ORDER : 1. The instant bail application has been filed under Section 483 B.N.S.S. on behalf of the accused-petitioner. The petitioner has been arrested in connection with ECIR No. JPZO/29/2023 dated 21.08.2023, registered for the offences under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (from now on referred to as ‘Act of 2002’) and punishable under Section 4 of Act of 2002. 2. It is contended by learned senior counsel Mr. Vikram Choudhary for the accused petitioner that accused-petitioner Sanjay Badaya has falsely been implicated under Section 3 (4) of the Act of 2002. It is vehemently argued that similarly placed co-accused Piyush Jain has been granted bail by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide order dated 09.09.2024, and the case of the present accused-petitioner is akin to the case of the other co-accused Piyush Jain. It is also contended that against the present petitioner, the charge sheet has already been filed, and the petitioner has been in custody since 16.07.2024. The charge sheet itself is voluminous, and the prosecution relied upon 47 witnesses; it is unlikely that the trial will conclude shortly. Learned counsel for the accused petitioner has relied on the judgment of Manish Sisodia Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court granted bail to the accused, Manish Sisodia, after considering the prolonged incarceration of 17 months, observing that it is unlikely the trial would conclude shortly. It is also contended that Sections 19 (1) & 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 were also not adhered to. It is also vehemently put forth by the learned senior counsel that in the primary grounds of the petitioner’s arrest, it was mentioned that despite the issuance of summons more than 3 times, the petitioner did not join the investigation even after accepting the summons for appearance on 15.03.2024 and also not submitted the essential documents and remained passive while tendering his statements on 16.07.2024. 3. It is contended that the grounds of arrest mentioned in the memo in Para Nos. 19, 20 & 23 are contrary to the law. Learned counsel for the accused petitioner has heavily placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors. 3. It is contended that the grounds of arrest mentioned in the memo in Para Nos. 19, 20 & 23 are contrary to the law. Learned counsel for the accused petitioner has heavily placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors. Criminal Appeal No. 3051-3052 of 2023 dated 03.10.2023, whereby it was held that the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) needed to provide written reasons of belief for arresting a person arrested under the provisions of the Act of 2002. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Arvind Kejriwal, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court formulated the following questions: “1. Is the “need and necessity to arrest” a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act? 2. Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take a person into custody, or it relates to other personal grounds and reasons regarding the necessity to arrest a person in the facts and circumstances of the said case? 3. If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative, what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken into consideration by the court while examining the question of “need and necessity to arrest?” Hon’ble Apex Court, in the said matter, allowed the interim bail application of Arvind Kejriwal because the right to life and liberty is sacrosanct, and the petitioner has remained in incarceration for 190 days. It is also argued that the non- cooperation of the petitioner in response to the same issued under Section 50 of the Act of 2002 would not be enough to render the petitioner liable to be arrested under Section 19 of the Act of 2002. It is also vehemently argued that many documents have been deliberately eschewed from consideration, including several statements of the petitioner and other documents. In the case of Arvind Kejriwal, it has been held that an officer cannot be allowed to selectively pick and choose the material implicating the person to be arrested. It is also argued that a similar provision of Section 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 was not followed. In the case of Arvind Kejriwal, it has been held that an officer cannot be allowed to selectively pick and choose the material implicating the person to be arrested. It is also argued that a similar provision of Section 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 was not followed. It is also contended that the respondents had submitted before the Special Court to prove the requirement of Section 19(2) of the Act of 2002 being complied which does not state when the Adjudicating Authority received the said material and no acknowledgement in terms of Rule 3 (2) and of the (arrest rules) was complied with. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of Dilbag Singh @ Dilbag Singh Vs. Union of India and Another CRM-M-2191-2024 (O&M); therefore, the regular bail application of the accused petitioner may be allowed. 4. Learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. R.D. Rastogi, appearing on behalf of the respondent, has vehemently opposed the bail application and contended that the learned Trial Court in the impugned order passed under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. dated 12.09.2024 has elaborately dealt with the issues raised by the petitioner. It is argued that the conditions enshrined under Sections 19 (1) & 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 were followed. The petitioner has not referred in Para Nos. 7 & 10 of “ground of arrest”, which explicitly demonstrates that the accused-petitioner was involved in money laundering about aiding the M/s Sh. Ganpati Tubewell Company for contract grant in Para 12 of the “ground of arrest.” It is mentioned that the petitioner received a sum of Rs.5.4 crores from Ganpati Tubewell Company. Similarly, in Para 24 of the “grounds of arrest” reasons to believe have been assigned. Therefore, it cannot be said that compliance with Section 19 (1) of the Act of 2002 was not adhered to. It is also argued that similarly, it is mentioned in Para 31 of the