JUDGMENT : Nitin Jamdar, C. J. This case is an example of how defaulting Borrowers can exploit systemic delays, in this case 30 years, to benefit themselves at the expense of genuine Auction Purchasers, depriving them of the rightful benefits of their investment. 2. The learned Single Judge, by the judgment impugned in these appeals, allowed the Writ Petition filed by the Judgment Debtor and set aside the sale concluded on 27 September 2002 in favour of the Appellants/Auction Purchasers by the Respondent Bank by setting aside the concurrent orders passed by the Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, and Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. Being aggrieved, the Auction Purchasers are before us with their appeals filed under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 3. The Auction Purchasers, the Appellants in W.A. Nos. 1614 and 1615 of 2015, are the Respondent Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the Writ Petition. Respondent No.1 / Writ Petitioner – Ms. Nimmy John, in both the appeals, is the wife of the original Judgment Debtor, referred to as Borrower. Respondent No. 2 in the appeals is the Catholic Syrian Bank, which, for the recovery of the loan extended to the Judgment Debtor, had conducted the sale in favour of the Appellants. Respondent Nos. 7 and 8 are the children of the Borrower. 4. The present recovery proceedings in these appeals are based on Recovery Certificate No.594 dated 20 January 2000 issued by the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, pursuant to the final order passed in T.A. No.1295/1997 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Ernakulam. 5. T.A. No.1295/1997 was instituted by the Catholic Syrian Bank in 1987 as O.S. No.449/1987 before the Sub Court, Ernakulam. The Sub Court decreed the suit on 27 September 1989 for realisation of the sum of Rs.16,17,715.90 with interest at 16.5% per annum with costs by sale of the scheduled properties. The Bank filed E.P. No.1563/1990 before the Sub Court, Ernakulam, for realising the sum of Rs.27,35,787.04 with costs. After the enactment of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the Execution Petition was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai, which was then exercising jurisdiction over the State of Kerala and renumbered as T.A. No. 1295/1997. After the enactment of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the Execution Petition was transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai, which was then exercising jurisdiction over the State of Kerala and renumbered as T.A. No. 1295/1997. The said T.A. was finally disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai, on 22 February 1999, and the Presiding Officer of that Tribunal issued Recovery Certificate No.255/99 dated 10 September 1999. 6. Based on that Recovery Certificate, the Recovery Officer of the DRT, Chennai, issued a demand notice dated 24 September 1999 to the certificate debtors directing them to pay the sum of Rs.60,63,740.42 in terms of the Recovery Certificate dated 10 September 1999 within 15 days of receipt of the notice. The certificate debtors failed to remit the dues as directed. Subsequently, the DRT, Ernakulam, was established in October 1999, and the matter was transferred to DRT, Ernakulam. 7. Aggrieved by the amount ordered to be recovered in terms of the Recovery Certificate dated 10 September 1999 issued by the DRT, Chennai, the certificate debtors filed I.A. No.396/1999 before the DRT, Ernakulam, consequent to which Recovery Certificate dated 10 September 1999 was amended and a revised Recovery Certificate No.594 was issued by this Tribunal on 20 January 2000. Pursuant to the issue of the amended Recovery Certificate dated 20 January 2000, a modified demand notice dated 7 November 2001 was issued to the certificate debtors, directing them to remit Rs.45,76,398.30 as of 20 January 2000 plus future interest and costs within 15 days of receipt of the notice. Since they failed to remit the dues pursuant to Exhibit-P8 sale proclamation, 43.808 cents of property in Sy. No. 816/2 of Ernakulam Village in Kanayanur Taluk was sold in a public auction on 27 September 2002 to the Auction Purchasers by the Recovery Officer of DRT, Ernakulam. 8. Ms. Nimmy John/8th Certificate Debtor, the Borrower, filed I.A. No.48/2002 (Exhibit-P9) before the Recovery Officer on 14 November 2002 seeking to set aside the sale under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Borrower also filed O.P. No.33965/2002 before this Court challenging the same. In view of the pendency of O.P., the I.A was kept in abeyance. This Court disposed of the O.P. by order dated 28 March 2003, against which, the Auction Purchasers and the certificate holder Bank filed Writ Appeal Nos. The Borrower also filed O.P. No.33965/2002 before this Court challenging the same. In view of the pendency of O.P., the I.A was kept in abeyance. This Court disposed of the O.P. by order dated 28 March 2003, against which, the Auction Purchasers and the certificate holder Bank filed Writ Appeal Nos. 1093/2003 and 1154/2003 respectively before this Court. The said writ appeals were finally disposed of by judgment dated 16 March 2005 with a direction to the Recovery Officer to take an independent decision on the I.A. filed by the Petitioner untrammelled by the observations and findings recorded in the judgment of the Single Judge. 9. Pursuant to the above direction in the judgment dated 16 March 2005, the Borrower approached the Recovery Officer with I.A. No.48/2002 for setting aside the auction sale of the mortgaged immovable property and I.A. No.881/2005 to accept the sum of Rs.38,47,306.40, in compliance with the requirements of Rule 61 of the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961. The Recovery Officer dismissed the interlocutory applications by Exhibit-P17 order dated 18 May 2005 and ordered return of cash order/banker’s cheque for Rs.35 lakhs submitted by the Borrower. Aggrieved by Exhibit-P17 order, the Borrower filed appeal under Section 30 of the Act of 1993 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which was dismissed by Exhibit-P19 order dated 29 August 2005. Thereafter, Exhibit-P19 order was challenged in appeal by the Borrower before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, which was also dismissed by Exhibit-P21 order dated 30 December 2005. It was observed in Exhibit-P21 order that the DRAT has carefully gone through the order passed by the Presiding Officer, who had taken into consideration all the objections raised by the Borrower before the DRT, and came to the conclusion that there was no irregularity in the conduct of sale and the Borrower had not substantiated that she sustained any injury by reason of any irregularity in the conduct of sale, and therefore, rejected all contentions and claim made by the Borrower. Being aggrieved, the Borrower filed W.P.