JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short "the C.P.C."], is filed by the appellants challenging the decree and judgment, dated 29.04.2000 in OS No.131 of 1983 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada [for short "the Trial Court"]. 2. The appellants herein are the defendants and respondents herein are the plaintiffs in OS No.131 of 1983. 3. The respondents/plaintiffs filed the suit for cancellation of the permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 executed by Sri Arther Earnest Goodman on behalf of Church Mission Society (hereinafter will be called as "CMS") in favour of one Lingam Doorvasulu and delivery of possession of the property to the plaintiffs ejecting the defendants and for future mesne profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery of possession. 4. Both the parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the Trial Court. 5. The brief averments of the plaint, in OS No.131 of 1983, are as under : (i) The plaintiff is the Charitable Trust having its Headquarters at Madras. The plaintiff Trust Association is the custodian of the properties of the Church of South India. For administration and management of properties in Krishna Diocese, the plaintiff has appointed four Power of Attorneys. Two out of them are entitled to represent the suits for recovery of the properties of the plaintiffs Association. The plaintiffs Association came into existence a long time back and the CMS merged itself into the Church of South India and all the properties of the CMS became vested in the plaintiffs Association, as per the instrument of transfer executed on 31.12.1956. The plaint schedule property originally belongs to the CMS, thus become vested in the plaintiffs Trust Association. (ii) On 25.03.1907 Sri Arther Earnest Goodman executed a permanent lease deed in favour of the grandfather of the defendants namely Sri Lingam Doorvasulu and delivered possession of the said land to him. As per the terms of the said permanent lease deed, the lessee has to pay Rs.20/- per year for the entire schedule land and enjoy the entire income thereupon and in case of failure of payment of rent every year, it was provided that the lessee should also pay interest at 12% per annum. As per the terms of the said permanent lease deed, the lessee has to pay Rs.20/- per year for the entire schedule land and enjoy the entire income thereupon and in case of failure of payment of rent every year, it was provided that the lessee should also pay interest at 12% per annum. The plaintiffs pleaded that the said permanent lease deed is invalid and inoperative on the ground that there was no necessity for the then Superintending Missionary of CMS to execute the permanent lease deed. There is neither legal necessity nor any benefit to the CMS which is a religious institution. They further pleaded that the plaintiff's Association is a Charitable Institution and the properties owned by them are all trust properties, which cannot be alienated without justifying necessity and benefit to the institution. Thus, Arther Earnest Goodman executed the said permanent lease deed without positive necessity, misusing his power as the then Superintending Missionary of the CMS. The schedule properties are specifically earmarked for the benefit of the Church at Tummalapalli and the income from the schedule land is to be utilized for the sole purpose of effecting repairs to the Church. The rent stipulated at Rs.20/- per year for the entire schedule property is absurdly low and it is practically a sale of schedule property to the said Doorvasulu under the cover of permanent lease. If the lease is for more than 20 years even though it may be for legal necessity, the express permission and the orders of the Principal Civil Judge having jurisdiction over the area, the permission of the District Court is required to make it as valid one. (iii) After the death of Doorvasulu, the defendants, who are the legal representatives of Doorvasulu are now in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. They also pleaded that the plaint schedule land is fertile land and it yields not less than 20 to 25 bags of paddy per acre towards the first crop of sarva and also on the same rate in case dalva crop is raised. As such, the plaintiffs are entitled for future mesne profits. They also pleaded that the plaint schedule land is fertile land and it yields not less than 20 to 25 bags of paddy per acre towards the first crop of sarva and also on the same rate in case dalva crop is raised. As such, the plaintiffs are entitled for future mesne profits. As a result of permanent lease deed, the CMS and subsequently the plaintiff's Trust Association became deprived of the possession of the plaint schedule property and consequently necessary repairs could not be effected to the Church also and great loss and damage was caused to them. Inspite of the demands of the 2nd plaintiff, the defendants did not deliver possession of the plaint schedule property. Hence, the suit. 6. The 1st defendant filed a written statement by denying all the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under :-- He admitted that on 25.03.1907 Sri Arther Earnest Goodman executed a permanent lease deed in favour of his paternal grandfather Sri Lingam