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2024 DIGILAW 1518 (ALL)

Gauri Shukla v. State of U. P.

2024-05-31

J.J.MUNIR

body2024
JUDGMENT : (J.J. Munir, J.) This writ petition is directed against an order passed by the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, District Kannauj dated 29.9.2023, dismissing the petitioner, a Class-IV employee (peon) from service after disciplinary proceedings. 2. Admittedly, the petitioner's deceased husband, Atul Kumar Shukla was an employee of the Nagar Panchayat, Tirwaganj, District Kannauj. He died in harness. While the late Atul Kumar Shukla was around, the petitioner and her husband had some marital discord, on account of which the petitioner went over to her parents' place alongwith her sons Kartik Shukla, a boy aged 15 years and Raghav Shukla, who was still younger and aged 10 years. It is the petitioner's case that taking advantage of the discord between parties and to grab the late Atul Kumar Shukla's estate, the deceased's mother and brother made him execute a Will dated 1.6.2018 in favour of his mother, Abhilasha Devi, carrying terms to the effect that after his demise, all his movable and immovable property, proceeds of insurance, provident fund and agricultural land, situate at Mudarawang, Tehsil Tirwaganj, would vest exclusively in the testator's mother, who would become the sole owner in possession thereof. The Will also says that his wife and sons would not be entitled to any share in the testator's property, including his insurance proceeds and funds. Sometime after execution of the aforesaid Will, Atul Kumar Shukla expired. It is the petitioner's case that the petitioner and the late Atul Kumar Shukla were never divorced or judicially separated by a decree of Court and until his demise, the petitioner and the Atul Kumar Shukla were lawfully wedded man and wife. After her husband's demise, the petitioner, who was his dependent, applied for compassionate appointment and appointed on a peon's post on compassionate grounds in accordance with rules vide letter of appointment dated 5th January, 2019 issued by the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, District Kannauj. The aforesaid facts are not in issue. 3. After her appointment, the petitioner discharged her duties, as she says, to the best of her abilities with full devotion, integrity and sincerity. There was no complaint against the petitioner. It is the petitioner's case that the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, misusing his authority as such, for no reason, indulged in misbehaviour with the petitioner and harassed her socially, economically and physically. There was no complaint against the petitioner. It is the petitioner's case that the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, misusing his authority as such, for no reason, indulged in misbehaviour with the petitioner and harassed her socially, economically and physically. The petitioner resisted the second respondent's overtures, which led the second respondent to tell the petitioner that if she did not obey the second respondent, she would be fired. On the 20th of March, 2023, the petitioner received a letter from the Executive Officer, which she says, was issued mala fide to effect that several tasks assigned to the petitioner, such as preparation of the demand register, non-provision of the list of Ayushman Cards, making recovery from liquor shops, had not been undertaken. It was also said that the petitioner abused one Jagjeewan Ram in caste suggestive words and did not deposit taxes in the office of the Nagar Panchayat. The petitioner was imputed with the misconduct of leaving office without informing anyone. The petitioner was asked to answer these allegations and also asked to show-cause why disciplinary proceedings be not initiated against her. The petitioner wrote a letter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate/Administrator, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, District Kannauj saying that the work assigned to the petitioner was not the work of a Class-IV employee and yet she discharged those duties to the full satisfaction of her superiors. It was in the month of March, 2023 that the petitioner suffered a reverse to her health. This gave occasion to Jagjeewan Ram to harass the petitioner. He addressed a complaint against the petitioner to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate/Administrator, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, which was received in the S.D.M.'s office on 22.3.2023. In the said letter, there is a summary of allegations levelled against the petitioner, that read: 4. On the 25th of March, 2023, the petitioner addressed a complaint to the Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur saying that the respondents without any reason were harassing her notwithstanding the fact she was discharging her duties sincerely and with good integrity. It was indicated that the Tax Collector, Jagjeewan Ram was also involved in harassing the petitioner, who asked her to stay after duty hours, besides making recovery of Government dues from liquor shops and other Government recoveries. It was also said in the