JUDGMENT : Nisha M. Thakore, J. 1. The present appeal along with condonation of delay caused in filing First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is filed by the appellants – original plaintiffs challenging the order dated 29.04.2017 passed by the 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad (Rural) below Exh.14 in Special Civil Suit No.320 of 2014. By the said order, the learned Civil Judge has allowed the aforesaid application preferred by the original defendant nos. 6 to 11 under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, the suit filed by the appellant herein – original petitioner has not been entertained. 2. In nutshell the case of the original plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint is reproduced hereinunder: 2.1. The dispute relates to plot no.61 admeasuring 9156 sq mtrs in TP Scheme No.212 (Ambali) which was carved out from the original revenue survey no.24/1, block no.56 admeasuring 13254 sq mtrs of village Ambali, Tal: Dascroi, Dist. Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as the “suit land”). The suit land originally was of the ownership of respondent nos. 1 to 5 herein – original defendant nos. 1 to 5. The registered agreement to sell dated 3.5.1989 was entered with the original plaintiffs and the effect was given in the revenue record vide mutation entry no.8876.Thereafter, the registered sale deed had also been executed in favour of the original plaintiff on 9.6.1994. It is the case of the plaintiff that possession of the suit land was handed on the date of agreement to sell. Initially, mutation entry was entered in the revenue record giving effect of the registered sale deed which was cancelled in absence of relevant dates, however, the sale deed had remained in force as was never declared cancelled. 2.2. Taking benefit of the aforesaid fact, defendant nos.1 to 5 had threatened to dispossess the original plaintiff whereby, cause of action arose for the original plaintiffs to approach the Court of learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad (Rural) which was registered as Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996. The original plaintiffs were parties to the aforesaid proceedings who had sought for declaration of their ownership right and for permanent injunction against the present defendant nos. 1 to 5 – original owners. The original plaintiffs were parties to the aforesaid proceedings who had sought for declaration of their ownership right and for permanent injunction against the present defendant nos. 1 to 5 – original owners. It is the case of the original plaintiffs that the learned Civil Judge had granted injunction vide order dated 2.9.1997 against the present respondent nos. 1 to 5, thereby, directing to maintain status quo till the final disposal of the suit. The aforesaid order of status quo was submitted before the revenue authority, whereby, mutation entry no.2874 dated 6.2.2003 was mutated in the form no.6 in respect of the suit land. 2.3 In Spite of the fact that defendant nos. 1 to 5 were directed to maintain status quo in respect of the suit land which was notified on record, in view of the mutation entry no.2874 dated 6.2.2003 entered in the revenue record, they proceeded to execute the registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 in favour of the defendant nos. 6 to 10. It is thereafter defendant nos.1 to 5 preferred Regular Civil Suit No.926 of 2003 against the present plaintiffs in the month of December 2003 challenging the registered sale deed dated 09.06.1994 as illegal and void-ab-initio on the ground that the sale deed was entered upon by a forged power of attorney of the original owners. It was also contended that such sale deed was executed in violation of the provision of Section 43 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the “Tenancy Act”). It was also contended that no consideration amount was in fact paid by the said purchaser and in fact they continued to be in actual occupation and possession of the suit land. The reliance was placed on the order dismissing the Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 which was dismissed for default. In the aforesaid suit, the present plaintiffs have submitted application under Order VII Rule 11 on the ground of limitation. It was contended that registered sale deed was of the year 1994 whereas, the suit was filed in the month of December 2003 and was therefore, clearly barred by provision of the Limitation Act. The reliance was placed on the summons and notice issued by the concerned Court seeking restoration of the Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 and being subsequently restored, whereby, the original order of grant of injunction stood restored. The reliance was placed on the summons and notice issued by the concerned Court seeking restoration of the Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 and being subsequently restored, whereby, the original order of grant of injunction stood restored. During the course of hearing of the aforesaid application under Order VII Rule 11, it was pointed out that original owners have not approached with clean hands as material facts were suppressed with regard to the fact that they cease to be owner of the suit land. It was pointed out that prior to the filing of the suit, the original owners through their power of attorney Vijaysinh Hathesinh had entered into a registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 which was in clear violation of the status quo order passed in the first suit filed by the plaintiffs. 