Doorvasulu and delivered possession of the suit land to him with terms of lease to pay rent of Rs.20/- per year and also to pay cist of Rs.28-14-0 to the Government irrespective of failure of crop. The lease deed is absolutely valid as the lessor was absolutely competent to lease out the lands and the land was not capable of fetching income by 1907 and it was not even for CMS to cultivate the land and get income from the plaint schedule land by that time. Even according to the plaintiffs, the plaint schedule land was purchased for Rs.33-8-0 by 09.02.1900, but as per the terms of the lease deed, the lessees have to pay Rs.20/- per year towards rent and pay cist of Rs.28-14-0 to the Government and both put together exceeds the value of the land and so, the lease is to the great advantage of the Missionary. He further contends that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 alone are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land after the death of their father and 3rd defendant has nothing to do with the plaint schedule land and as such, the suit against 3rd defendant is liable to be dismissed in limini. He further contends that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 alone are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land after the death of their father and 3rd defendant has nothing to do with the plaint schedule land and as such, the suit against 3rd defendant is liable to be dismissed in limini. He further contends that the suit claim for cancellation of permanent lease deed is barred by limitation and thus he denied the claim of the plaintiffs for cancellation of permanent lease deed with ancillary relief or alternatively for relief of declaration. He further contends that the plaint schedule land is a saline land, low lying and a tail end land and so it cannot yield more than 15 bags per year per acre which is hardly sufficient to meet the agricultural expenses. The dalva crop depends on the climatic conditions and hence the crop realized is hardly sufficient to meet the agricultural expenses. Therefore, he prayed to dismiss the suit. 7. Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues : (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of cancellation of the permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907? (2) Whether the suit is in time? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the plaint schedule land? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future profits and if so and what rate? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration that the permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 is invalid and does not bind on the plaintiffs? (6) To what relief? 8. During the course of trial in the Trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, PW1 and PW2 were examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A6 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DW1 to DW4 were examined and Exs.B1 to B44 were marked. 9. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the Trial Court decreed the suit vide its judgment, dated 29.04.2000, against which the present appeal is preferred by the defendants in the suit questioning the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court. 10. Heard Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Sivalanka Ramachandra Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellants and Sri J. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the respondents. 11. 10. Heard Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Sivalanka Ramachandra Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellants and Sri J. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the respondents. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellants would contend that the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court is contrary to law, the evidence on record and probabilities of the case and the Trial Court failed to consider the evidence on record in the correct perspective manner and in the light of principles laid down in the decided cases. He would further contend that the judgment of the Trial Court appears to be based on surmise and the Trial Court grossly erred in coming to conclusion that permanent lease under Ex.A3 is not for the benefit of the plaintiff's trust. He would further contend that Ex.A3 does not contain any recital regarding delivery of possession of the schedule property but only payment of interest is stipulated in case of failure to pay the agreed lease amount. He would further contend that the Trial Court grossly erred in concluding that Section 10 of the Limitation Act has no application to the present case on hand. He would further contend that the Trial Court failed to see that the plaintiffs never raised any objection for more than 76 years and the plaintiffs are not entitled to file the present suit without issuing any prior quit notice and he would further contend that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge. 12. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned Trial Judge rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the learned Trial Judge and the appeal may be dismissed by confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge. 13. Now the points for determination are : 1. Whether the Trial Court is justified in holding that the suit is not barred by limitation? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled the relief of cancellation of permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 executed by the Arther Earnest Goodman on behalf of Church Mission Society (CMS)? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief of recovery of possession of the suit schedule property? 4. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled the relief of cancellation of permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 executed by the Arther Earnest Goodman on behalf of Church Mission Society (CMS)? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief of recovery of possession of the suit schedule property? 4. Whether the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court needs any interference? 14. Point No.1 : Whether the Trial Court is justified in holding that the suit is not barred by limitation? The undisputed facts are the plaintiff is the Charitable Trust having its Headquarters at Madras and the same is recognized as a Charitable and Religious Organization by the Government of India and it is a registered Society under Companies Act and the Church Mission Society (CMS) purchased the plaint schedule property in the name of one Maddi Yesobu under a registered sale deed in the year, 1899 and subsequently he relinquished his rights in favour of CMS in the year 1900 under the original of Ex.A2 relinquishment deed, dated 09.02.1900. Ex.A2 is not at all in dispute and it is also not in dispute that the plaintiff's association has constituted as a Charitable Trust of Church of South India under Ex.A1 and Ex.A1 also reveals the same and the plaint schedule property is the agricultural land to the extent of Acs.4-81 cents situated at Tummapalli of Gudivada Taluq and on 25.03.1907 Sri Arther Earnest Goodman, the then Superintendent of Machinery leased out the plaint schedule property in favour of one Lingam Doorvasulu and delivered possession of the land to him by executing a permanent lease deed under original of Ex.A3, dated 25.03.1907 and the payment of lease is Rs.20/- per year and the entire schedule land of an extent of Acs.4-81 cents and in case of failure in payment of lease, there was a specific clause that the lessee should also pay the interest at the rate of 12% per annum and also pay cist of Rs.28-14 anas in three installments. It is also undisputed fact that after the death of Doorvasulu, his son Kasi Viswanadham and after the death Kasi Viswanadham, his two sons and one daughter i.e., defendant Nos.1 to 3 are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, the same is also not in dispute. 15. It is also undisputed fact that after the death of Doorvasulu, his son Kasi Viswanadham and after the death Kasi Viswanadham, his two sons and one daughter i.e., defendant Nos.1 to 3 are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, the same is also not in dispute. 15. Though initially it was disputed by the defendants that the plaint schedule property is not fertile land, but the 1st defendant in the suit as DW1 admits that the plaint schedule property is giving two crops yield for the last 7 or 8 years and used to get 15 bags of paddy yielding per sarva per acre and he admits originally the plaint schedule property belongs to the plaintiff's trust. It is also admitted by DW3 in his evidence the plaint schedule land originally belongs to plaintiff's Church. The evidence on record coupled with own admissions of the defendants' witnesses clearly go to show that the plaint schedule property belongs to the plaintiff's trust. The ownership of the plaintiffs is not at all in dispute. 16. In order to prove the case of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs relied on the evidence of PW1 and PW2. PW1 is Property Secretary of plaintiff's society. As per his evidence, he is a Property Secretary of the plaintiff's society and also a Treasurer. He reiterated in his evidence about the purchase of plaint schedule property by CMS under a registered sale deed in the name of one M. Yesobu and subsequently Yesobu relinquished his rights in favour of CMS under Ex.A2, the same is not in dispute. PW1 deposed in his evidence that the then Officer of CMS gave the plaint schedule property to Lingam Doorvasulu as a permanent lease under a registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 and Ex.A3 is the certified copy of the said registered lease deed. He further reiterated in his evidence that the said officer, who executed a lease deed, has no right to lease out the property in permanent, as such, the said lease is not valid. It is in the evidence of PW1 that after the death of Doorvasulu, his son Kasi Viswanadham was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and after his death, his sons and daughter i.e., defendant Nos.1 to 3 are enjoying the said property. 17. PW2 is another witness of the plaintiffs. It is in the evidence of PW1 that after the death of Doorvasulu, his son Kasi Viswanadham was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and after his death, his sons and daughter i.e., defendant Nos.1 to 3 are enjoying the said property. 