JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This case has got a long and chequered history, where delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner has led to much suffering for him. But, as the course of proceedings would show, the petitioner himself is responsible in substantial measure for the delay that came about in consequence of an interim order passed by this Court, when he challenged his provisional reinstatement in service, revoking his suspension. At the centre stage of challenge in this writ petition is the order dated 22.06.2011 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, awarding the petitioner the punishment of withholding two increments with cumulative effect and awarding him an adverse entry, deciding the pending disciplinary proceedings by the said order. The other order impugned is the one dated 07.06.2012, fixing for the petitioner his salary by the District Supply Officer, Kanpur Nagar. The last under challenge is the order dated 25.04.2013 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar. 2. The petitioner was appointed a Clerk in the office of the District Supply Officer, Kanpur. He was transferred from Kanpur Head Office to Akbarpur, situate in Kanpur Dehat in the year 1981. He was again transferred from Akbarpur to Kanpur in the year 1982 by an order of 9th December, 1992 passed by the District Supply Officer. The petitioner was transferred from Kanpur Nagar to Farrukhabad. He was placed under suspension pending inquiry and vide order dated 16.12.1983 passed by the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad. A charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner after a lapse of a year and a half on 19.06.1985. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet aforesaid on 22.06.1987. 3. Some five years later, the suspension order dated 16.12.1983 was revoked by the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad vide order dated 27.05.1990 and the petitioner reinstated on a provisional basis. The District Magistrate, Farrukhabad by a memo dated 14.05.1991 issued a notice to the petitioner asking him to show cause why his services may not be terminated. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause on 24.06.1991. It is averred that after suspension from service on 16.12.1985, followed by the order dated 22.05.1985, disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner lingered on, which adversely affected the petitioner's right to be considered for promotion. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause on 24.06.1991. It is averred that after suspension from service on 16.12.1985, followed by the order dated 22.05.1985, disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner lingered on, which adversely affected the petitioner's right to be considered for promotion. It is also averred that no inquiry was undertaken, though the petitioner had submitted his reply to the charge-sheet way back on 22.06.1987, as already said. 4. It appears that inquiry into the charge-sheet dated 22.05.1985 was not at all undertaken and without concluding it, the petitioner was issued with the show cause notice dated 14.12.1991, already spoken of, where the District Magistrate asked him to show cause why his services may not be terminated. The basis of the show cause notice was a different charge altogether, that was not part of the charge-sheet dated 22.05.1985, as the petitioner asserts. In the circumstances, the petitioner instituted Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991 before this Court, seeking to quash the pending disciplinary proceedings, presumably on the ground of inordinate delay. A further relief was sought by way of a mandamus commanding the respondents to transfer the petitioner from Kanpur to Farrukhabad and pay him his due salary for the period of suspension. In the said writ petition, an order was passed on 02.08.1991, directing the State to file a return within four weeks, and vide interim order, it was provided that departmental proceedings against the petitioner may continue, but final orders shall not be pronounced until further orders of this Court. 5. The interim order dated 02.08.1991 was vacated vide order dated 09.04.2004. It appears that the order dated 09.04.2004 was not communicated to the respondents, and, therefore, no final orders were made in the pending disciplinary proceedings. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991 came up for hearing before this Court on 25.04.2007. By a judgment and order of that date, the writ petition was allowed on the ground of inordinate delay in concluding the inquiry, but limited to the relief of quashing the order of suspension. The petitioner made a further application, being Civil Misc. Modification Application No. 162640 of 2007 before the learned Judge, who had allowed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991, seeking modification of the judgment and order dated 25.04.2007 to the extent that the pending disciplinary proceedings may also be quashed. The petitioner made a further application, being Civil Misc. Modification Application No. 162640 of 2007 before the learned Judge, who had allowed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991, seeking modification of the judgment and order dated 25.04.2007 to the extent that the pending disciplinary proceedings may also be quashed. This application was rejected by the learned Judge vide order dated 01.09.2007. Both the orders dated 25.04.2007 and 01.09.2007 were served by the petitioner upon the respondents through an application dated 13.09.2007. 