JUDGMENT : K. BABU, J. 1. The judgment acquitting the accused in C.C. No. 538 of 2016 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Tripunithura, is under challenge in this appeal filed under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. 2. The complainant is the appellant. The accused is respondent No. 1. The complainant filed a complaint under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the accused alleging that she executed a cheque for Rs.40,00,000/- drawn on the State Bank of Travancore, Kidangoor Branch and the same was dishonoured due to insufficient balance. The complainant caused to issue a lawyer’s notice seeking the amount covered by the cheque. The accused reverted by sending a reply stating that she had received an amount of Rs.4,70,600/- from the complainant and she returned the amount with interest. The accused stated in the notice that the pleadings in the lawyer’s notice are false. 3. On the side of the complainant, PWs. 1 to 8 were examined and Exts.P1 to P10 were marked. The learned Magistrate, at the close of the trial, found that the complainant failed to prove that the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable debt. The Court found the accused not guilty of the offence and acquitted her. 4. The learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the complainant has established the execution of Ext.P1 cheque and the accused failed to rebut the presumption drawn in favour of her under Section 139 of the NI Act. The learned counsel submitted that the accused has not brought in any circumstances required for rebutting the presumption. The learned counsel relied on Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : 2023 (6) KHC 691 to fortify his contentions. 5. The learned counsel for the accused submitted that the accused could lead evidence to shift the evidential burden to the complainant. The learned counsel submitted that Ext.P1 cheque was issued to the complainant at the time when the accused borrowed Rs.4,70,600/- and she had returned Rs.7,29,028/- inclusive of interest. The evidence adduced on the side of the complainant is sufficient to draw the inference in favour of the accused, the learned counsel added. 6. The case of the complainant is as follows: The complainant and the accused were friends. The accused received small amounts from the complainant initially projecting various demands. Thereafter, she demanded huge amounts. The evidence adduced on the side of the complainant is sufficient to draw the inference in favour of the accused, the learned counsel added. 6. The case of the complainant is as follows: The complainant and the accused were friends. The accused received small amounts from the complainant initially projecting various demands. Thereafter, she demanded huge amounts. In total, the complainant advanced an amount exceeding Rupees Forty Nine Lakhs. The complainant has the bank statements to prove the various transactions. The complainant raised the funds from her relatives and friends. The amounts were paid by deposit in the bank account number given by the accused and by payment of cash directly at the residence of the complainant. Few amounts were repaid but she left huge amounts unpaid. When the husband of the complainant later discovered the transactions, some issues evolved in her family and the complainant instructed the accused to repay the amount at the earliest. The accused immediately offered to repay the amounts. She showed to the complainant a bank statement in support of her capacity to repay the amount and confidentially requested that she required another urgent help within two days to enable her to manage repayment. To avoid strain and somehow to get back her money, the complainant paid the said amount. The accused came after two days, signed and issued Ext.P1 cheque in favour of the complainant for the amount rounded to Rs.40,00,0000/-. 7. The defence set up by the accused: The pleadings made by the complainant are false. On different occasions, the accused received Rs.4,70,000/-and Rs.600/-. She returned a sum of Rs.7,29,028/- and settled the entire liability. At the time of the transaction, the accused had received blank signed cheques bearing numbers 462890 to 462897, stamp papers and blank signed white papers. Ext.P1 is one of the cheques in the possession of the complainant. The complainant misused the cheque and presented the same before the drawer’s bank claiming Rs.40,00,000/-. The accused also filed a complaint against the complainant before the Superintendent of Police, Kottayam. 8. The complainant gave evidence as PW-1. She stated that the accused had borrowed a sum of Rs.49,00,000/- from her. The accused executed Ext.P1 cheque dated 25.07.2012 for a sum of Rs.40,00,000/-. She had collected money from her friends and relatives and given to the accused. On 03.08.2012, PW-1 went to accused’s house demanding half of the amount advanced. 8. The complainant gave evidence as PW-1. She stated that the accused had borrowed a sum of Rs.49,00,000/- from her. The accused executed Ext.P1 cheque dated 25.07.2012 for a sum of Rs.40,00,000/-. She had collected money from her friends and relatives and given to the accused. On 03.08.2012, PW-1 went to accused’s house demanding half of the amount advanced. The accused was not there. Her husband assured that the money borrowed would be repaid within five days. Thereafter, the accused’s husband started threatening her. The accused again managed to avail another loan from the complainant. While examined in cross, PW-1 stated that the accused repaid Rs.9,00,000/-. According to PW-1, when the transactions between them came to the knowledge of her husband, she started demanding the amount from the accused. PW-1 admitted that the accused paid Rs.7,50,020/- through bank transfers. PW-1 deposed that she had no job during the time in which the transactions occurred. She added that she used to file Income Tax Returns. To a specific question, PW-1 stated that her transactions with the accused would not find a place in the Income Tax Return submitted by her. According to PW-1 she obtained money from her friends and relatives. 