petitioner's complaint that Jagjeewan Ram would use derogatory and uncharitable language against the petitioner. It was indicated that the Tax Collector, Jagjeewan Ram was also involved in harassing the petitioner, who asked her to stay after duty hours, besides making recovery of Government dues from liquor shops and other Government recoveries. It was also said in the petitioner's complaint that Jagjeewan Ram would use derogatory and uncharitable language against the petitioner. When the petitioner would resist, he would threaten her with false implication in a case under the SC/ST Act. It was said in the complaint by the petitioner that earlier she was assigned duties related to postal work and other miscellaneous jobs, but later on the work of recovery of Government dues has been assigned. The petitioner said that when she would ask for leave, she was denied and threatened with removal from service. 5. It is also the petitioner's case that the Executive Officer caused to be pasted on the walls of the Nagar Panchayat premises posters saying that for any work to be done in the Nagar Panchayat, the petitioner may be approached by the parties concerned, and those posters showed the petitioner's mobile number. It is her case that on account of an unusual assignment and its publication, several notorious persons and miscreants called her up, making illegal demands and passing undesirable comments. In the meantime, the petitioner says, elections to the Nagar Panchayat were held and the petitioner was assigned a number of duties, including that on the Pink Booth, located inside the Indra Devi Girls Inter College, Tirwaganj. On the petitioner's complaint on 6.6.2023, the Additional Commissioner/Nodal Officer, Kanpur Nagar sent a letter to the District Magistrate, asking him to take action in the matter and submit a report to the office of the Additional Commissioner/Nodal Officer, Kanpur Nagar. It was in retaliation to the said complaint, as the petitioner says, that on 15.6.2023, she was illegally suspended from service pending inquiry. An Inquiry Committee was constituted on 3.6.2023, who submitted a preliminary inquiry report dated 17.6.2023. The petitioner was then served with a charge-sheet dated 8.7.2023, carrying six charges. She submitted her reply to the charge-sheet denying these and castigating them as false and without evidence to substantiate. 6. The Inquiry Officer, it is said, proceeded ex parte in the matter, holding inquiry into the charges carried in the charge-sheet. He concluded the inquiry, finding the charges proved. She submitted her reply to the charge-sheet denying these and castigating them as false and without evidence to substantiate. 6. The Inquiry Officer, it is said, proceeded ex parte in the matter, holding inquiry into the charges carried in the charge-sheet. He concluded the inquiry, finding the charges proved. He submitted his report dated 6.9.2023 to the Executive Officer, respondent No. 2. On the basis of the Inquiry Officer's report dated 6.9.2023, the Executive Officer issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner on 11.9.2023, alleging that the six charges levelled against the petitioner had been found proved. She was asked to show-cause why on the basis of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer on the relative charges, her services be not terminated. The petitioner answered the show-cause dated 11.9.2023 through a reply dated 27.9.2023, denying all the charges, that were held proved. A request was made to appoint an independent Inquiry Officer in the matter, who may inquire into the charges. The aforesaid reply was filed beyond the prescribed period of time for reason that the petitioner's elder son was ill and she was compelled to look after him. On the 29th of September, 2023, the Executive Officer passed the impugned order, terminating the petitioner's service. 7. On 22.11.2023, when this matter came up for admission, this Court noticed the averments in paragraph Nos. 35, 36 and 37 of the writ petition and as these seemed to involve a short point, the following order was passed: ''Let a personal affidavit be filed by the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Tirwaganj, District-Kannauj, amongst others, answering the averments in paragraph Nos. 35, 36 ad 37 of the writ petition, that no date, time or place of hearing before the Inquiry Officer was fixed and no opportunity given to cross-examine the Management's witnesses. The requisite personal affidavit shall be filed within ten days. Lay as fresh again on 6.12.2023. On the said date, the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Tirwaganj, District-Kannauj will produce the entire records of inquiry before the Court. Let this order be communicated to the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Tirwaganj, District-Kannauj through the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kannauj by the Registrar (Compliance) within 48 hours.'' 8. An affidavit of compliance was filed by Umesh Kumar Singh, Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, District Kannauj. The averments in paragraph Nos. 35, 36 and 37 were answered in paragraph Nos. Let this order be communicated to the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Tirwaganj, District-Kannauj through the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kannauj by the Registrar (Compliance) within 48 hours.'' 