(C) No.1070 of 2006 before the learned Single Judge. 10. In the Writ Petition, the Borrower sought to quash Exhibits-P17, P19 and P21 orders passed by Respondent Nos. 2, 7 and 8 and allow Exhibit-P9 application filed by the Borrower. Declaration was also sought that the conduct of auction sale of the Borrower’s property in Sy. 10. In the Writ Petition, the Borrower sought to quash Exhibits-P17, P19 and P21 orders passed by Respondent Nos. 2, 7 and 8 and allow Exhibit-P9 application filed by the Borrower. Declaration was also sought that the conduct of auction sale of the Borrower’s property in Sy. No. 816/2 of Ernakulam is vitiated by fraud and material irregularity and as such invalid, and to set aside the sale of the property held on 27 September 2002. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 9 April 2015 allowed the Writ Petition. Thereafter, the two sets of Auction Purchasers have filed these two Appeals challenging the said judgment. 11. The appeals were admitted by order dated 27 July 2015. On 13 August 2015, the application filed by the Borrower to keep the amount deposited by her in compliance of the judgment of the learned Single Judge be kept in the fixed deposit, was allowed. Subsequent thereto, the Borrower deposited an amount of Rs.1,74,44,924/-, evident from the clearance certificate dated 23 July 2015 issued by the Bank. Out of the Rs.76,80,000/-deposited by the Auction Purchasers, the Bank realized Rs.42,76,080/-, being the amount in default. The balance amount of Rs.34,03,919.73 was apportioned equally among the Petitioner and her two children. From this amount, Rs.11,34,437.91, i.e. the 1/3rd due to the Petitioner, was set off against dues to the Bank. The balance amount of Rs.22,68,875.82 was lying in fixed deposit in the names of the Borrower and her children. The Division Bench directed the Bank and the Recovery Officer to release the amount reflected in Exhibit-R1(B) memo along with the interest accrued thereon to the Borrower and her children on submission of application for that purpose. It was stated that the direction was an interim measure and was without entering into the merits of the appeal. 12. We have heard Mr. Johnson Abraham, learned counsel for the Appellants in both the appeals, Mr. Saji Mathew, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 Bank, and Mr. Santhosh Mathew, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent No.1/Writ Petitioner. 13. The auction was conducted pursuant to the recovery certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The procedure for this auction was as per the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act of 1961). Saji Mathew, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 Bank, and Mr. Santhosh Mathew, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent No.1/Writ Petitioner. 13. The auction was conducted pursuant to the recovery certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The procedure for this auction was as per the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act of 1961). Under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (Act of 1993), the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 is made applicable for recovery of debts. The Second Schedule lays down an elaborate procedure for recovery of tax. Part III of the Second Schedule deals with attachment and sale of immovable properties. Under Rule 52, the Recovery Officer issues a proclamation of the intended sale to be made. The contents of the proclamation provided under Rule 53, reads thus: “53. A proclamation of sale of immovable property shall be drawn up after notice to the defaulter, and shall state the time and place of sale, and shall specify, as fairly and accurately as possible,- (a) the property to be sold: (b) the revenue, if any, assessed upon the property or any part thereof; (c) the amount for the recovery of which the same is ordered; (cc) the reserve price, if any, below which the property may not be sold; and (d) any other thing which the Tax Recovery Officer considers it material for a purchaser to know, in order to judge the nature and value of the property.” 14. The mode of making proclamation is stated under Rule 54 of Part III, Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 as under: “54. (1) Every proclamation for the sale of immovable property shall be made at some place on or near such property by beat of drum of other customary mode, and a copy of the proclamation shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and also upon a conspicuous part of the office of the Tax Recovery Officer. (2) Where the Tax Recovery Officer so directs, such proclamation shall also be published in the Official Gazette or in a local newspaper, or in both; and the cost of such publication shall be deemed to be costs of the sale. (2) Where the Tax Recovery Officer so directs, such proclamation shall also be published in the Official Gazette or in a local newspaper, or in both; and the cost of such publication shall be deemed to be costs of the sale. (3) Where the property is divided into lots for the purpose of being sold separately, it shall not be necessary to make a separate proclamation for each lot, unless proper notice of the sale cannot, in the opinion of the Tax Recovery Officer, otherwise be given.” 15. The sale by auction is provided under Rule 56. Rule 57 contemplates deposit by the purchaser and resale in default. Rule 60 contemplates an application to set aside the sale of immovable property on deposit, which reads thus: “60. (1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the same, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the same, on his depositing- (a) the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, with interest thereon at the rate of one and one-fourth per cent for every month or part of a month, calculated from the date of the proclamation of sale to the date when the deposit is made; and (b) for payment to the purchaser, as penalty, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money, but not less than one rupee. (2) Where a person makes an application under rule 61 for setting aside the sale of his immovable property, he shall not, unless he withdraws that application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule.” 16. Under Rule 61 of the Act of 1961, an application can be made to set aside the sale of immovable property on the ground of non-service of notice or irregularity. This Rule reads thus: “61. Under Rule 61 of the Act of 1961, an application can be made to set aside the sale of immovable property on the ground of non-service of notice or irregularity. This Rule reads thus: “61. Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate, such Income-Tax Officer as may be authorised by the Principal Chief Commissioner or chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner in this behalf, the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale of the immovable property on the ground that notice was not served on the defaulter to pay the arrears as required by this Schedule or on the ground of a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale: Provided that- (a) no sale shall be set aside on any such ground unless the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of the non-service or irregularity; and (b) an application made by a defaulter under this rule shall be disallowed unless the applicant deposits the amount recoverable from him in the execution of the certificate.” 17. Under Rule 63 of the Act, confirmation of sale is provided. Postponement of sale to enable the defaulter to raise the amount due under the certificate is contemplated under Rule 66, and the acceptance of property in satisfaction of the amount due from the defaulter is provided under Rule 68A. This, in short, is the procedure to be followed in conducting the auction and sale of the property for payment of dues. 18. The learned Single Judge, after narrating the facts and adverting to the pleadings and contentions, posed four questions. First, whether the rejection of the application before the Recovery Officer for setting aside the sale with reference to Rule 61 of Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 was proper. Second, whether the petition filed by the Borrower to accept the amount sought to be deposited towards the amount covered by the recovery certificate and to set aside the sale was correctly rejected on the ground of limitation or not. Third, whether the ingredients of Rule 67 for want of notice and the procedural irregularities resulting in substantial prejudice were made out. Third, whether the ingredients of Rule 67 for want of notice and the procedural irregularities resulting in substantial prejudice were made out. Fourth regarding the implications of the order passed in the earlier round of litigation and whether the observations made therein were binding on the Recovery Officer. 19. We take up the last issue first, that is, the observations made in the earlier round of litigation. The Borrower had earlier filed O.P. No.33965 of 2002. By this Petition, the Borrower had sought to question the auction sale of the property. The learned Single Judge, in the judgment dated 28 March 2003, held that an alternate remedy was available to the Borrower and, therefore, refrained from exercising the jurisdiction. However, the learned Single Judge made various observations on merits in respect of the claim of the Borrower. The Auction Purchasers challenged this judgment by way of Writ Appeal No.1093 of 2003. By judgment dated 16 March 2005, the Division Bench disposed of the appeal and clarified that the authority dealing with the alternate remedy would take an independent decision untrammelled by the observations and findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned therein. The Auction Purchasers had contended before the learned Single Judge, as is argued before us, that the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the earlier round of litigation had been negatived and could not be raised again. According to us, the Division Bench had clarified that the Recovery Officer would have to take an independent decision uninfluenced by the observations made by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it cannot be said that the observations of the learned Single Judge made in the earlier round of litigation were either binding on the Recovery Officer or were expressly overruled. The Recovery Officer had to take a decision on its own merits. We do not find any error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment to that effect. 20. The next issue is the requirement for a pre-deposit. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment distinguished between Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule. We do not find any error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment to that effect. 20. The next issue is the requirement for a pre-deposit. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment distinguished between Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule. The learned Single Judge observed that under Rule 60, once the entire amount is deposited, no questions are asked, and the sale must be set aside under Rule 60, however, that is not the case when the application falls under Rule 61, which allows only two grounds for sustaining the petition: absence of proper notice and irregularities in the sale proclamation. The Auction Purchasers contended that since the entire amount was not deposited by the Borrower, along with the application to set aside the sale, the application should be dismissed at the outset as it was beyond jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge concluded that the application made under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule, which operates differently, does not require a pre-deposit clause, and the sale can be set aside if the conditions are met. 21. The learned counsel for the Borrower rightly contended that if the entire amount was to be deposited along with the application, then the application would be considered under Rule 60, and the conditions in Rule 61 need not have been demonstrated. Rule 60(1) allows the filing of an application to set aside the sale of immovable property, provided that the applicant deposits the amount specified in the confirmation of sale, in addition to a sum equivalent to 5% of the purchase price payable to the Auction Purchaser. Rule 