JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. Appellant­State of Himachal Pradesh has filed the instant appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 27.12.2012 passed by learned Special Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. in case No. 30­ST/7 of 2010, whereby the respondent has been acquitted of charge under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (for short “NDPS Act”). 2. The prosecution had relied upon following facts:­ (i) On 04.06.2010, police officials, namely ASI Pritam Singh (PW13), HHC Tikka Ram (PW11) and Constable Rajneesh Kumar (PW­3) left Police Station Rajgarh at about 8.45 A.M. towards Kanesh, Sanora and Dhamandari etc., for routine patrol duty. (ii) At about 6.30 P.M., police party noticed the presence of respondent at village Jagher, who was approaching the liquor vend with a bag held by him on his right shoulder. At the sight of police party, respondent got scared and tried to flee from the spot. (iii) Police apprehended the respondent after entertaining a suspicion. Mohi Ram (PW­1) and Hari Chand (PW­9) were associated as independent witnesses. (iv) Respondent was informed about his right to be searched in presence of a gazetted officer or Magistrate, however, the respondent opted to be searched by the police party. (v) Members of police party gave their personal search to the respondent. (vi) The bag held by the respondent was searched. One shirt and one sweater besides a polythene bag were recovered. The polythene bag contained ‘Charas’, which on weighing was found to be 1 Kg. 250 grams. The recovered contraband along with other articles were seized and sealed. Relevant portions of NCB form were filled. (vii) ASI Pritam Singh (PW­13) prepared ‘Rukka’ and sent the same to Police Station through C. Rajneesh Kumar for registration of FIR. ASI Gurdayal Singh (PW­10) registered the FIR and the file was handed over to Constable Rajneesh Kumar (PW­3) for being delivered to ASI Pritam Singh (PW­13) for further investigation. (viii) Respondent was formally arrested and was forwarded to ASI Gurdayal Singh (PW­10) along with seized contraband and allied articles collected as pieces of evidence. ASI Gurdayal Singh (PW­10) conducted resealing proceedings and issued resealing certificate. (viii) Contraband was deposited with H.C. Joginder Singh (PW­14) posted as MHC of the Police Station Rajgarh at the relevant time. (viii) Respondent was formally arrested and was forwarded to ASI Gurdayal Singh (PW­10) along with seized contraband and allied articles collected as pieces of evidence. ASI Gurdayal Singh (PW­10) conducted resealing proceedings and issued resealing certificate. (viii) Contraband was deposited with H.C. Joginder Singh (PW­14) posted as MHC of the Police Station Rajgarh at the relevant time. (ix) On 05.06.2010, contraband along with collected evidence was sent by PW­14 HC Joginder Singh to SFSL Junga for analysis through HC Amar Singh (PW­5). The contraband on analysis by SFSL Junga was found to be sample of charas. 3. On completion of investigation challan was presented. Respondent was charged for offence under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. Prosecution examined total 14 witnesses. ASI Pritam Singh (PW­13), Constable Rajneesh Kumar (PW­3) and HHC Tikka Ram (PW­11) were examined as spot witnesses. PW­1 Mohi Ram and PW­9 Hari Chand were examined as independent witnesses, but they did not support the prosecution case. PW­2 Dinesh Sharma had proved the factum of scale and weights being handed over by him to the police on 04.06.2010. PW­4 HHC Naresh Kumar and PW­7 ASI Som Dutt proved handing over and receipt of special report under Section 52 of the NDPS Act in the office of SDPO Rajgarh on 05.06.2010. PW­14 HC Joginder Singh and PW­5 H.C. Amar Singh proved the safe custody of recovered contraband during investigation. 4. Learned Special Judge acquitted the respondent on following grounds:­ (i) Material contradictions in the statements of spot witnesses. (ii) Non compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. (iii) Discrepancy in the weight of recovered contraband while under examination at SFSL Junga. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the entire record carefully. 6. Prosecution had sought support to its case from the depositions made by ASI Pritam Singh (PW­13), Constable Rajneesh Kumar (PW­3) and HHC Tikka Ram (PW­11). In addition, reliance was placed on the documents prepared during investigation to support the oral testimonies of aforesaid witnesses. 7. Placing reliance on the statements of PW­3 and PW­11, learned Special Judge concluded that it was not a case of chance recovery, rather the police had a prior information regarding the possession of ‘Charas’ by respondent. In addition, reliance was placed on the documents prepared during investigation to support the oral testimonies of aforesaid witnesses. 7. Placing reliance on the statements of PW­3 and PW­11, learned Special Judge concluded that it was not a case of chance recovery, rather the police had a prior information regarding the possession of ‘Charas’ by respondent. Since, there was no compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act at all was found, learned Special Judge acquitted the respondent by placing reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC 299 . 8. As per the case of prosecution, vide DDR Ex.PW13/A PW3, PW­11 and PW­13 had left Police Station Rajgarh on 04.06.2010 for routine patrol duty. These Police officials had allegedly been instrumental in effecting recovery of contraband from the respondent. 9. While analysing statements of PWs 3,11, and 13 recorded during trial, learned Special Judge found various inconsistencies and contradictions inter­se the versions of aforesaid witnesses, which rendered their testimonies doubtful, more particularly, when the independent witnesses PW­1 Mohi Ram and PW­9 Hari Chand had not supported the prosecution case. Learned Special Judge found that as per PW­3, police party had first visited Giripul and from there had proceeded to place Sanora where they remained till about 5.00 P.M. and thereafter had reached village Jagher at 6.15 P.M., whereas, according to PW­11 and PW­13 after leaving the Police Station, they had directly visited village Jagher. It was also noticed that according to PW­3 and PW­11, police party had not gone beyond Village Jagher, whereas, according to PW­13, they had gone upto 10 kilometres ahead of village Jagher on Chhaila road. The contradiction as to the ‘type and description’ of vehicle used by police had also weighed with learned Special Judge. 