8. An affidavit of compliance was filed by Umesh Kumar Singh, Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, District Kannauj. The averments in paragraph Nos. 35, 36 and 37 were answered in paragraph Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit. Treating the personal affidavit to be a counter-affidavit in the writ petition, the petition was admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith and judgment reserved on 6.12.2023. Later on, this Court felt that there were other issues involved in the writ petition and it was not a cause that could be determined on the short point that we thought it could, while recording our orders dated 22.11.2023 and 6.12.2023. Therefore, this matter was posted for further hearing in view of the fact that clarifications regarding the other pleas were also required. The matter came up for further hearing on 8.12.2023. On the said date, this Court granted liberty to the respondents to file a further counter-affidavit, adjourning it to 16.12.2023. The original records of inquiry relating to the petitioner were directed to be produced by the Executive Officer. In compliance, on 16.12.2023, the original records of the inquiry and the petitioner's service-book as well were produced by Mr. Rajeev Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. He also filed a counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The original records were directed to be placed in a sealed cover and made part of the record. The counter-affidavit was taken on record as well. Hearing proceeded forthwith and judgment was reserved. 9. Heard Mr. Ashish Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rajeev Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and Ms. Amrita Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State. 10. The foremost to be examined in this case is the issue if it is a case where no date, time and place for holding the inquiry was fixed and a matter where the Establishment did not produce evidence, documentary and more than that oral, to wit, witnesses, to prove the charges. This issue is seminal because the penalty imposed is major. This issue is seminal because the penalty imposed is major. It is a well-settled proposition of the law that in cases where there is likelihood of imposition of a major penalty, it is the duty of the Inquiry Officer to fix a date, time and place of inquiry, duly intimated to the delinquent and the Establishment. It is a further salutary requirement in such matters that the Establishment be required by the Inquiry Officer to prove the charge in the first instance by leading evidence, both documentary and oral. It is only after the Establishment has discharged its burden by leading evidence documentary and examining witnesses that the employee can be called upon to enter defence and produce whatever evidence he/she wants. The employee cannot be held guilty by the Inquiry Officer shuffling through the charge-sheet and the delinquent's reply, and without the Establishment producing evidence to prove the charges in the first instance. For the principles aforesaid, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 , Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 , State of Uttaranchal and others v. Kharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236 and the Bench decisions of this Court in State of U.P. and another v. Kishori Lal and another, 2018(9) ADJ 397 (DB)(LB), Smt. Karuna Jaiswal v. State of U.P., 2018(9) ADJ 107 (DB)(LB) and State of U.P. v. Aditya Prasad Srivastava and another, 2017(2) ADJ 554 (DB)(LB). 11. The first question to be examined, as already remarked, therefore, is: If the salutary principles regarding procedure for the holding of a departmental inquiry in a matter where a major penalty could be imposed was adhered to by the respondents in this case? 12. The substance of the petitioner's case pleaded in paragraph Nos. 35, 36 and 37 of the writ petition is that before the Inquiry Officer, the petitioner was not given opportunity of hearing, particularly personal hearing, cross-examination of the complainant and witnesses. It was also pleaded that the Inquiry Officer did not intimate any date for personal hearing nor provided any evidence in support of the charges, so that the petitioner could meet the same or properly answer the case against her. The pleas in paragraph Nos. It was also pleaded that the Inquiry Officer did not intimate any date for personal hearing nor provided any evidence in support of the charges, so that the petitioner could meet the same or properly answer the case against her. The pleas in paragraph Nos. 35 and 37, though clumsily worded, are nevertheless to the effect that the Establishment did not produce evidence, particularly witnesses in support of the charges, whom the petitioner could then cross-examine and the other is that the Inquiry Officer did not fix a date, time and place for holding the inquiry. If true, either of the two shortcomings in the procedure followed in holding the inquiry, would vitiate it since the result of the departmental inquiry has led to the imposition of a major penalty upon the petitioner. 