ORDER : The Writ Petition is filed seeking the following relief: “… to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of 3rd respondent in alienating the open space in the Layout No.41/80 situated in Survey No.398/3 and 4 and 399/3 situated at Gunadala, Vijayawada in favour of father of the 4th respondent by executing the Exchange Deed dated 12.04.2001 bearing No.2096/2001 and also according permission vide Permit No.620/2011 for construction of the building in the said place as arbitrary, illegal, without jurisdiction and ultra virus to power … …” 2. a) Averments in the affidavit, in brief, are that 1st petitioner society is registered under the Societies Registration Act bearing registration No.77 of 2009 and society has been looking after the welfare of residents of Veterinary colony. Various layouts were developed in respect of lands situated in Gunadala area. While obtaining layout, part of the land was earmarked for open spaces, as lung space for the benefit of residents of the said locality. Recently petitioners noticed that in part of open space, construction of a building was started. Petitioners approached the person supervising the construction of building, however, petitioners could not get a proper response. Petitioners approached 3rd respondent, but they could not get proper response about the construction made in layout No.41 of 80. b) Petitioners approached the 2nd respondent and could not get the copy of layout. Hence, an application under RTI Act was made to 2nd respondent to supply the copy of L.P.No.41 of 80. Accordingly, L.P.No.41 of 80 of Gunadala Gram Panchayat along with letter dated 09.07.2012 was issued. Petitioners found that construction is being made in open space reserved in lay out and immediately approached 3rd respondent. The office of 3rd respondent informed that land was allotted to 4th respondent’s father as compensation in lieu of surrender of affected portion of land to 3rd respondent-Corporation for the purpose of road widening by way of exchange deed. Petitioners approached the office of Sub Registrar, Gunadala and could get the exchange deed dated 12.04.2001 bearing document No.2096 of 2001. Impugning the said action writ petition is filed. 3. On 02.01.2013, while ordering notice, the Court directed the parties to maintain status quo for a period of four weeks. Petitioners approached the office of Sub Registrar, Gunadala and could get the exchange deed dated 12.04.2001 bearing document No.2096 of 2001. Impugning the said action writ petition is filed. 3. On 02.01.2013, while ordering notice, the Court directed the parties to maintain status quo for a period of four weeks. Seems by virtue of order of status quo the 4th respondent did not proceed further with construction of the RCC building. 4. a) Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of 4th respondent. It was contended, interalia, that father of 4th respondent late Srimannarayana along with Dhulipalla Chittemma, Dhulipalla Ramamohan Rao, Dhulipalla Surya Prakasa Rao, Dhulipalla Srilakshmi and Dhulipalla Naga Prasad are joint owners and possessors of land admeasuring 3011 square yards in NTS No.8 (Part), Block No.1, Revenue Ward No.11, Vijayawada abutting Karl Marx Road, which was called Eluru Road. Out of said extent, 4th respondent family is having 335 square yards. The 3rd respondent-Corporation is in dire need of land to lay the connecting road between Eluru Road and Bundar Road, as per master plan, and requested to transfer the said land to the Corporation. Accordingly, the Corporation agreed to exchange certain unused and open space available in different layouts. So far as 4th respondent’s father is concerned, his father was allotted part of unused open land available in L.P.No.41 of 80 admeasuring 335 square yards in R.S.No.398/3, 398/4 and 399/3 of Gunadala village, Krishna District. The Municipal Corporation passed resolution No.124 dated 29.10.1997. After passing resolution, 3rd respondent-Corporation forwarded the same to 1st respondent for its approval, who, in turn, issued G.O.Ms.No.258 (M.A.) dated 11.05.1998. Later, the Corporation executed a registered exchange deed dated 12.04.2001 in favour of 4th respondent’s father and 5 other family members. Possession was handed over to 4th respondent’s father and he continued in possession and enjoyment till his death in the year 2007. Thereafter, 4th respondent succeeded to property. During the lifetime of 4th respondent’s father constructed compound wall and erected a gate in the year 2005 and none raised any objection. b) The 4th respondent applied for building permission to 3rd respondent and the same was granted on 12.08.2011 for construction of stilt + 3 floors. The 4th respondent dug bore well in May, 2011 and commenced construction in July, 2012 and completed slabs. At that juncture, this writ petition was filed and the Court granted the order of status quo. b) The 4th respondent applied for building permission to 3rd respondent and the same was granted on 12.08.2011 for construction of stilt + 3 floors. The 4th respondent dug bore well in May, 2011 and commenced construction in July, 2012 and completed slabs. At that juncture, this writ petition was filed and the Court granted the order of status quo. c) Petitioners have no locus standi to file the writ petition. Petitioners 2 and 3 have nothing to do with L.P.No.41 of 80. None of the residents in the locality made any complaint. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. Writ of Mandamus cannot be issued for cancellation of registered instrument. The exchange deed is a consequence of G.O.Ms.No.258 dated 11.05.1998 and eventually, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 5. Neither the Corporation nor the Government filed counter affidavits. 6. Heard Mrs. N.Sahitya Reddy, learned counsel representing Sri Ghanta Rama Rao, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri P.V.S.Rajesh, learned counsel representing Sri Y.V.Anil Kumar, learned counsel for 4th respondent, Sri Abhishek, learned counsel representing Sri M.Manohar Reddy, learned standing counsel for 3rd respondent and Sri K.Sudhakar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents 1 & 2. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners while reiterating the averments in the affidavit would further contend that exchange of open space land, reserved, in lay out is not only illegal and arbitrary but also violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. She would further contend that allotment of land affects the petitioners right to live in proper atmosphere. 8. Learned counsel appearing for 4th respondent would contend that writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of latches. He would contend that land belonging to the petitioner’s father was acquired for public purposes and in lieu of compensation, the land in question was exchanged. Learned counsel for 4th respondent alternatively sought direction to the 3rd respondent-Corporation to initiate proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. 9. Learned Government Pleader would contend that land reserved in a lay-out cannot be allotted or exchanged for any other purpose. He also would submit that no construction is allowed to be made in the reserved space except for the purpose for which it was reserved. 10. 9. Learned Government Pleader would contend that land reserved in a lay-out cannot be allotted or exchanged for any other purpose. He also would submit that no construction is allowed to be made in the reserved space except for the purpose for which it was reserved. 10. The points for consideration are: 1) Whether the Exchange Deed executed by the Commissioner of the Corporation in favour of father 4th respondent is legally permissible? If not, Whether this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can annul the document? 2) Whether any construction is permissible in the open space reserved in a lay out? 3) Whether the Court allows illegality to be perpetuated? 4) Whether the Commissioner of the 2nd respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and execution of deed of exchange is a result of colourable exercise of power vested with the authority? 11. Before proceedings further, as seen from the writ affidavit, counter affidavit and material papers filed along with writ petition, there is no dispute that layout was made in L.P.No.41 of 80 in R.S.No.398/3, 398/4 and 399/3 of Gunadala village, Krishna District. Open space in lay out admeasuring 335 square yards or 280.42 square meters was transferred to Dhulipalla Sitaramayya, S/o Pakeerayya, father of 4th respondent vide Deed of Exchange of property dated 12.04.2001. As seen from the document, the boundaries mentioned are as follows: NORTH – Remaining part of municipal site i.e. layout open space of L.P.No.41/80; EAST – Others property; SOUTH – Others property and WEST – Municipal Road. 12. The deed of exchange of properties was executed between the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, represented by its commissioner as First Party and father of 4th respondent and four others as Second Party. In the document it was mentioned that First Party is the owner and possessor of immovable property described in ‘A’ schedule. Item No.4 in ‘A’ Schedule is the property involved in this writ petition. The recitals in the document, which are relevant are extracted hereunder: “And whereas the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation, the First party has agreed for exchange of sites in its Resolution No.124, dt.29.10.1997 and whereas the Government of Andhra Pradesh in their orders G.O.Ms.No.258 (M.A) Municipal Administration and Urban Development (N.I) Department dated 11.05.1998 has approved the proposal for exchange of these properties”. Thus, as seen from the recitals of the above document, there is no dispute that the property exchanged is open space in the layout. 13. Case at hand, lay out was approved vide LP No.41 of 1980 in R.S.No.398/3, 398/4 and 399/3 of Gunadala, Krishna District. As seen from the copy of the lay-out Gunadala is Gram Panchayat at that point of time. 14. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 217(1) and (2) of the A.P. Gram Panchayat Act, 1964, the Government of A.P. made Rules relating to the regulation and restriction of building and the use of sites for building. The said Rules issued under G.O.Ms. No. 377, Panchayat Raj (Samithi-I) Department, dated 12.10.1973 are called the A.P. Gram Panchayat Building Rules, 1972. Rule-3 of the said Rules provides that the owner of any land shall before he utilizes, sells, leases or otherwise disposes of such land or any potion thereof as sites for construction of the buildings make a layout and form a street or road and also set apart in the layout at least five per cent of the total area of the land for a playground, a park, an educational institution or for any other public purpose as may be prescribed by the Gram Panchayat. In supersession of the above Rules, Government of Andhra Pradesh made the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Land Development (Layout and Building) Rules, 2002 vide G.O.Ms.No.67, Panchayat Raj and Rural Development (Parts-IV) dated 26.2.2002. 