JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. By way of the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State has laid a challenge to the judgment dated 11.05.1994, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara in Sessions Case No.124/92 (State of Rajasthan v. Bahadur Singh and Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the charges against them under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, while extending them the benefit of doubt. 2. At the outset, Mr. C.S. Ojha, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-State drew the attention of this Court towards the order dated 23.02.1996 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Hon’ble Court, which reflects that on count of demise of the respondent No.3 herein, the instant appeal qua her stood abated on the said date itself. 2.1. Accordingly, the present adjudication is made only to the extent of surviving accused-respondents No.1 & 2, namely, Bahadur Singh and Gopal Singh, respectively. 3. The matter pertains to an incident which has occurred in the year 1992 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1995. 4. Brief facts of the case, as placed before the Court by learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that one Jor Singh presented an oral report on 02.06.1992 before the Reserve (Aarakshi) Centre, Badnor, District Bhilwara, stating therein that his house was situated at a short distance from the house of Gheesa Singh (deceased herein) and that on the said date, in between 10 and 11 am he heard the sister of Gheesa Singh shouting that someone has killed her brother, sister-in-law and niece. Thereupon, the informant as well as other villagers gathered along with the then Sarpanch (Prem Singh) and went to the house of Gheesa Singh, where they saw the dead body of the deceased lying on the cot and the bedding was completely blood-stained. Gheesa Singh’s wife Sita was lying on the floor and there was blood all around her and his daughter Radha, aged around 6 years old was also lying dead on the cot. Gheesa Singh’s neck had a cut due to weapon injury, apart from other injuries. His daughter had an injury on her face. 5. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR was registered under Section 302 of IPC. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused-respondents. Gheesa Singh’s neck had a cut due to weapon injury, apart from other injuries. His daughter had an injury on her face. 5. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR was registered under Section 302 of IPC. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused-respondents. The learned Trial Court framed the charges against the accused-respondents under Sections 302 r/w 34 IPC. The charges were read over to the accused-respondents, which they denied and claimed to stand the trial and the trial commenced accordingly. 6. During the course of trial, the prosecution produced witnesses (PW-1 to PW-25) and got exhibited documents (Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-63); whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 CrPC, wherein the accused respondents pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 7. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned trial Court, vide its impugned judgment dated 11.05.1994 acquitted the accused under Sections 302/34 IPC, against which the present appeal has been preferred on the behalf of the appellant-State. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State submitted that in the present case, even though there is no direct witness to the incident in question, there are circumstances which point towards the guilt of the accused-respondents, which is manifest from the previous strained relations between the deceased and the accused-respondents, arose due to the second marriage solemnized by Gheesa Singh (deceased), whereafter, a dispute pertaining to property also ensued between the parties. 8.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the causation of the murder was attributable to the accused-respondents, as this causal link is established between the deceased and the accused-respondents through the element of motive, which in turn was due to the property dispute between the two which arose as a consequence of the plausible division of property and a resultant reduction of their share, after Gheesa Singh’s second marriage with Sita. The same is also corroborated by the testimony of Smt. Noji (PW20). 8.2. The same is also corroborated by the testimony of Smt. Noji (PW20). 8.2. Learned counsel also submitted that during the process of investigation, recovery of the weapons i.e., axe and knife was made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which was subject to the examination; and in the said report (Ex.P. 62), the blood group was found to be same as that of the blood group of the deceased, which again established the causal link between the accused-respondents and the commission of crime. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Rajiv Vishnoi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-respondents, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that there is no direct evidence available on record which could in any manner connect the accused-respondents with the crime in question, and therefore the ambit of the present case is limited to circumstantial evidence. However, the chain of circumstances is broken due to various inconsistencies in the process of recovery and the subsequent hostilities of the witnesses, thereby weakening the case of prosecution. 9.