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2024 DIGILAW 1562 (AP)

Navaratna Estates, Visakhapatnam v. Kari Anasuya

2024-11-22

RAVI NATH TILHARI

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. Sri Venkata Srujan Vegi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, advanced his arguments through virtual mode. 2. The petitioner is the plaintiff in OS No.443 of 2017 pending in the Court of II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam. The said suit has been filed for decree of declaration to declare the plaintiff having absolute right, title and interest in the suit schedule property and consequential relief of permanent injunction. In the said suit the present respondent Nos.2 to 5 are defendant Nos.1 to 4. 3. In OS No.443 of 2017 the 1st respondent herein filed IA No.1009 of 2022 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for being impleaded. The said application has been allowed by the learned Trial Court by Order dated 29.07.2024 which is under challenge in the present civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. The 1st respondent herein had also filed OS No.792 of 2018, which is pending in the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. The said suit is for partition, claiming 1/9th share in the suit schedule property. In that suit, the present petitioner is defendant No.11 and the present respondent Nos.2 to 5 are the defendant Nos.1 to 4. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that one more suit was filed by the sister of the present 1st respondent being OS No.1635 of 2015 for partition, which is pending in the Court of IV Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. 6. The 1st respondent herein is the daughter of respondent No.2 and the sister of respondent Nos.3 to 5. The plaintiff of OS No.1635 of 2015, namely, D. Krishnaveni, is also so related to the respondent Nos.2 to 5 and 1st respondent is her sister. D. Krishnaveni is defendant No.8 in OS No.792 of 2018. 7. The case of the present petitioner in his suit OS No.443 of 2017 is that Sri Cheepulla Yellayya, husband of the 1st defendant and father of defendant Nos.2 to 4 in the said suit had purchased the said property from Maddula Appalanarasimham, S/o. Ramanayya under registered sale deed dated 28.01.1981. He died. From the defendants of the Suit Nos.1 to 4, one Bheri Bhuvaneswari purchased the said property under registered sale deed dated 30.03.1995. He died. From the defendants of the Suit Nos.1 to 4, one Bheri Bhuvaneswari purchased the said property under registered sale deed dated 30.03.1995. From Bheri Bhuvaneswari, the plaintiff's vendor Sri Barri Venkatarao purchased the same under registered sale deed dated 10.07.1997 and from Barri Venkatarao, the plaintiff/petitioner firm purchased under registered sale deed dated 09.04.2015. In the counter (written statement) of the 3rd defendant in the said suit, a specific plea was taken that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as the 3rd defendant had some sisters and they were also entitled to a share in the plaint schedule property. 8. The learned II Additional District Judge on consideration of the pleadings and the other litigation observed that in a suit for declaration of title the right of the plaintiff will be decided basing upon the title of his vendor, and it would mean that the title of the vendor of the plaintiff also has to be considered for better appreciation of the matter. It also observed that admittedly the suit for partition filed by the implead petitioner in OS No.798 of 2018 was pending. In the circumstances, considering the nature of the dispute between the parties as well as the relief claimed, the learned Trial Court was of the opinion that the presence of the implead petitioner was necessary for complete adjudication of the matter. 9. The learned Trial Court has allowed the application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC by Order dated 29.07.2024. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit of the 1st respondent was filed later on. He submits that in view of the impleadment of the 1st respondent, the scope of the petitioner's suit would be widened and he would have to amend the plaint drastically. He further submits that the plaintiff is dominus litis to choose his opponent against whom he has to seek relief. 11. I have considered the submissions advanced and perused the material on record. 12. The point that arises for determination is as under : "Whether the Order of the learned Trial Court allowing impleadment of the 1st respondent in OS No.443 of 2017 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, is legal and valid or it calls for any interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?" 13. 12. The point that arises for determination is as under : "Whether the Order of the learned Trial Court allowing impleadment of the 1st respondent in OS No.443 of 2017 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, is legal and valid or it calls for any interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?" 13. Order 1 Rule 10 CPC reads as under : "Order 1 Parties to suits Rule 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.-(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted thought a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.-Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons." 14. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons." 14. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision shows that the Court may direct addition of any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 15. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786 , one of the questions was whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition (that was a case of writ of certiorari) to quash the order of a Tribunal. It was held that the Tribunal or the authority performs a judicial or quasi-judicial act after hearing parties. Its order affects the right or rights of one or the other of the parties before it. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that a party whose interests are directly affected is a necessary party. It was further held that in addition, there may be parties who may be described as proper parties, that is parties whose presence is not necessary for making an effective order, but whose presence may facilitate the settling of all the questions that may be involved in the controversy. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the question of making such a person as a party to a writ proceeding depends upon the judicial discretion of the High Court in the circumstances of each case. Either one of the parties to the proceeding may apply for the impleading of such a party or such a party may suo motu approach the Court for being impleaded therein. The Hon'ble Apex Court summarized its conclusions in Paragraph 12. