JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. The Appellants/Plaintiffs filed this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.') against the and decree, dated 25.03.2004 passed in A.S. No.55 of 2001 on Judgment the file of District Judge, Ongole (for short, 'the 1st Appellate Court') confirming the Judgment and decree, dated 29.12.2000 passed in O.S. No.243 of 1997 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ongole (for short 'the trial Court'). 2. The Appellants are the Plaintiffs, who filed the suit in O.S. No.243 of 1997 for Specific Performance of sale agreement and for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants 1 to 3 from entering into the plaint schedule property and with costs. 3. It is prudent to refer to the parties as they were originally presented in the suit O.S. No.243 of 1997 to minimize any potential confusion and to enhance the understanding of the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: (a) The second Defendant acquired the property described in the plaint schedule, along with an additional area totalling 1.23 acres, through a registered sale deed dated 14.09.1978. Following the purchase, the southern portion of this property, adjacent to Kurnool Road, was subdivided into two plots of 111 gadies each, with a passage left between them to access the remaining northern area. The area further north of these two plots was also developed into house plots by the second Defendant. (b) The Plaintiffs and Maddineni Mala Kondaiah agreed to purchase the property outlined in the plaint schedule, with a price of Rs. 460/- per Gadi (equivalent to 72 feet), totalling Rs. 51,060/-. This agreement occurred in the presence of the second Defendant and K. Chiranjeevarao, who acted on the second Defendant's behalf. At that time, a proposal for a road between the two plots was under consideration. In April 1981, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was paid to K.Chiranjeevarao as instructed by the second Defendant. Subsequently, the second Defendant executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of K. Chiranjeevarao, who then executed the sale agreement on behalf of the Plaintiffs and Maddineni Mala Kondaiah. The vendor also delivered possession of the property to them. In April 1981, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was paid to K.Chiranjeevarao as instructed by the second Defendant. Subsequently, the second Defendant executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of K. Chiranjeevarao, who then executed the sale agreement on behalf of the Plaintiffs and Maddineni Mala Kondaiah. The vendor also delivered possession of the property to them. The eastern boundary was designated as the remaining site within the same survey number, intended for passage, noted as belonging to the vendor. Although a regular registered sale deed was not obtained, complications arose when Maddineni Mala Kondaiah wished to withdraw from the transaction. The first Plaintiff agreed to purchase Mala Kondaiah's share, and both the second Defendant and K. Chiranjeevarao consented to substituting the first Plaintiff's name for Mala Kondaiah's. It was advised that a fresh agreement be executed rather than an existing one amended. Consequently, on 09.08.1985, a new agreement of sale was drafted, incorporating all terms and conditions from the previous agreement, including site boundaries. The first Plaintiff compensated Mala Kondaiah for his proportionate share, and K. Chiranjeevarao signed the new agreement as the G.P.A. holder for the second Defendant. (c) Subsequently, though the Plaintiffs offered to pay the balance of Rs. 1060/- also, the vendor and his Power of Attorney agent stated that they would receive the balance of the amount after settling the accounts between them and that ever since 09.08.1985 all the Plaintiffs have been in possession of the plaint schedule site. It was mentioned in the agreement of sale that it was without reference to the Law of limitation. (d) K. Chiranjeevarao is suffering from cancer. The second Defendant, who held a G.P.A. from Chiranjeevarao, subsequently cancelled the original G.P.A. and executed a new one in favour of Chiranjeevarao's wife, the third Defendant, K. Ramadevi. When the Plaintiffs approached both the second and third Defendants to execute the regular sale deed, they were met with requests for additional time. Despite repeated follow-ups from the Plaintiffs, the Defendants failed to meet their demands. Frustrated, the Plaintiffs issued a legal notice to the Defendants, which was received on 27-28 October 1993. In response, the first Defendant sent a reply, received by the Plaintiffs on 03.11.1993, stating that the sale agreement was unavailable with the third Defendant and requesting a copy. On 04.11.1993, the Plaintiffs provided the requested copy along with a second notice. Frustrated, the Plaintiffs issued a legal notice to the Defendants, which was received on 27-28 October 1993. In response, the first Defendant sent a reply, received by the Plaintiffs on 03.11.1993, stating that the sale agreement was unavailable with the third Defendant and requesting a copy. On 04.11.1993, the Plaintiffs provided the requested copy along with a second notice. On 27.11.1993, the second Defendant replied that the entire scheduled property had been sold to the Plaintiffs and that the third Defendant (as the power of attorney holder) would execute the registered sale deed. However, the third Defendant did not appear at the Sub-Registrar's office in Ongole on 25.11.1993 to complete the transaction. (e) In 1981, a strip of land approximately 25 or 26 feet wide was left between two plots on the southern side of Ac.1.23 cents. No formal roads were constructed at that time; instead, there was a mutual understanding between the Plaintiff and his associates to set apart this area for providing a passage northward into the remaining plots. Ownership of this land, however, remained with the second Defendant. In the earlier agreement, this site was described as belonging to the vendor, and the boundaries listed in the prior sale agreement were reiterated by the scribe in the suit agreement of sale dated 09.08.1985. By 1989, a mud road was developed across this strip, extending to the site purchased by the partners of Harikrishna Industries. As the value of properties in the area increased, the third