10. Learned Special Judge has also extended the benefit of doubt to the respondent by finding discrepancy in the weight of contraband allegedly recovered by the police and as found on weighment by the official of SFSL Junga. 11. It is more than settled that the powers of Appellate Court while hearing the appeals against the acquittal are not unbridled. 10. Learned Special Judge has also extended the benefit of doubt to the respondent by finding discrepancy in the weight of contraband allegedly recovered by the police and as found on weighment by the official of SFSL Junga. 11. It is more than settled that the powers of Appellate Court while hearing the appeals against the acquittal are not unbridled. There is a clear caveat that in case the view arrived at by the trial Court is a possible one borne from the material on record, the same cannot be viewed differently, even if, there is a possibility of any other view. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala (2022)8 SCC 440 , wherein it has been held as under:­ “Scope of Appeal filed against the Acquittal: 25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters. Precedents: 26. Mohan @Srinivas @Seena @Tailor Seena v. State of Karnataka, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1233] as hereunder: – “20. Section 378 CrPC enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 CrPC speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of first instance has its own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. As a consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of first instance has its own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it, but is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial court is both possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses. Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the accused after acquittal in a certain way, though not absolute. Suffice it is to state that the Appellate Court shall remind itself of the role required to play, while dealing with a case of an acquittal. 21. Every case has its own journey towards the truth and it is the Court's role undertake. Truth has to be found on the basis of evidence available before it. There is no room for subjectivity nor the nature of offence affects its performance. We have a hierarchy of courts in dealing with cases. An Appellate Court shall not expect the trial court to act in a particular way depending upon the sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be appreciated if a trial court decides a case on its own merit despite its sensitivity. 22. At times, courts do have their constraints. We find, different decisions being made by different courts, namely, trial court on the one hand and the Appellate Courts on the other. If such decisions are made due to institutional constraints, they do not augur well. The district judiciary is expected to be the foundational court, and therefore, should have the freedom of mind to decide a case on its own merit or else it might become a stereotyped one rendering conviction on a moral platform. Indictment and condemnation over a decision rendered, on considering all the materials placed before it, should be avoided. The Appellate Court is expected to maintain a degree of caution before making any remark. 23. Indictment and condemnation over a decision rendered, on considering all the materials placed before it, should be avoided. The Appellate Court is expected to maintain a degree of caution before making any remark. 23. This court, time and again has laid down the law on the scope of inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 : “14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri ) 1179]) “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131], Excise & Taxation Officer­cum­Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372)” It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586], this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108]. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: ‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.’ 31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320], the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this noncompliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’ 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri ) 410], after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: ‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well­established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’ 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” 27. N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., [ (2021) 3 SCC 687 ] as hereunder: – “20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section 378 CrPC, no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this Court in the judgment in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC ( Cri) 325 has laid down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p. 432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. Further in the judgment in Murugesan v. State, (2012) 10 SCC 383 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 69 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said judgment, distinction from that of “possible view” to “erroneous view” or “wrong view” is explained. In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, the High Court not to reverse the acquittal to that of the conviction. * * * * 23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P., (2017) 5 SCC 719 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 653 this court has considered the powers of the appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment it is held that if the “possible view” of the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such “possible view” recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted. It is further held that so long as the view of the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, verdict of the trial court cannot be interdicted and the High Court cannot supplant over the view of the trial court. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722­23) “9. Para 9 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722­23) “9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the trial court's judgment is more than just a possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal, and that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused of the crime of murder i.e. under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6. 30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull, would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated and there was, in all probability, a scuffle that led to injuries on both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court's ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance and arrived by bus after the incident took place.” 24. By applying the abovesaid principles and the evidence on record in the case on hand, we are of the considered view that having regard to material contradictions which we have already noticed above and also as referred to in the trial court judgment, it can be said that acquittal is a “possible view”. By applying the ratio as laid down by this Court in the judgments which are stated supra, even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appellant for the offence alleged. By applying the ratio as laid down by this Court in the judgments which are stated supra, even assuming another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and to convict the appellant for the offence alleged. From the evidence, it is clear that when the Inspecting Officer and other witnesses who are examined on behalf of the prosecution, went to the office of the appellant­accused, the appellant was not there in the office and office was open and people were moving out and in from the office of the appellant. It is also clear from the evidence of PWs 3, 5 and 11 that the currency and cellphone were taken out from the drawer of the table by the appellant at their instance. There is also no reason, when the tainted notes and the cellphone were given to the appellant at 5.45 p.m. no recordings were made and the appellant was not tested by PW 11 till 7.00 p.m.” 12. We have thoroughly examined the entire evidence on record. The finding as to non compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act recorded by learned Special Judge is duly supported by the versions rendered by PWs 3 and 11. While being cross­examined, PW­3 has stated as under:­ “We went to the road leading to Giripul and reached Giripul at about 11.30 A.M. ASI Pritam Singh had received information regarding Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance. We had meal at Giripul and left from Giripul towards Sanora at 1.00 P.M. I do not know whether ASI Pritam Singh informed his superior officers regarding receipt of information qua charas or any Narcotic substance.” Similarly, the relevant extract of statement of PW­11 in cross­examination, reads as under:­ “We received secret information at Jagher regarding the contraband. The I.O. did not record the information, neither any information was sent to any superior officer.” 13. Though, PW­13 ASI Pritam Singh denied being in possession of prior information, yet the statements of PWs 3 and 11, as noticed above, cannot be discarded for the simple reason that the same was accepted by the prosecution and no effort at all was made to discredit their aforesaid versions by re­examining them. Thus, not only the factum of availability of prior information was proved, the non compliance of mandatory requirement of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act was also proved. Thus, not only the factum of availability of prior information was proved, the non compliance of mandatory requirement of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act was also proved. Admittedly, neither any such information was shown to have been recorded nor its transmission to higher officer was made out. 14. The non compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act has repeatedly been held to be fatal to prosecution case. Reference can be made to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Boota Singh and others vs. State of Haryana, (2021)19 SCC 606 , wherein it has been held as under:­ “12. In Karnail Singh { (2009)8 SCC 539 }, the Constitution Bench of this Court concluded:­ “35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed is that Abdul Rashid [ (2000) 2 SCC 513 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 496] did not require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham [ (2001) 6 SCC 692 :2001 SCC (Cri) 1217] hold that the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two decisions was as follows: (a) The officer on receiving the information [of the nature referred to in sub­section (1) of Section 42] from any person had to record it in writing in the register concerned and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1). (b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior. (c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. (c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is, after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency. (d) While total non­compliance with requirements of sub­ sections (1) and (2) of Section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the delay will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non­sending of a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of Section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof, to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will be a clear violation of Section 42 of the Act. Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got strengthened with the amendment to Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.” (Emphasis added) 13. In Jagraj Singh alias Hansa { (2016)11 SCC 687 }, the facts were more or less identical. In that case, the vehicle (as observed in para 5.3 of the decision) was not a public transport vehicle. After considering the relevant provisions and some of the decisions of this Court including the decision in Karnail Singh, it was observed:­ “14. What Section 42(2) requires is that where an officer takes down an information in writing under sub­section (1) he shall send a copy thereof to his immediate officer senior. After considering the relevant provisions and some of the decisions of this Court including the decision in Karnail Singh, it was observed:­ “14. What Section 42(2) requires is that where an officer takes down an information in writing under sub­section (1) he shall send a copy thereof to his immediate officer senior. The communication Ext. P­15 which was sent to the Circle Officer, Nohar was not as per the information recorded in Ext. P­14 and Ext. P­21. Thus, no error was committed by the High Court in coming to the conclusion that there was breach of Section 42(2). 