JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.-The petitioners, who are teachers in the primary section of the Sri Dayanand Sanskrit Mahavidyalay, Ganeshpur, Maniar, Ballia, pray that a mandamus be issued commanding the respondents to pay their monthly salary in the regular grade, borne on State grant, with effect from the date of their respective appointments. They also pray that a command be issued to the respondents to pay them arrears of salary from the date of their appointment, including consequential benefits. 2. The Sri Dayanand Sanskrit Mahavidyalay, Ganeshpur, Maniar, Ballia (for short, 'the Institution') is a recognized and aided institution, that is managed by a registered society, to wit, the Sri Dayanand Sanskrit Mahavidyalay, Ganeshpur, Maniar, Ballia (for short, 'the Society'). The Institution imparts education in their primary section i.e. Classes I to V, as well as the Prathama i.e. Junior High School, the Purva Madhyama equivalent to High School in the modern system of education and the Uttar Madhyama, equivalent to Intermediate Education in the mainstream system. This apart, the Institution also has the Shastri Section, which is equivalent to Graduation in conventional education. All teachers, teaching in the Institution across various levels from Prathama and Purva Madhyama to Uttar Madhyama, that is to say, Junior High School to the Intermediate level, are paid salaries borne on State funds. The teachers of the primary section of the Institution are not paid salaries borne on State grant. They are paid by the Management out of their own resources. 3. The petitioners say that the primary section is an integral part of the Institution and managed by the same Committee of Management. There is absolutely no distinction regarding administrative control over the teaching staff in the primary section of the Institution and those in the Junior High School, High School and Intermediate levels. To prove that the primary section is an integral part of the Institution, the petitioners have placed on record a certificate dated 17.6.1981 issued by the Inspector, Sanskrit Pathshala. The case of the petitioners goes that in the year 1989, the State Government considered the provision of maintenance grant to fund salaries for teachers in the attached primary sections of conventional higher secondary institutions, where the primary section was recognized prior to the year 1973. The case of the petitioners goes that in the year 1989, the State Government considered the provision of maintenance grant to fund salaries for teachers in the attached primary sections of conventional higher secondary institutions, where the primary section was recognized prior to the year 1973. A Government Order dated 6.9.1989 was issued, notifying a list of 393 institutions in the conventional system of education, whose attached primary sections were brought on Government grant-in-aid. The petitioners then say that a letter dated 5.3.1991 was issued by the Director of Education addressed to the Inspector, Sanskrit Pathshala, seeking information regarding attached primary sections of Sanskrit Schools, so that these could be considered by the Government for the purpose of extension of grant-in-aid to fund salaries of their teachers. 4. The matter, though in the notice of the State Government, did not receive attention, on account of which the issue regarding payment of salary to teachers teaching in the attached primary sections of Sanskrit institutions, came up for consideration before this Court in Ramesh Upadhya and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1993 (2) AWC 847 : 1993 SCC OnLine All 21. In Ramesh Upadhya (supra), this Court issued a mandamus to the respondents to pay salary to the primary section teachers in Sanskrit Institutions throughout the State as done in the case of Primary School Teachers of High School and Intermediate Colleges. The State preferred a special leave petition, being Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2470 of 1994, to the Supreme Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 12.7.1995. The State Government made an application for review of the order dated 12.7.1995 before the Supreme Court, but the review application too was dismissed. 5. The petitioners' case is that after dismissal of the special leave petition and the review by the Supreme Court, the State is bound to carry out the mandamus issued by this Court, which is to the effect that payment of salary to teachers, working in attached primary sections of Sanskrit Institutions, shall be made throughout the State borne on Government grant. The petitioners say that they are appointed in accordance with law through letters of appointment in the primary section of the Institution i.e. by the Manager of the Committee of Management of the Institution. Petitioner Nos. The petitioners say that they are appointed in accordance with law through letters of appointment in the primary section of the Institution i.e. by the Manager of the Committee of Management of the Institution. Petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have pleaded their respective dates of letters of appointment in paragraph No. 16 of the writ petition. They also assert that they are still working on their respective posts. It is emphasized that they are drawing meager wages dependent upon the frail resources of a private management, instead of salaries borne on State grant. 6. It is also the petitioners' case that after several orders were passed by this Court reiterating directions in Ramesh Upadhya, some teachers in the attached primary sections of Sanskrit Institutions were paid salaries by the State, but these were stopped due to a reference made to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi and others, (2006) 7 SCC 745 , with regard to issue of payment of salaries borne on State grant, in case of primary section teachers of conventional institutions. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court decided the question referred with regard to primary sections of different Junior Basic Schools, Junior High Schools and Intermediate College, including recognized Sanskrit Institutions. The petitioners say that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court decided the issue in favour of the primary section teachers in State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi and others, (2014) 9 SCC 692 , holding that the view taken by the Three Judge Bench in Vinod Sharma and others v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P. and others, (1998) 3 SCC 404 , was trite and held 'that Junior High School necessarily includes Classes I to V when they are opened in a Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII) after obtaining separate recognition and for which there may not be a separate order of grant-in-aid by the Government'.' 7. The petitioners' case, therefore, is that the issue with regard to entitlement of teachers of attached primary sections working in conventional institutions, including Sanskrit Institutions, that are already in receipt of grant-in-aid from the State, stands concluded in the petitioners' favour by the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi (supra). The petitioners' case, therefore, is that the issue with regard to entitlement of teachers of attached primary sections working in conventional institutions, including Sanskrit Institutions, that are already in receipt of grant-in-aid from the State, stands concluded in the petitioners' favour by the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi (supra). It is the petitioners' case that not paying them salary borne on State grant, though the primary section is an integral part of the Institution, which receives grant-in-aid for the payment of salary to teachers at the higher levels, is discriminatory and arbitrary. It is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioners claim that they are entitled to salary under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Junior High Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978 (for short, 'the Act of 1978'), which is applicable to assistant teachers, working in attached primary sections of conventional institutions. 8. A notice of motion was issued on 11.12.2014, but a counter-affidavit was not filed until 10.1.2023, when the District Inspector of Schools was summoned in person. He filed a short counter-affidavit. This short counter-affidavit is one on behalf of respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5. The State have not chosen to file a counter-affidavit, despite a lapse of more than nine years, until time when this petition was heard. The petitioners filed a rejoinder to the short counter-affidavit and on 23.11.2023, this petition was admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. After substantial hearing on that date, the cause was adjourned to 7.12.2023. On 7.12.2023, submissions of parties were concluded and judgment reserved. 9. Heard Mr. Santosh Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 10. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5, that is to say, the Director of Education, Secondary Education (Sanskrit), U.P., the Deputy Director of Education, Secondary Education (Sanskrit), U.P. and the District Inspector of Schools, Ballia (for short, 'the DIOS'), the stand taken is that after enforcement of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education Act, 2000 (for short, 'the Act of 2000') w.e.f. 30.9.2000, a separate Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education was established. There are only five examinations that are conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education (for short, 'the Sanskrit Board'). There are only five examinations that are conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education (for short, 'the Sanskrit Board'). These are shown in tabular form with their equivalent to classes/courses in the conventional system of education. The said table is depicted below: ‘Prathama’ Class – 8 (Junior High School) ‘Poorva Madhyama Pratham’ Class – 9 ‘Poorva Madhyama Dwitiya’ Class – 10 (High School) ‘Uttar Madhyama Prathama’ Class – 11 ‘Uttar Madhyama Dwitiya’ Class – 12 (Intermediate) 11. The stand taken is that the Sanskrit Board does not recognize institutions, which impart education from Classes I to V in the Sanskrit Medium. The Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi (for short, 'the Sanskrit University') is said to be the University, which recognizes and grants affiliation to institutions imparting education in the Sanskrit Medium. The case of the respondents goes to the effect that the first statute of the Sanskrit University also says that the University recognizes and grants affiliation to institutions which run courses in Sanskrit Medium, leading to Post-graduation i.e. Acharya, Graduation i.e. Shastri, Uttar Madhyama and Purva Madhyama i.e. Classes XII and X, respectively. The Institution is recognized and affiliated to impart education in Sanskrit by the Sanskrit University in terms of its first statute, and, therefore, on the grant-in-aid list of the State. The Institution is managed and controlled by a private management. The services of teachers and non-teaching staff of the Institution would be governed by the Uttar Pradesh Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education (Appointment and Conditions of Service of Heads of Institution, Teachers and other Employees of the Institutions) Rules, 2009 (for short, 'the Rules of 2009') read with the first statute of the Sanskrit University. 12. It is the respondents' further case that there is no provision either in the Rules of 2009 or the first statute of the University, making provision for imparting education from Classes I to V in the Sanskrit Medium. The respondents, therefore, say that the petitioners' case for provision of grant to the primary section of the Institution, where education is imparted from Classes I to V, is absolutely baseless. No aid can be provided to a Sanskrit Institution at that level. 13. The respondents, therefore, say that the petitioners' case for provision of grant to the primary section of the Institution, where education is imparted from Classes I to V, is absolutely baseless. No aid can be provided to a Sanskrit Institution at that level. 13. The issue regarding entitlement of teachers, imparting education in the attached primary sections of Junior High Schools, High Schools and Intermediate Colleges under the conventional system of education and those teaching in attached primary sections of Sanskrit Vidyalayas, to receive salaries borne on State grant, has been the subject-matter of much litigation. There has been one common feature, both in institutions imparting education under the conventional system and those teaching in the Sanskrit Medium, and, that is the resistance of the State to extend maintenance grant to attached primary sections, teaching Classes I to V, where the Institution was a private aided institution, teaching higher classes as well. In case of conventional institutions, this resistance was sought to be justified on the reasoning that except for certain specified institutions, where the attached primary sections had been recognized prior to 1973 and included in the list appended to the Government Order dated 6.9.1989, the Government having taken over the entire responsibility of primary education from Classes I to V upon establishment of the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972 (for short, 'the Act of 1972'), there was no residual responsibility left in private hands by the State to provide primary education to children. 14. The Government had taken upon itself the responsibility of securing primary education from Classes I to V in its entirety. The exception for older attached primary sections, as a one time measure, was provided by Government Order dated 6.9.1989, because these institutions dated back to a time when the State Government had not taken the entire responsibility upon itself through a State establishment, that is to say, the Board of Basic Education. Education was always regarded essentially as a public function up to the School, or so to speak, the Intermediate Level, the responsibility wherefor rested entirely with the State. Education was always regarded essentially as a public function up to the School, or so to speak, the Intermediate Level, the responsibility wherefor rested entirely with the State. Since the State found itself deficient in providing education to all, from Junior High School Level onwards, it shared this public duty with private hands, willing to undertake the enterprise, and subject to regulations of the State, expressed in Statutes, extended grant-in-aid to institutions, imparting education from Classes VI to XII, to wit, the Junior High Schools, the High Schools and the Intermediate Colleges. It is not that the State Government did not have institution of its own to impart this level of education, but the Government was not in a position to provide it for the whole of the population, which it goes without saying, up to the Intermediate Level, had to be compulsorily educated. Therefore, for the residual responsibility, which it could not undertake, as already said, the State Government enacted Statutes, regulating standards in private institutions, that were funded by it through maintenance grants, making elaborate provision for securing payment of salaries to their teachers and other staff out of the Exchequer. Insofar as payment of salary is concerned, the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (for short, 'the Act of 1971') and the Act of 1978, provide for and regulate the entitlement to salaries borne on State grant, paid to teachers and other staff of educational institutions. These Statutes do not at all mention primary sections attached to Junior High Schools, High Schools or Intermediate Colleges. That responsibility has already been taken over by the State, as already said, with the establishment of the Basic Education Board in the year 1972. 15. So far as the Sanskrit Education was concerned, there was similar resistance to fund primary education, though this was an entirely different system, which was not at all taken care of by the conventional education system. The Sanskrit Vidyalayas were recognized and regulated by the Government Sanskrit College, Varanasi or the Sanskrit University. The power to confer certificates or degrees always flows from statutes. The certification in Sanskrit Education started from the Prathama Education Examination, which was the first level graduation, followed by Madhyama and Uttar Madhyama. 16. The Sanskrit Vidyalayas were recognized and regulated by the Government Sanskrit College, Varanasi or the Sanskrit University. The power to confer certificates or degrees always flows from statutes. The certification in Sanskrit Education started from the Prathama Education Examination, which was the first level graduation, followed by Madhyama and Uttar Madhyama. 16. Admittedly, Prathama corresponds to Class VIII, Madhyama, or it is more properly called Purva Madhya corresponds to Class X and Uttar Madhyama corresponds to Class XII. Since classes lower than VIII, X or XII were not graduating classes, needing the issue of a certificate, it is but obvious that the statutes of the Sanskrit University did not mention these lower classes. Even in the conventional system of education, no Board of Education or University mentions Classes I to V. These are not classes of Graduation or Certification. But, this does not mean that Classes I to V, that are the most essential part of any system of education, most descriptively called primary education, do not exist. It is on the stepping stone of this foundational education of the first five years that the edifice of the later, higher and certified education rests. 17. It is in the background of these postulates quite unwritten that the learned Single Judge in Ramesh Upadhya addressed the issue of entitlement of teachers engaged in teaching Classes I to V in the primary section of a Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya to receive salaries borne on State grant. The facts in Ramesh Upadhya can best be recapitulated by a reference to the way these have been mentioned in the report. These read : ''1. This writ petition has been filed with a prayer for mandamus directing the respondents to pay salary to the petitioners in regular grade with effect from 1.10.1989 and to provide other consequential benefits to the petitioners. The petitioners are teachers of the primary section of Sri Alpeshwarnath Sanskrit Maha Vidyalaya, Janewar, Fatehganj, Jaunpur which is a recognised Sanskrit Institution imparting education for the Primary Section, Junior High School, Purva Madhyama (High School), Uttar Madhyama (Intermediate) and Shastri (B.A.) section. The Maha Vidyalaya is thus imparting education from Class I upto graduate level and it is a recognised institution affiliated to Sampurnanand Shastri University, Varanasi. The Maha Vidyalaya is thus imparting education from Class I upto graduate level and it is a recognised institution affiliated to Sampurnanand Shastri University, Varanasi. The teachers of the institution teaching in the Junior High School Section, High School, Intermediate and Bachelor of Arts Section are paid salary through State funds i.e., by the State Government. It is only teachers teaching in the primary section (such as the petitioners) who are not paid salary through State funds, and they are paid salary through the private resources of the institution is on the maintenance grant in-aid list of the State Government. The primary section of the institution has been duly approved by the District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur on 23.4.1958. In this connection the certificate of the District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur dated 17.3.1971 is Annexure-2 to the petition. The certificate of the Banaras Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya stating that the institution is recognised upto B.A. level (Shastri) is Annexure-3 to the petition. 