.P.O. No. 423 of 2010 filed by the original defendant no. 1. It is also observed that the decree passed in respect of the premises in question (88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata -700013) is lawful and hence directed the Kolkata Municipal Corporation to provide separate premises numbers to the substituted plaintiff, the defendant no. 1 series and accordingly the original premises being 88/2A Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road has already been provided with three separate premises nos. the holding no. 88/2A/1 Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road (formerly Lot A of the said premises has been allotted to the substituted plaintiff) whereas 88/2A/2 of the premises is allotted to defendant nos. 2(a) to 2(c) and, as requested by Mr. Pratik Kumar Bhattacharyya, the substituted defendant no. 1(b), the KMC authority was directed to provide the original premises no. i.e. 88/2A, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Kolkata to the substituted defendant nos. 1(a) to 1(c). Hence after accepting the proposal in respect of the premises nos. to be allotted to the substituted defendant no. 1 series, they are now estopped from challenging the decree in any manner before this Executing Court. 20. The learned counsel Mr. Deep Narayan Mukherjee submits that the question whether or not the compromise decree was an unlawful agreement or not, must be urged before the court which passed the said decree and not before the Executing Court. It is for the court which passed the consent decree to decide the unlawfulness of the consent decree and the Executing Court cannot decide the legality and validity of the decree in successive application under Section 47 of the Code. In this regard the plaintiff relies on Banwari Lal vs. Chando Devi and Another (1993) 1 SCC 581 . 21. It is for the court which passed the consent decree to decide the unlawfulness of the consent decree and the Executing Court cannot decide the legality and validity of the decree in successive application under Section 47 of the Code. In this regard the plaintiff relies on Banwari Lal vs. Chando Devi and Another (1993) 1 SCC 581 . 21. The learned counsel of the decree holder/plaintiff has further relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1977 Mad 402 (Paras 7 and 8 at page 121) Govindarajan and Ors. vs. K.A.N. Sriniivasa Chetty and Ors. in support of his contention that when a compromise petition is filed under Order XXIII Rule (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure with a request to record the same by the opposite party, the court could not go into the question of fraud or undue influence. The learned counsel has also relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1980 Orissa 108 (paragraph 3 at page 129) Bhaja Govinda Maikap & Anr. vs. Janaki Dei & Ors. to point out that when the parties in a suit entered into a lawful compromise, any objection raised by any of the parties to such compromise, do not authorize the court to refuse to record such compromise. The learned counsel has pointed out that during the lifetime of his father, that is, the original defendant no. 1, the substituted defendant no. 1(a), Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya had put his signature as a witness on a development agreement at the instance of his father in the year 1999 in respect of premises no. 55, Sri Aurobinda Sarani, Kolkata – 700005 which is also arrayed as a trust property in the present application. Thus, the knowledge of the defendant no. 1, Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya runs from the year 1999 and as such the defendant no. 1(a) is estopped by law of limitation from taking such a plea in 2023, that is, after a lapse of about 24 years on the ground of fraud. It is settled principle of law that where there is, according to the learned counsel of the plaintiff/decree holder, no period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 it would be presumed that the limitation would be for 12 years and thus, the defendant no. 1(a) is barred from taking such a plea after 24 years from the date of his knowledge. 22. 1(a) is barred from taking such a plea after 24 years from the date of his knowledge. 22. The learned counsel has further argued that an application under Section 47 was filed by the predecessor-in-interest of substituted defendant no. 1(a) and the same has been dismissed by the Executing Court vide order dated 16.11.2015 and thereafter, no appeal has been preferred against the said order. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Dipali Biswas and Others vs. Nirmalendu Mukherjee and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 869 [paragraph – 37 (i) and (ii)] while deciding the similar aspect as to the provisions of applicability of Section 47 of the Code, has specifically held that the objections cannot be raised in instalments and if such objection is raised in instalments that will be barred by provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 23. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the judicial decision reported in 1970 (3) SCC 440 (paragraph 18) Prem Lata Agarwal vs. Laksman Prasad Gupta & Ors. and submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment categorically stated that when a challenge which was available to the judgment debtor has not been raised at the appropriate time, if the same is raised on a subsequent event by any of the judgment debtor, the same will be barred by the res judicata. In this case, the original defendant no. 1 during his lifetime, never agitated the plea of fraud in his several objections including in the application filed by him during his lifetime under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and hence, the successor-in-interest, defendant nos. 1(a) to (c) who has stepped into the shoes of the original defendant no. 1 is precluded from challenging consent decree on a different footing from his father. 1(a) to (c) who has stepped into the shoes of the original defendant no. 1 is precluded from challenging consent decree on a different footing from his father. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the judicial decision reported in AIR 1977 RAJ 216 (Paras 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 & 12) Smt. Pushpa vs. Ganpat Singh, wherein the Hon’ble Court held that a judgment debtor to whom remedy was available at an earlier stage, fails to raise all his objection to the execution which he might and ought to have raised, all such objections would be due to have been impliedly decided against him and he will be precluded from raising the same objections at a later stage of the same execution proceeding, and, therefore, the defendant nos. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) are estopped by various estoppels including estoppel by deed, estoppel by conduct and by the principles of approbate and reprobate from challenging the decree in any manner whatsoever since their father the original defendant no. 1, had received an owelty money including a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-(ten lakhs) for the specific portion of the relevant premises which has been alleged as a trust property in this present application. The learned counsel has also relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1989 P & H 324 (paragraphs 17, 19 to 27) Gurudev Kaur and Another vs. Mehar Singh and Others in support of his contention that compromise decree does not require registration even if it creates title provided the immovable property of Rs. 100/-or more is the subject matter of the suit. As the application being G.A. No. 8 of 2023 is filed with mala fide intention only to delay the execution proceeding and hence, the defendant nos. 1(a) to 1(c) are debarring the plaintiffs to enjoy the fruits of the decree which has been passed during the lifetime of their father. The instant petition should be dismissed in limini. It is also submitted that a judgment has been passed by this Executing Court on March 2, 2023 whereby directions were given to the substituted defendant nos. 1(a) to 1(c) are debarring the plaintiffs to enjoy the fruits of the decree which has been passed during the lifetime of their father. The instant petition should be dismissed in limini. It is also submitted that a judgment has been passed by this Executing Court on March 2, 2023 whereby directions were given to the substituted defendant nos. 1(a) to 1(c) to execute the respective deed of conveyance and hence, this instant execution case is pending only for implementation of the judgment dated 2nd March, 2023 and for such circumstances the Executing Court has no power to revisit the legality and validity of the consent decree. 24. Learned advocate Mr. Pratik Bhattacharyya, the defendant no. 1(b) appearing in person has submitted that the defendant no. 1(a) has rightly filed this application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 since the order of compromise containing terms and settlement cannot be treated as a final decree. Mr. Bhattacharyyaa has further submitted that the substituted plaintiff/decree-holder did not disclose whether decree has been drawn up or not. The Will was annexed but it was not explained as to why the court passed the order on the face value of the compromise petition. Mr. Bhattacharyya has further submitted that the order of Hon’ble Justice Maharaj Sinha was violated by the departments. The defendant no. 2 (Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya) was shown to be alive. The defendant no. 1(b) i.e. Mr. Pratik Bhattacharyya was not heard before passing the order dated 02.03.2022 and, that is, why the order dated 2nd March, 2022 was challenged before the Hon’ble Division Bench. 25. The defendant no. 1(b) has harped on the point that the order of compromise cannot take the character of a final decree since there is no material which can be shown that such decree has ever been drawn up by the department. It is also pointed out signing of a development agreement as a witness by the defendant no. 1(a), does not mean that the fraud committed upon court can be wiped off by such act of the defendant no. 1(a). 26. The learned counsel appearing for defendant nos. 2(a), (b) and (c), the heirs of Sunil Bhattacharyya, adopted the submission of the learned counsels of the decree-holder. It is alleged that trust was not created and the testator had only a mind to create a trust. 1(a). 