16. In this context, it is relevant to note that before the Special Judge also the breach of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) was contended on behalf of the defence. In para 12 of the judgment the Special Judge noted the above arguments of defence. However, the arguments based on non­compliance with Section 42(2) were brushed aside by observing that discrepancy in Ext. P­14 and Ext. P­15 is totally due to clerical mistake and there was compliance with Section 42(2). The Special Judge coming to compliance with the proviso to Section 42(1) held that the vehicle searched was being used to transport passengers as has been clearly stated by its owner Vira Ram, hence, as per the Explanation to Section 43 of the Act, the vehicle was a public transport vehicle and there was no need of any warrant or authority to search such a vehicle. The High Court has reversed the above findings of the Special Judge. We thus, proceed to examine as to whether Section 43 was attracted in the present case which obviated the requirement of Section 42(1) proviso. 29. After referring to the earlier judgments, the Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that non­compliance with requirement of Sections 42 and 50 is impermissible whereas delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation will be acceptable compliance with Section 42. The Constitution Bench noted the effect of the aforesaid two decisions in para 5. The present is not a case where insofar as compliance with Section 42(1) proviso even an argument based on substantial compliance is raised there is total non­compliance with Section 42(1) proviso. As observed above, Section 43 being not attracted, search was to be conducted after complying with the provisions of Section 42. The present is not a case where insofar as compliance with Section 42(1) proviso even an argument based on substantial compliance is raised there is total non­compliance with Section 42(1) proviso. As observed above, Section 43 being not attracted, search was to be conducted after complying with the provisions of Section 42. We thus, conclude that the High Court has rightly held that non­compliance with Section 42(1) and Section 42(2) were proved on the record and the High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the conviction order.” 14. The evidence in the present case clearly shows that the vehicle was not a public conveyance but was a vehicle belonging to accused Gurdeep Singh. The Registration Certificate of the vehicle, which has been placed on record also does not indicate it to be a Public Transport Vehicle. The explanation to Section 43 shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression “public place” as explained in Section 43 of the NDPS Act. On the strength of the decision of this Court in Jagraj Singh alias Hansa, the relevant provision would not be Section 43 of the NDPS Act but the case would come under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. 15. It is an admitted position that there was total non­ compliance of the requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. 16. The decision of this Court in Karnail Singh as followed in Jagraj Singh alias Hansa, is absolutely clear. Total non­compliance of Section 42 is impermissible. The rigor of Section 42 may get lessened in situations dealt with in the conclusion drawn by this Court in Karnail Singh but in no case, total non­compliance of Section 42 can be accepted.” 15. Thus, the learned trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of non compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act to the respondent. 16. As regards the contradictions noticed by learned Special Judge, we have found the same to exist on record. Thus, the learned trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of non compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act to the respondent. 16. As regards the contradictions noticed by learned Special Judge, we have found the same to exist on record. Since, the very edifice of the prosecution case had been left doubtful by a division in the version of PW­13 on one hand and PWs 3 & 11 on the other hand in respect of the receipt of prior information, further doubting the prosecution story on the basis of other available contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of spot witnesses, cannot be said to be wrong exercise of jurisdiction by learned Special Judge. The findings and conclusion drawn by learned Special Judge are duly borne from the record and cannot be said to be perverse. In addition, we have found that according to PW­3 another police official, Constable Virender was also with them, whereas neither PW­11 nor PW­13 have uttered even a single word with respect to this fact. Even DDR Ex.PW13/A had the mention about three police officials only i.e. PW­3, PW­11 and PW­13. 17. We, however, do not find substance in learned Special Judge granting benefit to the respondent on the basis of alleged discrepancy found by him in the weight of the contraband. SFSL report Ex.PW8/A clearly reveals that the weight of parcel was 1.250 Kilograms and it was after deduction of weight of cloth parcel and polythene bag that the net weight of contraband was found to be 1.198 Kilograms. Thus, there was an explainable discrepancy. 18. As we have not found any infirmity with the findings and conclusion recorded by the learned Special Judge insofar as the non compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act and doubt found in the prosecution case, we do not consider this to be a fit case to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment dated 27.12.2012 passed by learned Special Judge Sirmaur at Nahan in case No. 30­ ST/7 of 2010 is affirmed. 19. The appeal is accordingly disposed of so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. Record be sent back.