2. The petitioners who are teaching in the primary section are getting salary of only Rs. 250/- per month as is evident from the certificate of the Manager dated 2.7.1990 (Annexure-4 to the petition). The State does not pay salary to the teachers of the primary section but is only gives some nominal compensation as is evident from Annexures-5 and 6. This compensation as clearly not sufficient to pay adequate salary to the teachers of the primary section. For example in the petitioners' institution the compensation grant for the year 1986-1987 was Rs. 2,844/-, for the year 1987-1988 was Rs. 2,914/- and for 1988-1989 was again Rs. 2,914/-. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not tell me whether there are any other teachers in the primary section apart from the two petitioners, but even if there are no other such teachers the compensation would give the petitioner about only Rs. 125/- per month, which in these hand days of inflation is next to nothing. The petitioners have been teaching since 1972-1973 i.e., for 20 years. .....'' 18. In repelling the contention of the State that the State paying salaries to teachers in Sanskrit Vidyalaya borne on State grant from the Junior High School level, or as it is called, the Prathama, but not for classes lower down, is a matter of policy, against which, no right can be pleaded, this Court in Ramesh Upadhya held: ''3. ..... In repelling the contention of the State that the State paying salaries to teachers in Sanskrit Vidyalaya borne on State grant from the Junior High School level, or as it is called, the Prathama, but not for classes lower down, is a matter of policy, against which, no right can be pleaded, this Court in Ramesh Upadhya held: ''3. ..... In Paragraph-4 thereof it has been stated that the demand of the petitioners is a matter of policy of the State Government. In my opinion this is no reply to the allegations of the petitioners. No policy can violate Article 14 of the Constitution. In the present case Article 14 of the Constitution has been violated since the petitioners have been discriminated against in two ways. Firstly, the teachers of the Sanskrit institutions from Junior High School level upto post graduate level are admittedly being paid salary through the State Government, and hence there is no basis for not paying the primary section teachers also through the State. After all, the foundation of knowledge is laid in the primary section, and if the foundation is weak the edifice built it cannot be strong. Hence there is no rational basis for discriminating against primary section teachers in the matter of salaries. Secondly, there is no good reason for discriminating against primary section teachers of Sanskrit institutions as against Primary Section Teachers of other institutions.'' 19. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, this Court issued a mandamus in Ramesh Upadhya, which reads : ''15. In the circumstances the writ petition is allowed and a mandamus is issued directing the respondents to pay salary to the primary section teachers in Sanskrit institution through the State as is done in the case of primary school teachers of High School and Intermediate Colleges. Also, the salaries be paid to the former must be the same as that paid to the latter. The petitioners will also be entitled to other consequential benefits like group insurance, General Provident Fund, retirement benefits etc., which are being made available to the primary section teachers in High School and Intermediate Colleges.'' 20. Also, the salaries be paid to the former must be the same as that paid to the latter. The petitioners will also be entitled to other consequential benefits like group insurance, General Provident Fund, retirement benefits etc., which are being made available to the primary section teachers in High School and Intermediate Colleges.'' 20. This Court may pause here and say that the mandamus that was issued by this Court in Ramesh Upadhya does not spare the slightest of doubt that it was not in personam or inter partes but a general mandamus that commanded the State to pay salary to the primary section teachers in Sanskrit institutions throughout the State, as done in the case of primary section teachers of High Schools and Intermediate Colleges. 21. Now, this Court may say that there was a similar issue at that time, which did not settle down easily as regards the entitlement of teachers in the attached primary section of High School and Intermediate Colleges to receive salaries borne on the State grant. Therefore, the mandamus issued in Ramesh Upadhya has to be understood, as a general command in regard to teachers of attached primary sections of Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya, where the Prathama and higher sections were in receipt of a maintenance grant for the payment of salary to teachers. 22. The State Government challenged the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Upadhya before the Supreme Court by means of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2470 of 1994, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 12.7.1995. The mandamus, therefore, issued in Ramesh Upadhya binds the State vis-à-vis every beneficiary teacher teaching in the attached primary section of a Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya, where the Prathama or the higher sections are in receipt of maintenance grant for the payment of salary to their teachers. There is no other way to limit or curtail the operation of the general mandamus issued in Ramesh Upadhyay, which has since attained finality against the State and in favour of teachers teaching in attached primary section as aforesaid, throughout the State of U.P. This issue fell for consideration much later before this Court in Markanday Mani v. State of U.P. and others, 2018(3) ADJ 246 . Now, Markanday Mani (supra) was a case which arose out of a claim by the petitioner seeking payment of post-retiral benefits including pension. Now, Markanday Mani (supra) was a case which arose out of a claim by the petitioner seeking payment of post-retiral benefits including pension. The petitioner in Markanday Mani was also a teacher in the attached primary section of a Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya, but after litigating over his rights to receive salary borne on State grant, had succeeded in securing the payment of salary under the provisions of the Act of 1978. Similarly situate teachers also drew salary borne on State grant, but when the petitioner retired, his post-retiral benefits and pension were denied on the pretext that there was no Government Order or departmental order making provision for the grant of pensionary or other post-retiral benefits in case of teachers of attached primary sections, part of Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya, where the higher sections were in receipt of a maintenance grant. 23. Now, by the time Markanday Mani came to be decided, there was a change to the statutory framework governing the regulation and control of Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya. The Act of 2000 came to be passed by the State Legislature and enforced with effect from 30.9.2000. It constituted a Board called the Sanskrit Board vide Section 3 and made elaborate provision for many things, including the conferment of powers on the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act, vide Section 34. It also conferred powers upon the Sanskrit Board, constituted under the Act of 2000, to make regulations under Sections 21 and 26. Section 21 read with Section 26 empowers the Board to make regulations to deal with scales of pay and payment of salaries to the heads of institutions, teachers and other employees. Section 13 of the Act of 2000 gave it overriding effect over the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, in particular, and any other U.P. Act, from the date of commencement of this Act. Section 13 further made provision that upon enforcement of the Act of 2000, the Sanskrit Vidyalaya imparting Sanskrit Education up to Prathama, affiliated to or recognized by the Sanskrit University, shall be deemed to have been recognized by the Sanskrit Board under the Act of 2000 and shall cease to be affiliated or recognized by the Sanskrit University. Section 13 further made provision that upon enforcement of the Act of 2000, the Sanskrit Vidyalaya imparting Sanskrit Education up to Prathama, affiliated to or recognized by the Sanskrit University, shall be deemed to have been recognized by the Sanskrit Board under the Act of 2000 and shall cease to be affiliated or recognized by the Sanskrit University. Thus, regulation of all educational institutions up to the level of Uttar Madhyama fell within the purview of the Act of 2000 with effect from 30.9.2000, whereas, all Mahavidyalaya courses leading to the award of Shastri, Acharya degrees fell to the province of the Sanskrit University to be governed by the first statute of the said University. It was in the background of these statutory changes that in Markanday Mani, this Court held: ''9. Undisputedly, the institution in question is a recognized institution under the first Statute of Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya which was established under the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973. The petitioner was working as Assistant Teacher in the primary section attached to the aforesaid Sanskrit institution. The Uttar Pradesh Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education Act 2000 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 2000') was enacted which came into force w.e.f. 30.9.2000. Section 2(f) of the Act 2000 defines the word ''institution'' to mean a Sanskrit School imparting Sanskrit Education upto Uttar Madhayama recognised by the Board. Section 13 of the Act 2000, provides for automatic recognition to certain institution which covers the institution in question. Section 13 of the Act 2000 is reproduced below: ''Notwithstanding anything contained in the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 or any other Uttar Pradesh Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, all the institutions, situated in the State, immediately before such commencement including Government Sanskrit Schools, imparting Sanskrit education up to Uttar Madhyama, affiliated to or recognised by the Government Sanskrit College, Varanasi or Sampumanand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi shall be deemed to have been recognised by the Board under this Act and shall cease to be affiliated to or recognised by the said Government College or Vishwavidyalayas and shall be governed by the provisions of this Act; Provided that the said Government college or Vishwavidyalaya shall hold examination of persons pursuing Prathama, Purva Madhyama or Uttar Madhyama courses of study in such institution immediately before such commencement and shall have power to grant diploma or certificate to such persons. 10. 10. Section 26 of the Act provides for service conditions of persons employed in an institution as may be prescribed by regulation. On being asked learned Additional Advocate General states that no regulation under Section 26 of the Act 2000 has been framed by the State Government so far. 11. In view of the fact and legal position as noted above, there remains no dispute that the institution in question is a recognised institution to which The Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1971') and The Uttar Pradesh Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 1978') are applicable. 12. The definition of the word ''institution'' given in Section 2(b) of the Act 1971 and Section 2(e) of the Act 1978 specifically includes Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya or a Sanskrit Vidyalaya receiving maintenance grant from the State Government. 13. In the case of Ramesh Upadhya (supra) the facts were that the petitioners in that case were teachers of primary section of ''Sri Alpeshwarnath Sanskrit Maha Vidyalaya Janewar, Fatehganj, Jaunpur'' which was the recognised Sanskrit Institution imparting education for primary section, Junior High School, Purva Madhyama (High School), Uttar Madhyama (Intermediate) and Shastri (B.A.). Thus that institution like the institution involved in the present writ petition, are imparting education from Class 1 upto graduate level and are recognised institution affiliated to Sampurnand Sanskrit University, Varanasi. In the aforesaid case teachers of ''Alpeshwarnath Sanskrit Maha Vidyalaya'' were aggrieved with non payment of salary to primary section teachers in Sanskrit institution from the State fund and as such they filed the aforesaid writ petition i.e. Ramesh Upadhya (supra) which was allowed by this Court and a general mandamus was issued as under: ''In the circumstances the writ petition is allowed and a mandamus is issued directing the Respondents to pay salary to the primary section teachers in Sanskrit institutions through the State as is done in case of primary school teachers of High School and Intermediate College. Also, the salaries to be paid to the former must be the same as that paid to the latter, i.e. in accordance with the G.O. dated 28.2.90 and 6.9.90 as amended. The petitioners will also be entitled to other consequential benefits like group insurance, General Provident Fund, retirement benefits etc. Also, the salaries to be paid to the former must be the same as that paid to the latter, i.e. in accordance with the G.O. dated 28.2.90 and 6.9.90 as amended. The petitioners will also be entitled to other consequential benefits like group insurance, General Provident Fund, retirement benefits etc. which are being made available to the Primary section teachers in High School and Intermediate Colleges.'' (Emphasis supplied by me) 14. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment in the case of Ramesh Upadhya (supra) the State of U.P. preferred a Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 2470 of 1994 (State of U.P. v. Ramesh Upadhyay and others) which was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court by order dated 12.7.1995. Despite a general mandamus having been issued by this Court in the case of Ramesh Upadhya (supra) the State respondents were not extending the benefits and were not obeying the general mandamus and as such certain teachers including the petitioner falling under the same class filed a writ petition before this Court which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge in limine. Against that order the petitioner and others filed a Special Appeal No. 558 of 1993 (Sant Prasad Mani and 16 others v. State of U.P. and others) which was allowed holding as under: ''We have perused the impugned order, memo of appeal and other documents annexed to it. We are satisfied that this case is covered by the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Upadhyay's case (supra). In the impugned order the learned Single Judge has not even referred to the said judgment, even though as submitted by Sri Padia a copy of the judgment dated 18.1.1993 was annexed as annexure to the writ petition. As noted earlier the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition in limine merely holding that the petitioners should approach the Vice Chancellor of the University first. In the facts and circumstances of this case discussed above the impugned order is unsustainable in law. Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The order dated 15.5.1993 is set aside and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993 is allowed in terms of the Judgment dated 18.1.1993 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29290 of 1990 (Ramesh Upadhyay v. State of U.P. and others).'' (Emphasis supplied by me) 15. Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The order dated 15.5.1993 is set aside and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993 is allowed in terms of the Judgment dated 18.1.1993 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29290 of 1990 (Ramesh Upadhyay v. State of U.P. and others).'' (Emphasis supplied by me) 15. Thus in view of the aforequoted Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of the present petitioner, the respondents were bound to pay salary to the petitioner as admissible to primary school teachers of High School and Intermediate. The salary was to be paid in accordance with the G.O. dated 28.2.1990 and 6.9.1990 as amended and all consequential benefits like group insurance, general provident fund and retirements benefits etc. as are being made available to primary section teachers of high school and intermediate colleges are also to be paid to the petitioners. Despite this settled legal position the State-respondents have not only arbitrarily and illegally rejected the representation of the petitioner by the impugned order but also shown disobedience to the orders and directions issued by this Court in the case of Ramesh Upadhya (supra) and Sant Prasad Mani (supra) in which the petitioner herein was petitioner No. 3. 16. Under the circumstances, the impugned order dated 1.12.2012 passed by the Joint Director of Education 7th Division, Gorakhpur cannot be sustained and is, therefore, quashed. Direction is issued to the State-respondents to extend all benefits to the petitioner in terms of the judgments in the case of Ramesh Upadhya (supra) and Sant Prasad Mani (supra). Whether action of the State-respondents is violative of Article 14 17. In the case of State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi and others, (2014) 9 SCC 692 , Hon'ble Supreme Court noted the fact that in one of the appeals a recognised Sanskrit institution affiliated to the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi is involved which is imparting education from Class 1 upto graduate level. In the case of State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi and others, (2014) 9 SCC 692 , Hon'ble Supreme Court noted the fact that in one of the appeals a recognised Sanskrit institution affiliated to the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi is involved which is imparting education from Class 1 upto graduate level. Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to the law laid down by Constitution Bench in J.P. Unnikrishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 (para 172), eleven-Judge Constitution Bench judgment in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 (question No. 9) and in Mohni Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666 , and provisions of Article 45 and subsequently inserted Article 21-A of the Constitution, highlighted the importance of primary education and primary educational institution, the provisions of the Act 1971 and the Act 1978 and held as under : ''43. It is important to notice here that recognised Junior High Schools can be of three kinds: (one) having Classes I to VIII, i.e., Classes I to V (Junior Basic School) and so also Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic School), (two) a school as above and upgraded to High School or intermediate standard and (three) Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic School) initially with no Junior Basic School (Classes I to V) being part of the said school. 