61, on the other hand, permits an application to be made to set aside the sale on grounds of non-service of notice or procedural irregularity. A person aggrieved by a sale conducted in the execution of a certificate may apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale, citing the non-service of the notice requiring payment of arrears or on the basis of material irregularities in the publication and conduct of the sale. The learned counsel for the Borrower has relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Hanu Reddy Realty India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jignesh and Others [judgment dated 4 February 2008 in C.R.P.NPD. No.518 of 2006 and other connected cases]. The learned counsel for the Borrower has relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Hanu Reddy Realty India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jignesh and Others [judgment dated 4 February 2008 in C.R.P.NPD. No.518 of 2006 and other connected cases]. The Division Bench observed that unlike Rule 60, Rule 61 does not mandate any pre-deposit as a condition for filing the application, whereas Rule 60 specifically requires the deposit of the amount stated in the proclamation of sale, along with the additional 5% of the purchase price payable to the Auction Purchaser. No contrary decision is shown to us. Therefore, we find no error in the finding of the learned Single Judge that the application made by the Borrower was not barred because of the non-deposit of the amount under the recovery certificate along with the application. 22. Before we examine the factual aspect as regards the breach of the Rules in the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961, the argument advanced by the Auction Purchasers in respect of interference with concurrent factual findings by the learned Single Judge while exercising writ jurisdiction has to be considered. A detailed order was passed by the Recovery Officer. The next is the order of the DRT, and then the DRAT. We have examined the argument of the Borrower before the DRT. The argument before the DRT was the same as before us that the Borrower was not given notice of the auction sale and the Borrower only became aware of it from the affidavit filed by the Bank in another case, and there was a material irregularity in the conduct of the sale, initiated by collusion and fraud. The DRT addressed these submissions and found no evidence of collusion between the Recovery Officer and Auction Purchasers nor any fraud in the conduct of the sale. The Tribunal observed that this theory is merely an afterthought and found no merit in it. The Tribunal also recorded a finding that the records showed the demand notice and the notice for settling the proclamation under Rule 53 were sent to the Borrower by registered post, which she received on 20 November 2001 and another notice on or before 12 March 2002. The Tribunal based this finding on the examination of postal acknowledgement cards. The Tribunal also recorded a finding that the records showed the demand notice and the notice for settling the proclamation under Rule 53 were sent to the Borrower by registered post, which she received on 20 November 2001 and another notice on or before 12 March 2002. The Tribunal based this finding on the examination of postal acknowledgement cards. Therefore, there is a clear finding of fact by the Tribunal negating the contention regarding the absence of knowledge about the auction sale. The Tribunal found that sufficient opportunities were given to the borrowers to clear the amount, which they failed to do. The Tribunal noted that in the application, the Borrower did not even include the Auction Purchasers as party respondents. The Tribunal recorded a fact that the auction sale was held on 27 September 2002, it was confirmed on 28 October 2002, and a sale certificate was issued on the same date. Therefore, although the Tribunal primarily noted the application was filed beyond the period of limitation, it also addressed factual assertions regarding the service of notice and the Borrower's lack of knowledge. 23. The Borrower then challenged Exhibit-P19 order of the DRT dated 29 August 2005 before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. Before the Appellate Tribunal, the Borrower raised only two grounds that the proclamation of sale was not as per Rules 52 and 53 of the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 and that the same is vitiated by material irregularity, and no notice was issued to the Borrower of the auction sale, which was neither proclaimed in the locality or any publication was made. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal again went through the record and found that the notice demanding payment as per the recovery certificate and notice for settling the proclamation under Rule 53 of the Second Schedule was sent to the Borrower by registered post, which was received on 20 November 2001 and 12 March 2002. The Appellate Tribunal also found that there was no irregularity in the conduct of the sale. 24. Therefore, when three authorities, on examination of the record, recorded a finding of fact that the sale was duly conducted, the interference in writ jurisdiction by the impugned judgment was on an entirely erroneous basis. Even otherwise, we find that fundamental errors in approach have permeated through the impugned judgment. 24. Therefore, when three authorities, on examination of the record, recorded a finding of fact that the sale was duly conducted, the interference in writ jurisdiction by the impugned judgment was on an entirely erroneous basis. Even otherwise, we find that fundamental errors in approach have permeated through the impugned judgment. That is, the enquiry is focused solely on the rights and contentions of the Borrower, overlooking the rights of the Auction Purchasers as if the Auction Purchasers were the guilty parties. The enquiry should have been on the competing rights of the Borrower and the Auction Purchasers, which is missing in the impugned judgment. 25. Regarding the ingredients of Rule 61 of Schedule II of the Act of 1961, the first condition is that notice was not served to pay the arrears as required under the Schedule, and secondly, it should have resulted in substantial injury as a reason for the non-service. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment observed that notice was served to the Borrower by registered post informing her of the date of the sale. Secondly, the notice was issued in the Kottayam edition of Mangalam daily and there was not wide publicity, and there was no reason for publishing the sale of the property in Ernakulam in the Kottayam edition of Mangalam daily, that too, in English. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment also observed that the average circulation of this daily was very low. Fourthly, the learned Single Judge observed that there was no proper description in the schedule of the sale proclamation to convey sufficient information to prospective bidders. These are the lacunas that the learned Single Judge found in the issuance of notice. 26. As to the description of the property in the notification is concerned, Exhibit-P8 sale proclamation dated 18 July 2002 provides the description of the property as under: “The property is having an extent of 43 cents and 808 sq. links comprised in Sub Division No.2 of Survey No.816 of Ernakulam Village, Kanayannur Taluk, Ernakulam Sub District of Ernakulam District, situated at Karithala Desom/Cochin Corporation. The minimum price/fixed price for the said property is Rs.76.70 lakhs. links comprised in Sub Division No.2 of Survey No.816 of Ernakulam Village, Kanayannur Taluk, Ernakulam Sub District of Ernakulam District, situated at Karithala Desom/Cochin Corporation. The minimum price/fixed price for the said property is Rs.76.70 lakhs. This property will not be sold for any price less than the said amount.” The learned Single Judge held that the above description of the property given in the sale proclamation did not mention the existence of direct access to Cannon Shed Road or proximity of the same to the Revenue Tower/Boat Jetty Junction, which otherwise could have attracted more bidders. 27. Rule 53 of the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961, which we have referred to above, deals with the contents of the proclamation. It only states that the proclamation for sale shall specify the property to be sold as fairly and accurately as possible. This Rule does not contemplate a proclamation akin to an advertisement as expected by the learned Single Judge. In the proclamation at hand, full particulars regarding survey number, sub division, name of the village and broad location have been given. The property admittedly is a valuable piece of land. Any prospective purchasers willing to invest such a large amount would be fully aware as to value of the property going by the location itself. The requirement read into Rule 53 of the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 that the proclamation was bad because it did not state that the property was next to the Boat Jetty, close to the junction, is not borne out by the Rules. This is a subjective evaluation, and if such subjective grounds are made as a basis to set aside an auction after two decades, there would be no certainty left in the auction process. The perception of the adequacy of listing qualities of property would differ from person to person. It is too naive to presume that the class of buyers in an auction of high-value properties would not be aware of the qualities of the properties put up for sale. In fact, as the Auction Purchasers had pointed out the property was sold for an amount of Rs.76,80,000/-and after satisfying the loan of the Bank, the excess amount could have been returned to the Borrower. 28. In fact, as the Auction Purchasers had pointed out the property was sold for an amount of Rs.76,80,000/-and after satisfying the loan of the Bank, the excess amount could have been returned to the Borrower. 28. Rule 53(d) of the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 states that the Tax Recovery Officer may decide to add any other thing for a purchaser to know, to judge the nature and value of the property. Even this requirement is subject to Rule 61(a) of the Second Schedule whereby a substantial injury has to be demonstrated. This publication with the same contents did attract a buyer, the Auction Purchasers, who were willing to pay the offset price, which is not shown to be unreasonable, then the entire sale cannot be set aside on the ground that it was not mentioned in the notice that the property is located near a Boat Jetty. Therefore, we find that this ground on which the sale proclamation was set aside by the learned Single Judge was erroneous in law. Such casual setting aside of the sale proclamation caused grave prejudice to the Auction Purchasers, who have responded to the proclamation and submitted a bid which was of the proper value as per law. 29. The Borrowers argued that the property was advertised in the Kottayam edition of the Mangalam daily, while the property is located in Ernakulam. They claim that this newspaper has a net paid circulation of only one lakh, suggesting that the publication was intended to evade other bidders and favour the Respondents. The Auction Purchasers contend that, to their knowledge, the Mangalam daily is one of the leading newspapers in Kerala, with a broad circulation in and around the Ernakulam district and other parts of Kerala. The edition distributed in the Ernakulam district is printed in Kottayam, as the Mangalam daily does not have a printing and publishing center in Ernakulam. Regardless, the sale notice was published in the Mangalam daily circulated in the Ernakulam district. 30. Concerning the circulation of the newspaper that advertised the sale proclamation, the learned Single Judge observed that it was published in the Kottayam edition in English, however, the property is located in Ernakulam, where the newspaper's circulation is low. All the three authorities had already rejected this factual contention. 30. Concerning the circulation of the newspaper that advertised the sale proclamation, the learned Single Judge observed that it was published in the Kottayam edition in English, however, the property is located in Ernakulam, where the newspaper's circulation is low. All the three authorities had already rejected this factual contention. Rule 54 of Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 states that every proclamation for the sale of immovable property must be made by beat of a drum or other customary methods, and a copy of the proclamation must be affixed in a prominent spot on the property as well as in a conspicuous area of the Tax Recovery Officer's office. Under Rule 54, where the Tax Recovery Officer so directs, such proclamation must also be published in the Official Gazette or in a local newspaper, or both. Therefore, the method of making a proclamation follows the direction of the Tax Recovery Officer. In this case, the Tax Recovery Officer stipulated in the conditions of sale that the notice must be published in a vernacular daily with significant circulation in the area where the property is situated and that the sale conducted near the property is to be announced by beat of drums. 