JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. Reference may be made to the order dated 10.01.2024 by which time was allowed on the prayer being made by Mr. PAS Pati, learned counsel for the respondent nos.2-4 to seek instructions. 2. Mr. P.A.S. Pati, learned counsel for the respondent nos.2-4 has sought for leave of this Court that the counter affidavit is ready and copy of the same has also been served in Court, hence, leave has been sought for to file the same in the court for its acceptance. 3. This Court considering the aforesaid submission and taking into consideration the fact that in the counter affidavit the issue of jurisdiction is the main ground for making opposition to entertain the instant writ petition. 4. Since the issue of jurisdiction is purely a legal issue and there is no question of rebuttal since the factual aspect is not in dispute in this counter affidavit. Further, this Court is only on the issue of jurisdiction of maintaining the instant application filed before the Tribunal in view of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and as such, we have taken note of the objection so made on behalf of respondent nos.2 to 4 at paragraph-2 of the order dated 10.01.2024, as such, we are of the view that in order to decide the aforesaid legal issue, it would be just and proper to accept the said counter affidavit in Court. 5. Accordingly, the said counter affidavit is taken on record. 6. The writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 13.12.2022 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna, Circuit Bench Ranchi in O.A. No. 898 of 2022, whereby and whereunder, the relief was sought for quashing the office order dated 5/28/2022/karmic dated 19.05.2022 by which the relief sought for on the ground of parity to allow the petitioner to continue as Assistant Office Manager has been refused to be granted. 7. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under: The Petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant Office Manager, on contractual basis on consolidated salary of Rs.20,000/- per month in Infra Division, Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Limited (hereinafter referred to as WAPCOS Ltd.), Ranchi, vide Office Order No.5/28/2014/Pers., dated 28.08.2014. Accordingly, her contract was extended from time-to-time. As per the extension of petitioner's contract extended vide Office Order No. 160/CNT/EXT (PS)/2021, dated 14.01.2021 on Pay Scale basis till 31.12.2021, the engagement of the petitioner was for the aforesaid period or will be co-terminus with the project duration. It is the case of the petitioner that she was pregnant and in pursuance thereof, she made an application to the project manager for grant of maternity leave from 01.04.2022 to 30.09.2022, but maternity leave was not granted and even no receipt was issued to her. It is the case of the petitioner that the project is still going on and the authorities without taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, has ended the contract of the petitioner under the garb of office order No.84/CNT/EXT/2022 dated 09.02.2022. Being aggrieved thereof, the petitioner filed Original Application vide O.A. No. 898/2022, before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Ranchi Circuit Bench, challenging the Order dated 09.02.2022, whereby and whereunder under the garb of extension of contract virtually the service of the petitioner has been ended and the order dated 19.05.2022, appointment order of Santosh Solanki, whereby and whereunder the in place of petitioner, only by changing the designation of post/nomenclature the respondent no.5 has been appointed for the same work which was assigned to the petitioner. The Learned Tribunal dismissed the O.A. No.898/2022, vide Order dated 13.12.2022. 8. It is evident from the order passed by the learned Tribunal that the said application was decided on the very first day without calling upon the respondents to file written statement. The relief having been rejected as was sought for in the original application, hence, the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. Mr. Binod Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken several grounds in assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal. 10. Mr. Pati, learned counsel for the respondent nos.2-4 has submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal is nullity in the eyes of law since the learned Tribunal was having no jurisdiction to enter into the lis since the petitioner cannot be said to be holder of the said post under the Union. 11. 10. Mr. Pati, learned counsel for the respondent nos.2-4 has submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal is nullity in the eyes of law since the learned Tribunal was having no jurisdiction to enter into the lis since the petitioner cannot be said to be holder of the said post under the Union. 11. It has been contended that the petitioner is working under the respondents which is being controlled by the Ministry of Jal Shakti, Government of India but it’s status is of public sector unit wherein as per the provision of Section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1985), appropriate Government is to notify by creating a forum of court of first instance before the Central Administrative Tribunal. According to Mr. Pati, there is no notification as required to be issued under Section 14(2) of the Act, 1985 and hence, the Central Administrative Tribunal was having no jurisdiction to decide the issue, as such, it has been submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal, due to want of jurisdiction, is nullity in the eyes of law. 12. Upon such objection, Mr. Binod Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the ground of jurisdiction which is now being taken at the stage when the order has been passed by the learned Tribunal is not fit to be accepted. 13. It has been submitted that what has been contended it is not the case of the respondent he was having no opportunity to take this ground since it would be evident from the impugned order the opposition for the purpose of declining the relief which was sought to be granted has already been taken in the impugned order which is the ground of misjoinder of a party. 