ORDER : 1. The present appeals are ADMITTED. Learned advocates appear and waive service of notice of admission on behalf of the respective respondents. 2. At the outset, learned advocate Ms. Krupali N. Bhatt, appearing for the appellants has submitted that the issue is squarely covered by the order passed by this Court dated 11.07.2024 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 659 of 2024 and allied matters. 3. It appears that the present appeals were not listed along with the group of matters, which are decided by this Court vide order dated 11.07.2024. 4. In the order dated 11.07.2024, this Court has observed thus: “9. We have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and also perused the documents as pointed out by them. 10. Both the rival parties have filed the captioned Letters Patent Appeals assailing the order passed by the learned Single Judges. So far as the issue of conferring the regular pay-scale from the initial date of appointment to the writ petitioners is concerned, the same is no more res integra and we do are not inclined to tinker with such directions. 11. In these group of LPAs, learned Single Judges have issued directions to grant arrears w.e.f. 01.01.2020. It is noticed by us that the appointments of the petitioners-respondent employees have been made in the year of 2004-2005. The writ petitioners have placed reliance on the order dated 07.10.2002 passed in Special Civil Application No. 1579 of 2002 to substantiate their claim. An averment is made that the writ petitioners of that writ petition was appointed on fixed pay in 1994 on compassionate appointment, and after the observations are made by this Court in the judgment dated 07.10.2002, he is appointed on regular pay-scale. On a perusal of the order dated 07.10.2002, we do not find any such directions issued by the High Court. However, it appears that the said petitioner is thereafter conferred the regular payscale. In fact, the policy of appointing the dependent of the deceased employee on compassionate appointment on fixed pay is introduced by the State Government vide Government Resolution dated 15.06.2004. All the writ petitioners, thus were appointed on fixed pay in the year 2004-2005 on fixed pay, and have filed the writ petitions claiming regular payscale after a long delay in the years 2019-2023. 12. All the writ petitioners, thus were appointed on fixed pay in the year 2004-2005 on fixed pay, and have filed the writ petitions claiming regular payscale after a long delay in the years 2019-2023. 12. The issue with regard to conferring the arrears either from 01.01.2020 or for 3 years from the date of filing of the writ petition, as declared by the Apex Court in the in the cases of Shiv Dass (supra) and Tarsemsingh (supra), was neither raised nor examined by the Coordinate Benches. The Division Bench in the order dated 03.10.2023 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 287 of 2023 has conferred the consequential benefits to the original petitioner - employees from the date of appointment, after directing the respondents to give them regular appointment in the regular pay-scale from the initial date of appointment. However, it is pertinent to note that subsequently, the Division Bench in the order dated 16.10.2023 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1293 of 2023 has upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge granting arrears from 01.01.2020. SLP (Civil) (Diary No).1024 of 2023 against judgment and order dated 05.09.2022 in LPA No. 1050 of 2022 in SCA No. 14642 of 2019 has been withdrawn by the District Development Officer on 24.05.2023, and SLP (Civil) Diary No. 30685 of 2023 against the judgment and order dated 19.04.2023 in LPA No. 464 of 2023 in SCA No. 10916 of 2020 has been dismissed in limine. 13. When a specific query was raised to the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties regarding fixation of the date 01.01.2020 for restricting the date of arrears; it is pointed out that for the first time in the judgment and order dated 18.04.2022 passed in group of writ petitions being Special Civil Application No. 14642 of 2019 and allied matters, the learned Single Judge has restricted arrears from 01.01.2020 since the writ petitions were filed in the year 2019, and no convincing explanation is tendered. It appears that thereafter, a view has been taken by learned Single Judges restricting the arrears from 01.01.2020. We did not also find any reasons assigned by the learned Single Judges for fixing the date of 01.01.2020 for grant of arrears. Fixing a particular cut-off date for grant of arrears or consequential benefits has to be on some rationale, which should be reflected in the orders conferring such benefits. 14. We did not also find any reasons assigned by the learned Single Judges for fixing the date of 01.01.2020 for grant of arrears. Fixing a particular cut-off date for grant of arrears or consequential benefits has to be on some rationale, which should be reflected in the orders conferring such benefits. 14. The employees before us have contended that they are entitled to arrears from their initial date of appointment and not from 01.01.2020, whereas the State has prayed for restricting it for three years. 15. In our considered opinion, the date 01.01.2020 cannot be made applicable in all the cases uniformly in wake of the fact that the date of appointment of each of the employees and date of filing of the writ petitions is also different. 16. We have heard on this issue. Before we may pass final orders, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Dass (supra). While dealing with the issue of delay and latches caused in filing the writ petitions challenging termination orders, the Apex Court has held thus: “10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.” 