2.4 The learned 6th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad (Rural) by order dated 10.11.2009 allowed the application preferred by the defendants- appellants herein under Order VII Rule 7 (d) and dismissed the suit filed by the original owners on the ground of limitation. It is the case of the present plaintiffs that the aforesaid order has attained the finality as it has not been challenged till date. 2.5 Having noticed the existence of the registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 in favour of defendant nos. 6 to 10, the plaintiffs have approached the Court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) to declare the said sale deed to be invalid. The said suit was numbered as Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004. In the aforesaid suit also, the subsequent purchasers i.e. defendant nos. 6 to 10 had preferred application under Order VII Rule 11, which also came to be allowed by holding that the sale deed dated 09.06.1994 in favour of the present appellants – original plaintiffs is barred by provisions of Section 43 as well as Section 63 of the Tenancy Act. It is the case of the original plaintiffs that the suit filed by them, which is Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 though at one point of time stood dismissed for default by order dated 21.10.2003, was subsequently restored by order dated 27.11.2007. However, during the interregnum the entry bearing no.3018 got certified regarding the registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 in force in favour of the defendant nos. 6 to 10. However, during the interregnum the entry bearing no.3018 got certified regarding the registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 in force in favour of the defendant nos. 6 to 10. The aforesaid entry was challenged before the revenue authority and ultimately the Secretary, Revenue Department reinserted their entry in the revenue record. 2.6 Taking disadvantage of mere reflection of their sale deed being effective by virtue of status of the revenue record, the defendant nos. 6 to 10 entered into the second transaction by executing the registered sale deed dated 3.11.2013 in favour of defendant nos. 11 by making false claim of final plot in the draft scheme being transferred in favour of defendant no.11. It is contended that the plaintiffs became aware about such a transaction on 5.4.2014 when they could collect the copy of the same. The plaintiffs therefore, approached the Court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad (Rural) by filing suit seeking declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the aforesaid suit land. The said Civil Suit i.e. the present suit was presented before the concerned Court on 19.05.2014 which was registered as Special Civil Suit No. 320 of 2014. 2.7 In the aforesaid suit, the original plaintiffs have prayed for declaration that their sale deed was prior in point of time by virtue of which, they had become owner and occupier of the suit land and no right, title or interest survived in favour of the defendants no. 1 to 5. Thus, defendants no. 1 to 5 have no authority to enter into subsequent sale transactions. The plaintiffs have also sought for cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 executed by the power of attorney holder (defendant no.6) of the original owners (defendant nos. 1 to 5) by treating it as false, illegal, voidable and void ab-initio document. It was prayed to declare that the defendants in collusion with each other had created false documents though no right, title or interest survived and had therefore, committed fraud. The plaintiffs have also prayed for declaration i.e. cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 3.11.2012 which was registered with the office of the Sub Registrar on 09.11.2012 by the first purchaser (defendant nos. 6 to 10) in favour of second purchaser (defendant no.11) by holding that such document has false, illegal, voidable and void ab-initio. The prayer was also sought to declare that since the defendant nos. 6 to 10) in favour of second purchaser (defendant no.11) by holding that such document has false, illegal, voidable and void ab-initio. The prayer was also sought to declare that since the defendant nos. 6 to 10 had no right, title or interest derived in the suit land, defendant no. 11 being not a bonafide purchaser had not derived any right, title or interest in the suit land. The plaintiffs have also prayed for permanent injunction in respect of suit land against the defendant. The said suit was preferred on 19.05.2014. 2.8 The Court noticing the aforesaid averments made in the plaint had issued summons upon the original defendant nos. 1 to 11. The original owners, though served with the summons, choose not to file any written statement. The defendant nos. 6 to 11 have jointly filed written statement mainly raising the dispute that the relief sought for in respect of sale deed dated 29.09.2003 executed in favour of first purchaser (defendant nos. 6 o 10) were subject matter of challenge in Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 filed by the same plaintiff on 09.02.2004 against the present defendant nos. 1 to 9 which was dismissed by order dated 21.10.2008, pursuant to the order passed below Exh.42 entertaining the application under Order VII Rule 11. It was specifically contended that the sale deed of the plaintiffs dated 9.6.1994 was noticed to be illegal as observed by the learned Civil Judge. Ultimately, the suit was not entertained by dismissing under Order VII Rule 11, against which, non appeal has been filed. It was contended by the original defendant nos. 6 to 11 that the present suit was preferred after a lapse of 20 years and therefore, the suit was barred by law of limitation as declaration is sought for in respect of registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003. In light of the aforesaid fact, it was pointed out that in view of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, no relief in fact can be sought for in respect of sale deed executed in favour of the original defendant no.11. It was further contended that the decision rendered in Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 has not reached finality as Regular Civil Appeal No.42 of 2009 was pending. 2.9. Apart from the aforesaid contention raised in the written statement, the aforesaid defendant nos. It was further contended that the decision rendered in Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 has not reached finality as Regular Civil Appeal No.42 of 2009 was pending. 