44. As regards the first two categories of Junior High Schools, the applicability of Section 10 of the 1978 Act does not create any difficulty. The debate which has centered round in this group of appeals is in respect of third category of the schools where Classes I to V are added after obtaining recognition to the schools which are recognized and aided for imparting education in Classes VI to VIII. Whether teachers of primary section Classes I to V in such schools are entitled to the benefit of Section 10 of the 1978 Act is the moot question. As noticed, the constitutional obligation of the state to provide for free and compulsory education of children till they complete the age of 14 years is beyond doubt now. The note appended to clause (xxvi), para 1 of the Educational Code (revised edition, 1958), inter alia, provides that Basic Schools include single schools with Classes I to VIII. As noticed, the constitutional obligation of the state to provide for free and compulsory education of children till they complete the age of 14 years is beyond doubt now. The note appended to clause (xxvi), para 1 of the Educational Code (revised edition, 1958), inter alia, provides that Basic Schools include single schools with Classes I to VIII. In our view, if a Junior Basic School (Classes I to V) is added after obtaining necessary recognition to a recognized and aided Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII), then surely such Junior Basic School becomes integral part of one school, i.e., Basic School having Classes I to VIII. The expression ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Act is intended to refer to the schools imparting basic education, i.e., education up to VIII class. We do not think it is appropriate to give narrow meaning to the expression ''Junior High School'' as contended by the learned senior counsel for the state. That Legislature used the expression Junior High School and not the Basic School as used and defined in the 1972 Act, in our view, is insignificant. The view, which we have taken, is fortified by the fact that in Section 2(j) of the 1978 Act, the expressions defined in the 1972 Act are incorporated.'' (Emphasis supplied by me) 18. In Writ - A No. 2702 of 2016, C/M Mahant Triveni Parvat Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya and another v. State of U.P. and two others decided on 21.1.2016 this Court observed as under: The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi and others, (2014) 9 SCC 692 and in Civil Appeal No. 3989 of 2006 (State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Dwivedi and others) dated 2nd September, 2014, has held that the attached Primary Institution of a recognized institution is also entitled for the payment of salary to the teachers and non teaching staff from the State Fund. A Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal Defective No. 994 of 2014 (Paripurna Nand Tripathi and another v. State of U.P. and 20 others), following the said cases and considering the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, has issued a direction to the State Government to reconsider its existing guidelines in respect of grant-in-aid to the attached Primary Institution. The relevant part of the order reads as under : ''After the enactment of the Act, 2009 and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra), Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust (supra) and State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi and others, we are of the view that the State Government may revisit its age old policy in the light of the constitutional amendment and the law laid down by the Supreme Court on the subject. Undoubtedly, now it is the State's responsibility to provide free and compulsory education to the children of the age of six to fourteen years. Private institutions, which are imparting education to children of the said age group, in fact, are performing and sharing the obligations of the State. Therefore, an obligation is cast upon the State Government not only to provide the grant-in-aid to such institutions but to provide infrastructure also subject to reasonable conditions laid down by it. Providing education to the children of the age of six to fourteen years shall be a mirage unless qualitative education is provided to them. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, the large majority of children of the said age group come from the marginalized sections of the society. Most of the institutions providing primary and basic education are situated in rural and semi-urban areas. To provide quality education it is necessary that trained and competent teachers are appointed and necessary infrastructure is also made available to such institutions. The teachers in private unaided institutions are working in pitiable conditions. No good teacher would like to work in such institutions. Thus, the students will be deprived of quality education.'' 24. Now, the higher principles about the obligation of the State to fund primary education and education for children up to the age of 14 years based on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, (1993) 1 SCC 645 , or for that matter, the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi (supra) will be alluded to a little later in this judgment, in order to show the impact of those principles upon the issues that arise here. 25. 25. It must be remarked that though we are in complete agreement with the principles on which his Lordship has reasoned in Markanday Mani, we may point out that the remark in paragraph No. 10 of the report in Markanday Mani, which says that the learned Additional Advocate General states that no regulation under Section 26 of the Act of 2000 has been framed by the State Government so far, is not accurate for a statement of fact. In fact, in exercise of powers under Section 26 of the Act of 2000, the Sanskrit Board have framed the Rules of 2009, which, though called rules, are, in fact, regulations. It has also been somewhat inaccurately said in paragraph No. 10 of the report in Markanday Mani that the regulations under the Act of 2000 have to be framed by the State, which they have not done. Regulations under Section 26 have to be framed by the Sanskrit Board, and not the State Government, and these have already been framed long back and come into force upon their publication in the Official Gazette with effect from 25.1.2010. 26. Notwithstanding this factual inaccuracy in the remarks carried in paragraph No. 10 of the report in Markanday Mani, the fact remains that by 'institutions' as defined under the Act of 2000, what is meant is a Sanskrit School imparting Sanskrit education up to the Uttar Madhyama recognized by the Sanskrit Board. It is also trite for a principle as held in Markanday Mani that by virtue of Section 13, there is an automatic recognition under the Act of 2000 for a Sanskrit Vidyalaya imparting education in Sanskrit up to the Uttar Madhyama, which were hitherto recognized and regulated by the Sanskrit University. 27. The same view as that in Markanday Mani has been endorsed by a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and others v. Tarkeshwar Nath Singh and others, 2015(3) ADJ 591 (DB). Tarkeshwar Nath Singh (supra) also related to a claim by teachers of the primary section of the Sri Amar Sanskrit Vidyalaya, Khejuri, District Ballia to payment of salary borne on State grant. The Division Bench in Tarkeshwar Nath Singh, relying upon the principle in Ramesh Upadhyay (supra), and, more particularly, the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi, after noticing paragraph Nos. 44, 45 and 46 of the report, held: ''5. We have considered the rival submissions. The Division Bench in Tarkeshwar Nath Singh, relying upon the principle in Ramesh Upadhyay (supra), and, more particularly, the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi, after noticing paragraph Nos. 44, 45 and 46 of the report, held: ''5. We have considered the rival submissions. So far as claim of the petitioners are that they are entitled for the salary similar to the teachers of the High School and Intermediate College under 1978 Act is concerned, issue is no more res integra. It is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court referred hereinabove. Therefore, the view of learned Single Judge is liable to be affirmed. However, a question whether the petitioners in the writ petitions are validly appointed teachers, has not been adjudicated at any stage. Therefore, we direct the authority concerned to examine the appointment of the petitioners and in case appointments of the petitioners are found to be in accordance to the law, the salary may be paid and in case if the authority concerned may arrive to the conclusion after giving opportunity to the hearing to the petitioners that they are not legally appointed, a reasoned order may be passed in this regard and in such circumstances, the petitioners may not be entitled for the salary in accordance to the law laid down by the Court.'' 28. There is a diametrically opposite view to that in Markanday Mani and Tarkeshwar Nath Singh taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Satish Chandra and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2019(12) ADJ 90 . In Satish Chandra (supra), the question, that was considered by the Court, finds mention in paragraph No. 8 of the report, which reads: ''8. The question before this Court is as to whether the primary institution in question can be said to be attached institution or integral part of the institution which is imparting Sanskrit Education from ''Prathama'' to ''Acharya'' (Junior High Schools to Post Graduate Level) and that whether recognition by the District Basic Education Officer for running Classes I to V by itself put obligation on the State to pay to the teachers of the primary institution.'' 29. In answering the question the learned Judge in Satish Chandra observed : ''9. In answering the question the learned Judge in Satish Chandra observed : ''9. To appreciate the said controversy, it would be apt to go through the relevant provisions of a few statutory enactments and the rules framed by the Government from time to time. In 1921, the U.P. Intermediate Education Act' 1921 (in short Act' 1921) was enacted to establish the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, which took place of the Allahabad University in regulating and supervising the System of High School and Intermediate Education in U.P. and prescribed courses therefor. Section 2(a) of the Act' 1921 as amended in 1975 defines ''Board'' means the Board of High School and Intermediate Education and ''Institution'' defines in Section 2(b) means a recognized Intermediate College, Higher Secondary School or High School and includes, where the context so requires, a part of an institution. ''Recognition'' in Section 2(d) means recognition for the purpose of preparing candidates for admission to the Board's Examinations. 10. Section 7 sub-sections (3) and (4) confer power on the Board to conduct examination at the level of the High School and Intermediate courses and to recognize institutions for the purpose of its examination; respectively. The U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act' 1971 (U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971) was enacted to regulate the payment of salaries to teachers and other employees of the High School and Intermediate Colleges receiving aid out of the State fund and to provide for matters connected therewith. Section 2(b) of the Act' 1971 defines ''Institution'' which means a recognized institution receiving maintenance grant from the State Government and includes a Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya or a Sanskrit Vidayalaya receiving maintenance grant from the State Government. It provides power to the Inspector of School namely District Inspector of Schools to make supervision in the matter of payment of salary to the teachers and other employees of the institution receiving maintenance grant and take action against such management which failed to disburse salary and post retiral benefits within time. 11. The U.P. Board of Basic Education Act' 1972 (in short as the Act' 1972) provides for the establishment of the Board of Basic Education and for matters connected therewith. 11. The U.P. Board of Basic Education Act' 1972 (in short as the Act' 1972) provides for the establishment of the Board of Basic Education and for matters connected therewith. The object of the Act is to strengthen the Basic Education (Primary and Junior High School) by reorganizing, reforming and expanding elementary education and to increase their usefulness by taking control and management of the primary education-institution, which were earlier managed by the Local Bodies (such as Zila Parishad and Municipal Board and Mahapalika in the State of U.P.). The said Act came into being from the academic session 1972-73. The expression ''Basic Education'' defined in Act' 1972 means:- ''Education upto the eight class imparted in schools other than high schools or intermediate college, and the expression ''basic schools'' shall be construed accordingly'' 12. The definition of ''Junior Basic School'' and ''Junior High School'' in clauses (d-1) and (d-2) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 inserted by U.P. Act No. 2 of 2018, deemed to have come into force in August, 1972, provides the definition of the said expressions as follows:- 2(d-1)-''Junior Basic School'' means a basic school in which education in imparted upto class fifth.'' 2(d-2)-''Junior High School'' means a basic school in which education is imparted to boys or girls or to both from class sixth to class eighth.'' 13. One of the important functions of the Board as provided in Section 4 of Act' 1972 is to organize, co-ordinate and control the imparting of Basic Education. On coming into force of the said Act, the power of management, supervision and control over the Basic Schools defined in clauses (d-1) and (d-2) of sub-section (2), which before the appointed day was with the local bodies, stood transferred in respect of such school to the Board. 14. In exercise of powers under Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act' 1972, the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules' 1975 were framed. 14. In exercise of powers under Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act' 1972, the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules' 1975 were framed. The ''Junior Basic School'' defined therein is an institution other than the High Schools or Intermediate Colleges imparting education upto Class V. ''Recognized School'' defined in Rule 2(e) of Rules' 1975 means any ''Junior Basic School'', not being an institution belonging to or wholly maintained by the Board or any local body, recognized by the Board before the commencement of the Rules' 1975 for imparting education from Classes I to V. The ''Board'' in Rule 2(c) of the Rules' 1975 means the U.P. Board of Basic Education constituted under Section 3 of the Act and the ''District Basic Education Officer'' in Section 2(d) means the District Basic Education Officer appointed by the State Government. For the applicability of the Rules' 1975, Rule 3 provides that every ''recognized institution'' shall be bound by the conditions and restriction specified therein. Rule 4 says that every ''recognized school'' must posses adequate financial resources for its efficient working and adequate facilities in accordance with the standard specified by the Board for teaching the subjects in respect of which such school is recognized. Rule 5 to 8 of the Rules' 1975 regulate the requirement of building and equipment to run the school, tuition fee and text books needed as per the curriculum prescribed by the Board. Rule 9 deals with the appointment of teachers in a recognized school and provides that no person shall be appointed as teacher or other employee in any recognized school unless he possess such qualifications as specified in this behalf by the Board and for whose appointment the previous approval of the Basic Education Officer has been obtained in writing. The procedure for appointment as provided therein is by publication of vacancy in daily newspaper and approval of selection by the Basic Education Officer. As far as the salary of teachers is concerned, Rule 10 provides that every recognized school shall pay the same scale of pay, dearness allowance etc. as are being paid to the teachers and employees of the Board possessing similar qualification and the payment shall be disbursed through cheque. 15. As far as the salary of teachers is concerned, Rule 10 provides that every recognized school shall pay the same scale of pay, dearness allowance etc. as are being paid to the teachers and employees of the Board possessing similar qualification and the payment shall be disbursed through cheque. 15. The recognition is granted with the object to supervise the working of the management of the recognized school to meet the standards of primary education. 16. The U.P. Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act' 1978 came to be enacted by the U.P. Legislature to regulate the payment of salaries to the teachers and other employees of the junior high school receiving aid out of State fund and to provide for matters connected therewith. Clauses (b) and (d) of Section 2 of the Act' 1978 defines ''Education Officer'' as District Basic Education Officer appointed under the U.P. Basic Education Act' 1972 and ''Inspector'' means the District Inspector of Schools. Section 2(e) defines ''institution'' means a recognized Junior High School for the time being receiving maintenance grant from the State Government. Sub-section (2)(e-e) inserted by U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018 provides for definition of ''Junior High School'' to mean as an institution which is different from the High School or Intermediate College in which education is imparted to boys or girls or to both from class VI to VIII. 17. ''Maintenance grant'' as defined in clause (f) of Section 2 means grant-in-aid of an institution provided by the State Government, by general or special order in that behalf to the level of the institution directed in the order. ''Salary'' of teachers means the aggregate of the emoluments including dearness or any other allowance, for the time being payable to a teacher or employee at the rate approved for the purpose of payment of maintenance grant. Section 2(j) in the definition clause says:- ''(j) Other words and expressions defined in the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972 and not herein defined shall have the meanings assigned to them in that Act.'' 18. Section 10 of Act' 1978 makes State Government liable for payment of salaries of teachers and employees of every institution receiving maintenance grant due in respect of any period after the appointed day. 19. Section 10 of Act' 1978 makes State Government liable for payment of salaries of teachers and employees of every institution receiving maintenance grant due in respect of any period after the appointed day. 19. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid enactments indicates that though in Section 2(b) of the Act' 1971, expression ''institution'' includes a Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya or a Sanskrit Vidyalaya receiving maintenance grant from the State Government but neither the Basic Education Act' 1972 nor the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 includes schools imparting Sanskrit education at junior high school level i.e. ''Prathama''. The Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya were initially maintained under the Varanasi Sanskrit Vidyalaya Act' 1956 which was renamed as Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi. During the course of time, Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi first Statute 1978 was framed under the U.P. State Universities Act' 1973 to regulate the affiliation of the institutions imparting Sanskrit Education. In Statute 12.01 of the Statute of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, framed under Section 37(2) of the U.P. State Universities Act' 1973, four categories of institutions have been provided which were affiliated by the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University to conduct the examination for the courses imparted by them. 1 LukrdksŸkj mikf/k egkfo|ky; (Post Graduate Degree College) for imparing courses from “Prathama” upto “Acharya” and Post Graduate examination. 