26. The learned counsel appearing for defendant nos. 2(a), (b) and (c), the heirs of Sunil Bhattacharyya, adopted the submission of the learned counsels of the decree-holder. It is alleged that trust was not created and the testator had only a mind to create a trust. He did not create a trust even during his lifetime since the testator died long after execution of the Will and in this long period he did not consider to create a trust as envisaged by him. The probate was granted but that was not challenged. Court’s view:- 27. Petitioner i.e. defendant 1(a)’s contention is that the fraud was practiced upon the concerned court to obtain the consent decree dated 19.12.2007 without disclosing that a portion of the suit property belongs to a trust property and cannot be part of the partition suit which was brought between the three brothers and they being senior members of legal fraternity persuaded the court to pass a consent decree of partition in respect of the properties including the present suit property on the basis of such misrepresentation. It is further alleged that though the probated Will separately allowed south west portion of the present suit property to be used for the purpose of a trust, the original plaintiff and his two other brothers i.e. original defendant nos. 1 and 2 proceeded with the said partition suit as if the said property of the trust belonged to their exclusive property after the death of the testator and obtained a partition decree in respect of ancestral properties including the relevant property of the trust without whispering that such property of the trust cannot be the subject matter of a partition suit. It is also argued on the part of the defendant no. 1(a) Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya to the effect that there were several proceedings whereby the said consent decree was tried to be resisted by filing separate petitions including petition under Section 47 of the Code by his father and also by his brother, defendant no. 1(b) Pratik Kumar Bhattacharyya against the said decree. It is further admitted that most of the petitions including a petition under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were dismissed by the concerned courts. 1(b) Pratik Kumar Bhattacharyya against the said decree. It is further admitted that most of the petitions including a petition under Section 47 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were dismissed by the concerned courts. His admission goes to show that Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya had received Rs.10,00,000/- from the original plaintiff and other sums of money in terms of such consent decree. But even, having regard to such fact, his conscience does not allow him to remain mute spectator when he finds that the court was defrauded by all the original plaintiff and the original defendants without disclosing relevant fact that the south west portion of the property belonged to trust property and the same cannot be the subject matter of the relevant partition suit. He found that all his predecessors in connivance with each other had been able to persuade the court to pass a consent partition decree on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation. The conscience of Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya dictates him to point out such serious fraud committed upon the court by his predecessors by bringing present application under Section 47 of the Code before this executing court. His counsel has referred to several judicial decisions where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that fraud and justice cannot dwell together. The plea of fraud can be taken up even at the later stage of the proceeding or even in the co-lateral proceeding and as such the instant executing court is under a duty to adjudicate all the questions relating to execution and resistance etc. of the decree and further, this court should, on the basis of materials available on records, consider as to the commission of fraud upon the court from the side of his predecessors to obtain a fraudulent consent decree. 28. I have considered the judicial decisions cited by the counsel of the petitioners as well as the learned counsels of the decree-holders. 29. In A.V. Papayya Sastry & Ors. Vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors. reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity. A judgment, decree or order so obtained by fraud has to be treated as a nullity by every court, superior or inferior. of A.P. & Ors. reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity. A judgment, decree or order so obtained by fraud has to be treated as a nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in co-lateral proceedings. 