6. There is slew of allegations in the writ petition that these orders were not complied with and a contempt application, bearing No. 4360 of 2007 against Alok Kumar, the then District Magistrate and another contemnor was also filed. What the petitioner appears to say that the two orders passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991 were not complied with, is that he was not given his consequential benefits, like increments and bonus, that was paid to other employees like him consequent upon his order of suspension being quashed. Also, the petitioner's grievance was that he was not considered for promotion like his juniors, who were considered and promoted during this period. The contempt application was dismissed with a remark that in case the petitioner has any grievance, it would be open to him to seek its redressal before the appropriate forum. It is noteworthy that while all this was happening, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation and retired from service on 31.05.2007. The complexion of the relief that the petitioner could secure, therefore, changed. The petitioner also says that apart from being denied his promotional avenues, pensionery benefits, gratuity, group insurance, bonus, due increment while in service and arrears on that account were never paid to the petitioner merely on the ground that he had suffered a suspension while in service. The petitioner in this case asserts the right that consequent upon quashing of the order of suspension, he is entitled to all those benefits that were his but for the suspension. 7. The respondents addressed two letters dated 16.10.2008 followed by another dated 10th August, 2009, requiring the petitioner to fill up his pension papers, and furnish necessary documents. Both the letters were replied to by the petitioner saying that he had fulfilled all the required formalities, duly applied and furnished all documents. 7. The respondents addressed two letters dated 16.10.2008 followed by another dated 10th August, 2009, requiring the petitioner to fill up his pension papers, and furnish necessary documents. Both the letters were replied to by the petitioner saying that he had fulfilled all the required formalities, duly applied and furnished all documents. The District Supply Officer, who had issued the last letter dated 10th August, 2009, was also informed to the above effect by the petitioner vide his letter dated 16.08.2009. 8. Since, the pensionery benefits worked out for the petitioner were far below his entitlement, he filed Writ-A No. 44729 of 2009 before this Court, seeking a direction to the respondents to pay him all his due service benefits, including pensionery benefits, appropriately revised, adding thereto increments and extending the benefits of pay revisions. The said writ petition was decided by this Court by a short order relegating the petitioner to the respondents, who were directed to consider the petitioner's case and pass appropriate orders in terms of the following order passed on 07.01.2013 in Writ-A No. 44729 of 2009: “The petitioner had filed the present writ petition praying for writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay and grant promotional benefit, pensionary benefit, gratuity, insurance, bonus, increment including arrears. During the pendency of the writ petition the relief claimed by the petitioner has been granted to a large extent. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however contended that the calculation has wrongly been made, namely, that the calculation has been made on the basic salary whereas the calculation should have been made on the basis of basic salary revised from time to time. In this regard, the petitioner may make an appropriate representation before the authority concerned. If such a representation is made, the authority concerned will consider and decide the matter by a reasoned and speaking order within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. The writ petition is disposed of.” 9. A certified copy of the aforesaid order was served by the petitioner upon the respondents along with a calculation charge of his due emoluments, which persons junior to him have received. The order was served along with representation dated 24.01.2023 in order to effectuate the order of this Court dated 07.01.2013 passed in the writ petition last mentioned. A certified copy of the aforesaid order was served by the petitioner upon the respondents along with a calculation charge of his due emoluments, which persons junior to him have received. The order was served along with representation dated 24.01.2023 in order to effectuate the order of this Court dated 07.01.2013 passed in the writ petition last mentioned. Nothing was communicated to the petitioner, and, therefore, he sought information under the Right to Information Act. It was thereupon that he received copies of two orders, one dated 07.06.2012 passed by the District Supply Officer, Kanpur Nagar and another dated 25.04.2013 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar. The order of the District Supply Officer fixes the petitioner's pension and other emoluments, much below entitlement as the petitioner says. The other order, that is to say, the one passed by the District Magistrate on 25.04.2013, where it is noticeable that there is reference to another order passed by the District Magistrate, bearing No. 2247 dated 22.06.2011, deciding the disciplinary proceedings, punishing the petitioner by withholding two increments with cumulative effect and awarding an adverse entry. This order for some reason had not been challenged by the petitioner, which in fact is the substantive order, deciding the disciplinary proceedings. It was challenged by making an amendment application after the remarks of this Court carried in the order dated 28.11.2017 passed in the present writ petition. 10. Now, therefore, what is under challenge is the order of the District Magistrate dated 22.06.2011 deciding the disciplinary proceedings and punishing the petitioner as aforesaid. The order of the District Supply Officer dated 07.06.2012 working out the petitioner's emoluments and post retiral benefits in terms of the District Magistrate's order of June, 2011 and the order dated 25.04.2013 passed by the District Magistrate, deciding the petitioner's representation and declining it in compliance with this Court's order dated 07.01.2013 passed in Writ-A No. 44729 of 2009. 11. Heard Mr. Sankalp Narayan, Advocate holding brief of Mr. D.K. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State. 12. It is argued by Mr. 11. Heard Mr. Sankalp Narayan, Advocate holding brief of Mr. D.K. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State. 