JUDGMENT : Kaushik Goswami, J. Heard Mr. Imti Longjem, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. E. Thiba Phom, learned Senior Govt. Advocate for respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 4 and Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGC for respondent No. 5. 2. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging inter-alia the detention order being No. CP/DMR/CB-19/2024-25/688 dated 13.05.2024 passed by the Commissioner of Police & District Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland under Sub-Section(3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act, 1980) by which the petitioner has been detained under the said Act. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he was arrested on 23.04.2024 and subsequent thereto, a Suo Moto FIR was registered by the Police at Dimapur East Police Station being Dimapur East PS Case No.0070/2024 under Section 384/34 IPC read with Regulation 7 of the Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962 (herein after referred to as the NSR,1962). 4. It is alleged in the FIR that information was received that UG cadre were collecting tax from business owners around Bata Charali area by visiting shops and making phone calls. In connection to which, one Khukivi Sumi was arrested and on the information provided by the said person, the petitioner/detenue was also arrested. It is further alleged in the FIR that the persons who were apprehended have said that they have, with the assistance of one Ruby Dey, extorted money from various locations within Dimapur town. 5. It is the further case of the petitioner that while he was under judicial custody, he was served on 14.05.2024 with the impugned Detention Order dated 13.05.2024 passed by the respondent No. 3 under Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act, 1980 by which he has been detained. 6. The respondent No. 3 by letter dated 13.05.2024 wrote to the respondent No. 2 for approval by the State Government of the detention order passed against the petitioner. Thereafter, the Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland by Order dated 22.05.2024 approved the said detention order. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 24.05.2024 through the Jail authorities to the Special Secretary, Government of Nagaland, Home Department against his detention. 7. The Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland by Order dated 30.05.2024 rejected the said representation. Thereafter, the Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland by Order dated 22.05.2024 approved the said detention order. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 24.05.2024 through the Jail authorities to the Special Secretary, Government of Nagaland, Home Department against his detention. 7. The Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland by Order dated 30.05.2024 rejected the said representation. Subsequently, by Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2024, the detention of the petitioner has been extended till 12.11.2024. 8. Situated thus, the present writ petition has been filed seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus to quash and set aside the said Detention Order dated 13.05.2024, the said Approval Order dated 22.05.2024 and the Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2024. 9. Mr. Imti Longjem, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the detention order is totally in violation of Section 8 of the said Act, 1980 and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 10. He further submits that reading of the detention order indicates that the ground of detention is that the petitioner is a habitual offender and is likely to move for bail. He further submits that no details whatsoever as regards the petitioner being a habitual offender is given in the detention order for which the detention order is in gross violation of the constitutional safeguards guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. He further submits that the detenue have the right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, to be furnished with all documents and materials relied upon by the detaining authority while passing the detention order. 11. He further submits that the apprehension of the detaining authority that the petitioner is likely to move for bail has no basis whatsoever. He further submits that detailed reasons and the materials based on which the detaining authority come to the conclusion that the detenue if moves for bail, is likely to be released on bail must be given in the grounds for detention. He further submits that mere ipse dixit statements without any cogent material that the detenue is likely to move for bail cannot sustain the order of detention. 12. He further submits that the petitioner has not been informed that he has a right to be assisted by a friend in the hearing before the Advisory Board and hence, the protection guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is totally infringed. 13. 12. He further submits that the petitioner has not been informed that he has a right to be assisted by a friend in the hearing before the Advisory Board and hence, the protection guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is totally infringed. 13. In support of the aforesaid submissions, he relies upon the following decisions:- i) Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 . ii) Nancy Vs. State of Nagaland & Others reported in 2024 (1) GLT 903. iii) Akhil Gogoi Vs. State of Assam & Others, reported in 2017 (5) GLT 660. iv) Nameirakpam Inaotomba Singh Vs. Union of India & Others, reported in 2007 (4) GLT 200. 14. Per contra, Mr. E. Thiba Phom, learned Senior Government Advocate submits that the detention order is valid and the detention authority upon being satisfied that the petitioner is a habitual offender and is likely to move for bail and that if he is not detained, he is likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities passed the impugned detention order in order to prevent him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the security of the State of Nagaland and maintenance of the public order. 15. Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGC for respondent No. 5 submits that he has adopted the arguments made by the learned Senior Government Advocate appearing for the State. 