31. The Auction Purchasers submitted that the provisions under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) and the Act of 1993 are different, as the latter contains a mandate regarding publication, unlike the SARFAESI Act. Under the Act of 1993, it is directed by the Recovery Officer, but Rule 52(2) of the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 gives discretion to the Recovery Officer regarding the proclamation to be published. The Recovery Officer directed the issuance of notice in a vernacular daily with circulation in the area where the property is situated. The advertisement was issued in a newspaper. It is noted that, although the newspaper is published in Kottayam, it is available for buyers in Ernakulam. In addition to the advertisement under Rule 54(2), the notice was also affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. The Borrower contended that the witnesses for affixing the proclamation on the subject property were officers of the Respondent Bank. However, how this fact would render the proclamation invalid for breach of Rule 54(1) is not explained. In addition to the advertisement under Rule 54(2), the notice was also affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. The Borrower contended that the witnesses for affixing the proclamation on the subject property were officers of the Respondent Bank. However, how this fact would render the proclamation invalid for breach of Rule 54(1) is not explained. Therefore, these grounds raised by the Borrowers to challenge the auction process were without merit. 32. One of the arguments raised by the Auction Purchasers is that only the 8th Certified Debtor – the Borrower filed the petition to set aside the sale and the other certified debtors were not made parties in this petition. No reason is given by the Borrower for the non-joinder of the others or the effects of the non-joinder of the other debtors. Therefore, the certified debtors have not challenged the transaction in favour of the Auction Purchasers. An anomalous position would arise if the challenge was raised by only one Judgment Debtor. 33. The Borrower then relied on Rule 53 of Schedule II of the Act of 1961, which pertains to the contents of the proclamation. Rule 53 states that a proclamation of sale of immovable property must be drawn up after notification to the defaulter, stating the time and place regarding the property to be sold, along with other details. The Borrower argued that the proclamation has to be drawn up after notifying the defaulter. It is also contended that under Rule 55 of Schedule II of the Act of 1961, a thirty-days’ period is available, and if the sale is postponed, the Borrower has the opportunity to redeem, but admittedly, there was no notice of deferment of sale, even though the initial proclamation was issued with the knowledge of the Borrower. It is also argued that the only communication the Borrower received was a notice indicating that the proclamation would be settled, but the actual settlement did not occur, and therefore, the right of the Petitioner to payment within thirty days was defeated. 34. We find no merit in the above contention. The documents of the Borrower do not support the specific case that the Borrower had the money ready and that, had the Borrower known about the deferment, the amount could have been deposited. Therefore, the argument advanced earlier is merely academic and a desperate attempt to create new grounds and nullify the auction. The documents of the Borrower do not support the specific case that the Borrower had the money ready and that, had the Borrower known about the deferment, the amount could have been deposited. Therefore, the argument advanced earlier is merely academic and a desperate attempt to create new grounds and nullify the auction. Rule 61 not only contemplates irregularity, but also rather material irregularity that would prejudice. This is to avoid the routine setting aside of the sale. It is not, and cannot be, the contention of the Borrower that she was totally unaware of the proceedings regarding the sale. Therefore, we must consider whether such a precise submission was raised by the Borrower in the proceedings that took place before two authorities and the learned Single Judge. We have to be mindful of the fact that it has been almost thirty years since the sale was concluded, and for most of the proceedings, the Auction Purchasers were not responsible. 35. Before the Recovery Officer, the Appellants raised issues concerning the mortgage to Catholic Syrian Bank, an argument that is not pressed before us, then identification of the property before the auction sale, the loan valuation, the absence of a fixed reserve price, and the lack of notice regarding the auction sale, along with incorrect dues not being communicated. The Recovery Officer addressed each of these grounds. Regarding the notice of auction sale, he found the claim to be unsustainable. He noted that the suit was filed in the Sub Court, Ernakulam, in 1987, decreed in 1989, and that execution proceedings have been pending for two decades through the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The Borrower cannot claim ignorance of the substantial amount owed to the Bank since the demand notice was duly served prior to proclaiming the property for sale. Notice under Rule 53 of the Second Schedule of the Act of 1961 was also served and the proclamation was affixed and published in local newspapers. This is a factual finding recorded by the Recovery Officer in his order dated 18 May 2005 (Exhibit-P17). Throughout three decades since the auction, the Borrower has repeatedly attempted to advance various new themes of the arguments. This is a factual finding recorded by the Recovery Officer in his order dated 18 May 2005 (Exhibit-P17). Throughout three decades since the auction, the Borrower has repeatedly attempted to advance various new themes of the arguments. The argument that the Borrower lost the right to make a deposit due to lack of notice of postponement is being raised for the first time, and even if it was raised earlier, as established by the authorities, the Borrower was fully aware of the proceedings and the dues payable, and was not prevented from depositing the amount. 