2.9. Apart from the aforesaid contention raised in the written statement, the aforesaid defendant nos. 6 to 11 had also moved application at Exh.14 under Order VII Rule 11 inter alia seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation inasmuch as the challenge was made to the sale deed dated 29.09.2003 executed in favour of the defendant nos. 6 to 10, whereby, the earlier suit filed by the plaintiffs being Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 was not entertained by order dated 21.10.2008. Similar contentions were raised as pointed out in the written statement filed by them. The appellants – original plaintiffs had responded to the aforesaid application by filing an objection. It was submitted that the plaintiff's claim is based on the registered sale deed dated 09.06.1994 whereas the cause of action has arisen to bring such suit in view of the subsequent execution of the sale deed dated 29.09.2003 in favour of the original defendant no.11. It was further submitted that the Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 seeking permanent injunction was filed by the plaintiffs, wherein, the status quo in respect of suit property was directed against the owner (defendant nos. 1 to 5). Thus, they were prohibited from alienating the suit land in any manner and in spite of such direction, registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 came to be executed in favour of defendant nos. 6 to 10 which was in violation of injunction order in operation and therefore, such transaction was to be treated as invalid and void. It was submitted that mere rejection of their suit being Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 which was otherwise dismissed on the technical ground of Order VII Rule 11, does not affect title of the original plaintiffs in respect of the suit land. 2.10 The learned Civil Judge upon hearing the respective parties, by impugned order dated 29.04.2017 allowed the application preferred by the original defendant nos. 6 to 11 at Exh.14 holding that the suit was barred by limitation. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid impugned order, leading to consequential rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit, the appellants herein – original plaintiffs have approached this Court by filing present appeal. 3. 6 to 11 at Exh.14 holding that the suit was barred by limitation. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid impugned order, leading to consequential rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit, the appellants herein – original plaintiffs have approached this Court by filing present appeal. 3. The present appeal was filed after a delay of 232 days on 21.03.2018. The present appeal was registered as First Appeal (Stamp) No.11156 of 2018 along with Civil Application for condonation of delay being Civil Application No. 1 of 2018. It is noticed from the record that by order dated 10.04.2018 this Court had directed the appellants to remove the office objections on or before 15.05.2018, failing which, the appeal was directed to be dismissed for non prosecution. One of the office objections was non furnishing of the certified copy of the impugned order dated 29.04.2017. However, the clerk of the advocate had failed to supply the same on record resulting in dismissal for default of the First Appeal as well as Civil Application for condonation of delay in view of the order dated 10.04.2018. The appellants had, therefore, moved application seeking restoration of the aforesaid captioned appeal as well as delay application. Noticing the averments made in the restoration, this Court by order dated 14.06.2019 had issued the Rule upon the respondents which was made returnable on 19.07.2019. In the interregnum period, the Bailiff report suggested that respondent no.1 had expired 7 months back and respondent no.2 had expired 14 years back. Noticing the fact that the appeal and the delay condonation application stood dismissed for default on the ground of non removal of office objection, this Court by order dated 29.04.2022 had condoned the delay which had occurred in filing restoration application and had further directed restoration of the captioned First Appeal along with delay condonation application. Thus, the captioned First Appeal and the delay condonation application filed in the main First Appeal stood revived by order dated 29.04.2022 passed by this Court. Noticing the fact of demise of respondent no.1 who had expired on 4.11.2019, the appellants were constrained to move application for bringing heirs and legal representatives of the said deceased respondent along with application seeking condonation of delay of 232 days caused in bringing the heirs of the said respondent on 19.03.2018, which came to be numbered as Civil Application 1 of 2019 (for bringing heirs). In the said application, this Court by order dated 03.03.2023 had issued notice upon the proposed heirs of the said respondent. The matter was thereafter notified on various occasions before this Court, however hearing could not be progressed in absence of presence of respondents. This Court, noticing the fact that appeal of 2018 was pending for admission hearing, had called upon the learned counsels who addressed on merits of the case. Learned advocates for the respective parties have jointly urged before us to hear the matter finally. Considering their request and the issue involved, the First Appeal along with Civil Applications were taken up for final hearing at the admission stage. 4. Mr. Varun Bharda, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of Mr. Sharvil Majmudar, learned advocate for the appellants, Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Ms. Aditi Raol, learned advocate for the respondent nos. 6 to 9 and Mr. Anshin Desai, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Mr. Venu Nanavaty, learned advocate for respondent no.11. Learned advocates for the respective parties were heard at length. At the end of the argument, learned counsels were permitted to tender written submission along with judgments relied upon. The matter was notified for the purpose of submission of written submissions on 4.7.2024, whereby, the learned advocate for the appellants has tendered written submission along with a copy of the judgments. At the same time, joint written submissions have been placed on record by the respondent no.11 and respondent nos. 6 to 9.The matter was thereafter kept for orders. 5. Mr. Varun Bharda, learned advocate for the appellants has made following submissions: 5.1. The present Appellant/Plaintiffs though being owners of a land which was of Restricted Tenure, had become owners by way of a Registered Sale-Deed executed in their favour by the Respondents/Defendants No. 1 to 5 and therefore, the said Sale-Deed which has not been cancelled by any Competent Civil Court, has stood the test of time and legality till today and therefore, still holds the force of law. He relied upon Para 19 & 20 of the judgment passed of this Court in Geetaben Ishwarbhai & Ors vs State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 1542, wherein it is held that "even in case of void transactions, the law of limitation would apply and unless and until they are declared as void within a reasonable period of time they cannot be termed as void and the petitioner cannot claim benefit thereof on the ground of the transaction being void". 