30. In Kishan Lal Barwa Vs. Sharda Sharan & Anr. reported in 2015 SCC OnLine All 4980 it has been held that the Executing Court can examine the plea of fraud raised in the proceedings under Section 47 of the Code and further the court should re-consider the objection to the decree after examining the allegation of fraud on merits. In other words, the plea of fraud should be adjudicated on merits. In Triloki Nath Singh Vs. Anirudh Singh reported in (2020) 6 SCC 629 it has been held that merely because the appellant was not a party to the compromise decree will be of no avail of the appellant, much less give him a cause of action to question the validity of compromise decree passed by the High Court by way of a substantive suit before the civil court to declare it as fraudulent, illegal and not binding on him. 31. It is trite law that a judgment/order or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. Such an order, judgment or decree can be challenged in any court at any time and even in co-lateral proceeding. It has been said after quoting the observation of A.V. Papayya Sastry & Ors. (supra) that fraud and justice never dwell together. In S.P. Chengalavaraya Naidu Vs. Jagnanath (dead) By L.R.S & Ors. reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that a fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design to secure something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. In S.P. Chengalavaraya Naidu Vs. Jagnanath (dead) By L.R.S & Ors. reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that a fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design to secure something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. A litigant, who approaches the court to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation, and if he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. 32. In Pradeep Mehera Vs. Hairjivan. J. Jethwa (Since Deceased Thr. Lrs.) reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1395 it has been held that Section 47 of the Code allows the Executing Court to determine whether a relevant decree, in the facts and circumstances of the case, can be executed or not and that has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 33. In the case law of Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Dei & Anr. (1993) 1 SCC 581 cited by the learned counsel of the decree-holder is taken into consideration. In the said case law, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Court that the court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise has to decide the questions whether or not an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on the basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensively, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise ‘which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act..” shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act or the compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. 34. In S.V. Chandra Pandian & Ors. Vs. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Ors. reported in (1993) 1 SCC 589 , disputes arose among the six brothers regarding their partnership business. To resolve these issues, they agreed to arbitration. 34. In S.V. Chandra Pandian & Ors. Vs. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar & Ors. reported in (1993) 1 SCC 589 , disputes arose among the six brothers regarding their partnership business. To resolve these issues, they agreed to arbitration. The arbitrators considered the arguments from all sides, circulated a draft award, and after receiving feedback, issued their final decision on 9th July, 1984. After the award was made, S.V. Chandra Pandian and Others asked the arbitrators to file the award in court, which was done. Subsequently, they requested the court to issue a decree based on the award. However, before the court could decide on this request, S.V. Sivalinga Nadar and S.V. Harikrishnan filed applications under Section 30 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside the award. The Division Bench accepted the appeal and overturned the decision of the Single Judge who held that since the award was not registered, it could not be enforced by the court. A Special Leave Petition was filed in the Supreme Court wherein the main issue was whether the interest of a partner in partnership assets is to be treated as movable property or both movable and immovable depending on the character of the property for the purposes of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 or not. The court finally held that the award did not require registration under Section 17(1) of the Registration Act, 1908. 35. In Govindaranjan & Ors. Vs. K.A.N. Srinivasa Chetty and Ors. reported at AIR 1977 Mad 402 the only question that arose for consideration was whether Mahar in its original shape or after having merged itself into a decree of court, retains the character of a debt within the meaning of Section 2(C) of Tamil Nadu Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Ordinance, 1975. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that as the husband is an agriculturist, the dower debt or the Mahar would not come within the privileged meaning of ‘debt’ under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1975 and therefore, the respondent is entitled to execute the decree based on such a Mahar debt. 36. In Bhaja Govinda Maikap & Anr. Vs. Janaki Dei & Ors. 36. In Bhaja Govinda Maikap & Anr. Vs. Janaki Dei & Ors. reported at AIR 1980 Orissa 108 the learned Trial Court rejected the petition of compromise as the parties failed to amend the plaint as per satisfaction of the learned Trial Court in view of the Order XXIII Rule (3) of the Code. The Hon’ble Apex Court allowed the revisional application and directed that the petition of compromise be recorded. It is further held that if any defects are there it must be left to be decided in a separate action. 