JUDGMENT : NISHA M. THAKORE, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the original plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the Code”), challenging the order dated 05.02.2022 passed by the learned 16th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara on Exh.22 in Special Civil Suit No.306 of 2018. By the said impugned order, the learned Judge has allowed the application preferred by the original defendant nos.1 to 3 at Exh.22 under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code, thereby rejecting the plaint followed by consequential order of dismissal of suit passed below Exh.1. 2. In nutshell, the facts of the case as pleaded in the plaint, are as under: 2.1. The present appellant/original plaintiff-Trust has filed Special Civil Suit No.306 of 2018 before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Vadodara seeking various reliefs. 2.2. It is the case of the original plaintiff that agricultural land bearing Block No.220 Paiki, Revenue Survey No.383 Paiki of moje Ankhol, Taluka-Vadodara ad-measuring 2-18-74 sq. mtrs. was originally owned by defendant nos.1 and 2. Similarly agricultural land bearing Block No.221/b, Revenue Survey No.387 ad-measuring 0-60-70, Revenue Survey No.531 ad-measuring 0-05-06 and Block No.221/a, Revenue Survey No.390 ad-measuring 0-48-56 and Revenue Survey No.391 ad-measuring 0-49-57 of moje Ankhol, Taluka-Vadodara was owned by defendant no.3. For the sake of convenience the aforesaid lands are referred as “suit lands”. 2.3. It is further contended that the aforesaid suit lands were gifted to the plaintiff-Trust, which was reduced in the form of trust deed on 17.08.1995 by the aforesaid defendant nos.1 to 3. It is further contended that in fact the application was moved by the aforesaid defendants seeking registration of the Trust and ultimately, the Trust was registered on 06.09.1996. It is pleaded that various communications were exchanged with different authorities including the District Collector, Mamlatdar, Talati cum Mantri, Competent Officer (ULC) and the Charity Commissioner with regard to the objections being invited as regards vesting of the aforesaid suit lands as Trust property. It was, therefore, pleaded that after following the due process of law, the learned Charity Commissioner had passed order dated 06.09.1996 accepting the registration of the Trust and the certificate to that effect was also issued in the name of the plaintiff- Trust. 2.4. It was, therefore, pleaded that after following the due process of law, the learned Charity Commissioner had passed order dated 06.09.1996 accepting the registration of the Trust and the certificate to that effect was also issued in the name of the plaintiff- Trust. 2.4. In spite of the aforesaid fact, the Mamlatdar & ALT, Vadodara Rural- original defendant no.4 had initiated proceedings almost after lapse of 19 years from the date of registration of the Trust and the vesting of the suit lands under Section 84(c) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948. It was further pleaded that pursuant to the trust deed dated 17.08.1995 and the registration of Trust, a mutation entry no. 876 dated 07.08.1998 has also been given effect in the revenue record. The plaintiff has, therefore, pleaded to be in possession of the suit lands since then and the aforesaid suit lands were used for the purpose of various religious, spiritual, social and educational activities. It was further pleaded that in fact, construction has also been carried out on the suit lands from the funds collected from the devotees. 2.5. By pleading the aforesaid facts, it is contended by the plaintiff that the defendant nos.1 to 3 have no interest in the suit lands since year-1995 and only because of rise in the value of the suit lands, the defendant nos.1 to 3 had tried to take over the possession of the disputed lands. 2.6. The cause of action has, therefore, arisen for the plaintiff to approach the court of learned Civil Judge, when on 29.08.2018, the defendant nos.1 to 3 had administered threat. The suit was, therefore, filed by the plaintiff for declaration and for permanent injunction against the original defendants and the same was presented on 03.10.2018. 2.7. By pleading the aforesaid facts, the plaintiff has raised the cause of action by contending that the defendant nos. 1 to 3 were trying to take away the possession of the suit properties without following due process of law by giving threat on 29.08.2018. 2.7. By pleading the aforesaid facts, the plaintiff has raised the cause of action by contending that the defendant nos. 1 to 3 were trying to take away the possession of the suit properties without following due process of law by giving threat on 29.08.2018. In light of the aforesaid pleadings, the plaintiff has sought for following reliefs: “(i) to declare that defendant nos.1 to 3 has no right, title or interest in the suit properties, (ii) to declare that the Trust has become the owner of the suit properties by way of adverse possession; (iii) to declare the proceedings initiated by the defendant no.4 being time barred and same is void-ab-initio; (iv) to declare that defendant nos.1 to 3 has no right or interest to disturb the possession of the suit properties of the plaintiff-Trust, without following due process of law; (v) to grant permanent injunction against defendant nos.1 to 3 against taking over possession of the Trust property without following due process of law.” 2.8. The learned Civil Judge upon appreciation of the pleadings of the plaint and the documents produced along with the plaint, allowed the application preferred by the original defendant at Exh.22 under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code, by passing the impugned order dated 05.02.2022, consequentially dismissed the suit. The learned Civil Judge has essentially taken into consideration three aspects i.e (i) that no permission is taken from the learned Assistant Charity Commissioner to present the suit in terms of Section 50 of the Bombay Public Trust Act; 1950 (ii) no permission under Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 has been obtained in respect of the suit lands, which are indisputably agricultural lands; and (iii) that the prayer was sought for against the Mamlatdar in respect of revenue proceedings which was otherwise barred in view of Section 85(2) of the Tenancy Act. 2.9. With the aforesaid factors noticed by the learned Civil Judge prohibiting the suit in terms of Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code, had allowed the application and dismissed the suit. Hence, this appeal at the instance of the original plaintiff. 