5.2. While referring to the pleadings, he pointed out the averment made by the plaintiffs about having pickpocketing the entire consideration amount, the present Respondent / defendant Nos. 1 to 5 had threatened the appellants/plaintiffs to vacate the said piece of land and therefore, in order to thwart the respondent / defendant nos. 1 to 5, the present appellants/plaintiffs had approach civil court by filing a Regular Civil Suit No. 711 of 1996 for Declaration & Permanent Injunction. Much emphasis was about the fact that the Id. Trial Court had granted "Status - Quo till the Final Disposal of the Suit" on 02/09/1997. It was submitted that the said injunction was reported to the revenue authority whereby mutation entry was entered in Revenue Records viz. entry no.2874 dated 6.2.2003. 5.3. It is the specific case of the Appellant/Plaintiffs that there was a wanton misconduct on the part the present Respondent/Defendants being that while the Injunction being in the nature of status-quo was in force, a sale deed came to be executed by Resp/Def No. 1 to 5 in favor of Respondents / Defendants No. 6 to 10 on 29/9/2003. It was therefore submitted that the sale deed was executed in violation of order of status quo and would be "Non-est" or "Void-ab-initio" from its very provenance of existence. Ld. advocate relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Surjit Singh & Ors. vs. Harbans Singh & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 50 . It was further submitted that as per the judgment of the division bench of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Keshrimal Jivji Shah and Anr. Vs Bank of Maharashtra & Ors., 2004 SCC OnLine Bom 368, it has been unequivocally stated that a transfer of immovable property in violation of an order of injunction or prohibition issued by the court of law confers no right, title or interest. Vs Bank of Maharashtra & Ors., 2004 SCC OnLine Bom 368, it has been unequivocally stated that a transfer of immovable property in violation of an order of injunction or prohibition issued by the court of law confers no right, title or interest. Therefore, taking into consideration the present set of facts and circumstances, it becomes inexorably crystal clear that the Sale-Deed executed by Respondent/Defendants No. 1 to 5 in favour of Respondent/Defendants No. 6 to dated 29/09/2003 was not a transfer at all as it was in breach of an order of Injunction granted by the Ld. Trial Court dated 02.09.1997 of which the transferors being Respondents / Defendant nos. 6 to 10 cannot reap any advantage or benefit. Ld. advocate also relied upon Para (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (ix) of the judgment of R.M.G Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd vs. USG Construction Private Ltd. & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 12032. 5.4. Learned advocate pointed out that Civil Suit No. 711 of 1996 came to be dismissed for default on 21.10.2003, however, thereafter, the Appellants/Plaintiffs had filed a Restoration Application dated 04.02.2004. The said restoration application was allowed and civil suit No.711 of 1996 as well as injunction were restored by order dated 27.11.2007. 5.5. Learned advocate had further argued that the civil suit no. 711 of 1996 which was initially though quashed and set aside by the judgment/order and decree passed in regular civil appeal no. 42/2009, by the Learned Appellate Court, in favor of the Respondent/Defendants Nos. 1 to 3, was in nullity for the fact that it was passed in favor of a dead person. The respondents/defendants had suppressed the said material fact that one namely Baldevji Kanaji Thakore (present respondent /defendant No. 2) had already turned deceased on 15.01.2005 that-being right before instituting the said Appeal and therefore, under such circumstances the Appeal could not have been filed on behalf of a Dead Person which would go to the very root of the order being in nullity. The Learned advocate had relied upon a decision of Karnataka High Court more particularly, Para 12 & 18 in the case of Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, Bangalore & Ors. Vs. S. Ranganayaki Setlur and Anr. reported in 1993 SCC OnLine Kar 78. The reliance was also placed on Pg. The Learned advocate had relied upon a decision of Karnataka High Court more particularly, Para 12 & 18 in the case of Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, Bangalore & Ors. Vs. S. Ranganayaki Setlur and Anr. reported in 1993 SCC OnLine Kar 78. The reliance was also placed on Pg. 143 of the order passed by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amar Kaur & Ors. vs. Sadhu Singh & Ors. 1960 SCC OnLine Punj 139 holding that a person who is dead had no existence, either in fact or in law and he is incapable of instituting a suit or an appeal or performing any act and for the same no attorney or counsel of his would be competent to file an appeal or institute a suit, as no-one can act for, or on behalf of a person who is dead and has his existence. 5.6. Learned advocate had emphasized on the fact that original owners present respondent no. 1 to 5 after a long delay of 9 years choose to file suit for cancellation of their sale deed by preferring civil suit no. 926 of 2003. In the aforesaid suit, the present appellants- defendants their has preferred an application under Order 7 Rule 11 seeking rejection of plaint, whereby the Civil Suit No.926 of 2023 came to be rejected on 10.11.2009 and therefore, it was submitted that their sale-deed dated 09.06.1994 not being cancelled by any competent civil court, has stood the test of time and therefore its legality remained unchallenged, still holds the force of law as it is Registered Instrument. 5.7. It was pointed out that in the Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 was filed by the appellants seeking cancellation of sale deed dated 29.09.2003 executed on behalf of the original owners through power of attorney in favour of present respondents / defendants no. 6 to 10 as well as for seeking permanent injunction to restrain from transferring the suit lands to any third party and to restrain them from infringing their peaceful possession. It was further pointed out that an application under order 7 rule 11 came to be filed by the respondents / defendants no. 6 to 10 on 24.01.2008 which was allowed by order dated 21.10.2008 whereby the suit instituted by the present Appellants/Plaintiffs came to be rejected. 