37. In Diplai Biswas & Ors. Vs. Nirmalendu Mukherjee reported at 2021 SCC OnLine SC 869 the Hon’ble High Court dismissed the relevant civil petition holding that the issue has already been clinched by the previous order. The Special Leave Petition filed against the said order was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the petition for review of the said order was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 38. In Gurdev Kaur & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh & Ors. reported at 1988 SCC Online P & H 430 the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that a compromise or consent decree does not require registration even it creates title in respect of the immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or more, provided it is the subject matter of suit. It is further held that a compromise or consent decree can be got set aside on any of the grounds on which a contract can be set aside namely, if obtained by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion with an additional ground in favour of the minors or persons of unsound mind, if they are able to prove that next friend or the guardian, who acted on their behalf, was negligent in concluding the proceeding. If none of the grounds is established, the court in a subsequent suit will have no jurisdiction to go behind the consent decree to find out whether facts stated in the plaint which culminated into a compromise decree were right or wrong. 39. After considering the submission and counter-submission of the learned counsel of the parties and also the case laws cited by them it appears to me that the factual matrix of the case in our hand is totally different from the case laws cited by the counsels of the parties. 40. 39. After considering the submission and counter-submission of the learned counsel of the parties and also the case laws cited by them it appears to me that the factual matrix of the case in our hand is totally different from the case laws cited by the counsels of the parties. 40. It is true that fraud cannot dwell with the principle of justice. It is also true the plea that fraud was exercised upon court can be taken up at any stage of the proceedings, but the nicety of the case in our hand is that after commission of the fraud upon the court and also appropriating and realizing some of the fruits of fraud, can a person who committed the fraud along with others, be allowed to raise the point that the decree is a nullity since fraud has been committed on the court of law. In this case it appears that the original defendant no. 1 Pran Kumar Bhattacharyya was the father of defendant no. 1(a) Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya and it is alleged by the later that his father along with original plaintiff and original defendant no. 2 committed fraud upon the court but his conscience dictates him that this aspect should be brought to the notice of the executing court so that this court can, on the basis of relevant judicial decisions cited by his learned counsel, set aside the consent decree dated 19.12.2007. 41. The record shows that the father of the petitioner i.e. the original defendant no. 1, since deceased, took Rs.10,00,000/- from the original plaintiff for the purpose of conveying the relevant property in favour of him as per terms of the decree. It is also found that a sum of Rs.1,89,000/- was taken by his father as owelty money for the purpose of construction of staircase, kitchen, bathroom etc in his Lot ‘B’. Nowhere, in the instant petition, Mr. Bhattcharya, the defendant no. 1(a) has made any prayer or averment as to what would happen in respect of such huge sum of money which was taken as consideration money by his father, if the consent decree is set aside on the ground of nullity. There is no indication in the said petition about the fate of such huge sum of money which has certainly become devalued by lapse of time. Admittedly, the defendant no. There is no indication in the said petition about the fate of such huge sum of money which has certainly become devalued by lapse of time. Admittedly, the defendant no. 1(a) series stepped into the shoes of the original defendant no.1. The defendant no. 1(a), the petitioner herein, unfortunately did not make any mention in that regard in his petition nor during hearing of the case. 42. The record shows that the consent decree was obtained with the active participation of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant no. 1(a) series and the said predecessor had contested the present execution case by filing several applications, proceedings including the petition for setting aside the consent decree dated 19.12.2007 on the ground of its unlawfulness. This court on several occasions had refused to entertain the pleas taken by the predecessor of the defendant no. 1(a)series and dismissed such applications upholding the validity and legality of the consent decree dated 19.12.2007. 