13. In the personal affidavit dated 6.12.2023, the stand that was taken was that the Inquiry Officer issued a notice dated 10.7.2023, calling upon the petitioner to appear before him on any date from 26th July, 2023 to 8th September, 2023 at 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. for the scheduled inquiry. It is also the respondents' case in paragraph No. 3 of the compliance affidavit that the Inquiry Officer called upon the petitioner to appear before him on twelve dates and cooperate with the inquiry, granting her full opportunity, including opportunity of personal hearing and cross-examination of witnesses. A photostat copy of the notice dated 10.7.2023 issued to the petitioner alongwith the relative postal receipt is annexed to the affidavit of compliance. In paragraph No. 5 of the affidavit of compliance, which answers the pleas in paragraph No. 37 of the writ petition, it is again said that as many twelve different dates were fixed calling upon the petitioner to appear before the Inquiry Officer for a personal hearing and to cross-examine witnesses, a fact evident from the inquiry report dated 26.7.2023. It was in view of this stand that the contents of the inquiry report were noticed and records of the inquiry summoned by the Court. 14. A perusal of records of the inquiry shows that the notice of the scheduled inquiry or the inquiry schedule was issued to the petitioner on 10.7.2023. It was in view of this stand that the contents of the inquiry report were noticed and records of the inquiry summoned by the Court. 14. A perusal of records of the inquiry shows that the notice of the scheduled inquiry or the inquiry schedule was issued to the petitioner on 10.7.2023. By an order of the said date sent to her by registered post, the order or if it may be called a notice of the date of hearing before the inquiry, the petitioner was intimated of the dates fixed. It is indeed a quaint one. It reads: 15. On the face of the copy of this notice/order dated 10.7.2023, a registered postal receipt, showing dispatch to the petitioner on 10.7.2023, is pasted. The dispatch of this notice to the petitioner on her address is not in dispute. What is rather odd is that the Inquiry Officer fixed all the scheduled dates, numbering twelve by the first notice, when invariably as per standard practice, dates are fixed after conclusion of the day's proceeding on a particular date scheduled. Nevertheless, in this case, the procedure howsoever odd does not appear to be sham if one goes through the proceedings of the inquiry. In answer to the notice, it appears that on all dates the Inquiry Officer convened formal inquiry between the specified hours, that is to say, from 10.7.2023 to 5.9.2023, and testimony on behalf of the Establishment was recorded. The Presenting Officer, Jagjeewan Ram was also examined as a witness, besides a number of other employees of the Establishment, who testified. They were Jagjeewan Ram, Clerk-cum-Presenting Officer, Mahesh, Office Assistant, Smt. Anjum Ara, Tax Collector, Ravindra Kumar, Collection Employee, Nagendra, Purnanshu Kumar, Computer Operators and Manoj Kumar Shukla, the petitioner's brother-in-law (the petitioner's husband's brother). The inquiry report shows that on none of the dates fixed, when these witnesses testified in support of the Establishment's case, the petitioner appeared. There is no case on behalf of the petitioner, particularly as there is no rejoinder, that the notice dated 10.7.2023, giving out a complete schedule of twelve dates in the inquiry, was never served upon the petitioner or that it was not sent at her correct postal address. Hence, there is no reason to disbelieve the respondents' case that the petitioner had notice of the various dates fixed during the inquiry, but she chose to remain ex parte. Hence, there is no reason to disbelieve the respondents' case that the petitioner had notice of the various dates fixed during the inquiry, but she chose to remain ex parte. Since witnesses on behalf of the Establishment did support the charges, there is no such flaw in the inquiry albeit ex parte, which may vitiate it on ground of violation of the salutary procedure governing such inquiries or constitute violation of the principles of natural justice. The submissions, therefore, urged on behalf of the petitioner that the punishment imposed is vitiated because the inquiry was held contrary to the salutary procedure, governing the holding of a departmental inquiry in matters, where a major penalty may be imposed, cannot be accepted. 16. This takes us to the merits of the matter, where the petitioner has challenged the entire proceedings as arbitrary, an instance of colourable exercise of power and based on conclusions that are perverse. Also, one facet of the challenge, that has to be examined, is that the charges are vague and some of them no charges at all, on the basis of which a finding of misconduct can be recorded and punishment imposed. 