Defendant, representing the second Defendant under a General Power of Attorney, demanded that the Plaintiffs calculate the enhanced value of the land and pay the additional balance amount. The Plaintiffs disagreed, asserting that the third Defendant, acting solely as an agent for the second Defendant, had no right to claim such an adjustment. The third Defendant further stated that her husband, the second Defendant, retained some land between the road and the site purchased by the Plaintiffs, which remained under his ownership. (f) The Plaintiffs further assert that boundary stones were planted when the two plots on the southern side of Ac.1.23 cents owned by the second Defendant were initially demarcated. However, due to the uncontrolled growth of Japan Babul trees, these boundary stones became obscured. (f) The Plaintiffs further assert that boundary stones were planted when the two plots on the southern side of Ac.1.23 cents owned by the second Defendant were initially demarcated. However, due to the uncontrolled growth of Japan Babul trees, these boundary stones became obscured. It has now come to light that the boundary stones on the western side of the roadway have been removed, which the Plaintiffs contend was done by the third Defendant. Taking advantage of this, the third Defendant is allegedly attempting to encroach upon the land adjoining the western side of the road. As a result, the Plaintiffs believe it is necessary to seek a separate and permanent injunction against the Defendants to prevent any encroachment or further interference. The Plaintiffs further state that they have always been ready and willing to fulfil their obligations under the sale agreement. However, the Defendants have failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, compelling the Plaintiffs to file the present suit. 5. The first Defendant filed a written statement, which the third Defendant adopted. In their response, they contend that the G.P.A. holder of the second Defendant executed an agreement of sale on 09.08.1985 in favour of the Plaintiffs, with accurate boundary descriptions. However, they assert that the boundaries in the suit schedule do not match the boundaries outlined in the agreement, and the Plaintiffs' interpretation of these boundaries should not be accepted. There is no ambiguity in the terms of the agreement. The third Defendant further states that she was ready and willing to execute the registered sale deed as per the agreement, contingent upon receiving the balance sale consideration. In her reply dated 09.11.1993, she had set a date and time for the execution of the sale deed, which she communicated to the Plaintiffs' counsel. However, the Plaintiffs failed to attend the Sub-Registrar's office to complete the transaction, thus failing to perform their part of the contract. The Plaintiffs did not act on the agreement for nearly four years and only revived the matter in 1997. When they sent a registered notice through their counsel, she responded to this notice, reiterating her earlier contentions; the Plaintiffs' claim, particularly their desire to acquire a site of 111 gadies running from west to east along Kurnool Road is inconsistent with the clear boundary descriptions in the agreement of sale. When they sent a registered notice through their counsel, she responded to this notice, reiterating her earlier contentions; the Plaintiffs' claim, particularly their desire to acquire a site of 111 gadies running from west to east along Kurnool Road is inconsistent with the clear boundary descriptions in the agreement of sale. Therefore, the Plaintiff's claims are not supported by the terms of the agreement nor by any other documentary evidence. The third Defendant denies that possession of the property was handed over to the Plaintiffs following the agreement of sale dated 09.08.1985. She asserts that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance of the contract. Additionally, the third Defendant asserts that the suit is barred by limitation. 6. Based on the above pleadings in O.S. No.243 of 1997, the trial Court framed the following issues: 1) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 09.08.1985 as prayed for? If so, whether the Plaintiffs are entitled for grant of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants 1 & 3 as prayed for? 2) Whether the suit is barred by limitation as pleaded by D.1 in her written statement? 3) To what relief? 7. During the trial, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined on behalf of the Plaintiffs and marked Exs.A.1 to A.14. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, DW.1 was examined, and no documentary evidence was marked. 8. After the trial concluded and both sides presented their arguments, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit. 3rd Defendant is directed to pay back Rs. 50,000/- with 12% p.a. interest to Plaintiffs from the date of Ex.A1 till filing the suit and subsequently at 6% p.a. till realization and since Ex.A1 discloses possession is delivered under Ex.A1 to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are directed to return schedule property to the 1st Defendant within three months from the date of this Judgment and 3rd Defendant is directed to pay back the amount received to a tune of Rs. 50,000/- with interest as mentioned supra within three months from the date of this Judgment vide Judgment dated 29.12.2000. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and decree in O.S. No.243 of 1997, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal in A.S. No.55 of 2001 on the file of the 1st Appellate Court. 9. The 1st Appellate Court, on scrutiny of oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, had dismissed the Appeal without costs. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and decree in O.S. No.243 of 1997, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal in A.S. No.55 of 2001 on the file of the 1st Appellate Court. 9. The 1st Appellate Court, on scrutiny of oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, had dismissed the Appeal without costs. Aggrieved by the 1st Appellate Court's Judgment passed in A.S. No.55 of 2001, the Appellants/Plaintiffs preferred the present Second Appeal. 