16. We have given our prudent consideration to the arguments made by the learned counsels appearing for the contesting parties and have perused the materials available on record including the citations cited at the bar. 17. It appears that a suo moto FIR was lodged on 23.04.2024 by the I/C SOT Dimapur alleging that he has received information from sources about UG cadre collecting tax from business owners around Bata Charali area by physically visiting the shops and making calls through mobile handsets. 18. It further appears that upon visiting the site and conducting surveillance, it was found that one of the mobile numbers used for making calls to the shop owners belongs to one Khukivi Sema. Accordingly, he was apprehended and with the information provided by him, the petitioner from whose mobile number also, calls were being made to the shop owner was also accordingly apprehended. It further appears that the petitioner alongwith the co-accused were interrogated and upon the FIR being registered was kept in judicial custody. Accordingly, he was apprehended and with the information provided by him, the petitioner from whose mobile number also, calls were being made to the shop owner was also accordingly apprehended. It further appears that the petitioner alongwith the co-accused were interrogated and upon the FIR being registered was kept in judicial custody. It further appears that while the petitioner was in judicial custody, the detaining authority passed the impugned Detention Order dated 13.05.2024 whereby the petitioner was placed under detention. 19. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Detention Order dated 13.05.2024 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “3. That, as per records made available by the sponsoring authority, the subject was arrested as per a written complaint received at East Police Station on 23/04/2024. Accordingly, a case has been registered vide Dimapur/ East P.S/ Case No. 0070/24 U/S 384/34 IPC R/W 7 NSR. The subject had joined armed organisation NSCN IM and presently working as an active member in the rank of SS. Tatar. The subject is also a part of the modus operandi wherein accused A3 Rabi Dey @ Sujoy would implant the MRP Tag machines in the shops and thereafter he and his accomplices would follow up by abducting the shop owners and extorting money from them and which is clearly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and security of the state. The subject is a part of a large scale extortion syndicate, which is rampant in the state, run by armed organizations leading to price rise of the essential commodities and services thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The subject was arrested for carrying out criminal activities/extorting money for the NSCN/GPRN (IM) outfit. Such covert, illegal and forceful activities/collection of money has led to the increase in the price of all essential commodities in the market and which is of a great concern for the general public. Such acts have caused fear and insecurity in the minds of the people. Moreover, being a member of an armed organization, such criminal acts & activities are a threat to public security, adversely effects the economic development of the state and detrimental to the tranquility and maintenance of law & order in the state. Such acts have caused fear and insecurity in the minds of the people. Moreover, being a member of an armed organization, such criminal acts & activities are a threat to public security, adversely effects the economic development of the state and detrimental to the tranquility and maintenance of law & order in the state. The subject is a habitual offender and has also been shown arrested in connection with Dimapur/ West PS/ Case No.0030/2024 U/S 384/34 IPC R/W 7 NSR. 4. That, the subject, Khekato Zhimomi, is a habitual offender and is presently under judicial custody at Central Jail, Dimapur, and is likely to move for bail. If he is not detained, he is likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities unless an effective alternative measure is called for. On examination of the report forwarded by the sponsoring authority, the subject is found fit to be booked under the National Security Act, 1980. Hence, in order to prevent him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the security of the state of Nagaland and maintenance of the public order, the undersigned has ordered the detention of the subject under the said Act.” 20. Apparent from the above, that the petitioner and the co-accused having been involved in extortion of money from the shop owners by using their respective mobile numbers were arrested and an FIR was registered. From a perusal of the aforesaid detention order, it is apparent that the ground of detention of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a habitual offender and has also been shown arrested in connection with Dimapur West PS Case No. 0030/24 under Section 384/34 IPC read with Regulation 7 NSR, 1962 and that he is likely to move for bail. 21. It further appears that the Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland by Order dated 22.05.2024 approved the aforesaid detention order. It further appears that though the petitioner submitted a representation dated 24.05.2024 through the Jail authorities to the Government of Nagaland, the same was rejected. It further appears that the said detention order has subsequently been confirmed by Order dated 09.08.2024. 22. The issue that falls for determination in this Habeas Corpus petition is whether the detention of the petitioner is illegal. 23. Personal liberty of an individual is a fundamental right and the most sacrosanct right guaranteed under the Constitution of India in Part-III thereof. 22. The issue that falls for determination in this Habeas Corpus petition is whether the detention of the petitioner is illegal. 23. Personal liberty of an individual is a fundamental right and the most sacrosanct right guaranteed under the Constitution of India in Part-III thereof. The same cannot be deprived except according to the procedure established by law. Notwithstanding the above, the State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as well as under the laws of preventive detention, however, such powers are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens or seeks to disturb public law and order warranting the issue of such an order. In order to ensure that such powers are not abused by the State authorities, the Constitution provides safeguards/protection against such arrest and detention. 