17. This Court thinks that it is imperative in the present matter to look to each of the six charges, on the foot of which the petitioner has been punished, and, for the purpose, it is necessary that each of those charges should be quoted. The charges against the petitioner read: 18. Now, the first charge against the petitioner is that the deceased employee, her husband, the late Atul Kumar Shukla, had executed a registered Will in favour of his mother, Smt. Abhilasha Devi and by that Will, he had bequeathed all his movable and immovable property to his mother. Smt. Abhilasha Devi, on the basis of the said Will, had requested the Executive Officer to appoint her other son, Manoj Kumar Shukla, a dependent of the deceased on compassionate basis. But, the Will notwithstanding the petitioner had been appointed as a peon with the Nagar Panchayat contrary to the deceased's Will, which is unconstitutional. By the terms of this charge, the petitioner was required to show-cause why her illegal appointment be not terminated and all salary paid to her recommended to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. The charge formally says that for all this illegality, the petitioner is liable. 19. By the terms of this charge, the petitioner was required to show-cause why her illegal appointment be not terminated and all salary paid to her recommended to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. The charge formally says that for all this illegality, the petitioner is liable. 19. This Court is constrained to say that Charge No. 1 against the petitioner is no charge at all. To dub it as a charge and hold the petitioner guilty, as regards this charge, is perversity of the highest order. It is not the respondents' case that the petitioner was not the deceased's wife, and, therefore, ineligible under the relevant rules for appointment. The substance of the charge is that the deceased had left a Will, bequeathing all his movable and immovable property to his mother and the mother, on the basis of that Will, had requested that her other son be appointed under the Dying-in-Harness Rules. Virtually, the Will has been read as a valid and binding nomination by the deceased as to which of his dependent is entitled to be appointed on compassionate grounds. It is not in the scheme of the Dying-in-Harness Rules that amongst the family members eligible, compassionate appointment ought be offered to the one, who has been nominated by the deceased through a Will. Here, the Will does not expressly say anything to that effect. Even if it did, it would be an ineffectual direction, which would not bind the employer. 20. A compassionate appointment is a matter relating to public law and governed by Rules framed for the purpose. It is not to be offered according to a devise or bequest made by a deceased Government servant as to who ought be appointed as his dependent to take care of the other dependent family members, whom he has left behind. To castigate the appointment in the petitioner's favour, on the basis of her right under the relevant Dying-in-Harness Rules, being the deceased's widow, on ground that it was contrary to directions in the deceased's Will, and, therefore, 'unconstitutional', is something on the terms of the charge that borders on absurdity. Remarkably, in the findings of the Inquiry Officer, it has been recorded that the petitioner has secured employment through wrong means contrary to the deceased's Will and the charge stands proved. Remarkably, in the findings of the Inquiry Officer, it has been recorded that the petitioner has secured employment through wrong means contrary to the deceased's Will and the charge stands proved. The impugned order dated 29.9.2023, which does not discuss any of the charges and betrays utter lack of application of mind, accepts this report, and, a fortiori the findings of the Inquiry Officer on this charge. As remarked at the outset, the charge itself discloses no misconduct and for that reason, the findings of the Inquiry Officer on this charge as well as the impugned order to the extent that it is founded on this charge are vitiated. 21. The second charge against the petitioner is to the effect that the petitioner has often come up with allegations against the Executive Officer that he indulges in lewd talk etc., but the petitioner admitted that no such event happened and sought apologies. Before the apology, the petitioner was given notice on a number of occasions, but there was no improvement. The petitioner repeatedly threatened the Executive Officer and other employees of implication on charges and in a false case/cases, whereas she had apologized a number of times over about her conduct, but there was no improvement or change in her conduct in this regard. The charge says that the petitioner is responsible for the aforesaid misconduct. The Inquiry Officer, in disposing of the charges, noticed the petitioner's defence that she never apologised, but was made by the Executive Officer to sign a number of blank papers, telling her that her husband's insurance proceeds would be paid to her. All that is recorded for a finding by the Inquiry Officer is that upon questions put to employees present in the office, to wit, Jagjeewan Ram, Smt. Anjum Ara, Ravendra Kumar, Kishan and others, they said that the petitioner did not sign blank papers as alleged. Rather, she delivered a signed document to the Executive Officer, presumably speaking about the letter of apology etc. The short and cryptic remark is that the aforesaid statement of the employees lead to the conclusion that the petitioner's stand is false and without force. It is then remarked that upon a thorough inquiry, the charge in question (Charge No. 2) stands proved. 