12. It is argued by Mr. Sankalp Narayan, learned Counsel for the petitioner that no punishment could have been inflicted upon the petitioner after his retirement, without invoking Article 351-A of the Civil Service Regulations (for short, 'the Service Regulations'), which exclusively empowers the Governor to pass appropriate orders sanctioning proceedings against a retired employee and the imposition of punishment. It is submitted that the petitioner retired from service on 31.05.2007, but the order of punishment impugned was passed by the District Magistrate on 22.06.2011, without obtaining the Governor's sanction under Article 351-A. Reliance in support of his contention is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon a Bench decision of this Court in Gaya Prasad Yadav vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2022 (11) ADJ 287 (DB); an unreported decision of the learned Single Judge in Sharda Prasad Verma vs. State of U.P. and Others, Writ (A) No. 9826 of 2013, decided on 03.04.2023 and the authority of the Supreme Court in Dev Prakash Tewari vs. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow and Others, (2014) 7 SCC 260 . 13. Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has refuted the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner is a government servant and it is common ground that the Service Regulations, including Article 351-A apply to him. The learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that there is no embargo upon the government to continue inquiry proceedings initiated against an employee before his retirement, after he retires from service. No sanction by the Governor is required in such a case. 14. I have keenly considered the aforesaid submission and found that there is no cavil that the petitioner is a government servant, to whom the Service Regulations apply. No sanction by the Governor is required in such a case. 14. I have keenly considered the aforesaid submission and found that there is no cavil that the petitioner is a government servant, to whom the Service Regulations apply. Article 351-A of the Service Regulations provides: “351-A The Governor reserves to himself the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government, if the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceedings to have been guilty of grave misconduct, or to have caused. Pecuniary loss to government by misconduct or Negligence, during his service, including service rendered on re-employment after retirement. Provided that: (a) such departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the officer was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment: (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor. (ii) shall be in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before the institution of such proceedings. (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place or places as the Governor may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to proceedings on which an order of dismissal from service may be made. (b) judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the officer was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment, shall have been instituted in accordance with sub-clause (ii) of clause (a). (c) the Public Service Commission, U.P., shall be consulted before final orders are passed. Explanation - For the purposes of this article: (a) departmental proceedings shall be deemed to have been instituted when the charges framed against the pensioner are issued to him, or, if the officer has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date. (b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to have been instituted: (i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which a complaint is made, or a charge-sheet is submitted, to a criminal court; and (ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date on which the plaint is presented or, as the case may be, an application is made, to a civil court. NOTE - As soon as proceedings of the nature referred to in this article are instituted the authority which institutes such proceedings shall without delay intimate the fact to the Audit Officer concerned.” 15. Apparently, there is embargo on the power of the Disciplinary Authority from initiating departmental proceeding against an officer, who has retired from service, except with the sanction of the Governor. This is the clear mandate of clause (I) of proviso (a) to Article 351-A of the Service Regulations. The embargo is upon institution of proceedings after an officer's retirement from service without the Governor's sanction. There is absolutely no prohibition on the continuance of departmental proceedings that have already been instituted while the Officer was in service and before his retirement or during re-employment. The question fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and Others vs. Harihar Bholenath, (2006) 13 SCC 460. In Harihar Bholenath (supra), it was observed by their Lordships: “12. It is not in dispute that the respondent was placed under suspension before he reached his age of superannuation. A departmental proceeding was not only initiated against him, but an enquiry officer was also appointed. The order of suspension, however, remained stayed by a judicial order. But the same paled into insignificance once the employee reached the age of superannuation. By reason of the same, however, the legal fiction created in regard to the point of time when the enquiry proceeding would be deemed to have commenced was not effaced. 13. Thus, only because the enquiry proceeding was actually started after superannuation of the respondent, the same would not mean that the enquiry proceeding had not been initiated. The right to initiate proceedings which would include a right to continue the proceedings was with the Governor. Sanction of the Governor is required to be obtained when proceedings are initiated by an authority other than the Governor. 14. The proceedings for recovery of the amount from a government servant can be passed in the event he is held to be guilty of grave misconduct or caused pecuniary loss to the Government by his misconduct or negligence during his service. Some procedural safeguards, however, have been laid down in terms of proviso appended thereto, including the requirement to obtain an order of sanction of the Governor. Some procedural safeguards, however, have been laid down in terms of proviso appended thereto, including the requirement to obtain an order of sanction of the Governor. Such order of sanction, however, would not be necessary if the departmental proceedings have been initiated while the delinquent was on duty. Proviso appended to Regulation 351-A merely controls the main proceedings. The same would apply in the exigencies of the situation envisaged therein, namely, even (sic when) the proceedings were initiated after retirement and not prior thereto.” 