24. Apt to refer to Article 22(1) to (5) of the Constitution of India, which provides protection against arrest and detention, which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.-(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. (2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. (3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply— (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. (3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply— (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. (4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless- (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention: Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” 25. Apparent from the above that under Article 22(5) the Constitution of India, mandates that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. 26. Section 8 of the said Act, 1980, provides that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, communicate the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. 27. 26. Section 8 of the said Act, 1980, provides that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, communicate the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. 27. Conjoint reading of the aforesaid Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 8 of the said Act, 1980 apparent that it is imperative upon the detaining authorities to communicate the grounds on which the order has been made and give full and effective opportunity to the detenue for making representation against the order of detention. In other words, the order of detention must contain the reasons based on which the detaining authority has arrived at its subjective satisfaction to place the detenue under detention. The aforesaid reasons must be cogent and specific so as to enable the detenue full opportunity for effective representation against such detention. 28. In the back drop of the above, let us examine the detention order as whether the protection against detention provided under the Constitution of India as well as the said Act, 1980 have been provided to the petitioner or not. 29. The grounds of detention as evident from the detention order are firstly that the petitioner is a habitual offender and secondly that he is likely to move for bail. 30. Let us first examine the second ground i.e. the petitioner is likely to move for bail. 31. Reading of the detention order, it is apparent that there are no materials given in the detention order for the authorities to come to the conclusion that the petitioner is likely to move for bail. In fact, it is the admitted position that till date, no bail application whatsoever has been filed by the petitioner before any Court of law. It is further admitted by the contesting parties that the co-accused has also not moved any Court of law for grant of bail. 32. Thus, on the face of it, the apprehension of the detaining authority that the petitioner is likely to move for bail appears to be erroneous and appears to be based on mere apprehension. There is no material placed for arriving at such conclusion. 33. 32. Thus, on the face of it, the apprehension of the detaining authority that the petitioner is likely to move for bail appears to be erroneous and appears to be based on mere apprehension. There is no material placed for arriving at such conclusion. 33. That apart, detailed reasons and the materials based on which the detaining authority concludes that the detenue is likely to be released on bail must be given in the grounds for detention. Mere ipse dixit statements regarding imminent possibility of the detenue being released on bail without any reliable materials cannot sustain the detention order. 34. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another(Supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that where a detention order is served on a person already in jail, there should be a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most Courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed. 35. Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 26 and 27 of the Apex Court’s decision in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another(Supra) are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “7. A perusal of the above statement in para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the concerned court. State of Tamil Nadu & Another(Supra) are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “7. A perusal of the above statement in para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the concerned court. Neither the date of the alleged bail orders has been mentioned therein, nor the bail application number, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of the co-accused on the same case, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other co-accused in cases on the same footing as the case of the accused. All that has been stated in the grounds of detention is that "in similar cases bails were granted by the courts". In our opinion, in the absence of details this statement is mere ipse dixit, and cannot be relied upon. In our opinion, this itself is sufficient to vitiate the detention order. 8. It has been held in T.V. Sravanan Vs. State, A.Shanthi Vs. Govt. of T.N. and Ors., Rajesh Gulati Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi etc. that if no bail application was pending and the detenue was already, in fact, in jail in a criminal case, the detention order under the preventive detention law is illegal. These decisions appear to have followed the Constitution Bench decision in Haradhan Saha Vs. State of West Bengal, wherein it has been observed: "34……where the person concerned is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or public order." 9. On the other hand, Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, has relied on the judgments of this Court in A. Geetha Vs. State of T.N. and Ibrahim Nazeer Vs. State of T.N., wherein it has been held that even if no bail application of the petitioner is pending but if in similar cases bail has been granted, then this is a good ground for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the detention order. 