17. PW2 is another witness of the plaintiffs. He deposed in his evidence that he is the 1st plaintiff and 2nd plaintiff is no more and he filed the suit on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust and he is working in the plaintiff's trust. He further deposed that he is the Property Secretary of the plaintiff's trust on the date of filing of the suit and the plaintiff's trust is having own properties and the plaint schedule properties are situated at Tummalapalli and the defendants did not pay the lease amount to the plaintiff's trust and that they filed the suit for cancellation of permanent lease and for delivery of plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs. 18. Per contra, the 1st defendant i.e., DW1 deposed in his evidence that they used to pay lease amount to the Church at Tummalapalli upto the date of filing of the suit i.e., upto the year 1983 and he also filed all those receipts issued by the Father of the Church at Tummalapalli and those are under Ex.B1 to Ex.B23. He further reiterated in his evidence that they sent the lease amount to the Office of the Church in the year 1984, but the same was returned. Ex.B24 is the returned Money Order Coupon. Here it is relevant to say that the suit is filed in the year 1983. It seems that during the pendency of the suit, the said amount was refused by the plaintiffs and that the said Money Order was returned to the defendants. As per the own statement of DW1 in his evidence they paid the land revenue upto the year 1983. Ex.B25 to Ex.B31 are the Land Revenue Receipts. To disprove Ex.B1 to Ex.B24 and Ex.B25 to Ex.B31, no evidence is let out by the plaintiffs. 19. As per the own statement of DW1 in his evidence they paid the land revenue upto the year 1983. Ex.B25 to Ex.B31 are the Land Revenue Receipts. To disprove Ex.B1 to Ex.B24 and Ex.B25 to Ex.B31, no evidence is let out by the plaintiffs. 19. It was seriously agitated by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants/ defendants that the plaintiffs has not filed any proof or document or did not adduce any evidence that the suit schedule property was transferred by CMS to the plaintiff i.e., C.S.I.T. In cross-examination of the evidence of PW1 when elicited PW1 stated in the year 1947 the properties of CMS were transferred to the plaintiff's trust and there was evidence in the records of the plaintiff's trust to that extent. DW1 admitted in his evidence in cross-examination that the suit schedule property belongs to the plaintiff's trust. DW3 i.e., own witness of the defendants admitted in his evidence in cross-examination itself that the suit schedule property belongs to the plaintiff's Church. Therefore, the plaintiffs proved the ownership in respect of the suit schedule property. It is not the case of the defendants that they are the owners of the plaint schedule property. Their defence is that their grandfather Doorvasulu was lessee under Ex.A3 registered lease deed and after his death, his son Kasi Viswanadham and after his death, the defendants are in possession as lessees in respect of the suit schedule property in an extent of Acs.4-81 cents. 20. It was seriously agitated by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants that the date of registered lease deed is 25.03.1907 and the suit for cancellation of registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 is filed by the plaintiffs in the year, 1983 i.e., subsequent to 76 years of the date of execution of the registered lease deed and that the suit is barred by limitation. It was further contended that the suit has to be filed within three years from the date of Ex.A3 i.e., 25.03.1907 and that the suit is barred by limitation. Admittedly, the date of alleged Ex.A3 registered lease deed is 25.03.1907, the plaintiffs sought the cancellation of the registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907, in the year 1983 in which year the suit is filed. Admittedly no notice has been issued prior to the filing of the suit by the plaintiffs. Admittedly, the date of alleged Ex.A3 registered lease deed is 25.03.1907, the plaintiffs sought the cancellation of the registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907, in the year 1983 in which year the suit is filed. Admittedly no notice has been issued prior to the filing of the suit by the plaintiffs. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the suit is maintainable in view of Section 10 of the Limitation Act. Section 10 of the Limitation Act defines as follows : 10. Suits against trustees and their representatives.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time. 21. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants would contend that Section 10 of the Limitation Act is not at all applicable to the present case on hand because the schedule property was given under lease to the grandfather of the defendants under a registered lease deed for valuable consideration of Rs.20/- per year and he would further contend that Section 10 of the Limitation Act is not at all applicable since the lease was for valuable consideration. The learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance of a decision in Kakumani Rathiah and others v. Pathan Asha Bibi and others, AIR 1964 AP 393 , wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as follows : "Section 10 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to transfers and conveyances for valuable consideration. The word "assign" in Section 10 is sufficiently wide to cover a leasehold interest. So also, the expression "valuable consideration" has a well-known connotation in law and it is not synonymous with the expression "adequate consideration". When the consideration is not illusory, the fact that it is not adequate does not mean that it is not valuable consideration." The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law is Section 10 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to transfers and conveyances for valuable consideration. When the consideration is not illusory, the fact that it is not adequate does not mean that it is not valuable consideration." The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law is Section 10 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to transfers and conveyances for valuable consideration. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the lease in respect of the suit schedule property in those days a way back 117 years in the year 1907 is Rs.20/- per year. It is not the case of none of the parties that the suit schedule property was leased out to the grandfather of the defendants in the year 1907 without any valuable consideration. It is an admitted fact by both parties that the lease for suit schedule property is Rs.20/- per year in the year 1907 under Ex.A3 lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. The plaintiffs also did not adduce any evidence to show that the lease amount fixed in those days i.e., more than 117 years is very less. 22. The learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a decision in Shri Jagadguru Gurushiddaswsami Guru Gangadharswami Murusavirmath v. The Dakshina Maharashtra Digambar Jain Sabha, AIR 1953 SC 514 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows : "The word "assign" in Section 10 is sufficiently wide to cover a lessee as well; but the benefit of that section cannot be had where the lease was for valuable consideration. The expression "valuable consideration" is not synonymous with "adequate consideration" and when that consideration, namely the rent reserved, though small, was not in any sense illusory, having regard to the State of affairs prevailing at the time when the transaction took place, the case would come within the terms of the exception laid down in the section and consequently the lessee would not be precluded, by reason of the fact that the property was to". Admittedly, in the case on hand as stated supra, the lease was given under valuable consideration at about 117 years ago and the expression in valuable consideration is not at all synonymous with the adequate consideration. Moreover, the appellants/defendants are not the trustees and they are the successors of the tenant under a permanent tenancy of the year 1907 under a permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Kakumani Rathiah's case (supra), is applicable to the present case on hand. 23. Moreover, the appellants/defendants are not the trustees and they are the successors of the tenant under a permanent tenancy of the year 1907 under a permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Kakumani Rathiah's case (supra), is applicable to the present case on hand. 23. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that Section 10 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the individuals and it applicable to the trustees. He relied on a decision in Vankamamidi Balakrishnamurthi v. Gogineni Sambayya and others, AIR 1959 AP 186 , wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as follows : In Rajah of Ramnad v. Ponnuswami Thevar, ILR 44 Mad. 277 = AIR 1921 Mad. 125, Sir John Wallis, C.J. and Sadasiva Ayyar, J., recognised a distinction in the treatment of the question of limitation by English Courts and Courts in India, and observed : "The learned Advocate-General cited several English cases to show that the bar of limitation would not be applied in a similar case in England but in my opinion those decisions have no application in this Court. In matters of equitable jurisdiction, such as trusts the English Courts never regarded themselves bound by the statutes of limitation and as regards trusts have refused to allow the limitation to be pleaded as regards breaches of express trust; whilst following the analogy of the statute as regards constructive trusts ..... The learned Lord Justice goes on to show that the English Courts have refused to apply the bar of limitation on the analogy of the statute in certain cases which appear to come within his definition of constructive trusts and this is the class of cases on which the learned Advocate-General relied. That was a matter well within their powers but in this country we are bound by the provisions of Section 10 of the Limitation Act ..... It is, in my opinion, impossible to hold that the payments ..... became vested in the mortgagee on trust ..... Section 10 has clearly no application to such a case." The composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh further held as follows : The case followed by another Bench is Krishna Pattar v. Lakshmi, ILR 45 Mad. 415 = AIR 1922 Mad. became vested in the mortgagee on trust ..... Section 10 has clearly no