22. This Court must say that for a first the charge is utterly vague. The short and cryptic remark is that the aforesaid statement of the employees lead to the conclusion that the petitioner's stand is false and without force. It is then remarked that upon a thorough inquiry, the charge in question (Charge No. 2) stands proved. 22. This Court must say that for a first the charge is utterly vague. It does not say or carry the essentials for a valid charge of this nature. The charge does not spell out when, where and how, the petitioner came up with allegations of lewd talk or misbehaviour against the Executive Officer or the other employees. It also does spell out the instances when she threatened the Executive Officer and other employees of implication in false cases. There is not the slightest reference to the occasion, time or the number of instances or any other circumstances, when the petitioner is said to have committed this act of misconduct or acts of misconduct. In the absence of material particulars relating to the second charge, at least by spelling out instances of false allegations or threat, vis-a-vis the Executive Officer or the particulars of the employee threatened with implication, the charge on its own terms is unfit to be sustained. The Inquiry Officer could hardly have recorded any finding on such a vague charge. Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer has not done anything to bring forth the particulars of the charge, even broadly. All that he has said is that the petitioner has not been able to dispel the fact that she had tendered a letter of apology, looking to the stand of the employees, who appeared before him. A charge of this kind cannot be sustained by relying on a mere letter of apology, even if it is one signed by the petitioner, though she disputes it. The findings on this charge, therefore, recorded by the Inquiry Officer are far from a plausible view of the evidence on record. The finding is perverse to its face and the charge so vague that no finding on its basis can be returned. The Executive Officer has hardly applied his mind to the matter while passing the impugned order. He has mechanically accepted the report, vis-a-vis this charge as well and proceeded to punish the petitioner. 23. This takes us to the third charge laid against the petitioner. The Executive Officer has hardly applied his mind to the matter while passing the impugned order. He has mechanically accepted the report, vis-a-vis this charge as well and proceeded to punish the petitioner. 23. This takes us to the third charge laid against the petitioner. It is said there that on 16th February, 2023, the petitioner in the meeting hall of the office addressed the Executive Officer and Jagjeewan Ram, Tax Collector and others in objectionable words, besides inciting other employees present against the two officers. The charge also says that Jagjeewan Ram was accosted in caste suggestive and objectionable words. Jagjeewan Ram belongs to a Scheduled Caste. The charge goes on to say that for the aforesaid act why legal proceedings be not initiated against the petitioner. It is also said in connection with the charge that for the aforesaid act in the past as well, the petitioner had been asked to explain herself for indiscipline and rude behaviour. She had apologized, but there had been no improvement in her conduct or behaviour. The petitioner is, therefore, liable. 24. It would be observed that while the charge under reference holds the petitioner accountable for employment on a particular date and place of caste suggestive words with attribution of similar and rude behaviour in the past, about which she had allegedly apologized but not reformed, the words employed against Jagjeewan Ram have not been indicated in the least. In the absence of the words employed, the charge would be vague. But, a deficiency of this kind could be got over in evidence. If one were to look to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, all that is said is that the employee, who appeared at the hearing, said that the petitioner abuses Jagjeewan Ram and the Executive Officer, besides employing caste suggestive words against the former. Not the slightest has been said in his findings by the Inquiry Officer as to what kind of caste suggestive words or abuses were uttered by the petitioner on a particular day against Jagjeewan Ram or words of abuse against the Executive Officer, which is the subject-matter of the charge. The finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer is so vague, indefinite and lacking in material particulars that it can hardly stand as a finding on the charge holding the petitioner guilty. The finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer is so vague, indefinite and lacking in material particulars that it can hardly stand as a finding on the charge holding the petitioner guilty. While the charge is somewhat definitive here, the evidence considered and the findings are so vague and indefinite that the conclusions reached by the Inquiry Officer are perverse. 