14. Submission has been made that when the ground of misjoinder of party has been taken as a ground for dismissal of the original application then at that stage only the issue of jurisdiction ought to have been raised by the learned counsel representing the respondent but having not done so, the aforesaid ground may not be entertained herein at this stage. 15. This Court, while considering the issue of maintainability has passed an order on 10.01.2024 wherein the said issue as was raised by Mr. 15. This Court, while considering the issue of maintainability has passed an order on 10.01.2024 wherein the said issue as was raised by Mr. Pati was taken note of and on his prayer time was allowed to seek instructions. The affidavit in pursuance to the aforesaid order has been passed which has been taken on record as referred hereinabove. 16. Admittedly herein, the respondent has not challenged the order passed by the learned Tribunal on the ground of jurisdiction. The aforesaid fact has also been taken as a ground for not accepting the issue of lack of jurisdiction of Mr. Binod Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the pleading made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit. 18. This Court, after appreciating the argument as referred hereinabove, is required to consider the following issues: (i) Whether a forum having no jurisdiction to decide the lis if decides, can it be said to be proper; (ii) If such forum has exercised the jurisdiction even though has not been conferred and no such plea of lack of jurisdiction was raised before the Tribunal can the same be taken as a ground by the higher forum to go into the merit of the lis without answering the issue of jurisdiction, if raised. 19. These two issues are the core of the subject and since both are linked together, hence, both the issues are being considered and are being answered hereinafter together. 20. Before answering the issue, it needs to refer herein that the Act, 1985 has been enacted in pursuance to the amendment carried under Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid amendment was for the purpose to provide for the establishment of an Administrative Tribunal for the Union and separate Administrative Tribunal for State or a Joint Administrative Tribunal for two or more States. The said amendment was enacted and by virtue of that, the Central Administrative Tribunal has been constituted. 21. The Act, 1985 contains the provision of jurisdiction, power and authority as under Chapter-III thereof. Section 14 deals with the issue of jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. For ready reference, the said provision reads as under: “14. The said amendment was enacted and by virtue of that, the Central Administrative Tribunal has been constituted. 21. The Act, 1985 contains the provision of jurisdiction, power and authority as under Chapter-III thereof. Section 14 deals with the issue of jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. For ready reference, the said provision reads as under: “14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court 2***) in relation to— (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian; (b) all service matters concerning— (i) a member of any All-India Service; or (ii) a person [not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)] appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; or (iii) a civilian [not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)] appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the Government; (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation 3 [or society] or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment. (2) The Central Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to corporations 3 [or societies] owned or controlled by Government, not being a local or other authority or corporation [or society] controlled or owned by a State Government: Provided that if the Central Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of, local or other authorities or corporations 1 [or societies]. (3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authority or corporation 1 [or society], all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme Court 2***) in relation to— (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation 1 [or society]; and (b) all service matters concerning a person [other than a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)] appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation 1 [or society] and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs.” 22. It is evident from Section 14 that the Tribunal so constituted has got jurisdiction and power with respect to recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian. Sub-section (b) of Section 14(1) provides that all service matters concerning (i) a member of any All-India Service; or (ii) a person [not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)] appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; or (iii) a civilian [not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)] appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 enlarges the scope of Section 14 by conferment of power upon the Central Government who by specific notification may include the local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to corporations owned or controlled by Government, not being a local or other authority or corporation controlled or owned by a State Government. 23. It is, thus, evident that Section 14 of the Act, 1985 is not having the inclusive provision rather it is exclusive provision by broadening the scope of the aforesaid provision that has been referred in Section 14(1)(b) & (c) and furthermore, if the appropriate Government thinks it proper, to incorporate other corporation or the authorities, local or other authorities, under the control of the Government of India. 