10. During the pendency of the Second Appeal, Appellants 1 to 3 died, and the L.R.s of Appellant No. 2 were brought on record as Appellants 5 to 9 vide order dated 05.11.2011 in SAMP.No.1975/2011. The L.R. of Appellant No. 1 was brought on record as Appellant No. 10 vide order dated 30.09.2015 in SAMP No. 1768/2015. The L.R. of Appellant No. 3 was brought on record as Appellant No. 11 vide order dated 30.09.2015 in SAMP No. 1771/2015. The case against the Respondent No. 2 is dismissed for default vide order dated 30.10.2012. 11. I heard Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri B. Chinnappa Reddy, learned counsel for the Appellants/Plaintiffs, and Sri K. Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Venkateswarlu Sanisetty, learned counsel for the Respondents/Defendants. 12. Based on the Appellants' contentions, the following substantial questions of law are involved in this Second Appeal: 1) Whether the Judgment and Decree of a Court be held valid when the same is passed without considering the evidence on record? 2) Can adverse inference be drawn or not because of the non-examination of the Defendants? More particularly when the Defendants admitted the execution of the Ex.A1 Sale Agreement? 3) Can the relief of specific performance of the Agreement of Sale be refused when there is categorical admission regarding the execution of the Sale Agreement except for a boundary in the schedule? 13. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the respective parties, I have reviewed the Judgments, pleadings, and evidence on record. 14. Since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C., arise only when there is a substantial question of Law and not mere such questions of Law or one based on facts. 14. Since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C., arise only when there is a substantial question of Law and not mere such questions of Law or one based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of Law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in nature in terms of Law. 15. In Mallanaguoda v. Ninganagouda (2021) 16 SCC 367 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: 10. The first appellate Court is the final Court on facts. This Court has repeatedly held that the Judgment of the first appellate Court should not be interfered with by the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC unless there is a substantial question of Law. The High Court committed an error in setting aside the Judgment of the first appellate Court and finding fault with the final decree by taking a different view on factual findings recorded by the first appellate Court....... 16. In K.N. Nagarajappa v. H. Narasimha Reddy (2021) 18 SCC 263 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: 14. Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction which a High Court derives under Section 100 is based upon its framing of a substantial question of Law. As a matter of Law, it is axiomatic that the findings of the first appellate Court are final. However, the rule that sans a substantial question of Law, the High Courts cannot interfere with the findings of the lower Court or concurrent findings of fact is subject to two important caveats. The first is that if the findings of fact are palpably perverse or outrage the conscience of the Court, in other words, it flies in the face of logic that given the facts on the record, interference would be justified. The other is where the findings of fact may call for examination and be upset, in the limited circumstances spelt out in Section 103CPC. 15. Section 103CPC reads as follows: "103. The other is where the findings of fact may call for examination and be upset, in the limited circumstances spelt out in Section 103CPC. 15. Section 103CPC reads as follows: "103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.-In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the Appeal- (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower appellate Court or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of Law as is referred to in Section 100." 16. In the Judgment in Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab S.E.B. [Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab S.E.B., (2010) 13 SCC 216 : (2010) 4 S.C.C. (Civ) 861], this Court held as follows : (S.C.C. pp. 228- 29, paras 26-28) "26. Thus, it is evident that Section 103CPC is not an exception to Section 100CPC, nor is it meant to supplant it; instead, it is to serve the same purpose. Even while pressing Section 103CPC in service, the High Court has to record a finding that it had to exercise such power because it found that finding(s) of fact recorded by the Court (s) below stood vitiated because of perversity. More so, such power can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and with circumspection, where the core question involved in the case has not been decided by the Court (s) below. 27. There is no prohibition on entertaining a second appeal, even on a question of fact, provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below stood vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an erroneous approach to the matter, i.e. that the findings of fact are found to be perverse. However, the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower Courts. However, the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower Courts. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 ]; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman- E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E- Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 ] and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali [Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740 : (2010) 4 S.C.C. (Civ) 738].) 28. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the Law. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence that is thoroughly unreliable or that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. Further, if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjecture and surmises, the Judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and, thus, stands vitiated. (Vide Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan [Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 498].)" (emphasis supplied) 17. In a recent judgment of this Court, Narayan Sitaramji Badwaik v. Bisaram [Narayan Sitaramji Badwaik v. Bisaram, (2021) 15 SCC 234 ], this Court observed as follows, in the context of the High Courts' jurisdiction to appreciate factual issues under Section 103IPC : (S.C.C. p. 238, para 11) "11. A bare perusal of Section 103CPC clearly indicates that it provides for the High Court to decide an issue of fact, provided there is sufficient evidence on record before it, in two circumstances. First, when an issue necessary for the disposal of the Appeal has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or by both the Courts below. And second, when an issue of fact has been wrongly determined by the Court (s) below by virtue of the decision on the question of Law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 17. And second, when an issue of fact has been wrongly determined by the Court (s) below by virtue of the decision on the question of Law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 17. In Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (2021) 12 SCC 529 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: 14. In the background of the legal position and on reasserting the position that there is very limited scope for re-appreciating the evidence or interfering with the finding of fact rendered by the trial Court and the first appellate Court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is necessary for us to take note as to whether in the instant facts, the High Court has breached the said settled position........................ 15. ................... When such divergent findings on fact were available before the High Court in an appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, though re-appreciation of the evidence was not permissible, except when it is perverse, but it was certainly open for the High Court to take note of the case pleaded, evidence tendered, as also the findings rendered by the two Courts which were at variance with each other and one of the views taken by the Courts below was required to be approved. 18. The Plaintiffs initiated the suit seeking specific performance of a sale agreement allegedly executed by Katragadda Chiranjeevi Rao on 09.08.1985 in their favour. The second Plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 to support their case. Additionally, the scribe and attestor of the sale agreement were examined as P.Ws.2 and 4. The original owner of the schedule property is shown as the second Defendant. It is undisputed that Chiranjeevi Rao, the G.P.A. holder for the second Defendant, executed the agreement (Ex.A1). According to the Defendants' version, Chiranjeevi Rao's wife, the third Defendant, became the General Power of Attorney (G.P.A.) holder for the second Defendant. P.W.2 and P.W.4 testified in support of the Plaintiffs' case, confirming the execution of Ex.A1 by Chiranjeevi Rao. On behalf of the Defendants, Katragadda Srinivasa Rao, the son of Chiranjeevi Rao and the third Defendant, was examined as D.W.1. D.W.1 acknowledged his father's signature on Ex.A1.The Defendants' position is that under Ex.A1, 111 gadies out of the total 200 gadies were agreed to be sold. On behalf of the Defendants, Katragadda Srinivasa Rao, the son of Chiranjeevi Rao and the third Defendant, was examined as D.W.1. D.W.1 acknowledged his father's signature on Ex.A1.The Defendants' position is that under Ex.A1, 111 gadies out of the total 200 gadies were agreed to be sold. They further contend that they have possession of 89 gadies located on the East and North sides of the property. The schedule property, covered under Ex.A1, was agreed to be sold to the Plaintiffs for a total consideration of Rs. 51,060, with the Plaintiffs having already paid Rs. 50,000 to Chiranjeevi Rao, leaving a balance of Rs. 1,060 to be paid. The trial Court observed that although the Plaintiffs claim to have taken possession of the property under the agreement dated 09.08.1985, no documentary evidence has been placed to substantiate this claim. 19. It is important to note that the trial Court directed the Plaintiffs to return the property covered under Ex.A1 to the first Defendant, affirming the Plaintiffs' possession claim. It is not the Defendants' case that the trial Court's finding aggrieved them; instead, they appealed and challenged the correctness of that finding. The first appellate Court upheld the trial Court's decision. Consequently, both Courts have accepted the Plaintiffs' assertion of possession over the property covered under Ex.A1. Moreover, the Defendants have not claimed that, following the execution of the Ex.A1 agreement, the Plaintiffs trespassed onto the property covered under Ex.A1. Since this is a question of fact, the concurrent findings of both Courts cannot be disturbed by this Court in the Second Appeal. 20. As both Courts have correctly observed, D.W.1 acknowledges the authenticity of Ex.A1 but disputes the Plaintiffs' claim that the eastern boundary of the suit property is a road, asserting instead that it is land belonging to Chiranjeevi Rao. P.Ws. 1 to 4 asserts in their evidence that before the execution of Ex.A1, there was a previous agreement in 1981 between P.W.3, M. Malakondaiah, and Plaintiffs 2 to 4, with Katragadda Chiranjeevi Rao. P.W.3 testified that he sold his share to the first Plaintiff, and therefore, a new agreement (Ex.A1) was executed, superseding the earlier 1981 agreement. The Plaintiffs assert that the contents of the 1981 agreement were simply reproduced in Ex.A1 by the scribe, P.W.2. P.W.3 testified that he sold his share to the first Plaintiff, and therefore, a new agreement (Ex.A1) was executed, superseding the earlier 1981 agreement. The Plaintiffs assert that the contents of the 1981 agreement were simply reproduced in Ex.A1 by the scribe, P.W.2. In the year 1981, it is not in dispute that no roads were in existence; instead, it was proposed that Katragadda Chiranjeevi Rao and the second Defendant would construct a road from South to North, running along the eastern boundary of their plot. Although P.W.3 testified regarding the earlier agreement of sale from April 1981, he could not produce any documentary evidence of this agreement. Notably, Ex.A1 itself does not refer to the previous agreement. 21. P.W.4 also testified that he facilitated the bargain on behalf of P.W.3, Plaintiffs 2 to 4, and the Defendant, agreeing on a rate of Rs. 460/- per gadi for the 111 gadies. According to P.W.4, the eastern boundary was earmarked as land reserved for road purposes in the context of the earlier agreement. However, despite this oral testimony, no documentary evidence of the previous agreement was placed. 