3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mehul Suresh Shah has appeared with Mr. Jinesh H. Kapadia, learned advocate on record for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah has appeared for the respondent nos.2.1 to 2.5 and 3.1. 4. Hence, this appeal at the instance of the original plaintiff. 3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mehul Suresh Shah has appeared with Mr. Jinesh H. Kapadia, learned advocate on record for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah has appeared for the respondent nos.2.1 to 2.5 and 3.1. 4. From the order-sheet, it has transpired that at the stage of admission hearing, this Court vide order dated 13.04.2022 had issued notice upon the respondents and by granting ad-interim relief, had stayed the operation and implementation of the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.02.2022 and had further directed the respondents to maintain status quo for the disputed lands. The adinterim relief granted earlier has been continued till date. With the joint request of learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter was finally heard at the admission stage. At the end of the conclusion of arguments, the learned advocates for the respective parties were permitted to place on record the submissions along with the list of authorities relied upon during the course of the arguments and the matter was kept for orders. 5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mehul Suresh Shah appearing for learned advocate Mr. Jinesh H. Kapadia for the appellant, at the outset, has invited our attention to the cause title of the original proceedings and has submitted that the appellant before this Court, is a registered Trust and is in actual possession of the suit lands. While referring to the trust deed produced along with the list of documents in the original proceedings, has submitted that the learned trial court misconstrued the fact that the suit lands were transferred in breach of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. It was submitted that the plain reading of the trust deed clearly indicates that the trustees were in fact the settlers, who had handed over the properties in the name of the Trust. The respondents-original defendants were in fact the original trustees, who had constituted the appellant-Trust. The suit properties were dedicated by them to the appellant-Trust created by them who had led the Trust to approach various authorities. The exchange of various communications between the State Authorities pursuant to an inquiry case No.147 of 1995 and the proceedings recorded by Talati-cum-Mantri on 12.10.1995 indicate the fact that they were the settlers who gave their lands to settle the Trust. 5.1. The exchange of various communications between the State Authorities pursuant to an inquiry case No.147 of 1995 and the proceedings recorded by Talati-cum-Mantri on 12.10.1995 indicate the fact that they were the settlers who gave their lands to settle the Trust. 5.1. According to learned Senior Advocate, the learned Charity Commissioner had declared the trust property vide order dated 06.09.1996 and the certificate of registration was also given to that effect. In spite being aware of the same, respondent authorities, the Mamlatdar & ALT had initiated proceedings in the year-2013, which was almost after 19 years under Section 84(c) of the Tenancy Act. As against that upon declaration being given by the learned Charity Commissioner of treating the suit properties as Trust Property, a mutation entry no.876 was also effected in the revenue record on 07.08.1998 and since then, the suit properties are running in the name of the Trust. By referring to the aforesaid facts, the learned Senior Advocate has invited our attention to the prayer sought in the plaint and has submitted that the learned Civil Judge committed serious error in invoking Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code, leading to dismissal of the suit at the threshold. 5.2. The learned Senior Advocate, upon instructions, has submitted that though the issue of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act was in center of the rejection of the plaint. However, pending this proceedings, the appellant-Trust has been able to secure the relevant permission under Section 63AC of the Tenancy Act. At this stage, learned Senior Advocate has referred to the relevant provisions and has submitted that plain reading of Section 63AC envisages a post facto, permission also. Our attention was invited to the proviso, more particularly, the reference to the expression “may grant permission”. As against the aforesaid provision, the learned Senior Advocate has drawn our attention to Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, where the expression “without previous sanction of the Collector” appears, which reflects the intention of the legislation to obtain previous permission from the Collector prior to entering into the transaction in respect of the agricultural land. The relevant observations of the Full Bench of this Court in the recent pronouncement in the case of Shaikh Ismailbhai Hushanbhai (Dead) by L.Rs. The relevant observations of the Full Bench of this Court in the recent pronouncement in the case