36. The Recovery Officer has recorded that prior to the issuance of sale proclamation, the property was identified by the Village Officer of Ernakulam Village, as per the sketch furnished by the Village Officer. The Sale Proclamation, dated 18 July 2002, was made by him after following all the procedural requirements as prescribed under the law. The Sale Proclamation, in both English and Malayalam, was affixed at a conspicuous part of the property at 4:30 PM on 22 July 2002. He stated that, as prescribed under the rules, there was a gap of more than 30 days between the date of affixation of the notice and the date initially fixed for the auction. The proclamation was also published in the Mangalam Daily. The upset price fixed for the property was Rs.76.70 lakhs. The public auction, initially scheduled for 29 August 2002, could not be held on that day due to the absence of bidders. It was, therefore, postponed to 3:00 PM on 4 September 2002. In the absence of bidders, the sale was again postponed to 11 September 2002, 17 September 2002, and 27 September 2002. Each time, the notice of adjournment was displayed on the notice board of the Tribunal. 37. The auction took place on 27 September 2002, and the Auction Purchasers bid the property for Rs.76,80,000/-and remitted Rs.19,96,810/-, including the security deposit of 25% of the bid amount plus poundage charges. The remaining 75% of the bid amount, which is Rs.57,60,000/-, was paid on 11 October 2002. Upon full payment of the bid amount, the Debts Recovery Tribunal confirmed the sale in favour of the respondents therein on 28 October 2002, after the 30-days period required by the Rules. There was no application to set aside the sale before the Recovery Officer when the confirmation order was issued. Upon full payment of the bid amount, the Debts Recovery Tribunal confirmed the sale in favour of the respondents therein on 28 October 2002, after the 30-days period required by the Rules. There was no application to set aside the sale before the Recovery Officer when the confirmation order was issued. The Recovery Officer asserted that before issuing the Proclamation of Sale, a notice under Rule 53 was issued to the Borrowers for settling the sale proclamation. The Borrowers had acknowledged the receipt of these notices. If there had been any purchasers for the property at a higher amount, the Borrower could have brought prospective purchasers before the Recovery Officer upon receiving the notice issued to her for settling the Sale Proclamation or afterward when the sale was adjourned. There is no dispute that the initial notice issued under Rule 53 of the Second Schedule was received by the Borrower. The Borrower did not file any objection to the proclamation statement. Subsequently, the reserve price was fixed and approved. The reserve price was set higher than the valuation of the property provided by the Bank according to the valuation report of a registered valuer. 38. To re-emphasis, a detailed order was passed by the Recovery Officer on 18 May 2005, of almost 26 pages, considering all the arguments of the Borrower. Thereafter, the Borrower filed an appeal in the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 30 of the Act of 1993. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, considering all aspects, dismissed the appeal by Exhibit-P19 order dated 29 August 2005. The Borrower filed M.A. No.173 of 2005 in the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The DRAT again considered all the issues raised by the Borrower and dismissed the appeal by Exhibit-P21 order dated 30 December 2005. Therefore, three reasoned judgments were against the Borrower when the Borrower had approached this Court. Hence, the findings of fact on the contentions raised by the Appellants were rendered concurrently in favour of the Auction Purchasers. According to us, no case was made out to interfere in these concurrent findings of fact. 39. The Borrower then sought to contend that it is the responsibility of the Court/Tribunal to ensure that the sale of property in an auction is just and fair. According to us, no case was made out to interfere in these concurrent findings of fact. 39. The Borrower then sought to contend that it is the responsibility of the Court/Tribunal to ensure that the sale of property in an auction is just and fair. For that purpose, the Borrower has relied on the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 16 September 1992 in C.R.P. No.799 of 1992 in these proceedings. However, this order was passed when the proceedings arose from the order passed by the Civil Court, and it was issued before the matter was transferred to the e DRT. The Borrower has also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhikchand S/o. Dhondiram Mutha (Deceased) Through Lrs. v. Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale (Deceased) Through Lrs. [2024 KHC 6284]. The said decision has arisen from the powers of the executing court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the sale of property pursuant to executing a decree. However, the principles that apply in respect of recovery of debts under execution of a decree of the Civil Court and the role of Civil Court therein are different than the one under the Act of 1993 and the SARFAESI Act. The preamble to the statement of object and reasons of the SARFAESI Act states that the establishment of a specialised tribunal was felt necessary to facilitate recovery of dues in the banking and financial sectors speedily as the existing procedure (in Civil Courts) had blocked a significant portion of the funds of the banks. Therefore, if again all the principles applicable to the Civil Suits are brought in to apply to the Tribunals under the Act of 1993, it will nullify the object. 40. Now, to emphasise the plight of the Auction Purchasers. 