22. As correctly observed by the trial Court, a comparison of the suit schedule and the schedule mentioned in Ex.A1 reveals a discrepancy, particularly concerning the eastern boundary. The Plaintiffs are now claiming a site adjacent to the corner road, extending from west to east, for 111 gadies under Ex.A1. However, Ex.A1 describes the eastern boundary as the remaining site of the Defendants, which differs from the Plaintiffs' current claim. 23. As seen from the record, the Plaintiffs sent a notice dated 26.10.1993 (Ex.A2) through their counsel to Defendants 2 and 3, in which the schedule referenced the eastern boundary as a "road." However, according to the Defendants' stance, they were willing to execute a registered sale deed under Ex.A1, which describes the eastern boundary as the remaining site of the Defendants, not as a road. Ex.A1 itself does not specify the property measurements, but the Defendants do not dispute the extent and three boundaries mentioned in the agreement. Consequently, the trial Court correctly found that the eastern boundary shown in the plaint schedule differs significantly from the east boundary outlined in Ex.A1. 24. The trial Court noted that the agreement under Ex.A1 was executed on 09.08.1985, while the suit was filed on 06.11.1997. Consequently, the trial Court correctly found that the eastern boundary shown in the plaint schedule differs significantly from the east boundary outlined in Ex.A1. 24. The trial Court noted that the agreement under Ex.A1 was executed on 09.08.1985, while the suit was filed on 06.11.1997. Before this, the Plaintiffs issued a notice on 26.10.1993 (Ex.A2) and another notice on 04.11.1993. In response, the Defendants sent a reply notice on 09.11.1993, disputing the eastern boundary referred to as a "road" in Ex.A2. The Plaintiffs subsequently sent a further notice on 17.11.1993 (Ex.A8). The trial Court observed that the Plaintiffs should have filed the suit for specific performance within three years from the date the Defendants denied the Plaintiffs' claim, which occurred on 12.11.1993 when the reply notice (Ex.A7) was received. As such, the suit should have been filed by 11.11.1996. However, the Plaintiffs filed the suit on 06.11.1997, which was beyond the three-year limitation period. Consequently, the trial Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. 25. Learned counsel for the Respondents supported the Judgment of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court by contending that the limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for instituting a suit for specific performance of a contract would be three years from the date fixed for the performance, or if no such date is fixed when the Plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. 26. The Plaintiffs relied on Ex.A10, a letter written by Katragadda Srinivasa Rao (D.W.1) to the fourth Plaintiff, dated 15.07.1997. However, the trial Court observed that this letter was addressed after the expiry of the limitation period. The trial Court rejected the letter, observing that it did not provide any legal protection against the issue of limitation, nor did it establish a fresh cause of action. The trial Court observed that D.W.1's letter merely reaffirmed the Defendant's intention to execute the registered sale deed based on the terms of Ex.A1 and not under the plaint schedule. In light of these observations, the trial Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit for specific performance. Nevertheless, the Court granted an alternative relief, directing the third Defendant to return the sum of Rs. 50,000/-, which had been received by Katragadda Chiranjeevi Rao, along with interest at 12% per annum from the date of Ex.A1. In light of these observations, the trial Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit for specific performance. Nevertheless, the Court granted an alternative relief, directing the third Defendant to return the sum of Rs. 50,000/-, which had been received by Katragadda Chiranjeevi Rao, along with interest at 12% per annum from the date of Ex.A1. This was despite the Plaintiffs not claiming an alternative relief of refund of the advance amount in their suit. 27. The Plaintiffs explained the eastern boundary discrepancy in Ex.A1. They contend that at the time of executing the agreement, there was a vacant site on the east side of the property. They agreed that a road would be constructed from south to north to provide access to the remaining site on the northern side of Ac.1.23 cents. Subsequently, a road was laid, and as a result, the eastern boundary was noted as a road in the plaint schedule. The Plaintiffs assert that this is the reason for the variance between the plaint schedule and the schedule shown in Ex.A1. 28. Both the trial Court and the first appellate Court failed to consider the Plaintiffs' contention regarding the eastern boundary being a road, under the mistaken impression that evidence contradicting the terms of the suit agreement was inadmissible. However, it is well-established that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act do not bar the introduction of evidence that addresses whether the parties agreed to the document's terms. 29. In a decision reported by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another vs. N. Raju Reddiar and another (1996) 4 SCC 551 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that: "The agreement between the parties was a written agreement and therefore the parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement. Once a contract is reduced to writing, by operation of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 it is not open to any of the parties to seek to prove the terms of the contract with reference to some oral or other documentary evidence to find out the intention of the parties. Under Section 92 of the Evidence Act where the written instrument appears to contain the whole terms of the contract then parties to the contract are not entitled to lead any oral evidence to ascertain the terms of the contract. Under Section 92 of the Evidence Act where the written instrument appears to contain the whole terms of the contract then parties to the contract are not entitled to lead any oral evidence to ascertain the terms of the contract. It is only when the written contract does not contain the whole of the agreement between the parties and there is any ambiguity then oral evidence is permissible to prove the other conditions which also must not be inconsistent with the written contract." 