of Shaikh Ismailbhai Hushanbhai (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Vankar Ambalal Dhanabhai reported in AIR 2024 GUJARAT 61 was invited to contend that the conditional decree can always be passed in cases involving Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. To re-affirm the aforesaid legal principle, the learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the nonreported decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute vs. Radhu Vithoba Barde (Neutral Citation being 2024 INSC 122 ) (delivered in SLP (C) 29462 of 2019 dated 15.02.2024), where in case involving sanction of the Collector under Section 36(A) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, the Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance of such agreement. The Court observed that it shall be open for the plaintiff to proceed under Section 36(A) of the said section before seeking conveyance of the subject lands in his favour in case where the defendant is a tribal. 5.3. The learned Senior Advocate, therefore, submitted that in such kind of circumstances, the suit ought not to have been dismissed at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code as the Courts are competent to pass conditional decree in the suit for specific performance. The learned Senior Advocate has, once again, reiterated the prayer clause of the plaint and has invited our attention to the multiple prayers prayed for to contend that once it was found that the suit was partially maintainable and even otherwise, the Court ought not to have invoked Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code to reject the plaint. 5.4] In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sejal Glass Limited vs. Navilan Merchants Private Limited reported in (2018) 11 SCC 780 and the judgment of this Court in the case of The Trust of Shri Laxmi Narayan Dev Temple & Its Subordinate Temple & Others vs. Ajendraprasadji Narendraprasadji Pande & Anr. reported in 2013 (2) G.L.H. 559 . reported in 2013 (2) G.L.H. 559 . The reliance was also placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Biswanath Banik and another vs Sulanga Bose and Others reported in (2022) 7 SCC 731 , to contend that when the suit is for a decree of permanent injunction and it is averred that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property, pursuant to the agreement have developed the land, the cause of action can be considered to have arisen on the date on which the possession was sought to be disturbed. In such circumstances, the suit for decree of permanent injunction cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Thus, following the principle of law that the plaint cannot be rejected partially, the order passed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code dismissing the suit was quashed and set aside and the suit was restored. 5.5. By referring to the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the specific averments has been made in the plaint which is further fortified in light of the documents placed on record as regards the appellant-original plaintiff being in actual possession of the suit lands. The reliance was placed on the photographs, which indicate that the land has been developed and the temple construction has been raised in the suit lands. It was submitted that various social activities are carried on by the appellant-Trust on the aforesaid land. The cause of action had arisen for the plaintiff to approach the court for permanent injunction against the respondents who were trying to dispossess the Trust by resorting to the provisions of Tenancy Act. Apart from the aforesaid decisions, learned Senior Advocate has also relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Purani Dhirajlal Amritlal vs. Mehta Shankleshwar Aditram reported in (1976) GLR 67, in the case of Harijan Manga Kala vs. Sir Admaji Haji Daud Education Society and Others reported in 1992 (2) GLH 157 and in the case of Atmaram Ranchhodbhai vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin reported in 1972 GLR 828 , on the issue of maintainability of the suit involving the trustees. 5.6. 5.6. By making the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior Advocate has urged this Court to allow the present appeal and to restore the suit as well as to extend the order of status quo as directed by this Court in Appeal, pending the suit as well in respect of the suit properties. 6. The aforesaid submissions of learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant has been vehemently objected by learned advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah appearing for the respective respondents. Our attention was invited to the reasons assigned by the learned Civil Judge. The learned advocate has referred to the plaint especially the names of the defendants as against the names appearing in the PTR, to contend that the respondents are not the trustees of the Trust. The reliance was placed on the document dated 17.08.1995, which was rightly construed as a gift deed amounting to transfer in breach of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. While referring to the prayer clause, the learned advocate has submitted that the principal prayer was, therefore, hit by Article 59 of the Limitation Act. Learned advocate has urged before us to take note of three dates. It was submitted that the original suit was filed on 18.09.2018. The application under Order VII Rule 11 was presented by the defendants at Exh.22 on 18.02.2019 and the relevant permission under Section 63AC of the Tenancy Act was sought for before the competent authority by filing the application subsequently on 05.09.2019. 