JUDGMENT : DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J. William Congreve, in the Mourning Bride (1697), said famously that ‘heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned’; and we are now reminded of this because, we see its exemplification in many cases involving matrimonial disputes and custody of children. Spouses fight each other with every weapon in their arsenal, when love turns to hatred; and travel great distances for what they perceive to be in validation of a combination of ego, frustration and despair. 2. The facts involved in these cases are no different, where the petitioner – former husband of the respondent, seeks criminal action against the latter on the imputation that she has violated certain earlier orders. 3. We are considering these four Original Petitions together, since they involve the same parties, impel analogous circumstances and arise out of a judgment which has been delivered by the learned Family Court, North Paravur, disposing of different interim applications. 4. Without recording unnecessary details, an Original Petition has been filed by the petitioner herein before the learned Family Court, seeking custody of his 7 year old child; and he obtained certain orders, granting him day visitation on 2nd and 4th Saturdays. The petitioner alleges that these orders have been violated by the respondent – mother on certain such Saturdays, citing one untenable reason after the other; thus denying him the custody of the child on such days. He, thereupon, filed the applications, from which, the impugned orders have arisen, seeking that necessary action under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, be taken against her and to punish her “for willful disobedience of Court orders, granting interim custody of the child to him” (sic). 5. The respondent – mother, however, contested the applications saying that she has never deliberately violated any order of the learned Family Court, nor does she intend to do so; and that the child is still going with the petitioner on 2nd and 4th Saturdays as ordered, but that on the specific days mentioned in the interim applications in question, the child was unable to go, either because of illness or compelling academic reasons; but that every time, and as is even today, she fears going with him, or to be in his presence and thus refuses. The respondent says that she does not know why the child behaves so; but that the latter is now severely tormented by even the thought of having to go with the petitioner on Saturdays; however, that, in spite of this, she pushes her to do so, notwithstanding her remonstrance, only because she has full deference to the orders of the Court. She adds that she has also moved appropriate applications for modification of the orders of the learned Family Court, North Paravur; but concedes that it has not been yet taken up or disposed of. 6. We have heard the petitioner, appearing in person; and Sri.Aparna Nair – learned Counsel for the respondent. 7. The petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondent reiterated the afore submissions on behalf of their clients; which, we see, are also part of the pleadings. But, the petitioner employs a twist, saying that his real intention is not to send the respondent to jail for contempt, but to obtain compensation from her for the violation she has committed; which he proposes to invest in buying what his daughter likes, to gift it to her. 8. The singular question before us today is whether we can find the respondent guilty of any action, which will come within the umbra of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, or under the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, read with Section 151, of the Code of Civil Procedure, as has been imputed for by the petitioner. 9. The foundational edifice on which the petitioner builds his case, to seek action as above against the respondent, is that, she had refused to allow the child to be with him on certain days in the past, in spite of the orders of the learned Family Court; and that this has been done with the singular intent of frustrating such. 10. When we examine the impugned orders of the learned Family Court, we see that it has rejected the applications of the petitioner, both on facts and on law. 11. On the conspectus of law, the learned Court has entered a finding that the applications under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are not maintainable because, there are specific provisions to be invoked under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 - assuming violations are committed by either of the parties against an order issued under it. 11. On the conspectus of law, the learned Court has entered a finding that the applications under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are not maintainable because, there are specific provisions to be invoked under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 - assuming violations are committed by either of the parties against an order issued under it. The apparent reason why the learned Family Court has entered such an opinion is because, the Original Petition has been filed under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. 