5.8. It was further pointed out that an application under order 7 rule 11 came to be filed by the respondents / defendants no. 6 to 10 on 24.01.2008 which was allowed by order dated 21.10.2008 whereby the suit instituted by the present Appellants/Plaintiffs came to be rejected. 5.8. Learned advocate had referred to para-8 of the plaint of the present suit to point out that the present Appellants/Plaintiffs have specifically averred that the Sale-Deed in favor of the present Appellants/Plaintiffs have never been cancelled by any competent Civil Court and appellants are the first bona-fide purchasers and once the land sold to them the original vendors Respondents/Defendants No 1 to 5 were devoid of any right-entitlement to further sell the land as they were no longer the owners of the said piece of land. The (original vendors) being Respondents / defendants no 1 to 5 had divested themselves from the ownership of the said property and therefore they retained no control or right over the said property. Reliance was placed on Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which unequivocally states that a ‘Sale’ is over once a document is executed and registered. (Madras HC Full Bench judgment Life Estate Line India Ltd. vs. Hadeeja Ammal & Ors. 2011 SCC OnLine 215 Para 48). It was submitted that the vendor cannot cancel unilaterally a registered instrument. That would amount to encouraging fraud and would be against public policy. It ought to be cancelled by a competent Civil Court only (Madras HC Full Bench judgment Para 58). Also, a third party can claim title of property against the purchaser (in the present case appellants) the present appellants/plaintiffs purchased the property for valuable consideration and were put into possession of the suit land. The present Appellants/Plaintiffs also relied upon Para 55 & 57 of the said judgment. 5.9. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon Para 5 & 6 of the Division Bench Judgement of this Court in Navuji Lalji Vaghela vs. State of Gujarat Through. 2011 (4) GLR 3636 and referred to the principle “Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” (no man can take advantage of his own wrong). 5.10. 5.9. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon Para 5 & 6 of the Division Bench Judgement of this Court in Navuji Lalji Vaghela vs. State of Gujarat Through. 2011 (4) GLR 3636 and referred to the principle “Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria” (no man can take advantage of his own wrong). 5.10. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that one of the kernel grounds for rejecting the plaint of the Appellant’s/Plaintiff’s was on the plea of Res-Judicata which as such cannot be considered while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC for the reason being that since an adjudication of the plea of res-judicata requires consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the previous suit, such a plea will be beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11 where only averments in the plaint will have to be perused. Reliance was placed in the case of Shrihari Hanumandas Totala vs. Hemant Vithal Kamat reported in (2021) 9 SCC 99 Para 20 & 21 which unequivocally states that plea of Res-Judicata is beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon decision in the case of Geetha vs. Nanjudaswamy reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1407 {para 12 sub-para (10 & 12)} to contend that the learned Trial Court has given a lot of vent on the point that the appellants/plaintiffs had preferred a Special Civil Suit No.47/2004 for cancellation of sale deed dated 29/09/2023 and as it came to be rejected and as no appeal was filed over the said proceeding, the order had attained finality and having acquired knowledge of the same, present suit of the year 2014 was barred by limitation. It was submitted that the learned trial court has failed to acknowledge other reliefs which have been asked by the appellants in the present suit and also the issue of breach of injunction and also the fact that the original vendors after divesting their rights in our favor were functus-officio from executing any sale deed in favour of respondents/defendants no. 6 to 10. According to ld. advocate in the given facts, various triable issues which demand adjudication on merits by adducing evidence had arisen for consideration. 5.11. 6 to 10. According to ld. advocate in the given facts, various triable issues which demand adjudication on merits by adducing evidence had arisen for consideration. 5.11. It was further submitted that taking into consideration the nitty-gritty of the present set of facts and circumstances it can be made crystal clear that the plea of Limitation would be a mixed question of law and fact which would demand a substantial and full-fledged trial by adducing evidence on all the issues. The learned advocate relied upon the Hon’ble Apex Court Judgement in Chhotanben and Anr. vs. Kiritbhai & Ors. 2018 (6) SCC 422 Para 15. Also, the Division Bench Judgement of this Court passed in Bardoli Shreeranj Exhibitors Pvt. Ltd vs. Maheshbhai Babubhai 2021 – AIJELHC 243278 Para 33, 34, 35 & 44. 5.12. Lastly, it was submitted that cause of action is a running cause of action from filing suit no. 711/1996, getting injunction in their favor, sale-deed executed on 29.0./2003 in breach of injunction the Civil Court, filing of Special Civil Suit No. 47/04, filing of Regular Civil suit No. 926/03, Regular Civil Suit No. 926/03 getting rejected on the ground of limitation, Special civil suit No. 47/04 getting rejected under Order VII Rule 11, Sale-deed being executed in favor of respondent/defendant No. 11 on 03.11.2012 and having acquired knowledge about the said sale deed on 05.04.2014, the present suit was filed. It was submitted that a cause of action cannot be deciphered from solitary averments made in the plaint but would be a bundle of facts taken together and if proved entitles the plaintiffs to get the relief as claimed in the plaint. It also needs to be taken into consideration the fact that the scope of Order VII rule 11 would come into play when the plaint does-not disclose the cause of action and not when the plaint has no cause of action. Learned advocate had relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kartick Chandra vs. Kenaram Mazumdars & Ors. 