10. State of T.N. and Ibrahim Nazeer Vs. State of T.N., wherein it has been held that even if no bail application of the petitioner is pending but if in similar cases bail has been granted, then this is a good ground for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the detention order. 10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored. 11. In our opinion, the detention order in question only contains ipse dixit regarding the alleged imminent possibility of the accused coming out on bail and there was no reliable material to this effect. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained. 26. It was held in Union of India Vs. Paul Manickam, that if the detaining authority is aware of the fact that the detenu is in custody and the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities he must be detained to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can validly be made. 27. In our opinion, there is a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed.” 36. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner is under judicial custody while the detention order was passed. Secondly, it is also admitted that till date, neither the petitioner nor the co-accused has moved any bail application whatsoever before any Court of law. Therefore, no bail application is admittedly pending. That being so, the grounds of detaining the petitioner on the basis that he is likely to move for bail is wholly unsustainable and on that score alone the impugned detention order is illegal and liable to be interfered with. 37. Reference is also made to paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the decision of this Court in the case of Nancy Vs. State of Nagaland & Others (Supra) , which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “15. The first point for determination which arises in the instant proceedings is as to whether a person who is in jail can be detained under the detention laws, taking into account that the husband of the petitioner herein is already in judicial custody. In the case of Dharmendra SuganChand Chelawat Vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 746 , it was observed that an order of detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that: (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenue was already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. The Supreme Court further clarified the expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention person already in custody to mean that there must be cogent materials before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which it may satisfy that: a) The detenue is likely to be released from custody in near future; and b) Taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenue, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 16. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Lal Vs. Union of India, reported in (2001)1 SCC 341 , wherein a similar issue arose as the Detaining Authority recorded its satisfaction for detention under the Act of 1980 in view of the fact that the person who was already in jail was going to move a bail application. The Supreme Court observed in the case of Amrit Lal (Supra) that although in the grounds of detention it has been mentioned that there was a likelihood of the detenue moving an application for bail, for which the detention was necessary, there must be cogent materials before the authority passing the Detaining Order that there was likelihood of his release on bail. 17. It is also pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Geetha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2006) 7SCC 603 wherein the Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority should be aware that the detenue is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenue may be released on bail cannot be ipsi dixit of the Detaining Authority. 18. Further to the above, we find it apt to note the judgment in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh Vs. State of Manipur & Ors. reported in 2012(5) GLT 23: (2012) 7SCC 181, wherein the Supreme Court culled out the three propositions as to when a per-who is in jail can be detained under the detention laws. Paragraph 9 of the said judg-ment being relevant is quoted hereinbelow: "9. State of Manipur & Ors. reported in 2012(5) GLT 23: (2012) 7SCC 181, wherein the Supreme Court culled out the three propositions as to when a per-who is in jail can be detained under the detention laws. Paragraph 9 of the said judg-ment being relevant is quoted hereinbelow: "9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged the Detaining Authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts: (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary." 19. In the said judgment, i.e. in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh (Supra), the Supreme Court also observed that merely because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in that case also if the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. Paragraph 15 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced hereinbelow: "15. In the instant case, admittedly, the said bail orders do not relate to the co-accused in the same case. The accused released in those cases on bail had no concern with the present case. Merely, because somebody else in similar cases had been granted bail, there could be no presumption that in the instant case had the detenu applied for bail could have been released on bail. Thus, as the detenu in the instant case has not moved the bail application and no other co-accused, if any, had been enlarged on bail, resorting to the provisions of the Act was not permissible. Therefore, the impugned order of detention is based on mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.” 20. Therefore, the impugned order of detention is based on mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.” 