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 are reproduced as under : "9. The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a Tribunal. As we have seen, a Tribunal or authority performs a judicial or quasi-judicial act after hearing parties. Its order affects the right or rights of one or the other of the parties before it. As we have seen, a Tribunal or authority performs a judicial or quasi-judicial act after hearing parties. Its order affects the right or rights of one or the other of the parties before it. In a writ of certiorari the defeated party seeks for the quashing of the order issued by the Tribunal in favour of the successful party. How can the High Court vacate the said order without the successful party being before it. Without the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial order affecting his right. Any or that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by the said party, with the result that the Tribunal's order would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the Tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the Court, would certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is, therefore, a necessary party. 10. In addition, there may be parties who may be described as proper parties, that is parties whose presence is not necessary for making an effective order, but whose presence may facilitate the settling of all the questions that may be involved in the controversy. The question of making such a person as a party to a writ proceeding depends upon the judicial discretion of the High Court in the circumstances of each case. Either one of the parties to the proceeding may apply for the impleading of such a party or such a party may suo motu approach the Court for being impleaded therein. 12. To summarise : in a writ of certiorari not only the Tribunal or authority whose order is sought to be quashed but also parties in whose favour the said order is issued are necessary parties. But it is in the discretion of the Court to add or implead proper parties for completely settling all the questions that may be involved in the controversy either suo motu or on the application of a party to the writ or an application filed at the instance of such proper party." 16. But it is in the discretion of the Court to add or implead proper parties for completely settling all the questions that may be involved in the controversy either suo motu or on the application of a party to the writ or an application filed at the instance of such proper party." 16. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 , on the point of addition of necessary party or proper party under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to its previous judgment in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886 , in which it was observed that the Courts in India have not treated the matter of addition of parties as raising any question of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and that it was firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation whether it be the questions relating to movable or immovable property. 17. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. 18. Paragraphs 10 and 12 to 14 of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (supra), read as under : "10. The power of the Court to add parties under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, came up for consideration before this Court in Razia Begum, 1959 SCR 1111 = AIR 1958 SC 886 . 18. Paragraphs 10 and 12 to 14 of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (supra), read as under : "10. The power of the Court to add parties under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, came up for consideration before this Court in Razia Begum, 1959 SCR 1111 = AIR 1958 SC 886 . In that case it was pointed out that the Courts in India have not treated the matter of addition of parties as raising any question of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and that it is firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation whether it be the questions relating to movable or immovable property. 12. Sinha, J., speaking for the majority said that a declaratory judgment in respect of a disputed status will be binding not only upon parties actually before the Court but also upon persons claiming through them respectively. The Court laid down the law that in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. In cases covered by the statutory provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant. If the Court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission, the result of a declaratory decree on the question of status such as the controversy in that suit affects not only the parties actually before the Court but generations to come and in view of that consideration, the rule of present interest as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force. Applying the propositions enunciated to the facts of the case, the Court came to the conclusion that the Courts below did not exceed their power in directing the addition of respondent Nos.1 and 2 as parties defendants in the action nor it could be said that the exercise of the discretion was not sound. 13. A clear distinction has been drawn between suits relating to property and those in which the subject-matter of litigation is a declaration as regards status or legal character. In the former category, the rule of present interest as distinguished from the commercial interest is required to be shown before a person may be added as a party. 14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd., (1956) 1 All ER 273 = (1956) 1 QB 357, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J., in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England, (1950) 2 All ER 605, 611, that their true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject-matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J., has stated : "The test is 'May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights'." 19. In Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held in Paragraph 13 as under : "13. From the aforesaid discussion, it is pellucid that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person." 20. Thus, it is settled that the necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. The person must be directly or legally interested in the subject-matter of the litigation whether it be a question relating to movable or immovable property. 21. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (supra), an argument was also raised that the Court could not direct addition of parties against the wishes of the plaintiff. The person must be directly or legally interested in the subject-matter of the litigation whether it be a question relating to movable or immovable property. 21. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (supra), an argument was also raised that the Court could not direct addition of parties against the wishes of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was the dominus litis and therefore could not be forced to join some other defendants. It was also argued therein that the addition of respondent therein would enlarge the issue in the suit. The same submissions as have been advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the present case. The Hon'ble Apex Court repelled such contentions. It was held that the plaintiff is no doubt dominus litis and is not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit. He may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom he wishes to proceed though under Order 1 Rule 3 CPC, to avoid multiplicity of suit and needless expenses all persons against whom the right to relief is alleged to exist may be joined as defendants. However, the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of parties. A party can be joined as defendant even though the plaintiff does not think that he has any cause of action against him. Rule 10 CPC specifically provides that it is open to the Court to add at any stage of the suit a necessary party or a person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 CPC gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record. 