16. This principle was followed in a Bench decision of this Court in Gaya Prasad Yadav (supra), where it was held: “18. It is, thus, clear that after retirement, withholding or withdrawing a pension and ordering the recovery from pension is permissible to be caused only by the Governor e. the State Government in terms of the Rules of Business, not only in case such employee is found causing pecuniary loss to the Government by his misconduct or negligence but also in a cases when the employee concerned is found guilty of grave misconduct. 19. The provision of first proviso appended to Article 351-A of the CSR clearly prohibits Institution of departmental proceedings except with the sanction of Governor if such proceedings were not instituted while the employee was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment. Thus, Article 351-A of CSR puts a prohibition of nitiating the departmental proceedings in a case of retired government servant, however, such proceedings are permissible to be instituted with the sanction of Governor, that too, in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before institution of such proceedings. The provision further provides that departmental enquiry in such an event shall be conducted by such authority and at such place as the Governor may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable. 20. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that in the instant case, since the departmental proceedings were already instituted against the appellant-petitioner prior to his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, no sanction under Article 351- A of the CSR was required to be taken from the Governor. This view is fully supported by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harihar Bholenath (supra). To this extent we do not find any error in the judgment of learned Single Judge which is under appeal herein.” 17. This view is fully supported by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harihar Bholenath (supra). To this extent we do not find any error in the judgment of learned Single Judge which is under appeal herein.” 17. In the present case, disciplinary proceedings were initiated way back on 16.12.1983, when the petitioner was placed under suspension. A charge-sheet was issued to him on 19.06.1985. Therefore, if these proceedings were continued beyond his retirement on 21.05.2007 and culminated in the order impugned passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar on 22.06.2011, there was no necessity to obtain the Governor's sanction under Article 351-A of the Service Regulations. That necessity would have arisen only if the proceedings have been initiated post retirement; not otherwise. 18. In this view of the matter, the first submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 19. The next submission, that is canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that in the absence of a specific Rules, authorizing infliction of punishment after retirement, no punishment can be imposed. Reliance in support of this proposition is placed by the learned Counsel on Dev Prakash Tewari (supra) and upon the authority of the Supreme Court in Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515 . The principle in both these authorities, relevant to the submission, turns on the fact if in the establishment where the employee serves, there are any Rules authorizing continuance of disciplinary proceedings against a retired employee. In Dev Prakash Tewari, it was held by the Supreme Court: “5. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. The facts are not in dispute. The High Court while quashing the earlier disciplinary proceedings on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice in its order dated 10-1-2006 [D.P. Tewari vs. U.P. Coop. Institutional Service Board, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 4328 of 1988, order dated 10-1-2006 (All)] granted liberty to initiate the fresh inquiry in accordance with the Regulations. The appellant who was reinstated in service on 26-4-2006 and fresh disciplinary proceeding was initiated on 7-7-2006 and while that was pending, the appellant attained the age of superannuation and retired on 31-3-2009. Institutional Service Board, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 4328 of 1988, order dated 10-1-2006 (All)] granted liberty to initiate the fresh inquiry in accordance with the Regulations. The appellant who was reinstated in service on 26-4-2006 and fresh disciplinary proceeding was initiated on 7-7-2006 and while that was pending, the appellant attained the age of superannuation and retired on 31-3-2009. There is no provision in the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975, for initiation or continuation of disciplinary proceeding after retirement of the appellant nor is there any provision stating that in case misconduct is established a deduction could be made from his retiral benefits.” (Emphasis by Court) 20. Dev Prakash Tewari was a case, which turned on the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975 and the said Regulations did not provide for initiation or continuance of disciplinary proceedings after retirement of an employee. The Regulations aforesaid also did not provide for deduction from the employee's post retiral benefits, in case the misconduct was established after his retirement. It is in those circumstances that their Lordships held that proceedings after the employee's retirement could not be continued in the absence of a provision in the Rules authorizing that course of action. In the present case, the relevant Services Rules applicable are Service the Service Regulations. It has already been held that Article 351-A of the Service Regulations does not at all forbid the continuance of disciplinary proceedings commenced before retirement of an employ, post retirement. It does not require any sanction by the Governor. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner on this score deserves to be rejected. 