2 mikf/k egkfo|ky; (Degree Colleges) affiliated for “Shastri” (Graduate) examination (which may include courses from Prathama to Shashtri). 3 mŸkj ek/;fed egkfo|ky; (Senior Secondary School) affiliated for imparting education upto “Uttar Madhyama” (Intermediate) examination (may include such institutions imparting courses from Prathama to Uttar Madhyama) 4 iwoZ ek/;fed egkfo|ky; (High School) affiliated for imparting education upto “Purva Madhyama” (High School) which may include courses from Prathama to Madhyama. 20. Thus, under the Statute of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, affiliation could be granted from ''Prathama'' (junior High School) to ''Shashtri'' (Post Graduate). There was no provision for grant of recognition or affiliation for the purpose of running a primary education Classes (I to V) institution in the Statute of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. 21. With the enactment of the U.P. Board of Sanskrit Education' 2000 w.e.f 1.11.2000, (deemed to have come into force on 30.9.2000) enacted to regulate the Sanskrit education in the State of U.P., the institution imparting Sanskrit education upto ''Uttar Madhyama (Intermediate)'' are now recognized by the U.P. Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education established under Section 3 of the said Act. With the enactment of the U.P. Board of Sanskrit Education' 2000 w.e.f 1.11.2000, (deemed to have come into force on 30.9.2000) enacted to regulate the Sanskrit education in the State of U.P., the institution imparting Sanskrit education upto ''Uttar Madhyama (Intermediate)'' are now recognized by the U.P. Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education established under Section 3 of the said Act. The ''institution'' as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act' 2000 means:- ''Institution'' means a sanskrit school imparting sanskrit education upto Uttar Madhayama recognized by the Board''. 22. Section 2(e) provides that the District Inspector of School shall discharge the functions of ''Inspector'' under the Act. Under Section 9 of the Act' 2000, the Board is to prescribe courses of instructions, text books etc. for ''Prathama'', ''Madhyama'', ''Uttar Madhyama'' (Junior High School to Intermediate) courses in Sanskrit Education and to conduct examination of the said courses and to grant diploma or certificate to the persons pursuing the same. 23. Section 13 of the Act' 2000 states that all institutions imparting Sanskrit Education upto ''Uttar Madhyama'', constituted in the State of U.P., immediately before the commencement of this Act, affiliated to or recognized by the Government Sanskrit College, Varanasi or Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi shall be deemed to have been recognized by the Sanskrit Education Board under the Act' 2000 and shall cease to be affiliated to or recognized by the said college or University and shall be governed by the provisions of the Act' 2000. 24. Meaning thereby since September 30, 2000, the part of the institution-in-question for imparting Sanskrit education from ''Prathama to Uttar Madhyama'' is governed by the provisions of the Act' 2000 and is deemed to be recognized by the U.P. Board of Sanskrit Education. For the purposes of higher Sanskrit education such as ''Shashtri'' and ''Acharya'' course, the institution continue to be affiliated with the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University which shall conduct the said examination. 25. As far as the primary institution (class I to V), neither there was any provision in the Statute of the erstwhile University or in the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University first Statute' 1978 to regulate the same. There was, thus, no question of affiliation with the said Universities. Mere permission by the University to run classes I to V, therefore, is of no relevance. 26. There was, thus, no question of affiliation with the said Universities. Mere permission by the University to run classes I to V, therefore, is of no relevance. 26. At the best, the part of the institution in question running classes I to V can be said to be recognized by the Board of Basic Education pursuant to the order dated 10.1.1973 (Annexure 1' to the writ petition.). Maintenance grant provided to the institution-in-question for imparting Sanskrit education from ''Prathama'' (Junior High School) to ''Shashtri'' (Graduation) would not ipso-facto extend the said grant to the primary institution (classes I to V), treating it as an integral part of the Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Pawan Kumar Dwivedi, (2014) 9 SCC 692 , would not be attracted in the above noted facts and circumstances of the present case, in as much as, in the said case question was of payment of salary to the teachers and employees of a recognized ''basic school'' running classes from primary to junior high school i.e. classes I to VIII. By reading of the expression ''Junior High School'' for the purposes of Act' 1978 having the same meaning as that of the ''Basic Education'' in Section 2(b) of Act' 1972, it was held therein that the expression ''Junior High School'' in the Act' 1978 is intended to refer to the schools imparting ''Basic Education'' i.e. education upto class VIII. It was held that the fact that the legislature used expression ''Junior High School'' in the Act' 1978 and not the ''basic school'' as used and defined in Act' 1972 is insignificant. It was concluded that if a ''junior basic school'' (classes I to V) is added after obtaining necessary recognition to the recognized and aided Senior basic school (class VI to VIII), then such ''junior basic school'' became integral part of one school i.e. the basic school having classes I to VIII. 27. The said analogy drawn by the Apex Court, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be imported here to bring a primary institution/[classes (I to V)] added to an institution imparting Sanskrit education from junior High School level ''(Prathama)'' to the higher level of education ''(Shahstri or Acharya)''. 28. 27. The said analogy drawn by the Apex Court, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be imported here to bring a primary institution/[classes (I to V)] added to an institution imparting Sanskrit education from junior High School level ''(Prathama)'' to the higher level of education ''(Shahstri or Acharya)''. 28. As regards the obligation of the State of imparting free education to the children upto the age of 14 years, a constitutional guarantee under Article 21-A of the Constitution brought by 86th Amendment' 2002, suffice it to note that even prior to the insertion of the said Article, the Apex Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645 , had observed that children upto the age of 14 years have a fundamental right to free education stipulated in Article 45 of the Constitution of India. However, at the same time, it observed that the said obligation cannot be said to be performed only through the State school but it can also be done by permitting, recognising and aiding voluntary non-Governmental organisations, who are prepared to impart free education to children.. The observation in paragraph No. 176 in Unni Krishnan (supra) read as follows:- ''176. This does not however mean that this obligation can be performed only through the State Schools. It can also be done by permitting, recognising and aiding voluntary non-Governmental organisations, who are prepared to impart free education to children. This does not also mean that unaided private schools cannot continue. They can, indeed, they too have a role to play. They meet the demand of that segment of population who may not wish to have their children educated in State-run schools. They have necessarily to charge fees from the students. In this judgment, however, we do not wish to say anything about such schools or for that matter other private educational institutions except 'professional colleges'. This discussion is really necessitated on account of the principles enunciated in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666 and the challenge mounted against those principles in these writ petitions.'' 29. In this judgment, however, we do not wish to say anything about such schools or for that matter other private educational institutions except 'professional colleges'. This discussion is really necessitated on account of the principles enunciated in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666 and the challenge mounted against those principles in these writ petitions.'' 29. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 , the eleven judges Constitutional bench of the Apex Court had approved the view of Unni Krishnan's (supra) to the extent that it had held that primary education is a fundamental right, though it did not agree with the scheme framed in Unni Krishnan (supra) case and the direction to impose the same in respect of the fee charged by private institutions. 30. Thus, under the scheme of the legal Enactments and the judicial pronouncement of the Apex Court noted above, at least this much is clear that the State is under no obligation to provide maintenance grant to each private institution imparting primary education or free education to children from age (6 to 14 years). At the same time, it is necessary for a primary institution to seek recognition by the Board of Basic Education. Mere recognition by the Board, however, does not entitle the institution to seek maintenance grant from the State. Further, even in a recognized institution, not receiving maintenance grant, the appointment of teachers has to be made with the approval of the Basic Education Officer. 31. The decision in ''Ramesh Upadhaya'' (supra) by the co-ordinate bench of this Court does not consider any of the above legal aspect of the matter and as such is not binding on this Court being per-incurium. 32. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioners are not entitled to get salary from the State exchequer for the mere fact that the primary institution was recognized by the Board of Basic Schools. In so far as the plea that it was an attached institution to the Sanskrit Degree College, the same is found misconceived for the above noted reasons.'' 30. The decision of the learned Single Judge in Satish Chandra was followed by another learned Single Judge in Moti Chand Yadav and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2020:AHC:48748. In so far as the plea that it was an attached institution to the Sanskrit Degree College, the same is found misconceived for the above noted reasons.'' 30. The decision of the learned Single Judge in Satish Chandra was followed by another learned Single Judge in Moti Chand Yadav and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2020:AHC:48748. At the same time, the learned Judge in Moti Chand Yadav (supra) refused to follow the opinion of another learned Single Judge in Ashok Kumar Tiwari and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2019:AHC:160054, holding it per incuriam and not binding. It was remarked in Moti Chand Yadav: ''12. In the aforesaid judgment, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has considered, at length, the relevant provisions of the statutory enactments, Rules, judgments of the Apex Court as well as of this Court and has held that the teacher of primary section of the Institution is not entitled for payment of salary from the State exchequer. The said judgment is squarely covers the case in hand. 13. The decision in Ashok Kumar Tiwari (supra) by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court does not consider any of the legal aspects (as in the case of Satish Chandra) and as such, is not binding upon this Court being per incurium.'' 31. In Vinod Sharma (supra), the questions about the State's obligation to pay teachers of the attached primary section of a Junior High School, to wit, The 58 Gorkha Training Centre, Junior High School, Dehradun Cantt. arose for consideration. The aforesaid School was established in the year 1952 for providing education to children of ex-servicemen, serving military personnel and officers and the civilians as well. The Government of U.P. granted recognition to this School w.e.f. 9.4.1959. The writ petition, out of which the appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court arose, was instituted by Assistant Teachers apparently appointed to the primary section of the School. The District Inspector of Schools, Dehradun granted permission to the Management to teach Classes I to VIII on 9.4.1970. The respondents did not extend the benefit of maintenance grant under the Act of 1978. The teachers of the attached primary section placed reliance upon Rule 10 of the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules, 1975 (for short, 'the Rules of 1975'). 32. The respondents did not extend the benefit of maintenance grant under the Act of 1978. The teachers of the attached primary section placed reliance upon Rule 10 of the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules, 1975 (for short, 'the Rules of 1975'). 32. The appellant before the Supreme Court had earlier instituted Writ Petition No. 24478 of 1988 before this Court, apparently seeking a direction for payment of salary to teachers of the attached primary section. This Court allowed the writ petition on 29.8.1991 and ordered payment of salary under the Act of 1978. The State's special leave petition, against the judgment of this Court dated 29.8.1991, was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 10.5.1993 and the review petition preferred too was rejected. The writ petition in Vinod Sharma claimed relief of payment of arrears of salary from 1.7.1975 because in the writ petition, there was no prayer for arrears. The writ petitioner-appellants, failing to persuade the Authorities on the representations to pay arrears, instituted Writ Petition No. 24284 of 1995 for a direction to pay them arrears of salary since 1.7.1975. The said petition, as the report of their Lordships' judgment shows, was disposed of by this Court on 7.10.1996 with a direction to pay the writ petitioner-appellants salary w.e.f. 29.8.1991. They, therefore, appealed by special leave, claiming arrears of salary w.e.f. 1.7.1975. It was held by the Supreme Court in Vinod Sharma: ''8. We find the aforesaid 1975 and 1978 Rules have been framed under Section 19(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Education Act, 1972. Section 2(b) defines ''basic education'' as imparting education up to Class VIII. It is under this Act, Rule 2(b) of 1975 Rules defines ''Junior Basic School'' as imparting education up to Class V and Rule 2(e) of 1978 Rules defines ''Junior High School'' as imparting education from Classes VI to VII (inclusive). In this background another Act was enforced viz. the Uttar Pradesh Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978. Argument for the State is that this Payment of Salary Act is not applicable to the primary sections as this applies only to the Junior High School viz. Classes VI and VII. In this background another Act was enforced viz. the Uttar Pradesh Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978. Argument for the State is that this Payment of Salary Act is not applicable to the primary sections as this applies only to the Junior High School viz. Classes VI and VII. Two questions arise, firstly, whether the State has any right to raise such an issue after the matter became final inter se between the parties through the aforesaid decision of the High Court on 29.8.1991 and, secondly, whether the appellants' claim for payment of salary from 1975 is sustainable, if not, from what date? 9. Considering first the appellants' latter claim it is necessary to reproduce relevant portion of the decision of the High Court in 1991 as aforesaid: ''I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners as also the learned standing counsel. The petitioners may be teaching the primary classes but they are working in the institution which is Junior High School and they are teachers of the Junior High School which runs the classes from 1 to 8. All the classes which are being taught in the school constitute one unit and they are not a separate unit. The respondents have also not said that they are a separate unit. In fact Annexure 2 appended to the writ petition makes it abundantly clear that the school is one unit in which education is imparted to primary classes and junior classes by the teachers who are working under one management and one Headmaster. That being so the petitioners cannot be deprived of the benefit of Payment of Salary Act and they are entitled to be paid under the provision of the said Act. The petitioners are entitled to be paid their salary under the provision of Payment of Salary Act as they are teachers of the Junior High School and the order contained in Annexure 2 lends support to their contention that they are also entitled to get salary in accordance with the provision of Payment of Salary Act.'' 10. However, the aforesaid Junior High School Payment of Salaries Act, 1978 came into force with effect from 1.5.1979 by virtue of the notification issued under Section 1(3). However, the aforesaid Junior High School Payment of Salaries Act, 1978 came into force with effect from 1.5.1979 by virtue of the notification issued under Section 1(3). This Act was brought in to remove frequent complaints that salary of teachers and non-teaching employees of aided non-Government Junior High Schools are not disbursed in time, resulting in hardships to its employees. The aforesaid judgment dated 29.8.1991 refers to this Act. For the respondent State of U.P. the contention is that this is not applicable to the primary sections, namely, from Class I to Class V but only to Classes VI to VII. The High Court finally directed the respondents to bring the appellants under the said Act, meaning thereby under the 1978 Act, and pay the salary according to the provisions of the said Act. The operative portion of the said order is also quoted hereunder: ''The respondents are directed by a mandamus to bring the petitioners under the provisions of Payment of Salary Act and pay their salary according to the provisions of the said Act.'' 11. It is not that the appellants are not entitled to the payment of any salary. They are, but prior to bringing them under the said Act this obligation is only on the recognised school under the aforesaid Rule 10 of the 1975 Rules. But by the said High Court judgment the respondents were bound to bring them under the Payment of Salary Act and pay their salaries accordingly. This cannot be denied by the State. But in spite of this, nothing was done in this regard. 12. Coming to the State's objection, the submission is that they are only entitled for payment of salary under the said Act since 11.2.1993, as on that date the Government issued such orders. This objection has no force and cannot be permitted to be raised in the present case. As aforesaid, inter se, between the appellants and the respondents including the State the matter has become final by the aforesaid High Court judgment dated 29.8.1991. Against the aforesaid judgment, admittedly, SLP of the State was rejected; even review petition was rejected. This apart, even otherwise the State has not come in appeal against the impugned judgment dated 7.10.1996, hence it cannot challenge the same in this appeal. 