30. In this regard, it would be profitable to refer to the case of Gangabai Vs. Chhabubai AIR 1982 SC 20 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that: "Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the terms of contracts or grants or of any other disposition of the property, which are, in fact, reduced to the form of a document, though not required by Law to be so reduced, and those which are required by Law to be reduced in the form of documents. It mandates that no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of any contract, grant or other disposition of property or such matter except the document itself or the secondary evidence of its contents, as is admissible under the provisions of the said Act. Section 91 is thus based on the best evidence principle, excluding extrinsic evidence of the terms." Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act mandates that no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from its terms, which are required by Law to be reduced to a form of a document. There are, however, certain exceptions contained in proviso (1) to (6) to the principle mentioned above under Section 92 of the said Act. 31. The Plaintiffs contend that although there is a discrepancy between the boundaries described in Ex.A1 and those in the plaint schedule, this does not render their claim invalid. They argue that Ex.A1 refers to the remaining site of D.2 and that a road was subsequently laid along the eastern side. As a result, the Plaintiffs incorporated the road as the eastern boundary in the plaint schedule. They argue that Ex.A1 refers to the remaining site of D.2 and that a road was subsequently laid along the eastern side. As a result, the Plaintiffs incorporated the road as the eastern boundary in the plaint schedule. In light of these circumstances, the trial Court rejected the Plaintiffs' evidence and that of their witnesses because oral evidence cannot contradict documentary evidence. Without addressing the substantive validity of the Plaintiffs' claims, this Court holds that when a road is formed after the execution of Ex.A1, the plaint schedule should reflect the road as the eastern boundary. Therefore, the trial Court was obligated to consider the Plaintiffs' evidence concerning the eastern boundary. However, the trial Court declined to do so, improperly disregarding the testimony because it contradicted the documentary evidence. However, this Court views that the Plaintiffs are expected to have taken appropriate steps to obtain measurements of the schedule property to clarify the discrepancy in the Eastern boundary. 32. However, without such measurements, it cannot be conclusively stated that the Plaintiffs' stand regarding the eastern boundary is incorrect. When the Defendants do not deny the execution of the agreement, and the extent and three other boundaries mentioned in Ex.A1 are not disputed, the absence of precise measurements does not automatically invalidate their explanation; however, it remains unclear from the available evidence whether the property covered under Ex.A1 extends up to the road. Although the Plaintiffs have provided oral evidence to explain the discrepancy in the eastern boundary, the lack of precise measurements of the property leaves the issue unresolved. Further evidence, such as a survey or measurements, would be required to determine whether the property extends to the road. Without this, it isn't easy to conclusively establish the exact boundary lines and whether they correspond with the description in the plaint schedule. While the Plaintiffs have presented oral evidence to support their explanation, both the trial Court and the appellate Court rejected this evidence, finding it inconsistent with the terms of Ex.A1. However, the Plaintiffs argue that their explanation regarding the eastern boundary should not be rejected merely because it contradicts the description in Ex.A1. The fact that the eastern boundary is described in Ex.A1 as the property of Chiranjeevi Rao does not render the Plaintiffs' explanation incorrect. However, the Plaintiffs argue that their explanation regarding the eastern boundary should not be rejected merely because it contradicts the description in Ex.A1. The fact that the eastern boundary is described in Ex.A1 as the property of Chiranjeevi Rao does not render the Plaintiffs' explanation incorrect. The Plaintiffs emphasize that it is not the Defendants' case that the road was laid at the time of executing Ex.A1, nor do the Defendants contend that D.W.1 or the third Defendant were present when Ex.A1 was executed. 33. Additionally, the Plaintiffs point out that the attestors and the scribe of the agreement are competent witnesses to testify about the circumstances surrounding the execution of Ex.A1, and they could provide clarity on the issue of the eastern boundary. In light of this, the Plaintiffs argue that their evidence should not have been rejected, and the explanation for the discrepancy in the boundary should be considered valid. In light of the preceding discussion, this Court finds merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant. 34. As previously noted, the third Defendant's counsel issued a reply (Ex.A7), asserting that the eastern boundary described in Ex.A1 is the remaining site of second Defendant, M. Ramachandraiah, and expressed a willingness to execute a registered sale deed under the agreement of sale dated 09.08.1985. However, both the trial Court and the Appellate Court observed that the Plaintiffs did not approach the Court with "clean hands." Specifically, the Courts noted that the Plaintiffs needed to seek specific performance of the agreement under the boundaries as mentioned in Ex.A1 in the suit schedule. 