15. As per Rule 3 of the Rules 2002, every person or a corporate body or the Government or a private corporate body who intends to undertake or carry out layout or development work shall be required to apply in writing to the Executive authority of such intention in the form prescribed in Annexure-A appended to the Rules by accompanying the documents mentioned in Sub-rule (3). 16. As per Rule 4(c) of the Rules a minimum open space @10% of total site area shall be set apart in the proposed layout for playground/park/educational institution or for any other public purpose. Sub-Rule (7) of Rule 11 lays down that all the roads and open spaces such as parks and playgrounds earmarked in accordance with these Rules in a layout, which is approved by the Gram Panchayat shall automatically stand transferred free of cost and vest with the Gram Panchayat free from all encumbrances. Sub-Rule (7) of Rule 11 lays down that all the roads and open spaces such as parks and playgrounds earmarked in accordance with these Rules in a layout, which is approved by the Gram Panchayat shall automatically stand transferred free of cost and vest with the Gram Panchayat free from all encumbrances. After such vesting, the Gram Panchayat shall maintain all such open spaces for the purpose for which they have been earmarked. 17. Seems, later Gunadala village was merged with Vijayawada Municipal Corporation. That is how, the Commissioner of the Corporation entered into deed of exchange with the father of the 4th respondent. 18. It is settled principle of law that a part provided lung space. The place reserved in a lay out shall not be used for any other purpose except for park, play ground, etc., in fact, the local authority is a trustee of the land vested with it and the local authority shall preserve the land to achieve its object. By using the lung space, the local authority shall improve the environment which will create citizenry better living conditions. 19. In Sri Balaji Park Residents Welfare Association Vs. Vice-Chairman, Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority, Siripuram Junction, Visakhapatnam, the Division Bench of composite High Court observed as follows: 21. A park provides for some lung space. It is well settled that community need hospitals, sports and recreational activities. Parks and wetlands are meant for maintaining the ecological balance. The park and the community centre in question were handed over to the 2nd respondent and it being a local authority was duty bound to maintain the same properly. The Division Bench upheld the view of learned single Judge in: 25. In Kalasagaram, Secunderabad Cultural Assn. v. State of A.P., 1997 (6) ALD 277 , a learned single Judge of this Court held: It is settled that the land reserved for public purpose namely, playground/park in the sanctioned lay-out cannot be allowed to be used for any other purposes including for any other public purpose. In such view of the matter, such lands reserved for playground/park etc., cannot be alienated by the Municipal Corporation in exercise of its purported power under Section 148 of the Act. In such view of the matter, such lands reserved for playground/park etc., cannot be alienated by the Municipal Corporation in exercise of its purported power under Section 148 of the Act. The power under Section 148 to alienate movable or immovable property subject to the conditions mentioned therein is not available in respect of the lands, which are reserved for playgrounds, roads, parks etc., in the sanctioned layout. The land, which is reserved for such purpose cannot be said to be the land belonging to the Municipal Corporation and available for alienation within the meaning of Section 148 of the Act. No doubt, after the approval and sanction of lay-out such lands which are reserved for public purpose and on communal benefits shall stand vests in the Municipal Corporation but only for the utilisation by the Corporation for the purpose for which such land is reserved in the sanctioned layout. The land cannot be utilised for any of the purpose and at any rate it can never be alienated by way of lease, exchange of sale either by the Commissioner or by the Corporation as the case may be. In such view of the matter, the inescapable conclusion is that the respondent-Corporation could not have alienated the land in question in favour of the petitioner under the lease deed 17-7-1982. The decision is absolutely illegal, ultra vires and void. Hon’ble Apex Court in M.I.Builders Private Ltd., Vs Radhey Shyam Sahu AIR 1999 SC 2468 while considering doctrine of administrative inconvenience observed as follows: In fact, Hon’ble Apex court also considered doctrine of public trust. “Mahapalika is the trustee for the proper management of the park. When true nature of the park, as it existed, is destroyed it would be violative of the doctrine of public trust as expounded by this Court in Span Resort case [ (1997) 1 SCC 388 ]. Public Trust doctrine is part of Indian law. In that case the respondent who had constructed a motel located at the bank of river Beas interfered with the natural flow of the river. Public Trust doctrine is part of Indian law. In that case the respondent who had constructed a motel located at the bank of river Beas interfered with the natural flow of the river. This Court said that the issue presented in that case illustrated “the classic struggle between those members of the public who would preserve our rivers, forests, parks and open lands in their pristine purity and those charged with administrative