12. On the factual matrix, the learned Family Court has concluded that the respondent - mother has not deliberately violated the orders; but had been incapacitated from complying with them on the days mentioned in the interim applications filed by the petitioner, for valid reasons, including that the child was either unwell, or had School reasons; or was obdurately unwilling to go. 13. Before we move forward, we must record that we had an interaction with the child in our Chambers today, without either of the parties being present. The child was crying inconsolably, exhibiting deep disappointment in being called to Courts over and over again; and she told us in unmistakable terms – very articulately for her age – that she feels distress in being summoned by Judges and Courts and that she fears all legal proceedings now. She told us that she is going with her father every 2nd and 4th Saturdays as ordered by the learned Trial Court; but explaining that she is doing so only because her mother forces her to do so, and not because she wishes to be in his presence. She also informed us - which we are not recording as being true or otherwise – that whenever she is in her father's house, he sleeps or spends time in his room, with her being left alone in the drawing area with her grandparents on the sofa; and that she plays with toys, rendering it limpid that she does not like it at all. She pleaded with us that she be not subjected to this kind of “humiliation”, even telling us that this is now making it difficult for her to have a happy existence. 14. She pleaded with us that she be not subjected to this kind of “humiliation”, even telling us that this is now making it difficult for her to have a happy existence. 14. We have recorded the content of the interaction with the little child only because we are obligated to do so; but we clarify that this will not prejudice or influence us, while we take a decision on the merits of these matters. 15. However, we have little doubt we saw in the child, being dragged into litigations, is something very real and not apocryphal; though, we are also fully cognizant of the specific submission and stand of the petitioner – father, that the child has spoken so, being heavily tutored by her mother and not her own freewill. 16. Coming back to the merits of the cases at hand, the issue is not whether there has been violation – since such is almost without contest – but what are the reasons behind it. 17. We say as afore because, the mother admits that, on some of the days mentioned in the interim application filed by the petitioner, the child was not sent to him; explaining that this was because of reasons beyond her control, as recorded supra. 18. As said earlier, the mother cites broadly three reasons, namely that the child was unwell; or that she had academic reasons for not going with the father; but primarily, that she is not ready to go with him as ordered. 19. We are prima facie of the view that we would be justified in finding the respondent-mother guilty under the Contempt of Courts Act – assuming that it is maintainable; or under the Guardians and Wards Act, only if we are convinced that she has acted in derision to the orders of the Court. 20. It is pertinent that the child told us that she has been with her father last Saturday, as also on all other 2nd and 4th Saturdays prior to that; and this is without contest even by the petitioner, when he appeared before us today. 20. It is pertinent that the child told us that she has been with her father last Saturday, as also on all other 2nd and 4th Saturdays prior to that; and this is without contest even by the petitioner, when he appeared before us today. Interestingly, the argument of the petitioner was that, for the days the mother did not allow the child to be with him in the past, he should be granted monetary compensation, but without citing the provision of law for making such a plea; adding that, with such money, he would like to buy ‘things’ for his daughter. 21. We have gone through the materials on record very intently and have tested them on the touchstone of the findings in the impugned order. 22. As already indited above, the allegation of the petitioner is not that he has not been given the child on any Saturday; but that he had been denied such on certain specified dates, as mentioned in the interim applications filed by him. The mother has offered cogent reasons for each of them and we find justification in her explication; fortified by the conduct of the child, when she was produced before us, as recorded supra. 23. However, this is not to mean that the respondent can refuse to comply with orders because, it is her obligation to do so, as per the statutory and constitutional mandate; and if there was a germane and real reason, it was for her to have moved the learned Family Court appropriately seeking exemption, which could then have been subjected to forensic evaluation by it, as per law. 24. As far as these cases are concerned, since we cannot find that the mother has acted in contempt or derision to the orders of the Court, or in its violation with an intent to circumvent it; and since the explanation given by her, with specific reference to the dates mentioned in the application, has not been established by the petitioner to be untrue, it persuades us to find in favour of the holdings of the learned Family Court. 25. When, factually, we cannot find the mother to have acted in deliberate violation of the orders of this Court, the question whether a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable or otherwise becomes academic for us to decide. 25. When, factually, we cannot find the mother to have acted in deliberate violation of the orders of this Court, the question whether a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable or otherwise becomes academic for us to decide. However, we find some force, solely in a manner of prima facie observation, that when the mandate of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, provide certain specific provisions and when the Original Petition is filed under its umbra, the normal procedure would be to have invoked its prescriptions itself, in cases where violations are projected. 26. This is, however, not to mean that any of the parties can violate orders; and we clarify that none of our observations herein can be construed to mean that such would be condoned, without proper cause/explanation; or in the absence of necessary and apposite applications, in future. In summation, we dismiss these Original Petitions, confirming the orders of the learned Family Court.