25. The fourth charge is again bad for vagueness. All that it says is that for the future the petitioner had furnished a written undertaking that she would not indulge in the offensive acts, the undertaking being given in the presence of two witnesses and signed, but there had been no change in the petitioner's behaviour or conduct. The petitioner was charged with indiscipline and conduct that is 'contrary to Government work'. As already remarked, the date and particulars of the undertaking and what were the acts that were undertaken to be eschewed and when was the undertaking breached, are all utterly lost in the vagueness of the charge. In the findings returned on the charge though the petitioner has been noted for her stand that she was subjected to undesirable conduct by the Executive Officer, leading to the charge, the Inquiry Officer noticed that the other employees present testified that the petitioner would not attend office and absented for two years from 1.1.2021 to 31.3.2023. She had deputed a privately engaged hand to discharge her duties unauthorizedly, one Nagendra Pandey, paying him a sum of Rs. 7000/- per month. The said fact, no doubt, would be a serious charge, but that is not the subject-matter of the charge at all. It is not even remotely mentioned that the petitioner had absented from work for two years and deputed a privately hired proxy to do her job. The finding, therefore, holding the fourth charge proved, which is utterly vague, on the basis of facts that never figure in the charge, is again absolutely perverse and vitiated by consideration of irrelevant evidence. 26. The fifth charge speaks about the petitioner's unauthorized absence. It indicts the petitioner of unauthorized absence from 23.5.2023 to 31.5.2023 and again from 17.6.2023 till date of the charge-sheet. 26. The fifth charge speaks about the petitioner's unauthorized absence. It indicts the petitioner of unauthorized absence from 23.5.2023 to 31.5.2023 and again from 17.6.2023 till date of the charge-sheet. It is also said that in the past also, on a number of occasions, the petitioner would come to the office at 11 o'clock in the morning hours and leave premises by 12:00 noon, without the written permission of the Executive Officer, forsaking her duties as a peon. The findings on this charge are again hardly relevant to it, though this charge is cast in quite certain terms. The Inquiry Officer first notices the petitioner's stand, where she attributes misconduct and immoral behaviour to the Executive Officer. The Inquiry Officer then goes on to take note of the stand of other employees, whom he says he virtually interrogated. The employees present, to wit, Smt. Anjum Ara, Jagjeewan Ram, Mahesh, Kishan and Ravendra Kumar, are reported to have said with regard to the charge that the petitioner levels irresponsible and wild charges, whereas she does not attend office. Her work, conduct, behaviour, discipline and devotion to duty are unsatisfactory. On the basis of this evidence gathered from the employees, the Inquiry Officer has abruptly concluded that the petitioner's defence about the Executive Officer's immoral behaviour etc., is ill-founded. He then remarks, even more abruptly and without reasoning or reference to any evidence that on a thorough inquiry, the charge is found proved. 27. Now, a bare look at the charge would show that it is definitive in its terms about two time periods of unauthorized absence attributed to her and her earlier misconduct in coming late to duty and leaving early without the Executive Officer's permission. The evidence of employees that has been noticed is hardly relevant to this charge. None of them specifically said that during the relevant period of time, the petitioner was indeed absent. The Inquiry Officer has also not considered any documentary evidence, like an attendance register, marking her absence during the relevant period of time, with the attendance register being duly proved by the employee, who maintains it in normal course of official business. The finding on the charge, therefore, is based on entirely irrelevant evidence and cannot at all be sustained, even in a secondary review. 28. So far as the sixth charge is concerned, all that it says is a case of absurdity. The finding on the charge, therefore, is based on entirely irrelevant evidence and cannot at all be sustained, even in a secondary review. 