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 1831 Para 16. He therefore submitted that it cannot be said that present suit is vexatious there-being no right to sue involved. By making aforesaid submissions, learned advocate had urged to allow the applications as well as to allow the appeal and restore the suit to its original file. 6. Learned Senior Advocates, Mr. 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 1831 Para 16. He therefore submitted that it cannot be said that present suit is vexatious there-being no right to sue involved. By making aforesaid submissions, learned advocate had urged to allow the applications as well as to allow the appeal and restore the suit to its original file. 6. Learned Senior Advocates, Mr. Shalin Mehta and Mr. Anshin Desai, appearing for the respective respondents have jointly made the following submissions: 6.1. The suit was hopelessly time barred and repeated challenge was made by the Appellants-plaintiffs to registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 being a registered sale deed in favour Respondents no. 6 to 11 by the original owners-Respondents no.1 to no.5. 6.2. The suit was instituted after a period of 11 years from the registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 and a consequential prayer was made to challenge registered sale deed dated 03.11.2012 in favour Respondent no.11 executed by Respondents no.6 to no.11. 6.3. It is a settled law that when the statements or the averments made by the plaintiff in his plaint without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by any law in force, then the plaint is required to be rejected. 6.4. The plaintiffs-Appellants had instituted a suit being Regular Civil Suit no.711 of 1996 on the basis of their registered sale deed dated 09.06.1994 stating that the said sale deed is legal and valid. As a matter of fact the said sale deed dated 09.06.1994 is an invalid sale deed as the land was of new tenure and there is an absolute bar under Section 43 of Tenancy Act. In support of their submission, learned Senior Advocates have relied upon the judgment of the Larger Bench of this Court rendered in Second Appeal No.208 of 2021 dated 12.01.2024. 6.5. Nonetheless, the appellants- plaintiffs instituted Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 under the guise of threatened dispossession, etc. It was pointed out that the said suit was dismissed for default on 21.10.2003 which was restored only on 27.11.2007. 6.6. 6.5. Nonetheless, the appellants- plaintiffs instituted Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 under the guise of threatened dispossession, etc. It was pointed out that the said suit was dismissed for default on 21.10.2003 which was restored only on 27.11.2007. 6.6. The Appellants-plaintiffs instituted another suit being Regular Civil Suit no.47 of 2004 on the basis of this very registered sale deed 09.06.1994 and prayed for cancellation of registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003; the said suit was dismissed on 21.10.2008 on the ground that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief since the sale deed of 1994 in favour of the Appellants-plaintiffs is barred by Section 43 of Tenancy Act. This dismissal of suit has attained finality, hence, registered sale deed in favour of Respondent nos. 6 to 10 was not disturbed. It is pertinent to note that in the present proceedings, in the plaint, the very same registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 is again sought to be challenged. 6.7. The cause of action mentioned in the present suit proceedings-plaint if perused, there is no clear cause of action shown by the Plaintiffs, and that the Appellant-plaintiffs have deliberately made vague and frivolous contentions; the cause of action is not only fictitious but is craftily drafted so as to make the court believe that the suit is not barred by limitation and it does disclose cause of action and that it is not a repeated challenge. In support of their submission, learned Senior Advocates relied upon the decision in the case of Dahiben V. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead Through Legal Representatives And Other, (2020) 7 SCC 366 . 6.8. It was argued that law is settled that crafty and shrewd drafting should not be permitted and specially in the cases where the reliefs which are under and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that while considering the Petition under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court can look beyond original cause of action or the pleadings and the averments made in the plaint that are craftily drafted and such is also held to be a valid ground to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Learned Senior Advocates for respondents have relied upon the decision in the case of NV Srinivas Murthy & Ors. vs. Mariyamma and Ors. reported in (2005) 5 SCC 548 . 6.9. Learned Senior Advocates for respondents have relied upon the decision in the case of NV Srinivas Murthy & Ors. vs. Mariyamma and Ors. reported in (2005) 5 SCC 548 . 6.9. It was submitted that Regular Civil Suit no.711 of 1996 which was dismissed and then restored in 2007 was decreed on dated 20.12.2008. It is pertinent to note that the said decree was quashed and set aside in Regular Civil Appeal No.42 of 2009 vide order dated 09.12.2015. The appeal was allowed with an order of remand and in remand proceedings on dated 20.10.2016 the suit was again dismissed. 6.10. It is therefore submitted that the registered sale deed dtd. 29.09.2003 was registered when there was no suit pending i.e R.C.S No.711 of 1996. The land was converted to old tenure on dated 06.02.2002 and therefore even otherwise the registered sale deed dated 09.06.1994 was invalid. 6.11. The present respondent no. 11 has purchased the property by way of registered sale deed dated 03.11.2012 from Respondents no.6 to no.10, with payment of full consideration by cheque and is in legal and peaceful possession of the property in question. The Appellants have not declared the death of Baldevji who died on 15.01.2005 and his heirs and legal representatives were never brought on record. Baldevji died before 19 years, who was one of the original owners. No sufficient cause is averred in the application for such a huge delay. 