6.1] By referring to the aforesaid dates, learned advocate has submitted that admittedly on the date of the presentation of the suit, the plaintiff-Trust was a non-agriculturist and holding of an agricultural land, was in clear violation of Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. Learned advocate has fairly conceded the fact that though initially notices were issued for breach of of Section 63 under Section 84 (c) of the Tenancy Act by the Mamlatdar & ALT, which has later been withdrawn, in view of disposal of the proceedings as is evident from the order dated 27.10.2020 placed on record along with the list of documents produced by the defendants. Our attention was invited to the fact that while disposing the aforesaid proceedings, the Mamlatdar & ALT had clarified that the parties shall be governed by the outcome of the Special Civil Suit No.306 of 2018. Our attention was invited to the fact that while disposing the aforesaid proceedings, the Mamlatdar & ALT had clarified that the parties shall be governed by the outcome of the Special Civil Suit No.306 of 2018. In light of the aforesaid facts, the learned advocate has submitted that no error can be found with the approach of the learned trial court in entertaining the application under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code while dismissing the suit at the threshold. 6.2. Learned advocate has made the valiant attempt to highlight the fact that contrary pleadings have been made in the plaint as is evident from the pleadings and the prayer clause. It was submitted that though at one stage, the appellant-Trust claims to be the owner of the suit lands and in the second breath, the plea of adverse possession is raised. By making the aforesaid submissions, he therefore, has urged this Court not to interfere with the impugned order and prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 7. Before considering the legality of the approach adopted by the trial Court, it is necessary to consider Order VII Rule 11, CPC and the precedents on the subject. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code reads as follows: “11. 7. Before considering the legality of the approach adopted by the trial Court, it is necessary to consider Order VII Rule 11, CPC and the precedents on the subject. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code reads as follows: “11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;] (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:] Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamppaper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]” (emphasis supplied). 8. The relevant principles have been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366 . The relevant paras read as under : “23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. 23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4. In [Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823 ] this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p. 324, para 12) “12. … The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.” 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512 ] , read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 23.7 Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under : 14. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512 ] , read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 23.7 Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under : 14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.– (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.” (emphasis supplied). 23.8 Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137 ]. 23.11. 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137 ]. 23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, 5 would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512 ] which reads as : (SCC p. 562, para 139) “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.” 23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614 ] the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3 SCC 267 ; See also Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941 ] . 23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 23.14. 23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557 ] . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain case[Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823 ]. 23.15. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint” 9. The plain reading of provision Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code provides that the plaint shall be rejected “where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law”. Hence, in order to decide whether the suit is barred by any law, it is the statement in the plaint which will have to be construed. The Court while deciding such an application must have due regard only to the statements in the plaint. Whether the suit is barred by any law must be determined from the statements in the plaint and it is not open to decide the issue on the basis of any other material including the written statement in the case. 10. In other words, the true test is first to read the plaint meaningfully and as a whole, taking it to be true. Upon such reading, if the plaint discloses a cause of action, then the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code must fail. 10. In other words, the true test is first to read the plaint meaningfully and as a whole, taking it to be true. Upon such reading, if the plaint discloses a cause of action, then the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code must fail. Following this clear principle, we have closely read the averments made in the plaint. The trial Court has taken into consideration the following undisputed facts : “1. The plaintiff has filed suit in respect of agricultural land at mouje : Ankhol, Vadodara. 2. No sale deed has been executed in respect of said land in favour of the Trust but the defendants having consented before the Assistant Charity Commissioner in an enquiry under section 18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, the Assistant Charity Commissioner has vested the land in the Trust. 