28. So far as the sixth charge is concerned, all that it says is a case of absurdity. Like the first charge, it indicts the petitioner of securing employment on compassionate basis, contrary to her deceased's husband's Will. In the findings that have been recorded on this charge by the Inquiry Officer, all irrelevant material has been considered to hold the petitioner's appointment illegal, because it is contrary to her husband's Will. We have already held as regards the first charge, that is almost identical to the sixth charge, that compassionate appointment is a matter that lies in the domain of public law and governed by Rules. It is to be offered to the person entitled under the Rules as a dependent of the deceased. It cannot be the subject-matter of a devise or bequest made by the deceased employee. The appointment cannot be termed illegal, because the deceased's Will has been construed by the respondents to hold that the deceased intended his brother to be granted compassionate appointment. There cannot be a more absurd charge than the present one, like the first, which in our considered opinion, is no charge in the eyes of the law. 29. So far as the other findings based on the evidence of one Nagendra is concerned that the petitioner had been carrying on work through two proxies, it is absolutely irrelevant to this charge. This charge is about the petitioner illegally drawing wages because according to the respondents, her appointment is illegal, falling back upon her husband's Will. The charge is not about the petitioner's illegally drawing wages by not working or discharging her duties through proxies. 30. Before parting with the matter, this Court is constrained to say that the findings recorded on Charges Nos. 1 and 6, or so to speak the charges on their own terms, are such glaring instances of absurdity and lack of acumen on the respondents' part that we are constrained to say that the Executive Officer and the Inquiry Officer, who sponsored the framing of Charges Nos. 1 and 6, or framed these charges, ought be careful in future while sponsoring or framing charges in the discharge of their official functions. 1 and 6, or framed these charges, ought be careful in future while sponsoring or framing charges in the discharge of their official functions. They must understand what can be a valid imputation against an employee and what are the basics of the law of compassionate appointment. 31. Quite apart from the findings of the Inquiry Officer, on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed, we think that the impugned order on its own terms is bad, because of utter non-application of mind. It is an order that simply says that the petitioner's explanation in answer to the show-cause notice dated 11.9.2023, was not found satisfactory; and on that basis punishes the petitioner with dismissal from service. It is too well-settled a proposition that an order passed by a Disciplinary Authority (unless the Disciplinary Authority happens to be a multi-membered body) must carry reasons for the conclusions reached. The Inquiry Officer's report cannot be read to supplement the impugned order, dismissing the petitioner from service. The impugned order being an order of immense adverse civil consequences, ought to have carried reasons, disclosing due application of mind by the Executive Officer/the Disciplinary Authority to the entire record, including the Establishment's case, evidence, the petitioner's defence etc., indicating in clear words, howsoever brief, reasons for the conclusions reached. The impugned order is utterly cryptic and laconic. For the said reason also, it deserves to be quashed. 32. Apart from the aforesaid infirmities, we must say that so far as Charges Nos. 1 and 6 are concerned, they are no charges in the eyes of the law. However, the other charges may have some substance to them, but these would require to be re-cast if the respondents think that these charges carry sufficient imputations to merit a de novo inquiry against the petitioner. It would, therefore, be open to the respondents to proceed afresh against the petitioner, if they so elect, on Charges Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, carried in the charge-sheet dated 8.7.2023, after issuing a fresh charge-sheet, re-casting the charges in definitive terms, carrying essential particulars of the impugned acts, time, place and occurrence, the words employed etc., to indict the petitioner. 33. So far as the impugned order is concerned, for all the reasons indicated, it cannot be sustained. 34. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. 33. So far as the impugned order is concerned, for all the reasons indicated, it cannot be sustained. 34. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 29.9.2023 passed by the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat Tirwaganj, District Kannauj is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith and paid her current salary regularly. The respondents shall be at liberty to pursue proceedings afresh upon issuing a fresh charge-sheet, bearing in mind the guidance in this judgment. If the respondents elect to pursue fresh proceedings, the arrears of emoluments shall abide by the event in the disciplinary proceedings. If the respondents do not elect to pursue fresh proceedings, the petitioner will be entitled to 50% of her emoluments for the period that she has remained out of employment, which shall be paid to her in that event forthwith. If fresh proceedings are pursued against the petitioner, the same shall be concluded expeditiously, wherein the petitioner shall cooperate. 35. There shall be no order is to costs.