14. Against the aforesaid judgment, admittedly, SLP of the State was rejected; even review petition was rejected. This apart, even otherwise the State has not come in appeal against the impugned judgment dated 7.10.1996, hence it cannot challenge the same in this appeal. 14. The appellants were not satisfied by the impugned order, as they claimed their salaries since 1975 when the aforesaid 1975 Rule came into effect. The contention is the spirit of the earlier High Court order was to pay from that date. This was as Junior High School teachers were getting since then, hence primary section teachers cannot be denied this right being in the same school. In other words, to pay from the same date as was paid to the Junior High School teachers. We find force in this submission. When grievance of the appellants was accepted in the first writ petition to bring them in parity with the Junior High School teachers, the payment from 1991 cannot be construed to be correct on the facts of this case. But considering the claim of the appellants, they could in no case be entitled to be paid prior to the Payment of Salary Act, 1978. Hence the appellants' claim since 1975 cannot be accepted. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed with a direction to pay the appellant from the day Payment of Salary Act, 1978 (aforesaid) was made applicable in the said institution, i.e., from the date Junior High School teachers of that institution were paid salary under the 1978 Act. If any payment of salary is already made and received by the appellants for this period, the same be adjusted and the balance amount, if any, be paid within two months from the date certified copy of this order is filed before the authority concerned. This is also without prejudice of the authority concerned if the recognised institution (the present institution) has not paid any salary to the appellants which they were obliged after enforcement of payment of salary to take such recourse as permissible in law. Cost on the parties.'' 33. This is also without prejudice of the authority concerned if the recognised institution (the present institution) has not paid any salary to the appellants which they were obliged after enforcement of payment of salary to take such recourse as permissible in law. Cost on the parties.'' 33. In Pawan Kumar Divedi, that is to say, the reference order [reported in (2006) 7 SCC 745 ], the correctness of the decision in Vinod Sharma was doubted by a Bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court, who referred the matter for reconsideration by a larger Bench given the fact that Vinod Sharma was a decision rendered by a Three-Judge Bench. In the order of reference in Pawan Kumar Divedi, it was observed by their Lordships: ''20. While noticing the fact that ''junior basic schools'' and ''junior high schools'' were treated differently, the High Court and, thereafter, this Court appear to have been swayed by the fact that certain schools provided education from Classes I to X as one single unit, although, the same were divided into different sections, such as, the primary section, the junior high school section, which were combined together to form the junior basic section from Classes I to VIII, and the high school section comprising Classes IX and X. In fact, in one of these appeals where a recognised Sanskrit institution is involved, the said institution is imparting education both for the primary section, the high school section, the intermediate section and the BA section. The Mahavidyalaya is thus imparting education from Class I up to graduate level in a recognised institution affiliated to the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi. It has been contended by Dr. Padia on behalf of the institution that the said institution is one unit having different sections and the teachers of the institution are teachers not of the different sections but of the institution itself and as a result no discrimination could be made amongst them. This was precisely one of the arguments advanced in Vinod Sharma case which was accepted by this Court. 21. This was precisely one of the arguments advanced in Vinod Sharma case which was accepted by this Court. 21. However, it appears to us that both the High Court and this Court appear to have lost sight of the fact that education at the primary level has been separated from the junior high school level and separately entrusted under the different enactments to a Board known as the Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education constituted under Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972 and the same Board was entrusted with the authority to exercise control over ''junior basic schools'' referred to in the 1975 Rules as institutions imparting education up to the Vth class. 22. In our view, the legislature appears to have made a conscientious distinction between ''junior basic schools'' and ''junior high schools'' and treated them as two separate components comprising ''junior basic education'' in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly, in keeping with the earlier Government orders, the Payment of Salary Act, 1978 did not include primary sections and/or separate primary schools within the ambit of the 1978 Act. 23. Of course, it has been conceded on behalf of the State Government that an exemption was made in respect of 393 schools which had been continuing to function from prior to 1973 and the teachers had been paid their salaries continuously by the State Government. In the case of the said schools, the State Government took a decision to continue to pay the salaries of the teachers of the primary section of such schools. 24. Apart from the above, it has also been submitted by Mr Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh that payment of salaries of teachers of recognised primary institutions must be commensurate with the State's financial condition and capacity to make such payment. 25. Having regard to the contentions of the respective parties, the issue decided in Vinod Sharma case [Vinod Sharma v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P., (1998) 3 SCC 404 ] that teachers of the primary sections of recognised junior basic schools, junior high schools and high schools were entitled to payment of their salaries under the Payment of Salary Act, 1978, merits reconsideration. 26. 26. Since the civil appeals preferred by Vinod Sharma and others were heard by a Bench comprised of three Hon'ble Judges, let these appeals be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders and direction for placing these appeals before a larger Bench for reconsideration of the issue involved.'' 34. This is how the matter came up before the Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi held: ''33. As would be seen, the 1978 Act makes the State Government liable for the payment of salaries of the teachers and the employees of every recognised Junior High School receiving maintenance grant after the appointed day. Curiously, Junior High School is not defined in the 1978 Act. We have to determine the meaning of the expression ''Junior High School'' for the purposes of the 1978 Act. But before we do that, a brief comment in respect of State's obligation to grant aid to recognised educational institutions imparting basic education corresponding to students of 6 to 14 years may be made. Before insertion of Article 21-A in the Constitution by the Eighty Sixth Amendment Act, 2002 which received the assent on 12.12.2002, this Court in Unni Krishnan [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] observed that the children up to the age of 14 years have a fundamental right to free education. 34. Article 45 which was under consideration in Unni Krishnan [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] reads that: ''45. Provision for free and compulsory education for children.-The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.'' In para 172 of the Report, the Constitution Bench in Unni Krishnan [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] said: (SCC pp. 733-34) ''172. Right to free education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years (Article 45). It is noteworthy that among the several articles in Part IV, only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. Has it no significance? Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of the Constitution? 733-34) ''172. Right to free education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years (Article 45). It is noteworthy that among the several articles in Part IV, only Article 45 speaks of a time-limit; no other article does. Has it no significance? Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of the Constitution? Can the State flout the said direction even after 44 years on the ground that the article merely calls upon it to 'endeavour to provide' the same and on the further ground that the said article is not enforceable by virtue of the declaration in Article 37. Does not the passage of 44 years-more than four times the period stipulated in Article 45-convert the obligation created by the article into an enforceable right? In this context, we feel constrained to say that allocation of available funds to different sectors of education in India discloses an inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution. The Constitution contemplated a crash programme being undertaken by the State to achieve the goal set out in Article 45. It is relevant to notice that Article 45 does not speak of the 'limits of its economic capacity and development' as does Article 41, which inter alia speaks of right to education. What has actually happened is-more money is spent and more attention is directed to higher education than to-and at the cost of-primary education. (By primary education, we mean the education, which a normal child receives by the time he completes 14 years of age.) Neglected more so are the rural sectors, and the weaker sections of the society referred to in Article 46. We clarify, we are not seeking to lay down the priorities for the Government-we are only emphasising the constitutional policy as disclosed by Articles 45, 46 and 41. Surely the wisdom of these constitutional provisions is beyond question. This inversion of priorities has been commented upon adversely by both the educationists and economists.'' (emphasis in original) Then, in para 175, the Court stated: (SCC p. 735) ''175. Be that as it may, we must say that at least now the State should honour the command of Article 45. It must be made a reality-at least now. Indeed, the National Education Policy, 1986 says that the promise of Article 45 will be redeemed before the end of this century. Be that as it may, we must say that at least now the State should honour the command of Article 45. It must be made a reality-at least now. Indeed, the National Education Policy, 1986 says that the promise of Article 45 will be redeemed before the end of this century. Be that as it may, we hold that a child (citizen) has a fundamental right to free education up to the age of 14 years.'' (emphasis in original) In para 176 in Unni Krishnan [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523], the Court said as follows: (SCC p. 735) ''176. This does not however mean that this obligation can be performed only through the State schools. It can also be done by permitting, recognising and aiding voluntary non-Governmental organisations, who are prepared to impart free education to children. This does not also mean that unaided private schools cannot continue. They can, indeed, they too have a role to play. They meet the demand of that segment of population who may not wish to have their children educated in State-run schools. They have necessarily to charge fees from the students. In this judgment, however, we do not wish to say anything about such schools or for that matter other private educational institutions except 'professional colleges'. This discussion is really necessitated on account of the principles enunciated in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka [ (1992) 3 SCC 666 : 1 SCEC 492] and the challenge mounted against those principles in these writ petitions.'' (emphasis in original) 35. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation [T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1], the eleven-Judge Constitution Bench approved the view of Unni Krishnan [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] to the extent it was held in that case that primary education is a fundamental right. Question 9 and its answer read as under: (T.M.A. Pai Foundation case [T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1], SCC p. 590, para 161) ''Q. 9. Question 9 and its answer read as under: (T.M.A. Pai Foundation case [T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : 2 SCEC 1], SCC p. 590, para 161) ''Q. 9. Whether the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] (except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right) and the scheme framed thereunder require reconsideration/modification and if yes, what? A. The scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan case [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to profiteering.'' 36. The statement by the five-Judge Constitution Bench in Unni Krishnan [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] that primary education is a fundamental right is echoed in H.P. State Recognised and Aided Schools Managing Committees [State of H.P. v. H.P. State Recognised and Aided Schools Managing Committees, (1995) 4 SCC 507 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1049] as well. The three-Judge Bench in paras 16 and 17 reiterated the constitutional mandate to the State to provide free education to the children up to the age of 14. The three-Judge Bench said: (H.P. State Recognised and Aided Schools Managing Committees case [State of H.P. v. H.P. State Recognised and Aided Schools Managing Committees, (1995) 4 SCC 507 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1049], SCC pp. 514-15) ''16. The constitutional mandate to the State, as upheld by this Court in Unni Krishnan case [Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645 : 1 SCEC 523] -to provide free education to the children up to the age of fourteen-cannot be permitted to be circumvented on the ground of lack of economic capacity or financial incapacity. 17. It is high time that the State must accept its responsibility to extend free education to the children up to the age of fourteen. 17. It is high time that the State must accept its responsibility to extend free education to the children up to the age of fourteen. Right to education is equally guaranteed to the children who are above the age of fourteen, but they cannot enforce the same unless the economic capacity and development of the State permits the enforcement of the same. The State must endeavour to review and increase the budget allocation under the head 'Education'. The Union of India must also consider to increase the percentage of allocation of funds for 'Education' out of the Gross National Product.'' 37. With the above constitutional philosophy, let us determine the meaning of the expression ''Junior High School'' for the purposes of the 1978 Act. 38. There is not much debate that the students of secondary and primary schools are classified in Section 3 of the Educational Code (Revised 1958 Edn.) as follows: (a) Pre-basic stage….Nursery education (b) Junior Basic (Primary) stage ….Classes I to V (c) Senior Basic (Junior High Schools) stage …Classes VI to VIII (d) Higher Secondary stage: I. High School stage..Classes IX and X II. Intermediate stage...Classes XI and XII 39. On behalf of the appellants, heavy reliance is placed on the definition of ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Rules. Does the definition of ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Rules control the same expression occurring in the 1978 Act? We do not think so. The definition of ''Junior High School'' in Rule 2(e) of the 1978 Rules is not incorporated in the 1978 Act either expressly or impliedly. The principle of interpretation that an expression used in a rule or bye-law framed in exercise of power conferred by a statute must have the same meaning as is assigned to it under the statute has no application in a situation such as the present one where the meaning of an expression occurring in a statute is itself to be determined. Obviously that cannot be done with the help of a rule made under a different statute. 40. Section 2(j) of the 1978 Act says that the words and expressions defined in the 1972 Act and not defined in this Act shall have the meanings assigned to them in the 1972 Act. But, the 1972 Act also does not define the expression ''Junior High School'', it merely refers to it as examination. 40. Section 2(j) of the 1978 Act says that the words and expressions defined in the 1972 Act and not defined in this Act shall have the meanings assigned to them in the 1972 Act. But, the 1972 Act also does not define the expression ''Junior High School'', it merely refers to it as examination. Mr Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants sought to invoke the principle of interpretation of statutes that rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction and obligation exactly as if they were in the Act, and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction and obligation. The invocation of this principle is misplaced. Firstly, because we are not concerned with the construction of an expression in the 1972 Act under which the 1978 Rules have been made. Secondly, and more importantly, there is no principle that rules made under a different and distinct statute must be treated for the purposes of construction as if they were part of the Act. In our view, the definition of ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Rules cannot be judicially noticed for the purposes of construction and obligation of the 1978 Act. 41. We are also not persuaded by the submission of Mr Sunil Gupta that since the expression ''Junior High School'' is not defined in the 1978 Act, its meaning can be ascertained from the 1978 Rules by applying the principle that when an expression in a later statute is ambiguous, its meaning can be ascertained from its use and/or meaning in a prior statute or statutory instrument dealing with the same subject-matter for the present purpose. On the above principle of interpretation, there is not much challenge. The question is of its applicability to the present case. The 1978 Rules are made by the Governor under the 1972 Act, which do not deal with the aspect of payment of salaries to the teachers and the employees of a recognised school at all. The State Legislature has made a separate enactment viz. the 1978 Act, for payment of salaries. The definition of ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Rules does not exhaust the scope of the expression ''Junior High School''. Moreover, a prior rule cannot be taken in aid to construe a subsequent enactment. 42. The State Legislature has made a separate enactment viz. the 1978 Act, for payment of salaries. The definition of ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Rules does not exhaust the scope of the expression ''Junior High School''. Moreover, a prior rule cannot be taken in aid to construe a subsequent enactment. 