22. Paragraphs 4, 5 & 6 of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal's case (supra), read as under : "4. Three grounds have been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant against the sustainability of the order. The plaintiff was dominus litis and, therefore, cannot be forced to join respondent No.2 as defendant. Respondent No.2 is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit. The addition of the respondent would enlarge the issue in the suit. Three grounds have been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant against the sustainability of the order. The plaintiff was dominus litis and, therefore, cannot be forced to join respondent No.2 as defendant. Respondent No.2 is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit. The addition of the respondent would enlarge the issue in the suit. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, 1959 SCR 1111 = AIR 1958 SC 886 . 5. It was argued that the Court cannot direct addition of parties against the wishes of the plaintiff who cannot be compelled to proceed against a person against whom he does not claim any relief. Plaintiff is no doubt dominus litis and is not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit. He may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom he wishes to proceed though under Order 1 Rule 3, to avoid multiplicity of suit and needless expenses all persons against whom the right to relief is alleged to exist may be joined as defendants. However, the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of parties. A party can be joined as defendant even though the plaintiff does not think that he has any cause of action against him. Rule 10 specifically provides that it is open to the Court to add at any stage of the suit a necessary party or a person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 6. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case." 23. In Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417 , the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that the general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit being dominus litis may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. 24. Paragraphs 13, 14 & 15 of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd.'s case (supra), read as under : "13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the Code", for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the Code", for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below : "10(2) Court may strike out or add parties.-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added." 14. The said provision makes it clear that a Court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party : (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the Court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. A "necessary party" is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a "necessary party" is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A "proper party" is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. A "proper party" is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the Court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance." 25. The plaintiff in a suit though a dominus litis and may choose his opponent, but, this is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The Court has still the power to direct the plaintiff to implead a person who is a necessary or proper party to the suit. In view of the aforesaid judgments, I do not find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the plaintiff being dominus litis could not be directed by the Court to implead the present 1st respondent and particularly when the learned Court has recorded a specific finding that the presence of such person, for the reasons recorded in the order, was necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the suit. 26. This Court on consideration of the undisputed facts of the case with respect to the filing of various suits with respect to the suit schedule property is also of the considered view that for the purposes of the application for impleadment being allowed, the 1st respondent established that she was directly and legally interested in the lis of OS No.443 of 2017. Such litigation may lead to result which will affect her legally by curtailing her legal rights to which she has also filed OS No.792 of 2018 in which the plaintiff of OS No.443 of 2017 is also one of the parties. 27. Such litigation may lead to result which will affect her legally by curtailing her legal rights to which she has also filed OS No.792 of 2018 in which the plaintiff of OS No.443 of 2017 is also one of the parties. 27. So far as the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the suit by the 1st respondent for partition was filed later on and the suit of the present plaintiff/petitioner was filed previously, the same will have no impact on the question of consideration of necessary or proper party for impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. Besides, one suit for partition by the sister of the present 1st respondent with respect to the same property was already filed and was pending since the year 2015. 28. The learned Trial Court did not exceed its power or jurisdiction nor acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in directing impleadment of the 1st respondent. Further, the matter of addition of parties does not raise any question of initial jurisdiction of the Court. 29. On the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Hon'ble Apex Court on analysis of various decisions of the Apex Court formulated the following principles on the exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in Para 49, which is as under : "49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated : (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of the Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 and the principles in Waryam Singh's case (supra), have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh's case (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 = 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 30. As is evident from the judgment in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case (supra), that in the exercise of its power of superintendence, the jurisdiction of the High Court has to be very sparingly exercised. The High Court can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it within the bounds of their authority. The power of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts Subordinate to the High Courts, and though the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. Frequent exercise of this power may be counterproductive. The parameters as laid down in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case (supra), for interference by the High Courts in exercise of power of superintendence, are not satisfied. 31. I do not find any illegality in the order of impleadment of the 1st respondent. 32. The civil revision petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 33. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.