3. No permission has been availed from the competent authority under section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, before vesting of the said lands in the plaintiff trust. 4. The suit land is in occupation of the plaintiff. In the revenue record, the status of land is agricultural land and no permission to convert into non agricultural land has been obtained. 5. The plaintiff has applied for conversion of land to non agricultural use on 24.08.2020 before Collector, Vadodara, which is pending, in terms of section 63AC of the Tenancy Act in view of the amendment brought into effect from 2015 in light of the government resolution no. GNT/102019/1987/Z, dated 05.09.2019, produced at mark 44/1.” The trial Court has followed the decision of the learned single Judge in the case of Heirs of deceased Chandubhai Krishnarao Jadav vs. Pax Society , 2018 (0) AIJEL-HC 242906 , and has arrived at the conclusion that no permission under section 63 of the Tenancy Act has been obtained by the plaintiff trust for transfer of the suit land and therefore in view of the prohibition against such transfer, the relief for possession or any other reliefs prayed for cannot be entertained. 11. In our view, the trial Court committed a serious error in applying the judgment of Chandubhai (supra) of the learned single Judge in the facts of the case, overlooking the subsequent amendment inserted in section 63 of the Tenancy Act. Section 63AB, 63AC and 63AD has been inserted by Gujarat Act no. 11. In our view, the trial Court committed a serious error in applying the judgment of Chandubhai (supra) of the learned single Judge in the facts of the case, overlooking the subsequent amendment inserted in section 63 of the Tenancy Act. Section 63AB, 63AC and 63AD has been inserted by Gujarat Act no. 28 of 2015, dated 16.09.2015 with effect from 5th December, 2015 vide notification no. GHM/2015/M-140/GNT/1015/C.3/Z, dated 5th December, 2015. Section 63AC reads as under : “Conversion of land into non-agricultural purpose if the land is purchased before the commencement of Amending Act, 2015. 63AC. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 63 or 63AD but subject to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, any institution registered as a public trust for charitable purpose under the Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950, or any company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 which has in its objects the promotion of charity and to which provisions of section 8 of the said Act are applicable, has purchased the land in contravention of the provision of sub-section (1) of section 63 on or before the 30th June, 2015, such institution shall be entitled to make an application within six months from the commencement of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015, to the Collector for conversion of such land into non-agricultural purpose. (2) On an application made under sub-section (1), the Collector shall make a detailed inquiry and comes to the conclusion that such institution has, in contravention of the provisions as referred to in sub-section (1) purchased the land, he shall call upon such public trust or the company as referred to in sub-section (1) to pay such amount in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government and if such public trust or company pays such sum as directed by the Collector, the Collector shall allow the conversion of such land into the nonagriculture purpose and pass the order accordingly.” 12. The plain reading of Section 63 AC of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 inter alia, provides that the public trust for charitable purpose registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act or the company registered under the Companies Act shall be entitled to apply for conversion of land to non-agricultural purpose if the land in question is purchased by such institutions on or before 30th June, 2015. Thus, the amending Act has made provision for regularization of transactions which has taken place prior to Year 2015 to apply even post facto. 13. It would be appropriate to refer to the relevant observations of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of the Shaikh Ismailbhai Hushainbhai (Dead) by LR’s. vs. Vankar Ambalal Dhanabhai, AIR 2024 Gujarat 61: 2024(1) GLH 222. The Court thus observed : “127 Coming to the decisions relied by the learned Advocates in the matter of agreements executed in violation of Section 63, as noted hereinbefore, there is a radical difference between the language of the two statutes. Section 63(1) though couched in negative language but the first proviso attached to sub-section (1) qualifies the negative language employed in the main Subsection (1), makes an agreement made by an instrument in writing for sale, lease etc. to a nonagriculturist, invalid. The first proviso to Subsection (1) of Section 63, however, attaches validity to such transfer on the grant of permission by the Collector or an officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf, on such conditions as may be prescribed. 128 A careful reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 63 with the first proviso attached to the same gives a clear indication that though an instrument of transfer or an agreement made by an instrument in writing for the transfer in favour of a nonagriculturist shall not be valid, but on the permission being granted by the Collector or the officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf, on the conditions as may be prescribed in the order of permission, such a transfer can be validated. The reading of the Sub-section (1) of Section 63 with the first proviso attached thereto makes it clear that though there is a restriction on transfer to a nonagriculturist, but there is no absolute bar as contemplated in Section 43 about transfer of a land of restrictive nature without the previous permission of the Collector. 129 We may note that as per the principles of Statutory interpretation, the real nature of a proviso or the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. 