43. In this regard, the observations made by the Hon’ble Division Bench in disposing of the appeal being No. APO 423 of 2010 on 10.12.2012. are quoted herein below for proper understanding of the matter:- “15. Before we proceed further it is necessary to note that G.A. No. 1493 of 2009 was filed for setting aside the compromise decree dated 19th, December, 2007. It was dismissed by the order of the learned Single Judge passed on 7th March 2011 in terms of the order of the Division Bench in the present appeal. An appeal was filed by the defendant No. 1 being APOT No. 106 of 2011 to challenge the order dated 7th March 2011. That appeal has been dismissed on 21st March 2011. Therefore, the question of setting aside the consent terms does not arise. The only issue which is relevant for our consideration is whether the order passed in the review application is incorrect. 16. In our opinion the learned Judge has not passed any illegal or incorrect order which requires interference in the appeal. The order which was passed on 7th March, 2011 was a common order passed in two applications, one which sought the implementation of the compromise decree in terms of the consent terms and the other praying for the compromise decree to be set aside. The order which was passed on 7th March, 2011 was a common order passed in two applications, one which sought the implementation of the compromise decree in terms of the consent terms and the other praying for the compromise decree to be set aside. Significantly, both these applications were filed by defendant No.1; on the one hand he chose to have the compromise decree implemented whereas on the other he contended that the decree should be set aside as it was void. 17. The learned Counsel for the Defendant No. 1 has sought to enlarge the scope of the appeal by contending that the compromise decree is unlawful. He has also pointed out that the Division Bench by its order dated 8th June 2011 passed in the present appeal has observed that the entire matter should be re-examined and re-considered. According to the learned counsel, therefore all points, including the validity of the consent terms, are in issue. 18. These submissions of the learned Counsel are untenable. The order of the Division Bench dated 8th June 2011 must be read in the context of its earlier orders. The order does not in our opinion mean that the question as to whether the compromise decree is unlawful can be reopened. All that, the Division Bench has observed at the interim stage is that the issues arising in the appeal should be re-examined and re-considered so that the interests of the appellant No. 1 are protected. These observations were made because of the contention of the Defendant No. 1 that the building plans submitted by him cannot be sanctioned in terms of the existing law. We have considered the prayers in the present appeal which is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 14th September 2010 refusing to review the earlier order passed on 27th August 2010. The order dated 27th August 2010, directing the submission of a plan to the Municipal Authorities was an interlocutory order passed in G.A. 2944 of 2010. The interlocutory order passed on 27th August 2010 has not been challenged in the present appeal. Apart from, this the issue as to whether the compromise decree is unlawful has been put at rest with the dismissal of APOT No. 106 of 2010 by the Division Bench. The interlocutory order passed on 27th August 2010 has not been challenged in the present appeal. Apart from, this the issue as to whether the compromise decree is unlawful has been put at rest with the dismissal of APOT No. 106 of 2010 by the Division Bench. Therefore, the only question which we called upon to decide is whether the review application has been correctly decided by the learned Single Judge when he passed the order on 14th September 2010. 19. We do not think that the learned Single Judge had committed any error. By directing the Defendant No. 1 to submit a plan for sanction by the Corporation. Whether that plan could be sanctioned in accordance with law is something that was within the domain of the officers of the Corporation. It was not for the Court to consider whether the plan which the defendant No. 1 proposed to submit was as per the building rules and regulations. It is obvious that only a plan which is in accordance with law can be sanctioned by the Corporation. If the plan submitted by Defendant No.1 is not sanctioned it is for him to adopt appropriate steps to remedy the situation, either by challenging the order or by submitting a fresh plan. 20. We have noticed that time and again the Division Bench of this Court had passed orders to ensure that the parties to the compromise decree implement the terms of the settlement without prejudice being caused to any one of them. The Division Bench had directed the defendant No. 1 to submit a plan so as to make Lot B habitable. It appears however, that defendant No. 1 submitted a plan which was for constructing a new building on Lot B and it is in these circumstances that the competent authority refused to sanction the same. The import of the order dated 24th February 2011 passed by the Division Bench of this Court is unambiguous inasmuch as the plan which the defendant No. 1 was to submit was for the construction of a staircase, a kitchen, a water reservoir and a toilet in Lot B which fell to the share of Defendant No. 1 under the consent terms. Instead of submitting such a plan, Defendant No. 1 submitted a plan depicting the construction of a building at the rear end of Lot B and for connecting the same to the existing structure. It is in these circumstances that sanction for such a construction was denied. 