responsibilities who, under the pressures of the changing needs of an increasingly complex society, find it necessary to encroach to some extent upon open lands heretofore considered inviolate to change”. In the treatise “Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law and Society” by Plater Abrams Goldfarb (American Casebook series-1992) under the Chapter on Fundamental Environmental Rights, in Section 1 (The Modern Rediscovery of the Public Trust Doctrine) it has been noticed that “long ago there developed in the law of the Roman Empire a legal theory known as the ‘Doctrine of the Public Trust’.” In America Public Trust doctrine was applied to public properties, such as shore-lands and parks. As to how doctrine works it was stated: “The scattered evidence, taken together, suggests that the idea of a public trusteeship rests upon three related principles. First, that certain interests-like the air and the sea-have such important to the citizenry as a whole that it would be unwise to make them the subject of private ownership. Second, that they partake so much of the bounty of nature, rather than of individual enterprise, that they should be made freely available to the entire citizenry without regard to economic status. And, finally, that it is a principle purpose of Government to promote the interests of the general public rather than to redistribute public goods from broad public uses to restricted private benefit….” With reference to a decision in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois [146 US 387 (1892)], it was stated that “the Court articulated in that case the principle that has become the central substantive thought in public trust litigation. When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, a Court will look with considerable scepticism upon any Governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate the resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties”. When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, a Court will look with considerable scepticism upon any Governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate the resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties”. This public trust doctrine in our country, it would appear, has grown from Article 21 of the Constitution”. It directed: 1. Block 1, 2 and 4 of the underground shopping complex shall be dismantled and demolished and on these places park shall be restored to its original shape. 2. In Block 3 partition walls and if necessary columns in the upper basement shall be removed and this upper basement shall be converted into parking lot. Flooring should be laid at the lower basement level built to be used as parking lot. Ramp shall be constructed adjacent to Block 3 to go to upper and lower basement levels for the purpose of parking of vehicles. Further to make block 3 functional as a separate unit walls shall be constructed between block 2 and block 3 and also block 3 and block 4. 3. Dismantling and demolishing of these structures in Blocks 1, 2 and 4 and putting Block 3 into operation for parking shall be done by the Mahapalika at its own cost. Necessary services like sanitation, electricity etc., in Block 3 shall be provided by the Mahapalika. 4. Mahapalika shall be responsible for maintaining the park and the Block 3 for parking purposes in proper and efficient manner. 5. M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, is divested of any right, title or interest in the structure built by it under or over the park. It shall have no claim whatsoever against Mahapalika or against any other person or authority”. In Virender Gaur v. State of Haryana, (1995) 2 SCC 577 the Hon’ble Apex Court considered importance of open spaces and preservation of hygienic conditions to the local people. That was a case where the Government of Haryana framed a Town Planning Scheme. One individual surrendered certain extent of land for the purpose of the scheme in favour of the Municipality, which was a condition for sanction to construct her building. Under the scheme the land vested in the Municipality was earmarked for open spaces. That was a case where the Government of Haryana framed a Town Planning Scheme. One individual surrendered certain extent of land for the purpose of the scheme in favour of the Municipality, which was a condition for sanction to construct her building. Under the scheme the land vested in the Municipality was earmarked for open spaces. But the said land was however granted on lease by the Government in favour of Punjab Samaj Sabha for construction of a Dharmasala. Considering the provisions of Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 and the right of the citizens to hygienic environment protection. When the land is earmarked for a public purpose, the Municipality is required to use the land for the protection or preservation of hygienic conditions of the local residents in particular and the people in general and not for any other purpose. It was observed: ……. there is a constitutional imperative on the State Government and the Municipalities, not only to ensure and safeguard proper environment but also an imperative duty to take adequate measures to promote, protect and improve both the man-made and the natural environment. In connection with non-usage of land, it was observed that: Yet the Municipality has to use the land for the purpose envisaged in the scheme read with those found in Section 61 unless unavoidable compelling purpose require change of user. Take a case where in the zonal plant certain land is marked out and reserved for