21. The next submission that has been pressed in aid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that on account of the inordinate and explained delay, that has occurred in concluding the disciplinary proceedings, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. It is pointed out that proceedings against the petitioner commenced with his suspension from service vide order dated 16.12.1983 and concluded with the impugned order dated 22.06.2011 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, that was passed four years after his retirement on 31.05.2007 in the interregnum. There is absolutely no reason, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, why these proceedings should have lingered on for son long. There is absolutely no reason, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, why these proceedings should have lingered on for son long. He submits that this kind of an inordinate and oppressive delay is prejudice in itself and a good ground to quash the impugned order passed much after the petitioner's retirement from service. 22. On the other hand, Mr. Girijesh Kumar Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, has refuted the above submission and says that the delay in conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings has been contributed much to by the petitioner himself. In support of this submission of his, Mr. Tripathi points out that the departmental proceedings remained withheld under interim orders passed by this Court on 02.08.1991 on the petitioner's behest in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991 until 09.04.2004, when the said order was vacated at an interlocutory stage of the said petition and before judgment. The learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, therefore, submits that the petitioner has contributed a period of time little shy of 14 years to the delay that has been occasioned in the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. 23. This Court has carefully considered this most vital submission advanced by learned Counsel for the parties. 24. The delay in the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings is regarded with considerable reservation as a ground to quash a charge-sheet or pending disciplinary proceedings. The principles in that regard, with some modification, will apply to a plea, where an order made at the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, inflicting penalty, is assailed. This question arose for consideration before the Supreme Court in Anant R. Kulkarni (supra), where it was observed: “Enquiry at belated stage: 14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question must be carefully examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of the charges involved therein. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question must be carefully examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of the charges involved therein. The court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. [Vide State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943 , State of M.P. vs. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp. SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514 : AIR 1990 SC 1308 , State of Punjab vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 : (1995) 29 ATC 546 , State of A.P. vs. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 : AIR 1998 SC 1833 , M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919 : AIR 2006 SC 3475 , Union of India vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304 : AIR 2007 SC 906 , Ministry of Defence vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 121 : AIR 2012 SC 2250 and LIC vs. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 : JT (2012) 11 SC 533].” 25. For one, the principle appears to have been laid down in the context of plea seeking premature termination of disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay. There would be some inherent lack of wisdom to quash proceedings on the ground of delay after they have reached a terminus, where the conclusions and the result with whatever delay is already there. For one, the principle appears to have been laid down in the context of plea seeking premature termination of disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay. There would be some inherent lack of wisdom to quash proceedings on the ground of delay after they have reached a terminus, where the conclusions and the result with whatever delay is already there. Perhaps, the only exception in a situation after the Disciplinary Authority has passed final orders even with an inordinate delay, would be if the order of the Disciplinary Authority is found otherwise vitiated, requiring a remand, and, a fortiori a further continuance of ancient proceedings. 26. This Court is mindful of the fact that in applying any principle that has the effect of preventing disciplinary proceedings to reach their logical terminus, must always be informed by the consideration of the seriousness of charges involved in the matter. A charge, that is profoundly serious and widely impacts clean administration in the service, must not be allowed to die or wither away with time. However, if the charge(s) is (are) not very serious in the sense that these do not inevitably attract the imposition of a major penalty if proved, or by the nature of the acts, are not widely destructive of clean administration in service, an inordinate delay that features if the order of punishment were quashed on some other grounds and the proceedings revived, may be a good ground to import the principle about giving quietus to the disciplinary proceedings. 27. Here, what has to be noticed is that the petitioner was suspended pending inquiry on 16.12.1983 and the charge-sheet issued to him a year and a half later on 19.06.1985. This charge-sheet carried three charges, to which allusion would be made shortly. A fourth charge was added to the existing charge-sheet dated 22.05.1985 by the Disciplinary Authority, the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad by an endorsement dated 09.12.1985. While these proceedings were pending, the petitioner was served with a most illegal order by the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad dated 14th May, 1991. 