42. It is important to notice here that recognised Junior High Schools can be of three kinds: (i) having Classes I to VIII i.e. Classes I to V (Junior Basic School) and so also Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic School); (ii) a school as above and upgraded to High School or intermediate standard and; (iii) Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic School) initially with no Junior Basic School (Classes I to V) being part of the said school: 42.1. As regards the first two categories of Junior High Schools, the applicability of Section 10 of the 1978 Act does not create any difficulty. The debate which has centred round in this group of appeals is in respect of the third category of the schools where Classes I to V are added after obtaining recognition to the schools which are recognised and aided for imparting education in Classes VI to VIII. Whether teachers of primary section Classes I to V in such schools are entitled to the benefit of Section 10 of the 1978 Act is the moot question. 42.2. As noticed, the constitutional obligation of the State to provide for free and compulsory education of children till they complete the age of 14 years is beyond doubt now. The note appended to clause (xxvi), Para 1 of the Educational Code (Revised Edn. 1958) inter alia provides that Basic Schools include single schools with Classes I to VIII. In our view, if a Junior Basic School (Classes I to V) is added after obtaining necessary recognition to a recognised and aided Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII), then surely such Junior Basic School becomes integral part of one school i.e. Basic School having Classes I to VIII. The expression ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Act is intended to refer to the schools imparting basic education i.e. education up to Class VIII. We do not think it is appropriate to give narrow meaning to the expression ''Junior High School'' as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the State. The expression ''Junior High School'' in the 1978 Act is intended to refer to the schools imparting basic education i.e. education up to Class VIII. We do not think it is appropriate to give narrow meaning to the expression ''Junior High School'' as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the State. That legislature used the expression Junior High School and not the Basic School as used and defined in the 1972 Act, in our view, is insignificant. The view, which we have taken, is fortified by the fact that in Section 2(j) of the 1978 Act, the expressions defined in the 1972 Act are incorporated. 43. The submission of Mr P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the State of U.P. with reference to the subject school, namely, Riyaz Junior High School (Classes VI to VIII), that the said school was initially a private recognised and aided school and the primary section (Classes I to V) was opened by the management later on after obtaining separate recognition, which was unaided, the teachers of such primary section, in terms of definition in Rule 2(b) and Rule 4 of the 1975 Rules are not entitled to the benefits of Section 10 of the 1978 Act does not appeal to us for what we have already said above. The view taken by the High Court in the first round in Vinod Sharma [Vinod Sharma v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P., (1998) 3 SCC 404 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 892] that Classes I to VIII taught in the institution are one unit, the teachers work under one management and one Headmaster and, therefore, teachers of the primary classes cannot be deprived of the benefit of the 1978 Act, cannot be said to be a wrong view. Rather, it is in accord and conformity with the constitutional scheme relating to free education to the children up to 14 years. 44. Rather, it is in accord and conformity with the constitutional scheme relating to free education to the children up to 14 years. 44. Though in the reference order, the two-Judge Bench has observed that the High Court in the first round in Vinod Sharma [Vinod Sharma v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P., (1998) 3 SCC 404 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 892] did not appreciate that the education at the primary level has been separated from the Junior High School level and separately entrusted under the different enactments to the Board constituted under Section 3 of the 1972 Act and the same Board exercises control over Junior Basic Schools and it was a conscious distinction made by the legislature between two sets of schools and treat them as two separate components and, therefore, Vinod Sharma [Vinod Sharma v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P., (1998) 3 SCC 404 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 892] does not take the correct view but we think that the features noted in the reference order do not render the view taken in Vinod Sharma [Vinod Sharma v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P., (1998) 3 SCC 404 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 892] bad. We find merit in the argument of Dr M.P. Raju that the schools having the Junior Basic Schools and the Senior Basic Schools either separately or together are under the same Board i.e. the Board of Basic Education, as per the 1972 Act. Moreover, any other view may render the provisions of the 1978 Act unconstitutional on the ground of discrimination. In our considered view, any interpretation which may lead to unconstitutionality of the provision must be avoided. We hold, as it must be, that Junior High School necessarily includes Classes I to V when they are opened in a Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII) after obtaining separate recognition and for which there may not be a separate order of grant-in-aid by the Government.'' 35. We hold, as it must be, that Junior High School necessarily includes Classes I to V when they are opened in a Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII) after obtaining separate recognition and for which there may not be a separate order of grant-in-aid by the Government.'' 35. Much later to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi and also the decisions by the two learned Judges in Satish Chandra and Moti Chand Yadav, the constitutional validity of U.P. Act No. 2 of 2018 and U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018, amending the Act of 1972 retrospectively w.e.f. 19.8.1972 and the Act of 1978 w.e.f. 22.1.1979 respectively, was challenged before this Court in Committee of Management, Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur, Harthala and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2022(4) ADJ 85 (DB). The amendments, brought about by U.P Act No. 2 of 2018 to the Act of1972, introduced clauses (d-1) and (d-2) to sub-Section (1) of Section 2 of the Act of 1972. Clauses (d-1) and (d-2) of sub-Section (1) of Section 2 aforesaid read: ''(d-1) ''Junior Basic School'' means a basic school in which education is imparted upto class fifth. (d-2) Junior High School means a basic school in which education is imparted to boys or girls or to both from class sixth to class eight.'' 36. Similarly, the Act of 1978 was amended by U.P. Act No. 3 to introduce retrospectively clause (ee) in Section 2 of the parent statute, which reads: ''(ee) ''Junior High School'' means an institution which is different High School or Intermediate College in which education is imparted to boys or girls or to both from class sixth to class eight.'' 37. The Division Bench in Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur (supra) classified institutions for the purpose of judging the validity of the Amending Acts 2 of 2018 and 3 of 2018, placing them in four categories, detailed in paragraph No. 5 of the report of the Bench decision. The categories of institutions in Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur, can best be gathered from what is said in paragraph No. 5 of the report, which reads: ''5. The petitioners herein are recognized institutions imparting education from Classes I to VIII. The categories of institutions in Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur, can best be gathered from what is said in paragraph No. 5 of the report, which reads: ''5. The petitioners herein are recognized institutions imparting education from Classes I to VIII. They have been categorized in four categories in view of the submissions of the learned Advocate General : Category A- Unaided Junior High Schools Category B- Primary Sections recognized first and Junior High School. Category C- Junior High School recognized first and attached primary sections later. Category D- Recognized primary and junior High Schools receiving grant-in-aid by wrong orders.'' 38. The provisions of the Amending Acts were read down for schools in Categories B and C, holding that the amendment partially removed the basis of the Constitution Bench decision in Pawan Kumar Divedi, and not in its entirety. Amendments were read down in the following terms: ''200. In view of the above discussion, our conclusions are : 1. Since we find that the U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018, bringing amendment to the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 has been challenged to be discriminatory being in violation of fundamental right of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution and has been found to be so in the context of the teachers of the petitioners institutions falling in category 'B' and 'C', the objection as to the maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that the petitioner's institutions cannot be said to be prejudiced by the amendments is unsustainable, in as much as, it is settled law that no prejudice needs to be proved in cases where breach of fundamental right is asserted/alleged. In our conclusion, the writ petitioners cannot be non-suited on the grounds that the action before the Court has not been brought by the teachers employed by them; and that the management has no legal right much less a fundamental right to seek grant-in-aid. The plea of the petitioners that the teachers of the attached primary sections of a recognized and aided Junior High School, whether established and recognized prior to or later to the establishment of the Junior High School stood discriminated, itself makes the Amendment Act' 2017 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018) vulnerable of being unconstitutional. The plea of the petitioners that the teachers of the attached primary sections of a recognized and aided Junior High School, whether established and recognized prior to or later to the establishment of the Junior High School stood discriminated, itself makes the Amendment Act' 2017 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018) vulnerable of being unconstitutional. Further, it was open for the petitioners institutions to challenge the constitutional validity of the Amendment Acts' 2017 while challenging the orders of rejection of their applications seeking grant-in-aid as the sole basis of rejection of their claim is the amendments under challenge. It is settled that while challenging any action or order of the State or executive, all possible objections have to be raised in one action and separate writ petitions for the same cause of action cannot be entertained. In other words, the petitioners management have no option but to challenge the constitutional validity of the Amendment Acts' 2017 in order to sustain their challenge to the correctness of the decisions rejecting their representations, as the only basis of rejection of their claims is exclusion by way of Amendment Acts' 2017. The writ petitions in this batch, thus, cannot be rejected, at the threshold, on the objection of the State as to the locus of the writ petitioners. (2) The U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018 bringing amendment in the Payment of Salaries Act 1978, which has been termed as the Validation Act does not have the effect to efface the whole basis of the Constitutional Bench judgment in Pawan Kumar Divedi, 2014 (9) SCC 692 , which in-turn had upheld the decision in Vinod Sharma, (1998) 3 SCC 404 . The issue of integrality or oneness of such institutions which have both primary sections (Junior Basic School) (classes I to V) and Senior Basic School (Junior High School) (classes VI to VIII), as propounded by the Constitution Bench, taking note of Clause (xxvi) Part-1 in Chapter I of the Education Code of U.P. (Revision Edition 1958) cannot be said to have been obliterated by virtue of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018 (Amendment Act' 2017). (3) The introduction of definition of ''Junior High School'' in Section 2(ee) of the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 with retrospective effect, i.e. the date of coming into force of the original enactment, i.e. 22.1.1979 has resulted in hostile discrimination to the teachers of institutions imparting education in the primary sections (Classes I to V) of a Junior High School getting grant from the State fund. Such a classification negates equality as it could not satisfy the twin test of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together or those that are left out of the group and that differentia having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute. The State could not bring before us the rationale on which classification is founded and which co-relate it to the object sought to be achieved. 4. The intention of the legislature in bringing the Original enactment namely the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 on 22.1.1979 was to remedy complaints of teachers and non-teaching employees of aided non-Government Junior High Schools about non disbursement of their salary in time resulting in hardship to them by taking action against the management under the Act in case of such a complaint is found true. The purpose of bringing Amendment Acts' 2017 for insertion of the definition of ''Junior High School'' in the 1978' Act, is to clarify that the original enactment regulates the matter of payment of salary to teachers and other employees of a Junior High School, (imparting education from classes VI to VIII) receiving aid out of State fund. Gathering the intention of the legislature for enactment of the 1978' Act the context in which the regulation provision occurred in the Act and the purpose for which the original enactment was made, the ''limitation'' to which the expression ''Junior High School'' has been restricted in the Amendment Act' 2017 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 1978), by excluding primary sections of a recognized and aided Junior High School is not found based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes the teachers of Classes VI to VIII from the teachers of Classes I to V of 'one institution' which are grouped together in a homogeneous class and cannot be differentiated. The differentia sought to be created cannot be said to have a rationale relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Original Act' 1978 or the Amendment Act' 2017. 5. As the challenge has been entertained by us only for one class of institutions, namely recognized and aided Junior High Schools having primary sections as integral part of the Schools, the whole Amendment Act' 2017 cannot be rendered unconstitutional. By reading the words ''including a Basic School having both Junior and Senior Basic School established or being run as a 'single unit' from Classes I to VIII'' into Section 2(ee) of 1978' Act inserted by U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018, the object and purpose for which the Original enactment namely the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 was enacted can very well be achieved. Applying the doctrine of reading down or reading into the statute, the words of limitation in the statute read in such a manner save the statute from being declared unconstitutional. It is, thus, declared that primary sections which are integral part of Junior High Schools, whether established prior or later to the establishment of recognized and aided Junior High Schools shall have to be brought within the purview of the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 as amended by the U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018. (Amendment Act' 2017). It is, however, clarified that the issue of integrality or oneness of such an institution would have to be examined in relation to that particular institution in each case depending upon the facts and circumstance of that case. Meaning thereby, whether a particular institution fulfills the test formulated in Vinod Sharma, (1998) 3 SCC 404 , approved in Pawan Kumar Divedi, (2014) 9 SCC 692 , by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, would be an issue of fact to be determined in respect of each individual institution. The test of 'oneness of an institution' on the principle of 'composite integrality' as evolved by the learned Single Judge in Jai Ram Singh, 2019(6) ADJ 255 , as approved by us has to be applied while evaluating as to when an institution may be made up of various sections or compartments to make it ''one unit''. The test of 'oneness of an institution' on the principle of 'composite integrality' as evolved by the learned Single Judge in Jai Ram Singh, 2019(6) ADJ 255 , as approved by us has to be applied while evaluating as to when an institution may be made up of various sections or compartments to make it ''one unit''. As held in Jai Ram Singh, 2019(6) ADJ 255 , in order to meet the test of 'composite integrality', it must be established that the institution exists as an amalgam of various components indelibly fused together to constitute a singular whole (unit). The requirement of a common campus solely as formulated in Vinod Sharma, (1998) 3 SCC 404 , cannot be recognised as a determinative factor. The issue of ''composite integrality'' would have to be answered upon a cumulative consideration of all relevant factors, which are necessary to be brought by the institutions before the competent authority at the time of taking decision. 6. The 2017' Amendment to the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 only partially removes the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in Vinod Sharma, (1998) 3 SCC 404 and the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi, (2014) 9 SCC 692 , as the expression ''Junior High School'' no longer is open for interpretation by the Court. 7. We may also clarify that in view of the reading of the above noted words into the definition of the ''Junior High School'' occurring in the U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018 enacted for insertion of Clause (ee) in Section 2 of the U.P. Junior High School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act 1978, the Validity of the U.P. Act No. 2 of 2018 bringing amendment in the U.P. Basic Education Act' 1972 is not to be looked into, in as much as, the meaning of the expression ''Junior High School'' in Section 2 (ee) of the 1978' Act as amended upto date, would control the provisions of the 1978 Act. The meaning of the said expression in Section 2 (d-2) of the 1972 Act inserted by the U.P. Act No. 2 of 2018, would not be relevant for the purpose of 1978' Act. The meaning of the said expression in Section 2 (d-2) of the 1972 Act inserted by the U.P. Act No. 2 of 2018, would not be relevant for the purpose of 1978' Act. The separation of Basic school into two categories in the U.P. Basic Education Act 1972 by the insertion of definition clauses by U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018 would not impact the meaning of the expression ''Junior High School'' in Section 2 (ee) of 1978' Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018, in as much as, Section 2(j) of 1978 Act takes care of any possible conflict. It clarifies that the words of expression defined in the U.P. Basic Education Act' 1972 and not defined in the 1978 Act shall be given the meaning assigned to them in the 1972' Act. It is clarified that since we have read into Section 2 (ee) of the Payment of Salaries Act' 1978, (as amended upto date) considering the object and purpose of the said enactment, we do not find that the meaning of the expression ''Junior High School'' in Section 2 (d-2) of 1972' Act would come in the way of the meaning assigned to the said expression in the 1978' Act provided by the Amendment Act No. 3 of 2018, as read down by us herein above.'' 