park or recreational purpose. It cannot be acquired or allotted for building purpose though housing is a public purpose. It was also observed that open lands vested in the Municipality were meant for the public amenity to the residents of the locality to maintain ecology, sanitation, recreation, playground and ventilation purposes. In HGN Samity v. Chief Secretary, 2000 (1) CHN 28 , a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows: “How the State Government had allotted a portion of the park in deviation of its policy decision in the name of building of Community Hall is a matter of great surprise that there are several statutes governing the field is not in dispute. A lay-out plan has to be made under the provision of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority has issued handbook laying down the procedure and guidelines for environmental clearance. A lay-out plan has to be made under the provision of the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority has issued handbook laying down the procedure and guidelines for environmental clearance. Although the same is meant for certain purposes, viz., industrial projects, the same is a pointer to show that the State had been also eager to maintain the greenery and the ecological balance. Therefore, we fail to understand as to how the State could allot the lands in question within a park which is contrary to the representation made by it to the residents particularly in view of the fact that excess premiums had been charged for those who had opted for settlement of land near the park or green verges. It is also surprising as to how the Bidhan Nagar Municipality also sanctioned the building plan within a park. The said action, in our opinion, was not commensurate with the professed policy decision of the State and the Municipality. The aspect of the matter has recently been considered in M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu, reported in JT 1999 (5) SC 42, wherein it has been held that the Municipality is a Public Trustee in respect of parks”. 20. In Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. B.S. Muddappa and others, the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the issue relating to allotment of land earmarked for other purpose and held thus: “24. Protection of the environment, open spaces for recreation and fresh air, playgrounds for children, promenade for the residents, and other conveniences or amenities are matters of great public concern and of vital interest to be taken care of in a development scheme. It is that public interest which is sought to be promoted by the Act by establishing the BDA. The public interest in the reservation and preservation of open spaces for parks and playgrounds cannot be sacrificed by leasing or selling such sites to private persons for conversion to some other user. Any such act would be contrary to the legislative intent and inconsistent with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, it would be in direct conflict with the constitutional mandate to ensure that any State action is inspired by the basic values of individual freedom and dignity and addressed to the attainment of a quality of life which makes the guaranteed rights a reality for all the citizens. 25. Furthermore, it would be in direct conflict with the constitutional mandate to ensure that any State action is inspired by the basic values of individual freedom and dignity and addressed to the attainment of a quality of life which makes the guaranteed rights a reality for all the citizens. 25. Reservation of open spaces for parks and playgrounds is universally recognised as a legitimate exercise of statutory power rationally related to the protection of the residents of the locality from the ill-effects of urbanisation. 26. In Agins v. City of Tiburon [447 US 255 (1980)], the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a zoning ordinance which provided ‘… it is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant impacts, such as …. pollution, …. destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and the environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl’. Upholding the ordinance, the Court said: (US pp. 261-62) “… The State of California has determined that the development of local open-space plans will discourage the ‘premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban uses’…. The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes long have been recognized as legitimate …. … The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas.” 27. The statutes in force in India and abroad reserving open spaces for parks and playgrounds are the legislative attempt to eliminate the misery of disreputable housing condition caused by urbanisation. Crowded urban areas tend to spread disease, crime and immorality. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Samuel Berman v. Andrew Parker [99 L Ed 27:348 US 26]:(LEd pp. 37-38 : US pp. 32-33) “… They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn. 37-38 : US pp. 32-33) “… They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river. … The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive …. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values ….” (Per Douglas, J.). 