remand application that the matter was sent to Adjudicating Authority under the provision of Section 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 and all the documents were made available to the present accused-petitioner, therefore, it cannot be said that the provisions of Sections 19 (1) & 19 (2) of Act of 2002 were not complied with and the accused-petitioner is denied to challenge his arrest. It is vehemently argued that in the matter of Arvind Kejriwal, the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the question of “need and necessity to arrest” in terms of Section 19 (1) of the Act of 2002. The Court categorically framed whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19 (1) of the Act of 2002. Therefore, it is clear that the legality of arrest cannot be raised when arguing the bail application. It is also argued that the accused-petitioner has failed to rebut the conditions enumerated under Section 45 of the Act of 2002, which cast obligation over the accused-petitioner to satisfy the Court that the accused-petitioner is not guilty of such offence. It is also argued that under Section 24 of the Act of 2002, the burden of proof heavily lies upon the petitioner to disprove the allegation levelled against him, and in the absence of it shall be presumed that the petitioner is involved in money laundering. It is also argued that from the inquiries carried out by the department, it was found that the petitioner helped Mr. Padamchand Jain and Mr. Mahesh Mittal to obtain tenders and, in turn, received a massive amount on the account of his father. This fact is substantiated by the Bank account of the petitioner's father. The other co-accused, Piyush Jain, in his statement recorded under Section 50 of Act of 2002 inter-alia, stated that the amount was transferred to the account of the petitioner’s father, Hari Narayan account, at the behest of the petitioner. It is also argued that for the two tenders, that is, NIT Nos. 06 & 07/2022-2023 of Nagaur, a bribe of Rs.5.4 crores was paid to the accused-petitioner and the same fact was confirmed by the other co-accused Padamchand Jain and Mahesh Mittal during their statement recorded under Section 50 of the Act of 2002. It is also argued that the amount received by the petitioner was utilised to purchase property in the village of Vimalpura, Tehsil Sanganer, Jaipur. Thus, it is apparent that the accused petitioner was involved in money laundering offences and illegally obtained money from both firms to facilitate obtaining the tender in their favour. Therefore, considering the above facts, it is clear that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of such offences. Thus, it is apparent that the accused petitioner was involved in money laundering offences and illegally obtained money from both firms to facilitate obtaining the tender in their favour. Therefore, considering the above facts, it is clear that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of such offences. Thus, the accused petitioner is not entitled to a grant of bail. It is also argued that the cases of Manish Sisodia & Arvind Kejriwal are entirely different. Similarly, the grant of bail of the other co-accused, Piyush Jain, by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide order dated 09.09.2024 is also not applicable as the custody period of the petitioner is much less than the custody period of the other co-accused. Hence, the bail application of the accused petitioner may be dismissed. 5. Heard and perused the material available on record. 6. At the outset, it is enough to mention that there is enough material against the accused-petitioner to exhibit that the accused-petitioner was involved in receiving the amount in tune to Rs.1.0575 crores from the M/s Sh. Shyam Tubewell company (co-accused Padam Chand Jain) is on the account of the petitioner’s father, Harinarayan Badaya. The statements of other co-accused Sh. Piyush Jain, Sh. Padamchand Jain & Sh. Mahesh Mittal, proprietor of M/s Ganpati Tubewell Company, substantiated the allegation of getting the money to obtain the tenders from the government. Section 45 of the Act of 2002 casts obligation upon the Court, and the Court shall release the accused-petitioner on bail only when the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused-petitioner is not guilty of such offences and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. This Court believes that there is enough material on the record to indicate that the present accused-petitioner received money from the other co-accused in his father’s account and also “siphoned off” the amount in purchasing the land. As far as violations of Sections 19 (1) & 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 are concerned, this Court believes that before arresting the petitioner, the respondents have mentioned the grounds of arrest and reasons to believe to the accused-petitioner. As far as violations of Sections 19 (1) & 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 are concerned, this Court believes that before arresting the petitioner, the respondents have mentioned the grounds of arrest and reasons to believe to the accused-petitioner. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the matter of Arvind Kejriwal, has referred the matter to the larger Bench, forming a question of whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest members in terms of Section 19 (1) of Act of 2002. It is also apparent from the documents that compliance under Section 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 was also complied with. At this stage, it would not be appropriate for this Court to enter into the intricacies of whether compliance with Sections 19 (1) & 19 (2) of the Act of 2002 was improper. As far as claiming parity with the other co-accused, it is apparent from the Hon’ble Apex Court order that the co-accused Piyush Jain was enlarged on bail after 193 days. The period of the present petitioner in custody is only 112 days, which is much less than the period of custody of the other co-accused, Piyush Jain, who has been enlarged on bail; upshot to the above, this Court is not inclined to enlarge the accused-petitioner on bail. 7. Accordingly, the criminal miscellaneous bail application of the accused petitioner is now dismissed.