9. PW-2 is the husband of the complainant’s younger sister. He stated that he paid Rs.3,00,000/- on two occasions to the complainant in the presence of the accused and the complainant handed over the same to the accused. 10. PW-3 is the sister of the complainant. She was examined to prove that the complainant had received money from her and the same was handed over to the accused. According to PW-3, on 27.07.2012, she gave Rs.3,00,000/- to the complainant who handed over the same to the accused and the accused executed Ext.P1 cheque in favour of the complainant. She further stated that it was on that day, the complainant gave Rs.40,00,000/- to the accused. 11. PW-4, the brother-in-law of PW-1 deposed that he gave Rs.5,00,000/- to the complainant. He added that he had seen the complainant giving Rs.5,00,000/- to the accused in several instalments. 12. PW-5 is the complainant’s neigbour. According to her, she gave Rs.3,00,000/- in three instalments to PW-1. 13. PW-6 is a house maid of the complainant. She had witnessed the transactions between the accused and the complainant. 14. PWs. 7 and 8 are the Managers of HDFC Bank Thripunithura Branch and SBT, Kadappakkada Branch, respectively. 12. PW-5 is the complainant’s neigbour. According to her, she gave Rs.3,00,000/- in three instalments to PW-1. 13. PW-6 is a house maid of the complainant. She had witnessed the transactions between the accused and the complainant. 14. PWs. 7 and 8 are the Managers of HDFC Bank Thripunithura Branch and SBT, Kadappakkada Branch, respectively. PW-7 was examined to prove the transactions pertaining to the account in the name of Priya Enterprises. PW-8, the Manager of SBT, Kadappakkada, was examined to prove the statement of accounts in the name of the accused. 15. On the application of the complainant, the Court permitted her to give further evidence by filing an additional proof affidavit. In further evidence, she produced a Registration Certificate issued from the Kerala Government Commercial Taxes Department in the name of Priya Enterprises [Ext.P10]. In the cross examination, the complainant stated that she came to know regarding the fact that she was the proprietor of Priya Enterprises only two days back. 16. The trial Court came to the following conclusions: (1) The complainant’s evidence regarding the payment of money to the accused lacks credibility, as there are many ambiguities in her depositions. (2) The complainant had not stated any reason as to why huge amounts were lent to the accused without even letting her husband know. (3) Though PWs. 2 to 5 stated that they had advanced Rs.14,00,000/- to the complainant during different transactions, they did not place any material to establish the same. She had no job during the relevant period. (4) The complainant failed to give convincing evidence as to how she had advanced money to the accused. (5) The complainant did not state the transactions in the Income Tax Return submitted by her. (6) The complainant had no idea about the transactions amounted Rs.3,15,300/- from the account maintained in the name of Priya Enterprises. (7) PWs. 2 to 5 stated only about the payment of Rs.14,00,000/- to the accused, whereas the complainant herself admitted that the accused had paid back more than Rupees Seven Lakhs. This makes the defence case more probable. (8) Though the complainant initially denied the registration of a police case against her alleging charging of exorbitant interest, in the subsequent stage of her cross examination, she admitted the same. This makes the defence case more probable. (8) Though the complainant initially denied the registration of a police case against her alleging charging of exorbitant interest, in the subsequent stage of her cross examination, she admitted the same. (9) The evidence of the complainant that she came to know about the fact that she was the proprietor of Priya Enterprises only two days prior to her examination in the Court makes her version doubtful. 17. The accused admitted the issuance of Ext.P1 cheque. She admitted her signature in Ext.P1, but denied the contents therein. The complainant also gave evidence that the accused issued Ext.P1 cheque in her favour. 18. A negotiable instrument, including the cheque, carries presumption in consideration in terms of Section 118(a) and under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Dishonour of a cheque carries a statutory presumption of consideration. The holder of the cheque, in due course, is only required to prove that the cheque was issued by the accused and that when the same was presented, it was not honoured. Since there is a statutory presumption of consideration, the burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued not for any debt or other liability. [Vide: Uttam Ram v. Devinder Singh Hudan and Another, (2019) 10 SCC 287 : 2019 (5) KHC 179 ] 19. In T. Vasanthakumar v. Vijayakumari, (2015) 8 SCC 378 , the Supreme Court held that since once the cheque as well as the signature are accepted by the accused, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act would operate and the burden is on the accused to disprove the existence of any legally recoverable debt or liability. In Rangappa v. Mohanan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : 2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC), the Apex Court held that presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act does include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. Therefore, I am of the view that the complainant has established the execution of Ext.P1 cheque by the accused. 20. Now, the crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the accused has succeeded in rebutting the presumption drawn in favour of the complainant. A presumption is an inference to the existence of a fact not actually known arising from its connection with another which is known. 