28. Any reasonable legislative attempt bearing a rational relationship to a permissible State objective in economic and social planning will be respected by the courts. A duly approved scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Act is a legitimate attempt on the part of the government and the statutory authorities to ensure a quiet place free of dust and din where children can run about and the aged and the infirm can rest, breathe fresh air and enjoy the beauty of nature. These provisions are meant to guarantee a quiet and healthy atmosphere to suit family needs of persons of all stations. Any action which tends to defeat that object is invalid. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Bruce Boraas [39 L Ed 2d 797 : 416 US 1] : (L Ed p. 804 : US p. 9) “… The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.” 29. The residents of the locality are the persons intimately, vitally and adversely affected by any action of the BDA and the government which is destructive of the environment and which deprives them of facilities reserved for the enjoyment and protection of the health of the public at large. The residents of the locality are the persons intimately, vitally and adversely affected by any action of the BDA and the government which is destructive of the environment and which deprives them of facilities reserved for the enjoyment and protection of the health of the public at large. The residents of the locality, such as the writ petitioners, are naturally aggrieved by the impugned orders and they have, therefore, the necessary locus standi.” Justice R.M.Sahai, while considering the locus standi to maintain writ petition and construction of hospital in place reserved for public park observed as follows: “35. Locus standi to approach by way of writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects, may be, with same result. One relates to maintainability of the petition and other to exercise of discretion. Law on the former has marched much ahead. Many milestones have been covered. The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation. Even in private challenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. Law has veered round from genuine grievance against order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the executive and comparative decline in proper and effective administrative guidance is forcing citizens to espouse challenges with public interest flavour. It is too late in the day, therefore, to claim that petition filed by inhabitants of a locality whose park was converted into a nursing home had no cause to invoke equity jurisdiction of the High Court. In fact, public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing cause of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. Present day development of this branch of jurisprudence is towards freer movement both in the nature of litigation and approach of the courts. Residents of the locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busybodies or interlopers. Present day development of this branch of jurisprudence is towards freer movement both in the nature of litigation and approach of the courts. Residents of the locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busybodies or interlopers. [S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 : (1982) 2 SCR 365 : AIR 1982 SC 149 ; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 246 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 50 : AIR 1981 SC 298 ; Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568 : AIR 1981 SC 344 ] Even otherwise physical or personal or economic injury may give rise to civil or criminal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. It furnishes enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern outweigh such considerations. 36. Public park as a place reserved for beauty and recreation was developed in 19th and 20th century and is associated with growth of the concept of equality and recognition of importance of common man. Earlier it was a prerogative of the aristocracy and the affluent either as a result of royal grant or as a place reserved for private pleasure. Free and healthy air in beautiful surroundings was privilege of few. But now it is a, ‘gift from people to themselves’. Its importance has multiplied with emphasis on environment and pollution. In modern planning and development, it occupies an important place in social ecology. A private nursing home on the other hand is essentially a commercial venture, a profit oriented industry. Service may be its motto but earning is the objective. Its utility may not be undermined but a park is a necessity not a mere amenity. A private nursing home cannot be a substitute for a public park. No town planner would prepare a blueprint without reserving space for it. Service may be its motto but earning is the objective. Its utility may not be undermined but a park is a necessity not a mere amenity. A private nursing home cannot be a substitute for a public park. No town planner would prepare a blueprint without reserving space for it. Emphasis on open air and greenery has multiplied and the city or town planning or development Acts of different States require even private house owners to leave open space in front and back for lawn and fresh air. In 1984 the B.D. Act itself provided for reservation of not less than 15 per cent of the total area of the layout in a development scheme for public parks and playgrounds the sale and disposition of which is prohibited under Section 38-A of the Act. Absence of open space and public park, in present day when urbanisation is on increase, rural exodus is on large scale and congested areas are coming up rapidly, may give rise to health hazard. May be that it may be taken care of by a nursing home. But it is axiomatic that prevention is better than cure. What is lost by removal of a park cannot be gained by establishment of a nursing home. To say, therefore, that by conversion of a site reserved for low lying park into a private nursing home social welfare was being promoted was being oblivious of true character of the two and their utility. 