24. There is no dispute about the fact that in view of Section 14(2) of the Act, 1985, the Government of India has brought various establishment under the fold of the Act, 1985. 25. Herein, the respondent is Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Limited (WAPCOS Ltd.). It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said corporation is under the control of the Central Government. 26. It is also admitted fact that the person working under the corporation, therefore, cannot be construed to be holder of civil post under the Union rather they have been said to be working under a corporation under the control of the Central Government. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal so as to exercise it in view of the provision of Section 14(1) is not there rather jurisdiction will only be said to be there if there is any notification having been issued by the Central Government in view of the provision of Section 14(2) of the Act, 1985. 27. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal so as to exercise it in view of the provision of Section 14(1) is not there rather jurisdiction will only be said to be there if there is any notification having been issued by the Central Government in view of the provision of Section 14(2) of the Act, 1985. 27. Further, it is admitted fact that there is no separate notification of the Central Government under Section 14(2) bringing the establishment, respondent nos.2-4 within the fold of the Act, 1985 by way of creating a forum of first instance under the statutory provision. 28. Thus, it is evident that the writ petitioner since is not the holder of civil post under the Union Government, hence, the forum as created under the Act, 1985 cannot be said to be appropriate forum. 29. The second question which requires consideration is that if the issue of jurisdiction has not been taken before the learned Tribunal and if on wrong perception any order has been passed by the Tribunal assuming the jurisdiction, can it not be entertained by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to rectify the error committed by the Tribunal. 30. The law is well settled that the issue of jurisdiction goes to the root of the lis and if the jurisdictional issue even if not raised before the court of first instance rather it has been raised before the higher forum, then also, it is the bounden duty of the higher forum to answer the issue of jurisdiction so that the illegality if at all has been committed by the court of first instance, be not allowed to be perpetuated. 31. The law in this regard is well settled that illegality if comes to the notice of the court of law higher in forum, then it is to be rectified on the principle that illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , wherein at paragraphs-56 and 57 it has been observed which reads as under: “56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , wherein at paragraphs-56 and 57 it has been observed which reads as under: “56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief.) 57. This principle also applies to judicial pronouncements. Once the court comes to the conclusion that a wrong order has been passed, it becomes the solemn duty of the court to rectify the mistake rather than perpetuate the same. While dealing with a similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P. [1993 Supp (4) SCC 536 : AIR 1993 SC 1048 ] observed as under : (SCC p. 551, para 12) “12. … ‘2. … To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this, we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter [1 NY 3 (1847) : A.M.Y. p. 18] at p. 18: “a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible and, therefore, ever ready to learn : great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead : and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors.”” 32. Herein, this Court needs to make comment upon the respondent that whatever ground has been taken by the respondent in the counter affidavit regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the order passed by the learned Tribunal ought to have been challenged before the higher forum but reason best known to the respondent as to why the order passed by the learned Tribunal has not been challenged before higher forum. 33. Be that as it may, we being a Court of Law and exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is duty bound to rectify the thing if any illegality in deciding the issue has crept up and that is the spirit of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The basic spirit is that nobody can be allowed to ingrace or outgrace their jurisdiction. 34. The basic spirit is that nobody can be allowed to ingrace or outgrace their jurisdiction. 34. Herein, although the lack of jurisdiction was not raised before the learned Tribunal but can in such circumstances, the order even though has been passed against the petitioner, can be said to be justified. 35. We are not with respect to the merit of the issue rather we, herein, are on the ground of jurisdiction which has been committed by the learned Tribunal in absence of any notification required to be issued under Section 14(2) of the Act, 1985. Since the jurisdictional issue goes to the root and when no jurisdiction has been conferred to the learned Tribunal any decision or even entertaining a lis will be said to be an illegal exercise. 36. This Court is making an observation by taking the word “illegal exercise” that illegality will be said to be a term which is incurable. The issue of jurisdiction is such an illegality which cannot be cured. This Court taking into consideration the aforesaid issue legal issue as also by making reference of the order passed by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 wherein at paragraph-99 it has been observed that the power of judicial review has been conferred to the High Court to be exercised under Article 226. The concept of judicial review is not only on the basis of the perversity but also on the ground of jurisdiction. Paragraph-99 of the said judgment reads as under: “99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 37. The law is well settled so far as the power which is to be exercised under the power of judicial review, as per the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Ors Vrs. Abdul Halim & Ors., reported in (2019) 18 SCC 39 , wherein, at paragraph-30 it has been held as under:- “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 . If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.” 38. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.C. Basappa Versus T. Nagappa, reported in (1955) 1 SCR 250 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e. g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.” 39. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the power of judicial review is to be exercised if the error apparent on the face of such order. 40. This Court is also required to refer herein that there is no dispute about the settled position of law that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of proceeding since the jurisdiction goes to the root of the lis. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balvant N. Viswamitra & Ors Vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (Dead) through LRs [(2007) 8 SCC 706], in particular paragraph 9, which reads as under: “9. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the decree passed by the trial court can be said to be “null” and “void”. In our opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The distinction between a decree which is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored. In our opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The distinction between a decree which is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored. Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a court or an authority having no jurisdiction is a nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings.” (emphasis supplied) 41. It is further settled position of law that even right decision by a wrong forum is no decision as has been held by Hon’ble in Pandurang & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (1986)4 SCC 436 ]. For ready reference, relevant paragraph 4 thereof is quoted as under: “4. When a matter required to be decided by a Division Bench of the High Court is decided by a learned Single Judge, the judgment would be a nullity, the matter having been heard by a court which had no competence to hear the matter, it being a matter of total lack of jurisdiction. The accused was entitled to be heard by at least two learned Judges constituting a Division Bench and had a right to claim a verdict as regards his guilt or innocence at the hands of the two learned Judges. This right cannot be taken away except by amending the rules. So long as the rules are in operation it would be arbitrary and discriminatory to deny him this right regardless of whether it is done by reason of negligence or otherwise. Deliberately, it cannot be done. Negligence can neither be invoked as an alibi, nor can cure the infirmity or illegality, so as to rob the accused of his right under the rules. What can be done only by at least two learned Judges cannot be done by one learned Judge. Deliberately, it cannot be done. Negligence can neither be invoked as an alibi, nor can cure the infirmity or illegality, so as to rob the accused of his right under the rules. What can be done only by at least two learned Judges cannot be done by one learned Judge. Even if the decision is right on merits, it is by a forum which is lacking in competence with regard to the subject-matter. Even a “right” decision by a “wrong” forum is no decision. It is non-existent in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. The judgment under appeal is therefore no judgment in the eye of law. This Court in State of M.P. v. Dewadas [ (1982) 1 SCC 552 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 275 : AIR 1982 SC 800 : (1982) 3 SCR 81 ] has taken a view which reinforces our view. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and send the matter back to the High Court for being placed before a Division Bench of the High Court, which will afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides and dispose it of in accordance with law, expeditiously. We wish to add that the Registry of the High Court was expected to have realized the true position and ought not to have created a situation which resulted in waste of court time, once for hearing the appeal, and next time, to consider the effect of the rules. No court can afford this luxury with the mountain of arrears which every court is carrying these days.” 42. This Court, therefore, is of the view that since this Court has been conferred with the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to exercise the power of judicial review and based upon the discussion made hereinabove, the Tribunal having no jurisdiction to entertain a lis so far as the case of the present petitioner is concerned, as such, as per the principle to exercise the power of judicial review, this Court is of the view that the power of judicial review is fit to be exercised. 43. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside. 44. Now the issue will be that what would be the appropriate forum for the petitioner. 45. 43. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside. 44. Now the issue will be that what would be the appropriate forum for the petitioner. 45. It is settled that a litigant cannot be made remediless but the moment the Tribunal having not been conferred with the power to deal with the issue of the employees of the concerned establishment, i.e., WAPCOS Ltd., then the forum will be under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 46. To this, Mr. Pati is also in agreement. 47. Since we have only gone into the jurisdictional issue and not into the merit, accordingly, this Court is of the view that while holding the order passed by the learned Tribunal null and void, a liberty is being accorded to the petitioner to approach by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 48. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands disposed of.