41. The Auction Purchasers purchased the property for a bid amount of Rs.76.80 lakhs. After the finalisation of the bid, on 27 September 2002, the Auction Purchasers remitted Rs.19.20 lakhs towards 25% of the bid amount and Rs.76,81,000/-towards the poundage fee on the same day as prescribed under the Rules. Of the total amount of Rs.19,96,810/-remitted on 27 September 2002, the date of the auction, Rs.16 lakhs was by way of Demand Draft/Pay Order and the remaining amount of Rs.3,96,810/-in cash. Of the total amount of Rs.19,96,810/-remitted on 27 September 2002, the date of the auction, Rs.16 lakhs was by way of Demand Draft/Pay Order and the remaining amount of Rs.3,96,810/-in cash. The balance 75%, Rs.57.60 lakhs, was remitted by the Purchasers on 11 October 2002, of which Rs.56.70 lakhs by Demand Draft and remaining Rs.90,000/-in cash, within 15 days of the date of auction as prescribed under the Rules. The sale was confirmed on 20 October 2002. Order of confirmation was passed on 28 October 2002. A certificate of sale was also drawn up and signed by this Respondent on 28 October 2002. An order of delivery of property to the Auction Purchasers was passed by this Respondent on 5 November 2002. The revenue records have been mutated in favour of the Auction Purchasers, who are paying taxes to date. The Appellants purchased the property after availing a loan. Yet, in view of the pendency of the present appeals, they were not able to enjoy the property. 42. The Auction Purchasers submitted that there is no fault on their part, and they have paid the full amount within the time limit. They submitted that had they paid the amount of Rs.76,80,000/-thirty years ago to buy a property in the open market, the Auction Purchasers would not have faced any of the difficulties they were facing today and cannot be penalised because they brought the property in Court Auction. We find merit in the grievance of the Auction Purchasers. Before the Recovery Officer, the Borrower had argued a case of collusion between Auction Officers and Purchasers and had sought to urge a case of fraud. No case is established on the standards required to prove that the Auction Purchasers have committed fraud or are guilty parties. 43. The Auction Purchasers stated that they got information about the sale of the property from the advertisement published in the newspaper and from the office, and thereafter, visited the land in question and found that it could be used to construct residential flats for their residence. The Auction Purchasers later approached the Bank for a loan of Rs.43,50,000/-. After confirming that the loan could be obtained by providing adequate security, they participated in the auction and purchased the property. They paid the remaining balance owed to the Bank using the loan amount. This upset price was determined after consideration of all the relevant factors. The Auction Purchasers later approached the Bank for a loan of Rs.43,50,000/-. After confirming that the loan could be obtained by providing adequate security, they participated in the auction and purchased the property. They paid the remaining balance owed to the Bank using the loan amount. This upset price was determined after consideration of all the relevant factors. If the starting price had been set too low, there would likely have been several bidders. There is no case that any other prospective buyer was willing to offer a higher amount. No bidder was brought in by the Borrower. 44. Therefore, the consequence of the impugned judgment is that the defaulter, who has delayed the repayment and has dragged on the litigation, is benefited, and the Auction Purchasers, who are not at fault, are penalised. Such positions would undermine the sanctity of the public auctions. In each successive round of litigation, the Borrower has sought to urge new grounds. In the case of K. Kumara Gupta v. Sri. Markendaya and Sri. Omkareswara Swamy Temple [ (2022) 5 SCC 710 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that repeated interference in public auctions would frustrate the sanctity and purpose of holding auctions. Therefore, it is necessary that public auctions duly held are not lightly interfered with. 45. We, therefore, agree with the grievance of the Auction Purchasers that the impugned judgment demonstrates an undue emphasis on the interest of the Borrower. The procedural aspects were examined only to set aside the sale. Subjective matters, such as the description and circulation of newspaper advertisements, ought to have been evaluated with the rights of the Auction Purchasers in mind, especially when concurrent orders were being set aside. 46. The Appellants deposited Rs.76,80,000/-as a sale consideration in 2003. The learned Single Judge set aside the auction proceedings and directed the Original Petitioner to deposit the sale consideration received by the Auction Purchasers with the Respondent Bank, along with 9% interest from the date of deposit. Subsequently, the Original Petitioner deposited Rs.1,74,44,924/-. Of the Rs.76,80,000/-deposited by the Auction Purchasers, the Bank realised Rs.42,76,080/-, which was the amount in default. The remaining amount of Rs.34,03,919.73 was divided equally among the Petitioner and her two children. From this amount, Rs.11,34,437.91, which is 1/3 of the amount due to the Petitioner, was set off against the dues owed to the Bank. Of the Rs.76,80,000/-deposited by the Auction Purchasers, the Bank realised Rs.42,76,080/-, which was the amount in default. The remaining amount of Rs.34,03,919.73 was divided equally among the Petitioner and her two children. From this amount, Rs.11,34,437.91, which is 1/3 of the amount due to the Petitioner, was set off against the dues owed to the Bank. The remaining amount, Rs.22,68,875.82, is in fixed deposit under the names of the Petitioner's children. By interim order dated 11 December 2023 in I.A. No.2 of 2023 in W.A. No.1614 of 2015, the Respondent Bank and Respondent No.4 – Recovery Officer, were directed to release the amount, along with interest accrued to the Borrower and Respondent Nos. 8 and 9, subject to the rights of the Appellants. The Appellants have made it clear that they are not interested in the return of the sale consideration with interest but in the property sold to them. It is for the Borrower and the Bank to work out the monetary modalities if the appeals are allowed and the sale is confirmed. 47. In light of the above conclusions, the Appellants/Auction Purchasers are entitled to succeed. A case is made for interference in the impugned judgment. Accordingly, the Appeals are allowed, and the judgment delivered in W.P.(C) No.1070 of 2020 is quashed and set aside. We permit the Borrower to apply for a refund of the balance amount deposited in the Court with accrued interest.