28. It was a show cause notice, which takes note of the fact that disciplinary proceedings are pending against the petitioner after his suspension from service vide order dated 16.12.1983 and his provisional reinstatement done on 27.05.1990. While these proceedings were pending, the petitioner was served with a most illegal order by the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad dated 14th May, 1991. 28. It was a show cause notice, which takes note of the fact that disciplinary proceedings are pending against the petitioner after his suspension from service vide order dated 16.12.1983 and his provisional reinstatement done on 27.05.1990. The show cause notice dated 14th May, 1991 says that there has been no improvement in his work and conduct and the petitioner does not take interest in government work, but obstructs the public distribution system, which is against the Service Rules. He was, therefore, required to show cause why his services be not terminated. This show cause was not based on the report of an inquiry into the charge, but dehors those proceedings. It carried vague allegations. This show cause notice dated 14th May, 1991, issued by the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad, was ex facie the most illegal thing to do. 29. The District Magistrate could not apparently proceed to terminate the services of a permanent employee by merely issuing him a show cause notice, without holding disciplinary proceedings, that independent of this show cause notice were already pending on the said date. After all, the show cause notice was not traceable to the District Magistrate's authority to dismiss or remove the petitioner under Clause (b) of the Second Proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, or any Service Rule similarly empowering the Disciplinary Authority to dispense with an inquiry after recording reasons in writing that it was not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. This show cause notice was a great diversion and a contributor delay in the already highly delayed course of the pending disciplinary proceedings, that were then in progress on the basis of the charge-sheet dated 22.05.1985. This show cause notice apparently led the petitioner to challenge the departmental proceedings pending against him, seeking these to be quashed, besides the issue of a mandamus directing the respondents to transfer him from Kanpur to Farrukhabad by means of a writ petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991. He also added by amendment some relief to the said petition, seeking promotion and the grant of annual increments, besides other service benefits like seniority etc. 30. Writ Petition No. 22002 of 1991. He also added by amendment some relief to the said petition, seeking promotion and the grant of annual increments, besides other service benefits like seniority etc. 30. This Court, perhaps noticing the show cause notice issued to the petitioner, passed an interim order dated 02.08.1991, while issuing notice, directing that the departmental proceedings against the petitioner may continue, but final orders shall not be made until further orders. Apparently, there was no interference with the show cause notice and the pending disciplinary proceedings were not interdicted either by this Court. All that was done was that the respondents were forbidden from passing final orders in the disciplinary proceedings. The inquiry could nevertheless be held and everything done, but the recording of final orders disposing of the disciplinary matter. 31. A perusal of the record shows that an inquiry of whatever kind into the charges against the petitioner was held and the inquiry report submitted to the Disciplinary Authority on 02.05.1997, but no orders could be made thereon, considering of course the interim order, that was passed on 02.08.1991. The interim order aforesaid was vacated on 09.04.2004. After the interim order was vacated, given the fact that an inquiry report dated 02.05.1997 had already been submitted to the Disciplinary Authority, the disciplinary proceedings were not carried forward to their logical conclusion and decided until the petitioner's retirement from service upon attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2007. There is absolutely no reason shown why these proceedings were not disposed of after this Court vacated the interim order dated 09.04.2004 and before the petitioner's retirement on 31.05.2007. The proceedings instead continued after the petitioner's retirement until 22.06.2011, when the impugned order of that date was passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, punishing the petitioner on three of the four charges found proved with imposition of the major penalty of permanent withholding of two increments together with the award of an adverse entry. 32. The calendar of events from the petitioner's suspension from service pending inquiry on 16.12.1983 to the final orders, disposing of the disciplinary proceedings, passed by the District Magistrate dated 22.06.2011, would show that it took in all a period of 28 years for the respondents to conclude the proceedings. 32. The calendar of events from the petitioner's suspension from service pending inquiry on 16.12.1983 to the final orders, disposing of the disciplinary proceedings, passed by the District Magistrate dated 22.06.2011, would show that it took in all a period of 28 years for the respondents to conclude the proceedings. In this period of time, if one were to examine the first lap of these proceedings, where nothing prevented the respondents from deciding them, it would appear that from 16.12.1983 to 02.08.1991, there was no interim order forbidding the respondents from concluding the proceedings. Post suspension, the charge-sheet was issued on 19.06.1985, as already said, after a year and a half of the petitioner's suspension. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 22.06.1987, which seems to be a rather delayed act on the petitioner's part. But, given the fact that the petitioner's reply was there before the respondents to the charges by June of 1987, a defisce understanding what took them all this while in not going ahead in concluding the disciplinary proceedings, until the District Magistrate committed the misadventure of issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner dated 14th May, 1991, asking him to show cause for reasons mentioned there why his services may not be terminated dehors the pending disciplinary proceedings, as already noticed. 