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the deceased individuals were sleeping on the terrace and the next morning they were found dead, however, no one else was present in the house on that fateful night. It was also submitted that the accused-respondents did not live with the deceased family and therefore, in the absence of any direct witness/evidence, there presence cannot be established at the spot of crime, at the relevant time. 9.2. Learned counsel further submitted that even though recovery took place under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, however, most of the recovery witnesses have turned hostile, thereby weakening the case of prosecution. 9.3. Learned counsel also submitted that the deceased persons (family) were alone on the terrace in the night and the death has been caused by some unknown individuals who have not been identified by any of the witnesses and the witnesses have also failed to support the case of the prosecution vis-à-vis recovery and motive which in turn, in absence of cogent evidence, shows failure on the part of the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 11. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 11. This Court observes that the accused-respondents were charged for the offence of murder and after conducting the trial, learned Trial Court acquitted them of the charges under Sections 302 r/w 34 of the IPC, vide the impugned judgment. 12. This Court further observes that from the evidence available on record, it is clear that the present case is not based on any direct evidence, rather the guilt or innocence of the accused-respondents lies solely upon the circumstantial evidences in the case. 12.1. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 , the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the five golden principles, which constitute the Panch-Sheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as follows: “(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ’may be proved’ and ’must be or should be proved’ as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ’may be’ and ’must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and 164 (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.” 13. This Court also observes that the prosecution, in furtherance of its case against the accused-respondents, has relied upon two pertinent circumstances, which includes motive and recovery of weapons pertaining to the offence in question. 13.1. This Court further observes that even though there have been differences between Gheesa Singh and the accused-respondents due to the second marriage of the former and the ensuing property dispute, however, there has been no evidence available on record to show the factum of a strong motive on the part of the accused-respondents, to commit the crime in question. 13.2. This Court also observes that to prove the point of motive, the prosecution has relied solely upon the testimony of the PW20, Smt. Noji, who has stated that the accused-respondents, namely Mangi and Gopal always used to argue with Gheesa Singh (deceased) over solemnization of second marriage by the latter, and used to express their discontentment over the resultant property dispute. 13.2. In the above factual backdrop, it is pertinent to examine, whether in the instant case such testimony is sufficient enough to prove accrual of motive which was grave enough to drive the accused-respondents to kill the deceased. The material available on record shows that even though there was some dispute regarding the property, there was no information to show quantum and value of the property, as to how much did the accused-respondents claim from Gheesa Singh and whether he accepted or denied to give the same. Furthermore, it is not even clear from the testimony of PW20 as to how much property did Gheesa Singh actually owned, and therefore, his testimony on the point of motive does not induce confidence of this Court. 13.3. This Court also observes during the examination of Jai Singh (PW25) it was pointed out in his testimony that there was no legal suit or proceeding subsisting between the accused-respondents and the deceased, at the relevant time. 13.4. Thus in the attendant facts and circumstances, it can be deduced that a motive on the part of the accused-respondents against the deceased is not made out. 14. This Court further observes that another vital aspect to be considered in the present case while examining the chain of circumstantial evidence is that of recovery of the weapons used for commission of the crime in question and the human blood detected on the clothes of the accused-respondents at the time of arrest. 14. This Court further observes that another vital aspect to be considered in the present case while examining the chain of circumstantial evidence is that of recovery of the weapons used for commission of the crime in question and the human blood detected on the clothes of the accused-respondents at the time of arrest. 14.1. This Court also observes that on the basis of the information in Ex.P. 59 an axe was recovered, which according to Ex.P. 19 was sealed after being seized. However, both the recovery witnesses, i.e., Mohan Singh (PW6) and Himmat Singh (PW11), have been declared hostile, as they have clearly stated in their examination that the axe was not recovered in their presence. 14.2. This Court further observes there has been major inconsistencies in the testimony of Manohar Singh (PW22), Ramlal (PW23), Laxman Singh (PW24) regarding the process of recovery and as to sealing of the objects (post recovery/seizure), which in turn cast a cloud upon the whole process of seizure itself. 