6.12. The Law envisages that even before registering plaint or before issuance of summons, it can be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In facts of the present case, a totally frivolous and bogus plaint is rightly rejected at the threshold. In support of his above submission, learned Senior Advocates for the respective respondents have relied upon the decision in the case of Saleem Bhai And Ors. V. State Of Maharashtra And Ors, (2003) 1 SCC 557 . 6.13. It was submitted that the appeal may be dismissed as the suit is completely frivolous and vexatious and continuation thereof would not only add to “docket explosion” but would also be a sheer wastage of judicial time and such proceedings as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are required to be nipped in the bud with realistic costs. 6.13. It was submitted that the appeal may be dismissed as the suit is completely frivolous and vexatious and continuation thereof would not only add to “docket explosion” but would also be a sheer wastage of judicial time and such proceedings as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are required to be nipped in the bud with realistic costs. Learned Senior Advocates for the respondents have relied upon the decision in the case of T. Arivandandam vs. T V Satapal and Ors, (1977) 4 SCC 467 . It was therefore urged that in absence of any error being pointed out in the impugned order, the appeal being devoid of any merits, the civil applications as well as the appeal may not be entertained. 7. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having perused the documents on record in the form of paper book produced along with memo of appeal and the written submissions along with list of authorities, the precise question which falls for our consideration, in the present appeal is whether the learned Judge has rightly exercised the powers conferred under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 consequently leading to the dismissal of the suit at the threshold, in the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. We have closely perused the impugned order allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code. The learned Judge though has confined to the plaint and the documents produced on record has considered the starting point of limitation to sue the defendants in so far as relief of cancellation of two registered sale deeds as relates to the year 2003. The learned Judge has taken note of the fact that present plaintiffs had filed Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 against the defendant nos.1 to 10 which was rejected pursuant to the application filed at Exh.42 under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. The learned Judge had therefore, arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiffs were aware about the execution of the sale deed dated 29.09.2003, whereas, the present suit was filed in the year 2014. The learned Judge had therefore, arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiffs were aware about the execution of the sale deed dated 29.09.2003, whereas, the present suit was filed in the year 2014. The learned Judge further noticed that there was no challenge to the said order of rejection of suit by way of appeal and hence the execution of the subsequent sale deed dated 03.11.2012, in favour of the defendant no.11 does not give fresh cause of action. The reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Jalambhai Ramjibhai Patel vs. Gulabchand-Galbabhai-Dhayabhai, 2013 (1) GLR 51 . The learned Judge arrived at a conclusion that the suit was apparently time barred. The learned Judge also noticed that the plea of Res Judicata is concerned, it would not come in the way, however on the ground of limitation and non existence of cause of action which were substantiated, the learned Judge rejected the plaint. 9. We have carefully gone through the argument canvassed by the appellants. The crux of the argument of the appellants is that the transaction in favour of appellants being first in point of time and having been not declared invalid or void ab-initio by any competent Court of law, the right, title and interest in the suit land vested in the appellants and therefore, the appellants are the exclusive owners and occupant of the suit land. 9.1 Secondly, by virtue of the order of injunction, essentially the order of status quo having remained in force right from 02.09.1997 till the final disposal of the suit being Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996, any transactions entered upon thereafter pending the suit was to be treated as invalid and void and was even otherwise not binding upon them. In such circumstances, no right, title or interest were conferred upon the subsequent purchasers i.e. defendant nos. 6 to 9 and defendant no.11 and their sale deeds were required to be ignored. 9.2 Though Regular Civil Suit No.340 of 2004 seeking cancellation of registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 in favour of defendant nos. 6 to 10 stood rejected by order dated 24.10.2008 would have no bearing on their title to the suit land as well as confirmation of the title of the defendant nos. 6 to 10 in respect of the suit land. 6 to 10 stood rejected by order dated 24.10.2008 would have no bearing on their title to the suit land as well as confirmation of the title of the defendant nos. 6 to 10 in respect of the suit land. It therefore, has to be inferred with the cause of action to file suit seeking cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 3.11.2012 executed in favour of the defendant no.11 had triggered the plaintiffs to approach the Court of Civil Judge seeking appropriate relief and hence, the plaint ought not to have been rejected on the ground of non-existence of the cause of action. Indisputably, the execution of sale deed in respect of suit land has taken place in favour of the appellants on 09.06.1994 which has till date remained unchallenged. 9.3 The respondent herein has raised the contention that acquisition of the title to the suit land by the aforesaid sale deed executed in their favour by the original owner is required to be ignored as the same has been executed in violation of Section 43 of the Tenancy Act. 9.4 Secondly, the argument is canvassed that the same issue had arisen for consideration before the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 instituted by the appellants seeking cancellation of their registered sale deed dated 29.09.2003 and the said suit being dismissed by order dated 21.10.2008 with observation being made as regards their title to the suit land in violation of Section 43 of the Tenancy Act, reached to the conclusion that the appellants have no cause to pursue the present suit. According to them, the cause of action therefore, does not arise for the appellants- original plaintiffs to seek cancellation of the subsequent sale deed dated 3.11.2012 executed in favour of the defendant no.11 by the defendant nos. 6 to 10. On the issue of plea of res judicata, according to the respondents, the title of the appellants to the suit land on the day when the plaint of Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 was not entertained by the Court by order dated 21.10.2008, was treated as not valid by competent court. 