17. Thereafter, in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), where the issue pertains to the claim of pension, the Apex Court has held thus: “5. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc. affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 18. The aforementioned both the judgments are considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, JT 2022 (5) SC 470. It is held thus: “12. In Tarsem Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching the courts affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this Court set aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with interest. The Court restricted “the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser.” Further, the grant of interest on arrears was also denied. 13. The Court restricted “the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser.” Further, the grant of interest on arrears was also denied. 13. The aforesaid ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) has been followed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538 and Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (2016) 13 SCC 797 . 14. In the facts of the present case, it is accepted that the respondent-Corporation had accepted the interpretation rendered by the High Court of Gujarat to the Scheme whereby the appellants, on financial upgradation, would be entitled to the higher grade payscale of the next promotional post, which is Rs.5,000-8,000/- in the present case. As noted above, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench accepts the said position and grants the appellants the said pay-scale but restricts the benefit from the date of the judgment of the Single Judge in the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants, that is, with effect from 31st July 2018. The Division Bench should not have taken the date of the decision/judgment of the Single Judge for grant of the said benefit in view of the decision and ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) which has been followed in several other decisions. That apart, the date of the decision of the Single Judge is a fortuitous circumstance. Only the date of filing of the writ petition is relevant while examining the question of delay and laches or limitation. The appellants would, in consonance with the case law referred to above, be entitled to the arrears for three years before the date of filing of the Writ Petition.” 19. The Apex Court has held that the claim which is related to service benefits, one of the exceptions to the said rule of delay and latches relating to a continuing wrong. It is held that where a service-related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is exception to the exception. It is held that where a service-related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is exception to the exception. Ultimately, it is held that the High Courts will restrict consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. The Supreme court in case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak (supra) has held that the High Court should not have taken the date of decision/judgment of the learned Single Judge for grant of benefits in view of the decision and ration in Tarsem Singh (supra), and further it is clarified that “only the date of filing of the writ petition is relevant while examining the question of delay and latches or limitation, and the arrears are to be confined for three years before the date of filing of the writ petition.” 20. Hence, the date of filing of the respective writ petitions becomes very relevant while restricting the arrears for three years. In the present group of appeals, the writ petitions have been filed after considerable delay and hence, the grant of actual arrears to such writ petitioners is governed as per the law enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforementioned decisions. The arrears are required to be restricted to the period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of each of the respective petitions. The reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Lekh Ram (supra) will not apply to the present facts, since the issue with regard to delay in filing the writ petitions by the employee was neither raised nor examined. 21. This directions will only be confined to those employees, who have belatedly filed writ petitioners beyond three years questioning the action of the State authorities in conferring the regular payscale belatedly, and not from their initial date of appointment. 22. Hence, the directions issued by the learned Single Judges in the respective writ petitions is altered and all the employees shall be entitled to the actual arrears from a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the respective writ petitions. 22. Hence, the directions issued by the learned Single Judges in the respective writ petitions is altered and all the employees shall be entitled to the actual arrears from a period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of the respective writ petitions. It is clarified that since we have not disturbed the decision with regard to the conferment of the regular pay-scale from the initial date of appointment, the pay fixation and other benefits to all the employees shall counted notionally for the intervening period. 23. With these observations, the present appeals are disposed of. As a sequel, the connected applications are also stand disposed of. Registry shall place a copy of this order in each of the connected matters.” 5. In view of the aforesaid observations made in the order dated 11.07.2024 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 659 of 2024 and allied matters, the present appeals stand disposed of accordingly. 6. As a sequel, connected applications also stand disposed of accordingly.