application to such a case." The composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh further held as follows : The case followed by another Bench is Krishna Pattar v. Lakshmi, ILR 45 Mad. 415 = AIR 1922 Mad. 57, with the observation that; "The case is of a constructive trust or of an obligation in the nature of a trust ..... Section 10 of the Limitation Act has never been held to apply to such cases. It is true that in Section 10 the term 'express trustee' is not used in the section itself but only in the marginal note, but the language of the section referring, as it does, to "persons in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose" is explicit enough to show that it refers only to express trustees. It is not contended before us that it would cover the case of the constructive trustee." We have thence forward an unvarying catena of decisions reaffirming the principle that the ambit of the main provision of the first paragraph of Section 10 of the Limitation Act confined to express trusts and trustees. 24. The learned Counsel for the respondents relied on a decision in Secretary, Department of Education, Government of A.P. and others v. Sri Ramaraju Ayurveda Ashramam, A Charitable Endowment, rep. by the Managing Trustee : Alluri Bhagavanraju and others, 2007 (4) ALT 239 . The facts in the aforesaid case law are the suit schedule property has been permitted to be used by the State Government to run a College permanently without any rent. Whereas in the present case in the year 1907 at about 117 years ago the property was let out under a registered lease deed for Rs.20/- per year to the grandfather of the defendants under Ex.A3 registered lease deed. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the aforesaid case i.e., Sri Ramaraju Ayurveda Ashramam's case (supra), are different to the instant case. 25. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied on a decision in Prem Singh and others v. Birbal and others, (2006) 5 SCC 353 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows : An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. 25. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied on a decision in Prem Singh and others v. Birbal and others, (2006) 5 SCC 353 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows : An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set out is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions. A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under : "31. When cancellation may be ordered.-(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the Court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation." Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable document. It provides for a discretionary relief. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eye of law, as it would be a nullity. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eye of law, as it would be a nullity. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary article would be. In the case on hand, the mere relief claimed by the plaintiffs is cancellation of registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. Admittedly the plaintiffs filed the suit in the year 1983 after lapse of 76 years from the date of Ex.A3 registered lease deed and no notice was issued by the plaintiffs to the defendants to terminate the tenancy or to vacate the suit schedule property during the aforesaid 76 years. It is not in dispute that no quit notice is issued to the defendants by the plaintiffs prior to institution of the suit from the date of lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. As seen from the plaint, in the cause of action para, the plaintiffs pleaded that on 01.10.1983 the plaintiffs Power of Attorney Sri B. Jacob Jaya Sundara Rao demanded the 1st defendant to deliver the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs. The said Jacob Jaya Sundara Rao examined as PW2. There is no whisper in the evidence of PW2 about the alleged oral demand made by him on 01.10.1983. There is also no whisper in the evidence of PW1 about the alleged oral demand made by PW2 on 01.10.1983. Therefore, the alleged cause of action mentioned in the plaint is myth and created one. 26. Admittedly, the suit is filed in the year 1983 for cancellation of instrument i.e., registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 and it is not the case of none of the parties that the lease was given under free of cost. The suit schedule property was leased out for Rs.20/- per year in the year 1907. As stated supra, no notice was issued by the plaintiffs to the defendants to terminate the lease or to vacate the suit schedule property. The date of registered lease deed is 25.03.1907 and the suit is filed in the year 1983 i.e., after 76 years from the date of the instrument i.e., Ex.A3 registered lease deed. Therefore, the suit is not filed within a period of limitation. The date of registered lease deed is 25.03.1907 and the suit is filed in the year 1983 i.e., after 76 years from the date of the instrument i.e., Ex.A3 registered lease deed. Therefore, the suit is not filed within a period of limitation. Therefore, the finding arrived by the learned Trial Judge that the suit is filed within the period of limitation is not at all correct. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in favour of the defendants and as against the plaintiffs. 28. Point No.2 : Whether the plaintiffs are entitled the relief of cancellation of permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907 executed by the Arther Earnest Goodman on behalf of Christian Machinery Society (CMS)? It is the specific contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that unless there is a cancellation clause in Ex.A3 lease deed, it cannot be cancelled. Admittedly, the lease is a permanent lease and the same is executed under a registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. As stated supra, no notice is given by the plaintiffs to the defendants to terminate the lease or to vacate the suit schedule property during the past 76 years prior to institution of the suit. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied on a decision in Modern Hotel, Gudur, represented by M.N. Narayanan v. K. Radhakrishnaiah and others, AIR 1989 SC 1510 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows : "The second contention advanced before us is equally weighty. The lease being for a term of 30 years is to expire in September, 1999. As we have already said, the lease did not stipulate a forfeiture clause and in the absence of a forfeiture clause in the lease leading to terminating by forfeiture, the contractual tenancy was subsisting under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and there could not be any eviction from such a tenancy". In the case on hand also there is no forfeiture clause in Ex.A3 registered lease deed and the said lease is dated 25.03.1907 which is more than 117 years old document and 76 years old document prior to the institution of the suit. As stated supra, without issuing any notice during 76 years, the plaintiffs straight away filed the suit in the year 1983 that too after 76 years from the date of execution of Ex.A3 registered lease deed. As stated supra, without issuing any notice during 76 years, the plaintiffs straight away filed the suit in the year 1983 that too after 76 years from the date of execution of Ex.A3 registered lease deed. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law of Apex Court is squarely applicable to the present case. 29. The learned Counsel for the appellants also relied another decision in Satish Chand Makhan and others v. Govardhan Das Byas and others, (1984) 1 SCC 369 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows : "Where a person holds over under an unregistered lease and continues in possession by paying the monthly rent, the holding over must be held as a tenancy from month to month. Thus, the defendants were holding over under Section 116, T.P. Act as tenants from month to month and therefore, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to serve a notice under Section 106 of that Act. In absence of such a notice the plaintiff's suit for ejectment as framed was not maintainable". In the case on hand the lease deed is registered in the year 1907 and no notice was issued and the specific case of the defendants is that they are the permanent lessees and they are not the trustees. The contention of the appellants is that originally the suit schedule property was let out to their grandfather under a registered lease deed a way back in the year 1907 and after the death of their grandfather, their father was in possession of the schedule property as a lessee and after their father they are in possession of the schedule property as lessees. Furthermore, no notice was issued by the plaintiffs prior to the institution of the suit in the year 1983 to the defendants. No allegations are leveled against the defendants in the plaint itself. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the person, who executed a lease deed, is not competent to execute the lease deed and the same is invalid one. 30. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A1. Ex.A1 is the Constitution of the Church of South India Trust Association. It shows that guidelines are framed in the year 1988 during the pendency of the suit. It is relevant to say the suit is instituted in the year 1983. 30. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A1. Ex.A1 is the Constitution of the Church of South India Trust Association. It shows that guidelines are framed in the year 1988 during the pendency of the suit. It is relevant to say the suit is instituted in the year 1983. The learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs placed reliance in a decision of United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar and others, (1996) 6 SCC 660 and he contended that the suit is filed by the Government, therefore, the plaint can be signed and verified by any person on behalf of the Government and that the suit is maintainable. 