33. No doubt, after this Court passed the order dated 02.08.1991, the respondents could not proceed to decide the disciplinary proceedings until that order was vacated on 09.04.2004, but again, as already noticed, nothing prevented them from concluding the inquiry and keeping matters at a stage that just awaited recording of final orders. We have already said that final orders could be passed immediately after the interim order dated 02.08.1991 was vacated on 09.04.2004. This never happened and all the rest of the culpable delay that was caused by the respondents' laxity has been noticed for every detail of it. The petitioner retired on 31.05.2007 and the disciplinary proceedings were concluded by the District Magistrate's order dated 22.06.2011. What took the District Magistrate all this time between 09.04.2004 when the interim order was vacated and 22.06.2011 when he passed final orders, is inexplicable. It is just irresponsible delay on the respondents' part, particularly, the District Magistrate; nothing else. 34. The petitioner retired on 31.05.2007 and the disciplinary proceedings were concluded by the District Magistrate's order dated 22.06.2011. What took the District Magistrate all this time between 09.04.2004 when the interim order was vacated and 22.06.2011 when he passed final orders, is inexplicable. It is just irresponsible delay on the respondents' part, particularly, the District Magistrate; nothing else. 34. This Court must say that the course of disciplinary proceedings in the present case, which includes the misconceived show cause notice issued by the District Magistrate on 14.05.1991 exhibits extreme lethargy on the respondents' part in responding to their duties. The officials of the State in discharging their public functions have to act with a missionary zeal, but the present case shows just the opposite of it. It discloses a typical official non-concern about the duties and responsibilities, with which officers concerned at the relevant time, were charged. It shows nonchalance to say the least. 35. This Court must also remark that the time schedule of disciplinary proceedings in any case, including the present one is something that rests in the hands of the establishment. If an employee does not cooperate with the proceedings, the establishment always have the liberty to proceed ex-parte in accordance with law. Of course, they have to prove the charges by evidence and not hold them proved by default. Nothing of that kind was done in this case for the two long spells from 16.12.1983 to 02.08.1991 and from 09.04.2004 until culmination of proceedings on 22.06.2011. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation in holding that the proceedings in this case were indeed unduly delayed beyond permissible limits, causing gross prejudice to the petitioner. Still, that is not a ground in itself to quash the order of punishment that has ultimately come to be made. If one looks to the impugned order dated 22.06.2011 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, there is no cavil there that the Inquiry Officer, out of the four charges, has held Charge No. 2 proved and Charges Nos.1 and 4 partly proved. Charge No. 3 has been held not proved for want of evidence. 36. A reading of the impugned order dated 22.06.2011 passed by the District Magistrate shows it to be ex facie illegal and vitiated. It betrays utter lack of application of mind and does nothing more than to refer to the various events during the course of proceedings. Charge No. 3 has been held not proved for want of evidence. 36. A reading of the impugned order dated 22.06.2011 passed by the District Magistrate shows it to be ex facie illegal and vitiated. It betrays utter lack of application of mind and does nothing more than to refer to the various events during the course of proceedings. There is no meaningful consideration of the three charges, the petitioner's defence, the findings of the Inquiry Officer recorded in his inquiry report dated 02.05.1997 and reasons for the District Magistrate's conclusions, howsoever brief to agree with the Inquiry Officer on the three charges found proved and partly proved. At the end of a reference to the proceedings, there is a cryptic remark that the charges are serious, followed by an abrupt conclusion to punish the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of withholding two increments with cumulative effect etc. It is also noteworthy to mention that though in the impugned order, there is a reference to the inquiry report dated 02.05.1997, a copy of this report has not appeared on the record along with the respondents' return. There is not even the slightest discussion in the impugned order about the findings of the Inquiry Officer carried in his report, the evidence considered by him to reach his conclusions, and if at all the petitioner was given opportunity to show cause against those findings. This kind of an utterly opaque decision making without the slightest reason indicated for the conclusions reached, cannot qualify for a valid order made in disciplinary proceedings, adversely affecting the petitioner's right. For the said reason, the impugned order dated 22.06.2011 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar cannot be sustained and has to be quashed. 37. It is at this stage that the question arises: Should this Court permit the respondents to resume the proceedings against the petitioner, a retired man, who has been subjected to the most prolix departmental proceedings throughout his career, not for a commensurate fault on his part? It is here that the gravity of the charges against the petitioner would become relevant. For if the charges found proved are grave, the mere factum of inordinate delay in concluding the departmental proceedings, may ultimately be outweighed by larger public interest. It, therefore, becomes imperative to see what were precisely the charges that were found proved against the petitioner. It is here that the gravity of the charges against the petitioner would become relevant. For if the charges found proved are grave, the mere factum of inordinate delay in concluding the departmental proceedings, may ultimately be outweighed by larger public interest. It, therefore, becomes imperative to see what were precisely the charges that were found proved against the petitioner. This takes us to the