35. Simply because the Plaintiffs have yet to take steps to obtain measurements of the property covered under Ex.A1 to verify whether it extends up to the road, it cannot be concluded that the Plaintiffs have taken an incorrect stance regarding the eastern boundary. The Court acknowledges that the attestors and scribe, who were present at the time of executing Ex.A1, have no apparent reason to support the Plaintiff's case. However, their testimony could still provide relevant information regarding the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, D.W.1, who is the son of Chiranjeevi Rao, does not possess personal knowledge of the terms agreed upon between his father and the Plaintiffs, making his testimony less authoritative on this issue. However, their testimony could still provide relevant information regarding the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, D.W.1, who is the son of Chiranjeevi Rao, does not possess personal knowledge of the terms agreed upon between his father and the Plaintiffs, making his testimony less authoritative on this issue. Therefore, without measurements of the property, it cannot be definitively stated that the Plaintiffs' plea regarding the eastern boundary is incorrect. The Plaintiffs' claim remains plausible, and the absence of precise measurements alone does not render their stand untenable. 36. It is undisputed that a road has been laid towards the eastern side of the plaint schedule property on land belonging to Chiranjeevi Rao. However, neither party has provided any material evidence regarding the extent of land situated between the road and the property covered under Ex.A1. Given the lack of such evidence, it is impossible to determine whether the property covered under Ex conclusively.A1 extends up to the road or if a strip of land is owned by the second Defendant between the property and the road. 37. Since the Defendants have not contested the execution of Ex.A1, nor disputed the extent, measurements, and three boundaries outlined in the agreement, the trial Court should have granted the Plaintiffs' claim for specific performance per the boundaries specified in Ex.A1. The Defendants' absence of a challenge to these terms further supports the Plaintiffs' case, and the trial Court's dismissal of the suit on this basis was not warranted. 38. The learned counsel for the Respondent submits that the trial Court erred significantly in granting an alternative relief of refund of the advance amount, despite the Plaintiffs not having made such a specific prayer. The appellate Court upheld this erroneous decision, and therefore, both the findings of the trial Court and the appellate Court are liable to be set aside. In Desh Raj and Others vs Rohtash Singh (2023) 3 SCC 714 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that: 36. Applying these principles to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the Respondent has neither prayed for the relief of refund of earnest money in the original plaint nor he sought any amendment at a subsequent stage. Applying these principles to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the Respondent has neither prayed for the relief of refund of earnest money in the original plaint nor he sought any amendment at a subsequent stage. In the absence of such a prayer, it is difficult to accept that the Courts would suo motu grant the refund of earnest money irrespective of the fact as to whether Section 22(2) of the S.R.A. Act is to be construed directory or mandatory in nature. 39. This Court is also of the view that the trial Court erred in granting the alternative relief of refund of the advance amount suo motu without such a prayer being made by the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, both the trial and appellate Courts have failed to adhere to well-established legal principles. It is not in dispute that the Respondent/Defendants did not file cross-objections/Appeal against the judgments of either the trial Court or the first appellate Court, and therefore, it is to be seen whether they are precluded from raising such contentions in the Second Appeal. The learned counsel for the Respondents relied on a decision made by Shri Saurav Jain and another vs. M/s. A.B.P. Design & another 2021 SAR (Civ) 934, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Respondent can raise a challenge to the adverse findings of the lower Court without filing a memorandum of cross-objection. The learned counsel for the Appellants submits that the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court do not apply to the Second Appeals, as the decision cited by the learned counsel for the Respondent pertains to the first Appeal. If this Court is inclined to grant a decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale, the question of the applicability of the decision in Shri Saurav Jain's case to the present Second Appeal need not be addressed in this matter. 40. Both the trial Court and the appellate Court rejected the Plaintiffs' case, ruling that the suit was barred by limitation. However, the Plaintiffs' case is supported by oral evidence that the boundaries of the property covered under Ex.A1 extend up to the road, which was laid subsequently. 40. Both the trial Court and the appellate Court rejected the Plaintiffs' case, ruling that the suit was barred by limitation. However, the Plaintiffs' case is supported by oral evidence that the boundaries of the property covered under Ex.A1 extend up to the road, which was laid subsequently. The Plaintiffs argue that while they did not provide documentary proof of the property's measurements, the absence of any oral evidence from the Defendants to disprove their claim, particularly from witnesses with direct knowledge of the facts, undermines the Court's decision to dismiss the suit. Given that there was no dispute over the execution of Ex.A1, the payment of consideration, or the boundaries of the property and extent described in the agreement, the trial Court and appellate Court should not have concluded that the Plaintiffs approached the Court with "unclean hands." The Plaintiffs have provided consistent oral testimony supporting their claim, which the Defendants did not effectively rebut. In the written statement, the 1st Defendant has taken a specific plea that she was ready and willing to execute the registered sale deed as per the agreement of sale after receiving the balance of sale consideration. In her reply, she also expressed her readiness and willingness to execute a registered sale deed as per the sale agreement in favour of the Plaintiffs. 