31. Learned Counsel for the respondents also relied on a decision in Maroti v. Tulasiram, AIR 1994 OnLine SC 127, wherein the Apex Court held as follows : "The findings recorded by the High Court and the Trial Court were that the appellant had entered into the possession as a tenant and he is estopped to deny the title of the trust by operation of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, his only character is whether he was in possession as a tenant or in his own right as an owner. His contention that he purchased the property from Anandrao Bujade and thereafter he became the owner cannot be gone into in this appeal for the reason that he admitted in the cross-objections that he was a tenant. Ex.46 also denies him the right to set up his own independent title, even if at all the deed was validly executed, it does not bind the trust. Be it whether Anandrao Bujade's predecessor, namely, Kanhaiyalal was the Managing Trustee of the property or mismanaged the property, since this admission is sufficient for disposal of this appeal, we do not go into the controversy raised by the appellant. He then contended that in view of the provisions of the '--..P. & Berar (Letting of Houses and Rent Control) Order, 1949, the permission of the competent authority was not taken before filing the suit, under clause (13) of the C.P. & Berar (Letting of Houses & Rent Control) Order, 1949, and the suit is not maintainable. The contention was not raised in the High Court. Therefore, we decline to go into the question. The contention was not raised in the High Court. Therefore, we decline to go into the question. Even otherwise, we find no force in the contention for the reason that the appellant himself set up his own right, title and interest in the property. Necessarily, the civil suit has to be filed and the Civil Court alone can go into the controversy, in that view, the High Court has not committed any error of law warranting interference." In the case on hand, it is not the case of the appellants that they are the owners of the plaint schedule property. It is not in dispute by both parties that the lease amount is being paid by the appellants. Though PW2 stated in his evidence in cross-examination that the defendants are not paying lease amount to the plaintiffs prior to filing of the suit, but the same is evidenced under Ex.B1 to Ex.B23 and Ex.B24 that the defendants paid lease amount to the plaintiffs. It is also not in dispute that the defendants are paying land revenue to the Government upto the year 1983 which is also evidenced under Ex.B25 to Ex.B31 Land Revenue Receipts. The appellants also filed a memo alongwith copies of challans that they are depositing an amount of Rs.8,000/- per year before the Trial Court during the pendency of the appeal towards crop lease for every year. 32. As stated supra, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and Section 10 of the Limitation Act is not at all applicable to the present case on hand. As seen from the material on record no allegations are leveled against the appellants either in the plaint or in the evidence of PW1 except saying that lease amount is very low in the year 1907. In the plaint it was reiterated that the said lease is invalid and inoperative and that the plaintiffs seeking relief of cancellation of registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. As stated supra, the suit is filed in the year, 1983, prior to the institution of the suit, no notice is issued by the plaintiffs to the defendants from the date of Ex.A3 i.e., 25.03.1907 to till date of filing of the suit in the year 1983. As stated supra, the suit is filed in the year, 1983, prior to the institution of the suit, no notice is issued by the plaintiffs to the defendants from the date of Ex.A3 i.e., 25.03.1907 to till date of filing of the suit in the year 1983. The main relief claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit is that to cancel the registered lease deed said to have been executed in favour of grandfather of the defendants in the year 1907. As stated supra, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. As stated supra, there is no cancellation clause in Ex.A3 lease deed. The contention of both parties is that Ex.A3 lease deed is a permanent lease deed which is registered in the year 1907. In the case on hand, the appellants are not trustees. The appellants are the successors of the tenant under permanent tenancy of the year 1907 under the permanent registered lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled the relief of cancellation of permanent lease deed, dated 25.03.1907. 33. For the aforesaid reasons, the Trial Court is not justified in holding that the plaintiffs are entitled the relief of cancellation of lease deed. Accordingly, Point No.2 is answered against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants. 34. Point No.3 : Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief of recovery of possession of the suit schedule property? In view of my findings on Point Nos.1 and 2, the plaintiffs are not entitled for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property. 35. Point No.4 : Whether the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court needs any interference? In view of my findings on Point Nos.1 to 3, the Trial Court is not justified in decreeing the suit and therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge is liable to be set aside. 36. In the result, the appeal suit is allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment, dated 29.04.2000 in OS No.131 of 1983 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada. Each party do bear their own costs in the suit and also in the appeal. 37. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand closed.