20. In the backdrop of the above, we would like to revert to the facts already de-lineated supra. The proposal which was sent by the Superintendent of Police, Kohima on 24.07.2023 to the Deputy Commissioner cum District Magistrate, Kohima do not, in any manner, state that there were reliable materials on the basis of which one could have reasons to believe that there was a real possibility of the detenue to be released on bail and further, on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. The Detention Order was passed on 26.07.2023. In the Schedule to the Detention Order, there is no mention that there are materials available with the authorities on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was a reasonable possibility of being released on bail. In the Schedule it was stated that keeping the accused at large (if bailed) would endanger the safety and security of the State and the Union of India. There is no mention of any cogent materials on the basis of which there were reasons to believe that the husband of the petitioner had a likelihood of being released on bail. 21. This Court has also taken note of the Approval Order dated 07.08.2023, the order by which the representation of the husband of the petitioner dated 14.08.2023 was rejected, the Advisory Board's opinion dated 28.08.2023 as well as the Confirmation Order dated 24.10.2023, and in neither of these orders and opinions there is any material that mention that these authorities were fully aware of the fact that the detenue was actually in custody; that there were reliable materials before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which the Detaining Authority had reasons to believe that there was real possibility of the detenue, i.e., the husband of the petitioner would be released on bail. Under such circumstances, this Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the Detention Order, the Approval Order as well as the Confirmation Order are based upon mere ipsi dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.” 38. Under such circumstances, this Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the Detention Order, the Approval Order as well as the Confirmation Order are based upon mere ipsi dixit statement in the grounds of detention and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.” 38. In the present case, there is no mention of any materials whatsoever on the basis of which there were reasons to believe that the petitioner, if moves for bail is likely to be released on bail. In fact, it appears that the power of detention is being abused by the detaining authority, whereby the right of the petitioner to move a bail application is being totally frustrated, without there being any reasons to believe that the petitioner shall be released on bail if a bail application is moved, which is in total deprivation of the personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Therefore, the second ground of detention fails. 39. This takes us to the first ground of detention i.e. that the petitioner is a habitual offender. It appears that a bald statement is made in the detention order that the petitioner has been shown arrested in connection with one Dimapur West PS Case No. 0030/24 under Section 384/34 IPC read with Regulation 7 of the NSR, 1962. However, no detail of the aforesaid case whatsoever is provided in the impugned detention order. 40. The basis on which the detaining authority has reached its satisfaction that the petitioner is a habitual offender unless is provided to the petitioner, the right of opportunity guaranteed to the petitioner under the Constitution of India becomes meaningless. 41. Paragraphs 66, 67, 68 and 69 of the decision of this Court in Akhil Gogoi Vs. State of Assam & Others(Supra) is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:- “66. The petitioner contends that certain materials, more particularly a CD that finds mention in the order of detention of 29.04.2017 and which was forwarded to the Principal Secretary to the Govt. of Assam in the Home and Political Department had not been provided to the petitioner along with the order of detention and the grounds thereof. Mr. Dutta, learned senior counsel for the petitioner refers to the dossier that was provided to the petitioner which refers to certain video clippings and video footage which establishes that the petitioner had instigated the people for taking 'Hendang' and 'AK-47 Rifle' against the nation. Mr. Dutta, learned senior counsel for the petitioner refers to the dossier that was provided to the petitioner which refers to certain video clippings and video footage which establishes that the petitioner had instigated the people for taking 'Hendang' and 'AK-47 Rifle' against the nation. It is contemplated that perhaps the CD mentioned in the order of detention pertains to such video clippings and video footage which establishes that the petitioner made certain inflammatory statement for instigating the people. Accordingly, it is also contemplated that the said CD perhaps relates to the grounds that the petitioner had made an obnoxious statement that he would complete the task that was supposed to have been done by ULFA (I), which is a banned outfit and that on 12.09.2017, in his speech at Bamunbari Tea Garden, Playground in Dibrugarh, he had instigated the common people to wage war against the State by taking up arms like 'AK- 47 Riffle', 'Hangdang' (Sword). 67. Although Mr. Sarma, learned senior counsel for the detaining authority takes the Court through several documents containing the statement of various witnesses in different police cases which would indicate that the petitioner had made such inflammatory statements, but the existence of such statement, although provided to the petitioner, cannot mitigate the situation where particular materials that had been relied upon by the detaining authority to arrive at its satisfaction as regards the existence of the grounds had not been provided to the detenue. It cannot be a matter that even in the absence of the concerned CD being provided to the petitioner, he had the knowledge as regards the basis of the satisfaction for arriving at a particular ground, and therefore, by not providing the CD no prejudice has been caused. It is rather a matter of procedural requirement of the law as laid down in various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the detenue is entitled to be provided with all such documents and materials that are relied upon by the detaining authority for arriving at its satisfaction regarding the existence of a particular ground and such entitlement flows from Article 22(5) of the Constitution. 68. In this respect, reference is made to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamla Kanyalal Khushalani -Vs-State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in (1981) 1 SCC 748 wherein, in paragraph-4 it was held as under:- “4. 