41. The trial Court also observed that while answering Point No. 2, thus from the above documents, it is clear that the Defendants never refused to execute a sale deed in favour of the Plaintiffs; when once the Defendants have not refused to execute a registered sale deed and expressed their willingness to execute the registered sale deed in terms of the schedule mentioned in Ex.A1, it cannot be said that there is refusal on the part of the Defendants in executing the registered sale deed in favour of the Plaintiffs. However, the only dispute concerns the eastern boundary shown in the plaint schedule. This Court has elaborately discussed the evidence adduced on behalf of both sides and concluded that the Plaintiffs' claim concerning the Eastern boundary remains plausible. The plea of limitation does not come in the way of the Plaintiffs to grant relief of specific performance as the Defendants have taken a plea that they have no objection to executing the sale deed in terms of the Ex.A1 agreement of sale. 42. The plea of limitation does not come in the way of the Plaintiffs to grant relief of specific performance as the Defendants have taken a plea that they have no objection to executing the sale deed in terms of the Ex.A1 agreement of sale. 42. This Court also believes that specific performance is an equitable remedy, and there is no justification to deny relief for the admitted portion of the property. Accordingly, specific performance may be granted for the admitted portion. Even if it is assumed that some portion of the land of the Defendants is situated between the property covered under Ex.A1 on the eastern side and the road, nothing prevented the Court from granting relief per the terms of Ex.A1-Agreement. The Plaintiffs have sufficiently explained the discrepancy concerning the property's eastern boundary under Ex.A1. 43. In Jagadish and others vs Ram Karan and others MANU/PH/0725/2002, the Punjab and Haryana High Court relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bachan Singh vs Kartar Singh and others (2002) 131 PLR 512 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that: "18. xxxx if the claim of the Defendant was admitted by the Plaintiff and on the basis of the said admission, a decree was passed and if there was no fraud in passing the decree then the said decree was a good and valid decree and could not be ignored on the ground that the same was not registered." 44. In Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. Ltd. vs United Bank of India 2000(7) SCC 120 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that: "12. xxx, it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the Plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment, at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the Defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled". We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy Judgment." 45. As the material facts regarding the agreement and its terms are undisputed in the light of the preceding discussion, this Court views that the suit should have been decreed granting specific performance of the agreement of sale, per the boundaries set out in Ex.A1-Agreement. As the material facts regarding the agreement and its terms are undisputed in the light of the preceding discussion, this Court views that the suit should have been decreed granting specific performance of the agreement of sale, per the boundaries set out in Ex.A1-Agreement. The Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the Defendants interfered with their rights, as alleged in the plaint. Additionally, the mere fact that the Defendants disputed the accuracy of the eastern boundary does not, in itself, constitute interference with the Plaintiff's possession or rights, as claimed in the plaint. 46. In light of the above, this Court concludes that the trial Court erred in granting the alternative relief for the advance amount, as no such prayer was made in the plaint. The appellate Court, however, upheld this finding. Additionally, this Court finds that the trial Court was wrong in directing the Plaintiff to return possession of the property, as the Defendants neither admitted to possessing the property by the Plaintiffs nor made a claim in the suit for possession of schedule property. The 1st Appellate Court has also not considered such legal flaws in the Judgment of the trial Court. By simply reiterating the trial Court's findings, the 1st Appellate Court erroneously affirmed the Judgment, which was inconsistent with established legal principles. 47. This Court discerns perversity in the Judgment rendered by the learned trial Court as well as the 1st Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court are inconsistent with established legal principles. Furthermore, the 1st Appellate Court should have considered the evidence following the well-settled principles of Law. As a result, the Judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the 1st Appellate Court, which dismissed the suit for specific performance, are set aside. Consequently, the substantial questions of Law raised in this Second Appeal are adjudicated in favour of the Appellants and against the Respondents. 48. As a result, the Appeal is allowed, and the judgments and decrees passed by both the trial Court and 1st appellate Court are set aside. Accordingly, the suit is decreed in favour of the Plaintiffs, granting the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale per the boundaries specified in Ex.A1. The boundaries mentioned in Ex.A1 shall be incorporated in the decree. Accordingly, the suit is decreed in favour of the Plaintiffs, granting the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale per the boundaries specified in Ex.A1. The boundaries mentioned in Ex.A1 shall be incorporated in the decree. The Plaintiffs are directed to deposit the remaining balance of the sale consideration from the date of suit, along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, within two (2) months from the date of this Judgment if it has not already been deposited. Upon such deposit within two months, the Defendants are required to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the Plaintiffs. If either party defaults on any condition outlined in the Judgment, the non-defaulting party shall seek and pursue appropriate legal remedies per the Law. The relief claimed in the suit concerning the permanent injunction is hereby dismissed. Both parties are directed to bear their costs throughout the legal proceedings. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, in this Second Appeal, shall stand closed.