20. Now, the crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the accused has succeeded in rebutting the presumption drawn in favour of the complainant. A presumption is an inference to the existence of a fact not actually known arising from its connection with another which is known. A presumption is a conclusion drawn from the proof of facts or circumstances and stands as establishing facts until overcome by contrary proof. Analysing the terms “proved” and “disproved” as provided in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, a court shall presume a Negotiable Instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that the consideration does not exist. The necessary conclusion is that for rebutting such a presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. All the circumstances, including the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant, could be relied upon. 21. In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 , a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, on the scope of Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, held that the obligation of the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. In Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35 , while considering the presumption under Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Supreme Court held that the defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. The Supreme Court observed that if the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the complainant, who would be to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the Negotiable Instrument. The Supreme Court further observed that the burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either directly or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. 22. In Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 , the Supreme Court, while considering the nature and scope of onus of proof which the accused was required to discharge in a criminal case, held that the onus on an accused person might well be compared to the onus on a party in civil proceedings, and just as in civil proceedings the court trying an issue makes its decision by adopting the test of probabilities. In V.D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1762 , the Supreme Court held that it is well established that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. In Rajaram S/o Sriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) through LRs. v. Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) through LRs. 2023 SCC Online SC 48 : 2023 Live Law (SC) 46, the Supreme Court held that the standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities, and it is open for the accused to rely on the evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. 23. The principle that emerges from the above discussion is that the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of responsibility being that of the prudent man. 24. In M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Supreme Court has elaborately considered the question of the standard of proof for rebutting the mandatory presumption drawn under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In Narayana Menon, the Supreme Court held that if some material is brought on record consistent with the innocence of the accused, which may reasonably be true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to acquittal. In Narayana Menon, the Supreme Court held that if some material is brought on record consistent with the innocence of the accused, which may reasonably be true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to acquittal. The Supreme Court further held that it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence and that the standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. 25. The Supreme Court, in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : 2023 (6) KHC 691, reiterating the above principles, observed thus: “39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of ‘preponderance of probabilities’ similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa v. Mohan, AIR 2010 SC 1898 ] 40. In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. The words ‘until the contrary is proved’ occurring in Section 139 do not mean that accused must necessarily prove the negative that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. [Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983 and Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 ] 41. In other words, the accused is left with two options. The first option-of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The first option-of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The preponderance of probability in favour of the accused's case may be even fifty one to forty nine and arising out of the entire circumstances of the case, which includes: the complainant's version in the original complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice, complainant's case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in the reply notice, his 313 statement or at the trial as to the circumstances under which the promissory note/cheque was executed. All of them can raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding that there was ‘no debt/liability’ [Kumar Exports and Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 ]. 42. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact.” 26. In Rajesh Jain (Supra), the Supreme Court held that the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence to shift the burden to the complainant. It is open for him to rely upon presumption of fact as provided in Section 114 of Evidence Act or other provisions in the Evidence Act. Once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint, the burden shifts to the complainant and the onus having now shifted to the complainant, he/she will have to prove the existence of debt/liability as a matter of fact. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the rescue of the complainant. Once both parties adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983 ] 27. Now, I turn to analyse the pleadings and evidence on the touchstone of the precedents referred to above. The specific case of the complainant is that she advanced a sum of more than Rs.49,00,000/- at different intervals to the accused. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983 ] 27. Now, I turn to analyse the pleadings and evidence on the touchstone of the precedents referred to above. The specific case of the complainant is that she advanced a sum of more than Rs.49,00,000/- at different intervals to the accused. She further pleaded that the amount was rounded to a lower figure by fixing the liability at Rs.40,000,000/-. According to the complainant, in discharge of this liability, the accused executed Ext.P1 cheque. While examined in cross, the complainant stated that she had advanced a sum up to Rs.49,00,000/-. She further stated that the accused had returned Rs.9,00,000/-. The complainant did not state regarding the return of Rs.9,00,000/- by the accused either in the complaint or in the affidavit filed in lieu of the chief examination. At one stage of her cross-examination, she deposed that she did not state either in the complaint or in the affidavit in lieu of chief examination that she had advanced more than Rs.49,00,000/-. 28. To a specific question as to limiting the liability by rounding the amount due at Rs.40,00,000/-, the complainant answered that she had no idea about it. These inconsistencies affected the credibility of the evidence of the complainant. According to the complainant, even after advancing a sum of Rs.49,00,000/- to the accused, her husband had no idea about it. Thereafter, she added that when amounts were advanced on some occasions, her husband had not objected to it. In the cross-examination, the complainant had at one stage stated that when she advanced Rs.40,00,000/- to the accused, the matter came to the knowledge her husband. Thereafter, she advanced Rupees Three Lakhs more, the complainant added. The accused executed the cheque for Rs.40,00,000/- inclusive of Rs.3,00,000/-. The complainant had no idea about on how many occasions the accused received money from her. The above versions of the complainant also affect her credibility. The source of income of the complainant to advance such a huge amount is under challenge. The complainant examined PWs. 2 to 5 to prove that they gave Rs.14,00,000/- on different occasions to her and in turn she advanced the same to the accused. The source of the the rest of the money advanced by the complainant is doubtful. The complainant gave further evidence by filing an additional affidavit stating that she was the proprietor of Priya Enterprises. 2 to 5 to prove that they gave Rs.14,00,000/- on different occasions to her and in turn she advanced the same to the accused. The source of the the rest of the money advanced by the complainant is doubtful. The complainant gave further evidence by filing an additional affidavit stating that she was the proprietor of Priya Enterprises. While examined in cross, the complainant stated that only two days before she came to know that she was the proprietor of Priya Enterprises. The complainant attempted to prove a transaction of Rs.3,15,500/- from the account maintained in the name of Priya Enterprises. The complainant stated in the cross-examination that she had no idea about the sum of Rs.3,15,500/-. The complainant admitted that she had no job during the relevant period. 29. To a question from the defence as to whether she had mentioned the amount advanced to the accused in the Income Tax Return, the answer was in the negative. 30. The Kottayam Police had registered a crime against the complainant, alleging that she charged exorbitant interest. Initially, the complainant denied the registration of the crime. But in the later stages of the cross-examination, she admitted that the crime has been registered against her. The oral evidence of the complainant is not believable due to its inherent inconsistencies. 31. It is the case of the accused that she had borrowed a sum of Rs.4,70,600/- from the complainant and returned Rs.7,29,028/-. It is the further case of the accused that at the time of the transaction, she had handed over signed cheque leaves, stamp papers and blank papers affixed with revenue stamps. The complainant admitted that the accused had returned a sum of Rs.7,50,020/-. In the initial stage of her cross-examination, she also stated that the accused returned Rs.9,00,000/- to her. Oral evidence of PWs. 2 to 5 is also not credible due to many improbabilities. 32. The circumstances brought out in evidence point to several suspicious circumstances. The onus has now shifted to the complainant, she is obliged to prove the existence of a debt or liability as a matter of fact. The presumption under Section 139 does not again help the complainant. In the present case, the complainant failed to prove the same. I am of the considered view that the accused has satisfied the Court that there was a reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the consideration. The presumption under Section 139 does not again help the complainant. In the present case, the complainant failed to prove the same. I am of the considered view that the accused has satisfied the Court that there was a reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the consideration. The necessary conclusion is that the accused has successfully rebutted the presumption drawn in favour of the complainant. 33. The accused having been acquitted by the trial Court is entitled to the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. If reasonable conclusions are possible based on the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. 34. The Apex Court in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , following various authorities on the subject, deduced the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, as follows: “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes” etc, are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.” 35. The view taken by the trial Court cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. The reasoning recorded by the trial Court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible and no interference is required. 36. The appeal stands dismissed.