39. The Division Bench in Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur observed regarding the State's policy to fund private institutions, offering primary education, thus: ''84. It is submitted that the age old policy of the State is not to provide funds to private primary institutions. The rationale behind this classification is that a large number of institutions providing primary education from Classes I to V have been established and are being run by the State or its instrumentalities in discharge of its Constitutional obligation under Article 45 as it stood before the Eighty Sixth Amendment in the Constitution and Article 21-A thereafter. With the passage of time, as a policy matter, the State Government provided aid to institutions where there was need. Junior High Schools established by the State have been found in lesser number and, therefore, it was decided to give grant to private institutions according to the need and availability of fund of the State. With the passage of time, as a policy matter, the State Government provided aid to institutions where there was need. Junior High Schools established by the State have been found in lesser number and, therefore, it was decided to give grant to private institutions according to the need and availability of fund of the State. No legal right much less fundamental right has been conferred on any individual person or management to seek aid from the State fund to run an educational institution. The policy decision of the State to exclude primary institutions from the purview of the 1978' Act has been challenged in the present matter on the touchstone of Article 21-A, violation of which cannot be agitated by institutions or its management.'' 40. I had occasion to consider the effect of the Bench decision in Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur in Arvind Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2023(2) ADJ 308 . The facts leading to the decision can be noticed with profit from the report of the decision in Arvind Singh (supra), which read: ''1. This judgment will dispose of Writ-A Nos. 10560 of 2020, 2190 of 2020 and 21463 of 2019, as these involve common questions of fact and law. Writ-A No. 10560 of 2020 shall be treated as the leading case, where pleadings have been exchanged and arguments addressed; of course, with reference to the other two petitions as well. This Court proposes to notice facts from the leading case. 2. The petitioners are assistant teachers and headmasters, either working or retired, who have been appointed to Primary Schools in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules, 1975 (for short, 'the Rules of 1975') as well as other Government Orders issued from time to time. These institutions are established and managed by Societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 through a Committee of Management. All the schools, where the petitioners were appointed, are duly recognized under the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972 (for short, 'the Act of 1972'). They are in receipt of grant-in-aid from the State Government, but with the difference that unlike some other primary schools that are in receipt of grant-in-aid from the Department of Basic Education, the schools where the petitioners were appointed receive grants from the Department of Social Welfare. 3. They are in receipt of grant-in-aid from the State Government, but with the difference that unlike some other primary schools that are in receipt of grant-in-aid from the Department of Basic Education, the schools where the petitioners were appointed receive grants from the Department of Social Welfare. 3. The petitioners claim that they are entitled to all retiral benefits under the triple benefit scheme, that is to say, Contributory Provident Fund, Insurance and Pension by virtue of the Uttar Pradesh State Aided-Educational Institution Employee's Contributory Provident Fund-Insurance-Pension Rules, 1964 (for short, 'the Rules of 1964). The question involved in this petition is whether the Rules of 1964 would apply to teachers of primary schools, run by a private management, recognized by the Department of Basic Education and funded by the Social Welfare Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. While the petitioners say that they are entitled to receive all benefits under the Rules of 1964, including pension, the stand of the State is that there is a distinction between primary schools run by a private management recognized by the Basic Education Board, where grant is provided by the Department of Social Welfare and those schools run by a private management, where grant is extended by the Department of Basic Education. This distinction is sought to be drawn on the basis of a Government Order dated 31.3.1994. 4. The petitioners say that the Rules of 1964 do not make a distinction between private schools, duly recognized and aided by one Government Department or the other. This distinction between the two sets of schools sought to be drawn by the State on one hand and repudiated by the petitioners on the other, would be alluded to in some detail later in this judgment. 5. It would be apposite to refer to the origins of this issue and the earliest litigation between parties that has led to the order impugned in the present petition. A writ petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2766 of 1996 was instituted by a certain Sangarsh Samiti Shikshak Samudaya Vibhagiya Pathshala, U.P., Allahabad through its Secretary and five others, all teachers espousing the cause of teachers in primary institutions, that were in receipt of grant-in-aid from the Department of Social Welfare of the State Government. The petition was claimed to be filed on behalf of all such teachers in a representative capacity. The petition was claimed to be filed on behalf of all such teachers in a representative capacity. The petition was heard and allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide judgment and order dated 1.11.1996, ordering in the following terms: ''This petition is allowed. A mandamus is issued to the Respondent No. 1 to pay the same salary, allowances and other benefits to the teachers of Primary schools under the Department of Social Welfare as is being paid and given to the teachers of primary schools run by the Board of Basic Education, U.P. or which are privately managed but are aided and recognized by the Board of Basic Education. The arrears from 1.1.1996 till today shall be paid to the teachers of primary schools run under the Department of Social Welfare within three months from the date of production of a copy of this order before the Authority concerned. The other benefits will also be implemented within the same period.'' 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the State preferred Special Appeal No. 180 of 2000, which came to be disposed of largely upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge, but modifying it in one very material detail. The order of the Division Bench dated 11.8.2006 passed in the Special Appeal aforesaid reads: ''We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning given and the order passed by an Hon'ble Single Judge on the 1st of November, 1996, and the appeal is dismissed, excepting that the last sentence of the said judgment and order shall be struck out. The said last sentence reads as follows :''The other benefits will also be implemented within the same period.'' The phrase, with respect, is a little vague. It would bring in several other matters, like pension for which contribution is ordinarily to be made. As such, in our opinion, the writ petitioners-respondents should not be entitled to any other benefits than salary on the basis of equalisation, but our order will not, needless to mention, prevent the writ petitioners-respondents from receiving all other benefits, which they are entitled to receive on their own on the basis of express rules or conditions applicable to themselves.'' 7. The State carried the matter further in Appeal by Special Leave to the Supreme Court, where Civil Appeal No. 2028 of 2011 was heard and dismissed on 27th July, 2017 by a short order affirming the Division Bench. The order of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2028 of 2011 reads: ''We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.'' 8. It is the petitioners' case that the Division Bench of this Court modified the learned Single Judge's mandamus only to the extent that apart from salary at par with teachers of aided primary schools, who were funded by the Department of Basic Education of the Government, the teachers of primary schools funded by the Social Welfare Department, like the petitioners, would not be entitled to benefits other than salary at par with the teachers of the former class of schools, but with a further and clear mention that the order of the Division Bench would not deprive the petitioners from receiving all other benefits, which they are entitled to under the Rules. 9. The petitioners' case is that they were paid salary after dismissal of the State's appeal by the Supreme Court at par with teachers of other primary schools funded by the Basic Education Department, but were not paid their pension. The petitioners' case is that in terms of the orders of the Division Bench, they are not at all disentitled to receive pension, because they are eligible to it under the Rules of 1964, which apply to all primary schools aided by the State, irrespective of the Department, which extends the aid. 10. After a long drawn chase of the cause to receive pension under the Rules of 1964, which includes writ proceedings by certain teachers, circumstanced like the petitioners and prosecution for contempt also, the impugned order dated 27.2.2019 has been passed, holding that teachers of primary schools in receipt of grant-in-aid from the Social Welfare Department, are not entitled to pension, family pension etc. because there is no policy, rule or scheme in force, providing the benefit of pension to teachers of such schools at par with similarly circumstanced teachers of schools funded by the Basic Education Department. because there is no policy, rule or scheme in force, providing the benefit of pension to teachers of such schools at par with similarly circumstanced teachers of schools funded by the Basic Education Department. It is this part of the impugned order that the petitioners challenge through the present writ petition. The order, regarding other matters, acknowledges the petitioners' rights to revision of the pay scale and payment of salary at par with their counterparts in schools funded by the Department of Basic Education. 11. The facts aside that the petitioners' grievance is about the non-grant of pension and family pension, the petitioners before this Court also rely on the Rules of 1964 to urge a case that they are covered by the said Rules and entitled to receive the two other benefits admissible, that is to say, Insurance and Contributory Provident Fund-the triple benefit. 12. It must be recorded here that the impugned order dated 27.2.2019 has recognized the petitioners' right to receive General Provident Fund, towards which deduction from the petitioners' salary and those of teachers similarly circumstanced has been made to be credited to their respective GPF Account. No other benefit, however, has been extended. '' 41. In repelling the claim to receive pension etc. under the Uttar Pradesh State Aided-Educational Institution Employee's Contributory Provident Fund-Insurance-Pension Rules, 1964 by the teachers and headmasters, who were serving or retired from the special class of primary schools recognized under the Act of 1972 and teaching students of marginalized sections of the society, represented by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, funded through special grant by the Department of Social Welfare and not a maintenance grant by the Department of Basic Education, I held: ''38. In substance, therefore, what appears to be the case is that there is general embargo by State policy upon funding or the provision of grant-in-aid to primary institutions, exclusively imparting education at the Junior Basic School or Classes I to V. The said education has been retained by the State in its hands with the aspiration that they can provide to each child the necessary primary education up to Class V. The State in their wisdom have thought that they ought not to share resources with private enterprise, where individuals establish primary institutions to teach children from Classes I to V. If the State have taken a policy decision that they would not fund education where private institutions have been established, exclusively teaching Classes I to V, there is no right inhering in anyone to compel the State to extend grant-in-aid to support pensions to retired teachers of such private institutions, under the Rules 1964, merely because a contingent grant has been provided by the Social Welfare Department to support payment of salaries to teachers, subject to the condition of providing primary education to a certain class of children in particular strength. 39. It is only stated to be noticed that it is well-settled that there is no right inhering in any citizen to compel the State to pay grants to a private institution. Of course, children in the age group of 6-14 have a fundamental right to free and compulsory education and it is to be realized in the manner dictated by the law. The Act of 2009 places burden on the shoulder of private institutions, completely unaided, to share it as well. Section 12(1)(c) and 12(2) read with the definition of School in Section 2(n)(iv) of the Act of 2009 make it evident that obligations rest with private unaided institutions as well to admit in Class I at least 25% of the strength of that Class, ''children belonging to the weaker section and disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood and provide free and compulsory elementary education till its completion'', to quote the words of the Statute. 40. 40. Now, in the absence of a policy by the State to fund any privately owned or managed institution imparting primary education from Classes I to V, the petitioners are teachers of a special class of institutions catering to the requirements of a marginalized section of the society, who are members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The grant paid to the schools where the petitioners teach is apparently not by the Basic Education Department, who have no policy to extend any grant-in-aid to institutions imparting education from Classes I to V alone. 41. It is another matter that by the State's policy recurring grant is extended, where the primary section is an integral part of the Junior High School. However, in order to achieve the objective of extending education to marginalized sections of the society represented by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Department of Social Welfare of the State had in the past been extending the facility of a recurring grant-in-aid to primary institutions as well, that is to say, institutions teaching children from Classes I to V, where a minimum of 50% of the scholar strength is from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This policy too by the State Government has been discontinued after the year 1994. 42. There is an office memo dated 5th October, 2006 issued by the Department of Social Welfare, which indicates that the policy has been discontinued after 1994 and further says that with the introduction of Article 21-A in Part III of the Constitution, free and compulsory education is the obligation of the State up to the age of 14 years. The said office memo also says that to realize the aforesaid objective under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, the Department of Basic Education has established schools in every village at the distance of 1.5 kilometers. By 2008, these would be established at a distance of a kilometer each. The office memo says that with so much of promotion of free and compulsory education for the children up to the age of 14 years, which has to be achieved through primary schools established by the Department of Basic Education, there is no necessity of offering grants-in-aid to private institutions, run under managements teaching children, hailing from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The aforesaid office memo has been annexed as SCA-2 to the supplementary counter-affidavit dated 20.1.2021. 43. The aforesaid office memo has been annexed as SCA-2 to the supplementary counter-affidavit dated 20.1.2021. 43. It is, thus, evident from a reading of the said office memo that the State has long abandoned its policy of funding this special class of institutions, where the petitioners have been teaching. The policy has been changed, because a large number of schools have been established or are to be established by the Basic Education Department through the Board, which would achieve the purpose of free and compulsory education to all children up to the age of 14 years. The policy change is dictated by changes to the law and outlook towards education for children up to the age of 14 years. There is no further need to undertake efforts through assistance of private institutions for the purpose of encouraging marginalized sections of the society, whose needs are now being adequately catered to by the Department of Basic Education through its established schools functioning under the Board. 44. The said changes apart what emerges is that the institutions, where the petitioners are or were employed and have now retired, were funded by a grant very different from the maintenance grant envisaged under Section 2(f) of the Act of 1978. The recurring grant provided by the Department of Social Welfare is very different from the maintenance grant envisaged under the Act of 1978. This grant is limited to the provision of salaries to teachers teaching in the special class of primary institution, managed by private managements, who were offered assistance by the State for the singular reason that at the relevant time and considering the need then emergent, these institutions were provided education to a special class of citizens in the specified age group. The grant provided to these institutions has, therefore, to be limited to the terms of the grant. It cannot be extended beyond anything what it actually is. '' 42. The question that, therefore, arises is if teachers teaching in the attached primary sections of privately managed Junior High Schools, High Schools or Intermediate Institutions, teaching Sanskrit (called the Prathama, Purva Madhyama and Uttar Madhyama Level, respectively) are entitled to be paid salaries borne on State grant. 43. It cannot be extended beyond anything what it actually is. '' 42. The question that, therefore, arises is if teachers teaching in the attached primary sections of privately managed Junior High Schools, High Schools or Intermediate Institutions, teaching Sanskrit (called the Prathama, Purva Madhyama and Uttar Madhyama Level, respectively) are entitled to be paid salaries borne on State grant. 