129 We may note that as per the principles of Statutory interpretation, the real nature of a proviso or the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. The discussion in this regard in the 15th Edition of the “Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P.Singh” is to be extracted hereinunder :- 3.9.1 Its Real Nature The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. As stated by Lush J : When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subjectmatter of the proviso. In the words of Lord Macmillan : The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. The proviso may, as Lord Macnaghten laid down, be “a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. The general rule has been stated by Hidayatullah, J in the following words : As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. And in the words of Kapur, J : The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment.” 130 It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. 131 In light of the above noted rule of statutory interpretation, on a careful reading of the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 63, it is clear that the proviso qualifies the main Subsection (1) to the extent that on a permission being granted by the Collector or an officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf, on such conditions as may be prescribed, that an agreement made by an instrument in writing for transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange etc. or an instrument for transfer by sale, gift, etc. to a nonagriculturist, would be valid. The bar in Sub-section (1) of Section 63 on such transfer is qualified with the first proviso attached to the said sub-section. 132 In view of the above discussion with regard to the language employed in Section 43, we are not impressed with the arguments of the learned Advocates based on the judgments pertaining to the agreements hit by Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, that an agreement hit by Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, 1948 would not be illegal or void and can be specifically enforced by the Civil Court by granting a conditional decree mandating the vendor to seek permission of the Collector and execute the sale deed. We are afraid to agree with the said contention in view of the clear difference in the language employed in two provisions, namely Section 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act, 1948. 14. This brings us to the issue as to whether the learned Judge ought to have exercise powers under order VII Rule 11 of Code to dismiss the suit at threshold, in facts and circumstances of the case. In our opinion, the vesting of the suit lands in the trust is prior to 2015 and indisputably the plaintiff trust has subsequently applied for the permission under section 63AC of the Tenancy Act. The aforesaid fact was disclosed before the trial Court. In such circumstances, as interpreted by the Full Bench when there was no absolute bar under section 63 of the Tenancy Act, and such a transaction can be validated as provided under section 63AC of the Tenancy Act, the dragonion power of dismissal of suit at the threshold were uncalled for. The aforesaid fact was disclosed before the trial Court. In such circumstances, as interpreted by the Full Bench when there was no absolute bar under section 63 of the Tenancy Act, and such a transaction can be validated as provided under section 63AC of the Tenancy Act, the dragonion power of dismissal of suit at the threshold were uncalled for. Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act 1963 provides for Declaratory Decrees under Section 34 of the Act which governs declaratory reliefs. It reads: “34. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right: Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 contemplates certain conditions which are to be fulfilled by plaintiff. In order to obtain the relief of declaration the plaintiff must establish that (i) the plaintiff was at the time of the suit entitled to any legal character or any right to any property (ii) the defendant had denied or was interested in denying the character or the title of the plaintiff (iii) the declaration asked for was a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to a legal character or to a right to property (iv) the plaintiff was not in a position to claim a further relief than a bare declaration of his title. Thus, a person claiming declaratory relief must show that he is entitled 1. to a legal character, or 2. to a right as to property, and that 3. The defendant has denied or is interested to deny his title to such character or right and 4. He has sought all reliefs in the suit.” 15. The object is to protect from adverse attacks on the title of the plaintiff, where a cloud is cast upon it, and to prevent further litigation by removing existing causes of controversy. The threat to his legal character has to be real and not imaginary. He has sought all reliefs in the suit.” 15. The object is to protect from adverse attacks on the title of the plaintiff, where a cloud is cast upon it, and to prevent further litigation by removing existing causes of controversy. The threat to his legal character has to be real and not imaginary. In other words, any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: PROVIDED that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 16. In the facts on hand, the plaintiff Trust has approached the Court seeking declaration against the defendants having ceased to have any right , title or interest in suit lands or alternatively for decree of adverse possession and for seeking permanent injunction against their apprehended dispossession. Admittedly, the suit lands are vested as Trust property. It is the specific case of the Plaintiff that the dedication of the suit lands was voluntarily made by the defendants as