21. We do not, therefore, think it necessary to consider whether the consent terms are legal and justified as the compromise decree has been passed. There was a challenge to that compromise decree by the defendant No. 1 and he sought revocation of that decree. The learned Single Judge having failed to pass any order on that application in favour of defendant No. 1, he filed APOT No. 106 of 2011 which has been dismissed.” 44. Needless to mention that there are sufficient admitted materials on record. During 1999 the defendant no. 1(a) took part with his father in executing a development agreement in respect of one of the properties of the probated Will, wherein he signed the relevant document as a witness. The defendant no. 1(a) in this case has taken the plea that he was not aware of the nitty grity of the litigation and as his father and, after his demise, his brother, Mr. Pratik Kumar Bhattacharyya, one of the learned advocates of this court, used to look after the litigation he did not try to be involved in day to day legal proceedings. But this plea cannot be accepted since the concept of date of knowledge regarding occurrence of relevant fact has undergone a sea change and it has been extended to a new dimension. An applicant cannot take the plea simpliciter that he has no knowledge of the relevant incident or facts of the case, if he had the opportunities to get to know of such fact, had he applied his due diligence. This is the new normal. In this case it appears that the defendant no. 1(a) had involved himself in the property matters from the year 1999 at least and, therefore, he had the opportunity to know the factual aspects of the matter, had he exercised his due diligence. Therefore, the contention of the defendant 1(a) is not convincing. 45. This is the new normal. In this case it appears that the defendant no. 1(a) had involved himself in the property matters from the year 1999 at least and, therefore, he had the opportunity to know the factual aspects of the matter, had he exercised his due diligence. Therefore, the contention of the defendant 1(a) is not convincing. 45. From a comparative study of the papers in the partition suit and those of a probate proceeding it appears that the Will of Ramesh Chandra Bhattacharyya had allocated the south west tenanted portion as the property belonging to the relevant trust. But that was not brought to the notice of the Trial Court and the consent decree was passed on the basis of the submission of learned counsels who were the actual parties to the proceedings before the concerned Trial Court. The issue was raised that during his life, which was justifiably quite a long one, the testator did not himself create the trust or did not take active steps for creation of such trust, and therefore, the proposed trust was abandoned by the testator himself during his lifetime. In my view, the said questions cannot be decided right now without recording evidence and without examining the original trial court proceedings. The petitioner i.e. the defendant no. 1(a) or any other person in this proceeding had the opportunity under the law to knock the door of the Trial Court which passed such consent decree on the alleged fraudulent submission and misrepresentation. The present executing court is not equipped to deal with such allegations in this forum, particularly, when in several earlier proceedings, the consent decree was declared to be valid and legal. 46. A preliminary decree is nothing but declaration of shares of the parties to a partition proceeding, and final decree relates to the demarcation, allocation of separate possession to the parties as per their respective shares etc. by appointment of Partition Commissioner. In this case, it appears that on consent of the parties they had demarcated their own allocation and respective separate possession of such demarcated portions were taken over by them with the help of a learned partition commissioner and separate premises numbers have been provided to all of them, and further on consent of the parties the matter has been finally disposed of by passing a consent decree. The plea that the consent decree is not a final decree was earlier considered by a co-ordinate bench of this Court, and therefore the same cannot be agitated right now. 47. Considering all aspects of the matter I do not find any material on record to allow the instant petition being GA 8 of 2023. Accordingly, the same is dismissed on contest with a cost assessed at Rs.1,00,000/- to be paid by the defendant 1(a), Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhattacharyya to the Decree Holder within one month from date, in default, the decree holder is to take appropriate steps to realize the same in accordance with law. 48. GA 3 of 2023 is accordingly disposed of. 49. Liberty to mention before appropriate Bench. 50. Copies of this Judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.