14.3. This Court also observes that recovery of a knife was made on the basis of the statement made by the accused-respondent Gopal. However, the recovery witnesses of the aforementioned recovery, namely, Mewaram (PW13) and Bheru (PW14) were declared hostile during the trial, thereby casting a serious suspicion on the recovery of the alleged weapon of the offense i.e., knife and thereby creating one more hindrance in the completing the chain of circumstances, that the accused-respondent only committed the act of homicide. 14.4. This Court further observes that in addition to the aforementioned, at the time of arrest, a blood-stained vest, being worn, by the accused-respondent Gopal, at the relevant time, was also recovered from him. However, in this regard also, the relevant recovery witnesses, namely Gajanand (PW18) and Hajari Singh (PW9) have turned hostile, thereby have not supported the prosecution story. 14.5. This Court also observes that the recovery witnesses Mithu Singh (PW7) and Dudi Singh (PW8), who were present at the time of recovery of axe have also been declared hostile during the trial. Furthermore, a sword and a knife were recovered during the investigation, however, the same were not sent for medical examination and therefore, absence of any report or doctor’s comments tilts the case in favour of the accused-respondents. 14.6. Furthermore, a sword and a knife were recovered during the investigation, however, the same were not sent for medical examination and therefore, absence of any report or doctor’s comments tilts the case in favour of the accused-respondents. 14.6. In light of the aforementioned, this Court observes that the recovery in the instant case is seriously vitiated due to inconsistencies in the process and the testimonies of the witnesses, along with the corollary hostilities in that behalf, which in turn further weakens the chain of circumstances. 14.7. This Court further observes that prosecution witnesses, namely Mohan Singh (PW6), Mithu Singh (PW7), Dudi Singh (PW8), Hajari Singh (PW9), Mewa Ram (PW13), Bheru (PW14), Teja Singh (PW15) have also been declared hostile by the trial court. 15. This Court, therefore, observes that in absence of any direct evidence, the onus lied on the prosecution to establish a complete chain of circumstances, which could point towards one and only one conclusion which is the guilt of the accused and no other. However, in the present factual matrix, the story of prosecution is knotted due to vitiated shreds of evidence and does not point only towards the guilt of the accused. 16. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court." Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): "38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: - "8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/ omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record." 17. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court’s judgment dated 11.05.1994 impugned herein, acquitting the accused-respondents of charges under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witness at a considerable length and duly analyzed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 18. Thus, in light of the factual matrix of the case and the evidences adduced, this Court observes that in the instant triple murder case, the actus reus i.e., the causation of death of the victims have been established on the part of the prosecution. However, it has failed to prove the quintessential element of any crime, i.e., causation. 18. Thus, in light of the factual matrix of the case and the evidences adduced, this Court observes that in the instant triple murder case, the actus reus i.e., the causation of death of the victims have been established on the part of the prosecution. However, it has failed to prove the quintessential element of any crime, i.e., causation. In other words, the causal link between the crime in question and the accused-respondents is absent in the instant case. 18.1. In the present case, there was no eye-witness and therefore, the burden was upon the prosecution to establish a complete and unbreakable chain of circumstances, pointing surely towards the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts and towards no other inference. However, from marshalling and appreciation of the evidences available on record, major inconsistencies and loopholes have been manifested in the prosecution story. Thus, in the present case, since the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused-respondents (acquitted) beyond all reasonable doubts, and therefore, the learned Trial Court vide the impugned judgment was right to give them the benefit of doubt. 19. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, and that a mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment. 20. Thus, in the overall factual matrix and the circumstances surrounding the case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, the impugned judgment dated 11.05.1994 passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be anything, which would call for intervention of this Court to reverse the same. 21. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 21.1. However, keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A CrPC / Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the each of the surviving accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 21. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 21.1. However, keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A CrPC / Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the each of the surviving accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- each and a surety bond each in the like amount before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the surviving accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as and when called upon to do so. 21.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.