settler and after due inquiry conducted by the Charity Commissioner under section 18 and 19 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, the suit lands were registered in the name of the Plaintiff Trust in the PTR which has continued since Year 1996 till date and has not been challenged. Prima facie, the dedication can be inferred from long, continuous , uninterrupted use throughout these years for religious charitable purposes. In our view, the plaintiff Trust legal character to seek relief of declaration and permanent injunction based on right to possession of suit lands which is attacked as apprehended by the plaintiff in the plaint, cannot be ousted at the threshold. The legal character of the plaintiff to hold agricultural land is not absolutely barred under section 63 of the Tenancy Act when the legislation itself recognised such right to regularise the possession and the plaintiff trust having applied for the same, the Plaintiff Trust had a cause of action to pursue for reliefs. 17. The legal character of the plaintiff to hold agricultural land is not absolutely barred under section 63 of the Tenancy Act when the legislation itself recognised such right to regularise the possession and the plaintiff trust having applied for the same, the Plaintiff Trust had a cause of action to pursue for reliefs. 17. So far as the issue of bar under section 85A of the Tenancy act is concerned, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provision. Section 85A of the Tenancy Act reads as : “85A. (1) If any suit instituted, whether before or after the specified date in any Civil Court] involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or dealt with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the "competent authority") the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination. (2) On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall communicate its decision to the Civil Court and such court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section a Civil Court shall include a Mamalatdar's Court constituted under the mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906.” 18. The language employed in the aforesaid provision in fact clarifies that issues which touch the jurisdiction of the competent authority under the Tenancy Act, can be referred by the Civil court and it does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide the suit. Admittedly, the notice issued under section 84C of the Tenancy Act has been withdrawn by the competent authority with further liberty to trust to approach under section 63AC of the Tenancy Act and it is further ordered to be governed by the outcome of the present Civil Suit. It has been submitted by the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties that the permission under section 63AC of the Tenancy Act which was applied for has now been granted and the plaintiff Trust has complied with the conditions imposed by the competent authority. In such circumstances, the issue of maintainability of suit does not survive. 19. It has been submitted by the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties that the permission under section 63AC of the Tenancy Act which was applied for has now been granted and the plaintiff Trust has complied with the conditions imposed by the competent authority. In such circumstances, the issue of maintainability of suit does not survive. 19. As regards the issue of maintainability of suit for want of permission under section 50 of the Bombay Public Trust Act is concerned, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of The Trust Of Shri Laxmi Narayan Dev Temple & Its subordinate temple and ors. Vs. Ajendraprasadji Narendraprasadji Pande & ors., 2013(2) GLH 559 , it is held that there is no requirement of a plaintiff to plead the performance of condition precedent for obtaining leave from the Charity Commissioner under section 50 of the Trust Act in the plaint. The Court further held that order 6 rule 6 would be applicable and in absence of such pleadings as regards compliance , it is for the defendant to raise such defense in the written statement and if such defense is raised, the plaintiff has to produce evidence showing compliance of condition precedent. In such circumstances, the Court shall have to frame appropriate issues as regards maintainability. Thus, the plaint cannot be rejected by resorting to Order VII rule 11 of the Code on such ground. 20. Though the contention of nonjoinder of all trustees has been raised, the trial Court has chosen not to examine the same for the purpose of Order VII Rule 11 of Code. In our view, in light of the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Harijan Manga Kala ( supra) and Atmaram Ranchodbhai ( supra), we are not inclined to consider the same at this stage. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal succeeds. The order impugned dated 05.02.2022 passed below EXH. 22 in Special Civil Suit No. 306 of 2018, by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara is hereby quashed and set aside. The suit is restored back to its original file. The Trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial from the stage it stood dismissed. The order impugned dated 05.02.2022 passed below EXH. 22 in Special Civil Suit No. 306 of 2018, by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara is hereby quashed and set aside. The suit is restored back to its original file. The Trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial from the stage it stood dismissed. The ad-interim relief granted by this Court by order dated 13.04.2022, in terms of para 6(B) of the Civil application (for stay) pending the captioned appeal as regards maintaining status quo is directed to be continued till the hearing of interim injunction application, pending the adjudication which now stands revived by this order on revival of the suit. The civil application for stay stands disposed of, in above terms.