68. In this respect, reference is made to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamla Kanyalal Khushalani -Vs-State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in (1981) 1 SCC 748 wherein, in paragraph-4 it was held as under:- “4. The court, therefore, clearly held that the documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention formed an integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenu pari passu the grounds of detention. If the documents and materials are supplied later, then the detenu is deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. In this case, the court relied upon the ratio in Icchu Devi Choraria case extracted above. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view expressed by the two decisions of this Court and we are unable to accede to the prayer of Mr. Rana for sending the case for reconsideration to a larger Bench. This Court has invariably laid down that before an order of detention can be supported, the constitutional safeguards must be strictly observed." In Icchu Devi Choraria -Vs- Union of India and Ors., reported in (1980) 4 SCC 531 it had been held as under:- 7. "......these grounds which were served upon the detenu did not include the documents, statement and other materials relied upon in the grounds and forming part of them..... It is clear from the discussion in the preceding paragraph that under clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3 sub-section(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, the detaining authority was bound to supply copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention to the detenu within five days from the date of detention, that is, on or before June, 9, 1980 and in any event, even if we assume that there were exceptional circumstances and reasons for not supplying such copies within five days were recorded in writing, such copies should have been supplied to the detenu not later then fifteen days from the date of detention" 9." The facts as we find them here are that the detenu asked for copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention by his letters dated June 6, 1980 and June 9, 1980 and he also complained about non-supply of such copies in his representation date June 26, 1980..... There was thus a delay of more than one month in supply of copies of the documents, statements and other materials to the detenu.... We must in the circumstances hold that there was unreasonable delay on the part of the detaining authority in supplying to the detenu copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention and the continued detention of the detenu was accordingly illegal and void and the detenu was entitled to be released forthwith from detention." In the case of Pritam Nath Hoon -Vs-Union of India and Ors., reported in (1980) 4 SCC 525 in paragraph-11 it was held as follows:- “11 ..... It was, therefore, incumbent on the detaining authority to supply copies of those statements to the petitioner to enable him to make an effective representation....." 69. From the aforesaid provisions of law, it is discernible that the right to be provided with all the relevant documents and materials which the detaining authority had relied upon to arrive at its satisfaction as regards the existence of grounds of detention, is a constitutional right of the detenue under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. As such, any such violation of the said right would render the ground, which was based upon such material and document, to be vitiated. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the grounds for which the concerned CD also constitutes a material for arriving at the satisfaction regarding the existence of the ground, stands vitiated, for not being provided with the CD under reference.” 42. In the present case, it is apparent that no materials whatsoever as regards the other case relating to Dimapur West PS Case No. 0030/24 under Section 384/34 IPC read with Regulation 7 of the NSR, 1962 based on which the detaining authority has arrived at its satisfaction that the petitioner is a habitual offender, has been provided to the petitioner. Thus, the FIR in connection with the Dimapur West PS Case constituting a material for arriving at the satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the petitioner being a habitual offender i.e. the existence of the first ground of detention, having been not provided to the petitioner, the detention order stands totally vitiated. 43. Thus, the FIR in connection with the Dimapur West PS Case constituting a material for arriving at the satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the petitioner being a habitual offender i.e. the existence of the first ground of detention, having been not provided to the petitioner, the detention order stands totally vitiated. 43. In terms of the protection provided under the Constitution of India, it is mandatory for the detaining authority to provide all the relevant documents and materials which the detaining authority had relied upon to arrived at its satisfaction as regards the existence of grounds of detention. The same being a constitutional and fundamental right of the detenue under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, any violation of the same would render the detention order illegal. 44. In the present case, the materials on the basis of which the detaining authority has arrived at its satisfaction that the petitioner is a habitual offender, having been not provided nor being stated in the detention order, the constitutional and fundamental right of the petitioner to make an effective representation is being totally infringed, the first ground of detention also fails. 45. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the Detention Order dated 13.05.2024 is totally illegal and the petitioner has been detained illegally without following the procedure established by law. 46. In view of the above, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned Detention Order dated 13.05.2024, the impugned Approval Order dated 22.05.2024 and the impugned Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2024 are not sustainable and as such, stands set aside and quashed. However, we make it clear that this will not affect the criminal cases pending against the petitioner. We further direct the detenue concern to be released forthwith, if not otherwise required in connection with any other case. 47. With the above observations and directions, this habeas corpus petition stands allowed. 48. Disposed of.