46. Financial gain by a local authority at the cost of public welfare has never been considered as a legitimate purpose even if the objective is laudable. Sadly, the law was thrown to winds for a private purpose. ……….. Speedy or quick action in public institutions call for appreciation but our democratic system shuns exercise of individualised discretion in public matters requiring participatory decision by rules and regulations. No one howsoever high can arrogate to himself or assume without any authorisation express or implied in law a discretion to ignore the rules and deviate from rationality by adopting a strained or distorted interpretation as it renders the action ultra vires and bad in law. Where the law requires an authority to act or decide, ‘if it appears to it necessary’ or if he is ‘of opinion that a particular act should be done’ then it is implicit that it should be done objectively, fairly and reasonably. Where the law requires an authority to act or decide, ‘if it appears to it necessary’ or if he is ‘of opinion that a particular act should be done’ then it is implicit that it should be done objectively, fairly and reasonably. Decisions affecting public interest or the necessity of doing it in the light of guidance provided by the Act and rules may not require intimation to person affected yet the exercise of discretion is vitiated if the action is bereft of rationality, lacks objective and purposive approach. The action or decision must not only be reached reasonably and intelligibly but it must be related to the purpose for which power is exercised. …………. As stated earlier a private nursing home could neither be considered to be an amenity nor it could be considered improvement over necessity like a public park. The exercise of power, therefore, was contrary to the purpose for which it is conferred under the statute.” 21. In Pt. Chet Ram Vashist Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the issue relating to allotment of land earmarked for other purpose and held thus: “6. Reserving any site for any street, open space, park, school etc. in a layout plan is normally a public purpose as it is inherent in such reservation that it shall be used by the public in general. The effect of such reservation is that the owner ceases to be a legal owner of the land in dispute and he holds the land for the benefit of the society or the public in general. It may result in creating an obligation in nature of trust and may preclude the owner from transferring or selling his interest in it. It may be true as held by the High Court that the interest which is left in the owner is a residuary interest which may be nothing more than a right to hold this land in trust for the specific purpose specified by the coloniser in the sanctioned layout plan. But the question is, does it entitle the Corporation to claim that the land so specified should be transferred to the authority free of cost. That is not made out from any provision in the Act or on any principle of law. But the question is, does it entitle the Corporation to claim that the land so specified should be transferred to the authority free of cost. That is not made out from any provision in the Act or on any principle of law. The Corporation by virtue of the land specified as open space may get a right as a custodian of public interest to manage it in the interest of the society in general. But the right to manage as a local body is not the same thing as to claim transfer of the property to itself. The effect of transfer of the property is that the transferor ceases to be owner of it and the ownership stands transferred to the person in whose favour it is transferred. The resolution of the Committee to transfer land in the colony for park and school was an order for transfer without there being any sanction for the same in law.” 22. In Alamunagar Residents Welfare Association Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, the Madras High Court held thus: “60. The reservation under the sanctioned layout creates an obligation on the owner of the land and the Corporation in the nature of trustee to protect the interest of the public. So too, the purchasers of the plots in the sanctioned layout have the vested right for enjoying the common area fully. The Corporation and the owner have the legal necessity of respecting the expectation of the purchasers of the layout sanctioned plots that the earmarked portion continue to be available for public purpose; that neither the passage of time nor the whims and desires of the land owners affect the reservation of the land for public purpose.” 23. Thus, as seen from the precedents referred supra, open spaces in layout cannot be made use of for any other purpose. Way back in the year 1991, the Hon’ble Apex Corut set the ratio in Bangalore Medical Trust case. Notwithstanding the same, case at hand, the Commissioner of Corporation, addressed a letter dated 28.02.1998 to the 1st respondent, who in turn issued G.O.Ms.No.258 dated 11.05.1998, authorizing the Corporation to exchange the corporation land in various layouts. In fact, the power exercised by the Government as well as the Commissioner of Corporation suffers from colourable exercise. 