charge-sheet dated 22.05.1985 issued by the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad. This charge-sheet is in two parts. The charge-sheet that was issued on 22.05.1985 carried three charges. To this, a fourth was added by the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad by his note dated 19.06.1985. The charges against the petitioner, the three originally framed and the fourth added on 19.06.1985, read: 38. The first charge as aforesaid relates to the petitioner's act in not joining the station of transfer at Farrukhabad upon being transferred from Kanpur Nagar vide order dated 16.10.1982. The petitioner has been charged with unauthorized absence from duty for a period of about 16 months from 06.09.1982 to 26.04.1984. The second charge is about the petitioner canvassing his case through his wife for the cancellation of his transfer with the Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, Lucknow, that is said to be in violation of Rule 27 of the relevant Service Rules. The third charge is about the issue of forged permits relating to cement and selling cement in the black market. The fourth charge is based on facts that after his transfer from Kanpur Nagar to Farrukhabad in compliance with an order of the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad dated 16.10.1982, there was information from the Assistant Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies that the petitioner was making efforts to ensure his transfer back to Kanpur Nagar or his attachment there, which amounts to exertion of undue influence upon officials in violation of the relevant Service Rules. 39. A reading of these charges would show that while the third charge about forging permits relating to cement and selling cement in the black-market is most serious of them all. It has not been proved at all for want of evidence. The first and the fourth charges have been found partly proved. 39. A reading of these charges would show that while the third charge about forging permits relating to cement and selling cement in the black-market is most serious of them all. It has not been proved at all for want of evidence. The first and the fourth charges have been found partly proved. The first is somewhat serious, being a case about unauthorized absence for a long period of time, but considering that much of the absence could be adjusted against leave, if any due, or otherwise held to be leave without pay. There is not much of public interest relevant involved in the said charge under the peculiar facts obtaining in this case. These peculiar facts include the inordinate delay in disposing of the disciplinary proceedings. Also, since the first charge has been found partly proved and a copy of the inquiry report has not been placed before the Court before the Court, it is not known how much of the case of unauthorized absence has in fact been found proved by the Inquiry Officer. This feature of the extent of proof of the charge has also not at all been discussed by the Disciplinary Authority in the order impugned, which we have already held to be utterly cryptic. 40. So far as the second and the fourth charges are concerned, these are about the petitioner canvassing his case to secure his transfer back to Kanpur Nagar. This kind of a charge may make the employee an undisciplined hand, but the charges in essence are not very serious. It can invite a frown and some punishment, but certainly not major penalty. Also, out of these two Charges Nos.2 and 4, relating to unauthorized canvassing for a transfer back to Kanpur Nagar, Charge No. 2 has been found proved while the fourth has been found partly proved. It is not known how much of it, has been found proved for reason that neither the inquiry report has been placed before the Court by the respondents nor the findings in the said report discussed by the Disciplinary Authority in the order impugned dated 22.06.2011. It is not known how much of it, has been found proved for reason that neither the inquiry report has been placed before the Court by the respondents nor the findings in the said report discussed by the Disciplinary Authority in the order impugned dated 22.06.2011. This then being the profile about the gravity of the charges found proved against the petitioner, in the considered opinion of this Court, it would not at all be condign to the misconduct alleged against him, to throw open the matter again before the respondents to pass orders afresh in the disciplinary proceedings. The inordinate delay in the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings in the background of the nature and gravity of charges against the petitioner and the manner in which the respondents have acted, including the manifestly illegal order imposing penalty upon the petitioner, in our opinion, would require a quietus to be now given to these proceedings, resting it in the petitioner's favour. 41. So far as the two other impugned orders are concerned, that is to say, the order dated 07.06.2012 passed by the District Supply Officer, Kanpur Nagar fixing the petitioner's salary and post retiral benefits and the further order passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar dated 25.04.2013 are concerned, the same would have to be quashed because these have been made in consequence of the impugned order dated 22.06.2011, imposing penalty upon the petitioner. Of course, it will be open to the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar and the District Supply Officer, Kanpur Nagar to determine the petitioner's salary and post retiral benefits afresh after purging their earlier determination of the effect of the order dated 22.06.2011, ordering withholding of the two increments and the adverse entry. 42. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 22.06.2011 and 25.04.2013 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar and the order dated 07.06.2012 passed by the District Supply Officer, Kanpur Nagar are hereby quashed. The District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar and the District Supply Officer, Kanpur Nagar are ordered to revise and redetermine the petitioner's emoluments during the period of his service as also his post retiral benefits, free from the effect of the impugned order dated 22.06.2011, since quashed by this judgment. 43. There shall be no order as to costs.