43. The learned Judge, who decided Satish Chandra, has held to exclude Sanskrit Institutions from the purview of the maintenance grant scheme, that is paid to certain attached primary sections of Junior High Schools etc. in the conventional system of education under the Act of 1972 read with the Act of 1978 and the Rules of 1975. It would be noticed that though Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971 defines an institution to include a recognized institution ''for the time being receiving maintenance grant from the State Government and includes a Sanskrit Mahavidyala or Sanskrit Vidyalaya, receiving maintenance grant from the State Government'', there is no such recognition or acknowledgment of Sanskrit Institutions in the Act of 1972 or the Act of 1978. 44. So far as Classes I to V are concerned, one would think that what is more relevant are the Acts of 1972 and 1978, inasmuch as these deal with governance, regulations, sanction and disbursement of grant to institutions up to the Junior High School Level. This is one of the reasons adopted by the learned Judge in Satish Chandra to exclude Sanskrit Institutions from the purview of maintenance grant paid by the State Governance under the Act of 1978. It has also been noticed by the learned Judge that after enactment of the Act of 2000 w.e.f. 30.9.2000, Sanskrit Education in the State, up to the Uttar Madhyama or the Intermediate Level, is governed by the Sanskrit Board established under Section 3 of the last mentioned Act. It has been emphasized that an institution defined under Section 2(f) of the Act of 2000, means a Sanskrit School, imparting Sanskrit Education up to Uttar Madhyama recognized by the Sanskrit Board. Also acknowledged is the fact that under Section 13 of the Act of 2000, existing Sanskrit Institutions before commencement of the said Act, affiliated to or recognized by the Government Sanskrit College, Varanasi or the Sanskrit University, shall be deemed recognized by the Sanskrit Board and their affiliation with the Sanskrit University shall cease. 45. Also acknowledged is the fact that under Section 13 of the Act of 2000, existing Sanskrit Institutions before commencement of the said Act, affiliated to or recognized by the Government Sanskrit College, Varanasi or the Sanskrit University, shall be deemed recognized by the Sanskrit Board and their affiliation with the Sanskrit University shall cease. 45. The most relevant part relating to the entitlement to receive State grant by the attached primary section of a Sanskrit Institution, teaching up to the Prathama, Purva Madhyama or Uttar Madhyama Levels, is to be found in paragraph Nos. 26 and 27 of the report in Satish Chandra. It is reasoned there that as far as primary institutions teaching Sanskrit go, there was neither provision in the statutes of the Sanskrit University to regulate the same nor was this level of classes affiliated by the University. It is remarked that a mere permission by the Sanskrit University to run Classes I to V is of no relevance. It is also observed that at best the part of the institution running Classes I to IV, can be said to be recognized by the Board of Basic Education pursuant to the order dated 10.1.1973, that is to say, in the case before the Court in Satish Chandra. It then observed that maintenance grant provided to the Institution for imparting Sanskrit Education from Prathama (Junior High School) to Shastri (Graduation), would not by itself extend the said grant to the primary section treating it to be an integral part of the Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya. 46. Except for some technical sense to the reasoning in Satish Chandra about an Institution being defined in the Act of 1971, which is not defined in the Act of 1972 or the Act of 1978, we find it difficult to accept, with utmost respect, the reasoning of the learned Judge to deprive Classes I to V of Sanskrit Institutions of State aid, merely because the mention of aid is one with reference to the Prathama, Purva Madhyama and Uttar Madhyama Levels of education, earlier recognized by the Sanskrit University and now by the Sanskrit Board. For the same reason, affiliation granted by the Sanskrit University to institutions from Prathama to Uttar Madhyama earlier, which now stands transferred to the Sanskrit Board by virtue of Section 13 of the Act of 2000, is of little consequence in our opinion. For the same reason, affiliation granted by the Sanskrit University to institutions from Prathama to Uttar Madhyama earlier, which now stands transferred to the Sanskrit Board by virtue of Section 13 of the Act of 2000, is of little consequence in our opinion. The reason is, as pointed out in the opening part of the judgment, that after all Classes I to V, are neither Classes of Graduation or certification. These classes, though an integral part of an institution like the case here, which is a Mahavidyalaya teaching classes up to the Shastri Level and an integral part of the Mahavidyalaya, there is neither reason for it to be affiliated or recognized, either by the Sanskrit University or the new found Sanskrit Board. All that may be required is permission to run the classes and that permission is not in dispute here. After all, no recognition or affiliation of Classes I to V is needed by the Sanskrit University or the Sanskrit Board, because theses classes do not involve, as earlier said, any certification by the Sanskrit University or the Sanskrit Board for passing them. A person can pass Class V on the authority of the Institution itself and get promoted to the Junior High School Section, joining Class VI without certification by the Sanskrit University or the Sanskrit Board. It is for this reason that in the first statute of the Sanskrit University and now under the Act of 2000, there is no provision for recognition of Classes I to V of a Sanskrit Institution, or affiliation of the Institution for their Classes I to V, though necessary for the Prathama Section, where Classes VI to VIII are taught. We are, therefore, in respectful disagreement with the reasoning of the learned Judge in Satish Chandra in paragraph No. 26 of the report. For the same reason, we are also not in agreement with the reasoning in Moti Chand Yadav, that has followed Satish Chandra. 47. This, however, is not the end of the matter so far as the basis of the reasoning in those decisions is concerned or reasons to disagree therefrom. For the same reason, we are also not in agreement with the reasoning in Moti Chand Yadav, that has followed Satish Chandra. 47. This, however, is not the end of the matter so far as the basis of the reasoning in those decisions is concerned or reasons to disagree therefrom. The other part of the reasoning of the learned Judge in Satish Chandra, which says that Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971 defines an institution to include a Sanskrit Mahavidyala or a Sanskrit Vidyalaya, but the definition of an institution under the Act of 1972 or the Act of 1978, does not mention these Sanskrit Institutions, and on that basis inferring that the provisions of the Act of 1978, would not at all be available for provision of maintenance grant to Sanskrit Institutions teaching Classes I to V, also appears to be flawed. The reason is that if this construction were placed upon the terms of the Act of 1978, read in the scheme of the Act of 1972, it would lead to a classification that suffers from invidious discrimination between children identically circumstanced in the age group of 6 to 14 years. It is beyond cavil that the right to provision of free and compulsory education to children in the age group of 6 to 14 years, was earlier judicially acknowledged to be part of the fundamental right to life under Article 21 and now a named fundamental right, under Article 21-A. Now, if a scholar joins Classes I to V in a conventional Institution, i.e. a Postgraduate College, a Degree or an Intermediate College or a High School, the Act of 1971 or the Act of 1978 may well be pressed in aid to secure the maintenance grant for the attached primary section, extending the reasoning adopted by the learned Judge in Satish Chandra. A funded attached primary section would then be expected to extend quality education. However, if a scholar is admitted to Class I of a Junior High School, which is a Sanskrit Vidyalaya, logically extending the principle followed by the learned Single Judge in Satish Chandra, the primary section of the institution, cannot be funded by the State, because the Act of 1978 does not at all mention a Sanskrit Vidyalaya, teaching Clsses I to V, within the definition of an institution; nor does the Act of 1972. There would, thus, be an immense difference in the kind of education to similarly situate children to receive while in the decisive age group of 6 to 14, one admitted to the primary section of a Purva Madhyama or Uttar Madhyama Vidyalaya or a Mahavidyalaya on one hand and the other admitted to the attached primary section of a Junior High School, a High School or an Intermediate College. This classification with a serious entailing impact on the quality of education, imparted in one case with State aid and the other dependent on private resources of the management, would have no intelligible differentia bearing nexus with the object of classification. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge, therefore, in paragraph No. 18 of the report does not commend to us. 48. What has to be borne in mind are the remarks of the Constitution Bench in paragraph Nos. 42.1, 42.2, 43 and 44 of the report of their Lordships' judgment in Pawan Kumar Divedi. The underlying principle is that in the conventional system of education, basic schools, which are teaching Classes I to VIII, form an integral whole, if Classes I to V are taught there, after obtaining necessary permission. Their Lordships have eschewed understanding of a Junior High School as a distinctly divided set of Classes from VI to VIII, though in fact a Junior High School for the purpose of recognition and affiliation involves Classes VI to VIII. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Constitution Bench that the expression 'Junior High School' in the Act of 1978 is intended to refer to the schools imparting basic education i.e. education up to Class VIII. We do not think it appropriate to give a narrow meaning to the expression 'Junior High School', as contended by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State. 49. This Court, at the cost of repetition, wishes to refer to the observations of the Constitution Bench in paragraph No. 44 of the report in Pawan Kumar Divedi, which say: ''44. …. We find merit in the argument of Dr M.P. Raju that the schools having the Junior Basic Schools and the Senior Basic Schools either separately or together are under the same Board i.e. the Board of Basic Education, as per the 1972 Act. …. We find merit in the argument of Dr M.P. Raju that the schools having the Junior Basic Schools and the Senior Basic Schools either separately or together are under the same Board i.e. the Board of Basic Education, as per the 1972 Act. Moreover, any other view may render the provisions of the 1978 Act unconstitutional on the ground of discrimination. In our considered view, any interpretation which may lead to unconstitutionality of the provision must be avoided. We hold, as it must be, that Junior High School necessarily includes Classes I to V when they are opened in a Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII) after obtaining separate recognition and for which there may not be a separate order of grant-in-aid by the Government.'' (emphasis by Court) 50. This position of the law for a Sanskrit Vidyalaya or a Mahavidyala, that has an attached primary section teaching Classes I to V, after necessary permission from the Authorities, has been held not to apply by the learned Judge in Satish Chandra and Moti Chand Yadav. There is no reason in the case of a Sanskrit Vidyalaya to regard Classes I to V not as part of the Prathama Institution, which is now recognized by the Sanskrit Board. Considering that Prathama, strictly so called, involves teaching Classes from VI to VIII and the Act of 2000 does not mention the primary section, comprising Classes I to V, would not lead to the conclusion that an attached primary section of a Vidyalaya, recognized as a Prathama Vidyalaya, would not be an integral part of it. For the same reason, the attached primary section of a Mahavidyalaya, teaching up to the Shastri Level, would be regarded as an integral part of it, provided it satisfies other conditions. This would be the direct consequence of the wider principle laid down by the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi, where a Junior High School has been understood to include Classes I to V, though strictly speaking under the conventional system of education, a Junior High School when recognized as such, is an institution teaching Classes VI to VIII. This would be the direct consequence of the wider principle laid down by the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi, where a Junior High School has been understood to include Classes I to V, though strictly speaking under the conventional system of education, a Junior High School when recognized as such, is an institution teaching Classes VI to VIII. Here also, though it is not a Junior High School, where the petitioners were teaching, but a Mahavidyalaya, teaching up to the Shastri Level, there would now be a twin recognition and affiliation by virtue of Section 13 of the Act of 2000 for classes up to the Shastri Level and those from Prathama to Uttar Madhyama. The classes taught in the Institution would be part of the Prathama, though strictly not so. There is an added reason to it, part of which we have spoken of earlier when we said that Classes I to V are classes, which do not involve any certification of the course passed or a graduation of any kind earned, except the right to a promotion to Class VI. It is to be understood that the Prathama Level, which does involve certification as well as graduation by the Sanskrit Board, would require students passing Classes I to V to enter the Prathama. Therefore, Classes I to V, part of any Mahavidyalaya or Sanskrit Vidyalaya, in our opinion, would be an integral part of the Prathama Section and a fortiori of the higher sections of the institution. 51. The principles regarding provision of maintenance grant to the attached primary sections of Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya, teaching Prathama, Purva Madhyama, Uttar Madhyama or the Shastri course, have another feature about them, different from the conventional system of education. In case of the conventional system of education, with the enactment of the Act of 1972, the State took upon itself the responsibility to look after basic education of children from Classes I to V and did not have a policy of sharing resource for this grade of education with any private institution. It is for this reason that except for a defined class of old affiliated primary sections of Junior High Schools, High Schools and Intermediate Institutions, independent primary institutions and other attached primary sections, subsequently established, were not extended maintenance grant by the State. This is not the case with Sanskrit Education. It is for this reason that except for a defined class of old affiliated primary sections of Junior High Schools, High Schools and Intermediate Institutions, independent primary institutions and other attached primary sections, subsequently established, were not extended maintenance grant by the State. This is not the case with Sanskrit Education. The Board of Basic Education or the Act of 1972, or for that matter the Sanskrit Board, much later established in the year 2000, do not take corresponding responsibility like conventional education by the State for teaching students from Classes I to V in Sanskrit Education. Sanskrit Education, therefore, would in any case remain with privately managed institutions from Classes I to V. If, therefore, an institution of the Prathama Level, the Purva Madhyama, the Uttar Madhyama or a Mahavidyalaya, teaching Shastri Classes, has an attached primary section established with permission of the relevant Authorities, the principles applied in the case of conventional education to deny maintenance grant to newly established institutions on ground that the State caters to all the requirements of basic education from Classes I to V, cannot apply to the case of Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya at all. It has also to be remembered that the fundamental right to receive free and compulsory education cannot be read in a narrow sense and understood to mean education offered by the conventional system alone. There is no reason why it would not apply to Sanskrit Education, offered through Sanskrit Vidyalaya and Mahavidyalaya, whether affiliated to the Sanskrit Board or the Sanskrit University. 52. Since our opinion does not accord with that of the learned Single Judge in Satish Chandra and Moti Chand Yadav on one hand and is inline with the reasoning in Ramesh Upadhya, Markanday Mani and the Bench decision in Tarkeshwar Nath Singh, we consider it appropriate to refer the following questions for consideration by a larger Bench: 1. Whether the State's obligation to provide free and compulsory education to all children in the age group of 6 to 14 years, in such manner as the State may, by law determine, envisaged under Article 21-A of the Constitution, extend to funding education for the aforesaid age group of children reading in Sanskrit Vidyalaya or Mahavidyalaya in the attached primary section, teaching Classes I to V? 2. 2. Whether the learned Single Judge in Satish Chandra was trite in opining that the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi, treating Junior Basic Schools (Classes I to V) as an integral part of Senior Basic Schools (Classes VI to VIII), when added after obtaining necessary recognition to the recognized and aided Senior Basic Schools, becomes an integral part of one school, not requiring a separate order for grant-in-aid by the Government, does not apply by analogy to a primary institution, teaching Classes I to V, attached or added, to an institution imparting Sanskrit Education from the Junior High School Level (Prathama) to Higher Level of Education (Shastri or Acharya)? 3. Whether the decisions of the learned Single Judges in Satish Chandra and Moti Chand Yadav accord with the principle laid down by the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi, insofar as these holdings deny extension of maintenance grant to the attached primary sections of Sanskrit Institutions, receiving grant for their Prathama, Uttar Madhyama and other higher level of courses? 4. Whether the learned Single in Satish Chandra is trite about the principle that the first statute of the Sanskrit University and the provisions of the Act of 2000, not providing for regulation of the primary institutions in Sanskrit, the said classes can neither be affiliated by the Sanskrit University or the Sanskrit Board nor funded by the State? 5. Whether the decision of the learned Single Judges in Satish Chandra and Moti Chand Yadav lay down correct law or that in Ramesh Upadhya, Markanday Mani or the Bench decision in Tarkeshwar Nath Singh and the opinion expressed here on the issue of aid to attached primary section (Classes I to V) to the Prathama and the higher courses in Sanskrit Vidyalaya and Mahavidyalaya? 53. Let the papers be placed by the Registry at the earliest before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench to consider the aforesaid questions.