24. Notwithstanding the same, case at hand, the Commissioner of Corporation, addressed a letter dated 28.02.1998 to the 1st respondent, who in turn issued G.O.Ms.No.258 dated 11.05.1998, authorizing the Corporation to exchange the corporation land in various layouts. In fact, the power exercised by the Government as well as the Commissioner of Corporation suffers from colourable exercise. 24. Learned Government Pleader would fairly submit that the Government ought not to have allowed the Corporation to enter into exchange deed, since the land is reserved land, for public purpose, in layout. He would also submit that the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.72 M.A. dated 20.02.2002 in that regard. Case at hand, though the deed of exchange was executed pursuant to the G.O.Ms.No.258 (M.A.) dated 11.05.1998, however, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bangalore Medical Trust (supra-1), and the Corporation being the Trustee has no jurisdiction to enter into such transaction, the document, impugned in the writ petition, is liable to be set aside. 25. It is also settled principle of law that no one would convey better title than what he has “nemo dat quad non habit”. The Corporation being the trustee of the property (open land in lay out), had no jurisdiction to exercise right of ownership. Thus, the very transaction i.e. deed of exchange, even pursuant to the G.O., will not provide better title in favour of predecessor in interest of 4th respondent. 26. If the case at hand is considered from the perspective that illegality shall not be perpetuated, even on that ground also, the document impugned is liable to be set aside. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must prevent perpetration of legal fraud and promote good faith and honesty [(A.P. State Financial Corporation Vs Gar Re Rolling Mills, (1994) 2 SCC 647 ]. 27. Thus, going by the facts and circumstances of this case, there are no disputed questions of fact, which require evidence to be let in thereby this court may relegate the parties to invoke common law jurisdiction. Normally while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this court will not annul document except in case of fraud or unilateral cancellation. However, as stated supra, the document impugned in the writ petition is result of colourable exercise of power and contrary to settled legal principle and the facts are undisputed. Normally while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this court will not annul document except in case of fraud or unilateral cancellation. However, as stated supra, the document impugned in the writ petition is result of colourable exercise of power and contrary to settled legal principle and the facts are undisputed. Petitioners are also got locus standi to challenge the action of the State and its Instrumentalities in view of the discussion supra. Thus, the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is maintainable. 28. The other important aspect in this case is that neither the State nor the Corporation filed counter affidavits. Even the resolutions said to have been passed were not placed before the Court. Non-filing of counters either by Corporation or State, the Court is drawing presumption that the averments made in the affidavit qua the Corporation or State are true and correct and the authorities misused the power vested with its office. 29. It is also an undisputed fact that the land belonged to father 4th respondent and others was acquired for public purpose. Instead of paying compensation, a deed of exchange was executed. Of course, the deeds executed in favour of other persons’ are not under challenge. In fact, the father of the 4th respondent, as seen from the document, paid differential amount. This Court is not venturing to record findings that father of 4th respondent entered deed of exchange knowingly the consequences. However, the fact remains that the land belonged to the father of 4th respondent was acquired for public purpose. Hence, the Municipal Corporation shall take steps in accordance with law and pay compensation and also refund the amount paid at the time of deed of exchange. 30. Though the learned counsel for petitioner would contend that the writ petition suffers from laches, this Court is not persuaded with said submission. When the 4th respondent started making construction, petitioners came to know about the exchange deed and immediately filed the writ petition. Averment in the counter affidavit that compound wall was constructed long back, cannot be construed as knowledge to non-suit the petitioners. 31. In view of order of status quo, the 4th respondent did not proceed further with construction of building. Averment in the counter affidavit that compound wall was constructed long back, cannot be construed as knowledge to non-suit the petitioners. 31. In view of order of status quo, the 4th respondent did not proceed further with construction of building. Since the building was not constructed, 3rd respondent shall take necessary steps to restore the park in the land admeasuring 335 Square yards in L.P.No.41/80, in R.S.No.398/3, 398/4 and 399/3 of Gunadala, Vijayawada, Krishna District, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 32. In view of the discussion supra, the Writ Petition is allowed. The action of 3rd respondent in alienating open space in L.P.No.41/80 in R.S.No.398/3,398/4 and 399/3 of Gunadala, Vijayawada, Krishna District by way of exchange deed No.2096 of 2001 is set aside. Since the exchange deed is set aside, the permission accorded vide permit No.620/2011 granted by 3rd respondent in favour of 4th respondent is also set aside. No costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.