9.5 The suit was therefore rightly dismissed at the threshold as barred by law of limitation. 10. 9.5 The suit was therefore rightly dismissed at the threshold as barred by law of limitation. 10. We have carefully read the impugned order in fact the learned Civil Judge has though refused to entertain the plea of res judicata, though urged by the original defendant nos. 6 to 10 in their application at Exh.14 under Order VII Rule 11, has taken shelter of the fact that the earlier suit being Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 had stood rejected and had therefore, arrived at a conclusion that no cause of action survive for the plaintiffs to approach the Court to seek challenge to the subsequent transaction. We do not approve the aforesaid approach of the learned Civil Judge. On the appreciation of the averments made in the respective suit filed by the parties, it is evident that the appellants have not made any attempt to conceal the fact as regards earlier suit being Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 filed by them seeking declaration of their ownership right and permanent injunction as well as dismissal of their earlier suit being Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004. According to us, the learned Judge committed a serious error in not appreciating the cause of action as pleaded by the original plaintiffs – appellants herein in the present suit. According to us, the learned Judge committed a serious error in not appreciating the cause of action as pleaded by the original plaintiffs – appellants herein in the present suit. For better appreciation of the averments leading to the cause of action for the appellants to approach the Court, the translated version of the cause of action is reproduced herein under : “The cause of this suit has arose from the time the suit land had been under the possession, owned and occupied by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 and from the time you had executed agreement for sale in favour of me – the Plaintiff and from the time direct possession was handed over and from the time the registered sale deed of the land was executed in my favour and from the time the entry of this sale was mutated in the revenue record of the land and from the time I – the Plaintiff instituted suit being Civil Suit No. 711/1996 and from the time permanent injunction till the final disposal of the Suit was granted and from the time entry to this effect was mutated in the revenue record and from the time that Suit was ‘dismissed for default’ and from the them when order for re-filing was passed and from the time the Ld. Court passed decree in our favour and from the time the Respondent No. 1 to 5 executed Deed on 29/09/2003 in favour of Respondent No. 6 to 10 and from the time when I filed Special Civil Suit No. 47/2004 as I came to know about the same and from the time Special Civil Suit No. 926/2003 was preferred by the Respondent No. 6 to 10 and from the time the Ld. Court dismissed the suit of Special Civil Suit No. 926/2003 due to time-limit and from the time Special Civil Suit No. 47/2004 was dismissed as per provisions of CPC Order 7, Rule 11 and from the time Ld. Court dismissed the suit of Special Civil Suit No. 926/2003 due to time-limit and from the time Special Civil Suit No. 47/2004 was dismissed as per provisions of CPC Order 7, Rule 11 and from the time Ld. Secretary passed order for restoration of Entry No. 3018 and from the time Respondent No. 6 to 10 executed Deed in favour of Respondent No. 11 on 03/11/2012 and from the time when I – the Plaintiff came to know about the same and when I obtained copy of the same on 05/04/2014 and from the time when the Respondents committed wrong and unlawful acts and got the Deeds executed and from the time they acted against the rights and interest of the me - Plaintiff and the cause arose during that period within the jurisdiction of this Ld. Court and the same exists even today.” 10.1. The plain reading of the cause of action as pleaded by the original plaintiffs- appellants herein indicates that the appellants herein all throughout have pursued the legal remedy to protect their title to the suit land. Essentially, the averment in the plaint indicates that the suit land was agreed to be purchased from the original owners, for which, the agreement to sell was entered and followed by registered sale deed dated 09.06.1994. By virtue of the aforesaid sale deed, specific averment was made as regards handing over the possession of the suit land to the appellants. In fact, mutation entry was also entered in the revenue record. The recital was made with regard to handing over of possession from 3.5.1989, the date on which the registered Banakhat with possession was executed by the original owners. In absence of any challenge to the said sale deed and any declaration from any competent Court holding it to be illegal, voidable or void ab-initio, the right, title and interest in respect of suit land stood transferred in favour of original plaintiff. 10.2 Indisputably, filing of Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 with regard to declaration of ownership right and permanent injunction at the instance of the appellants herein was pending for adjudication on the date when the second sale deed dated 27.09.2003 was entered upon by the original owners (present defendant nos. 1 to 5) in favour of defendant nos. 6 to 10. Thus, the aforesaid sale transaction was governed by the outcome of the said suit. 1 to 5) in favour of defendant nos. 6 to 10. Thus, the aforesaid sale transaction was governed by the outcome of the said suit. Additionally, as rightly pointed out by learned advocate Mr. Varun Bharda for the appellants that the said transaction was entered in violation of the status quo order granted by the Courts below pending the aforesaid Civil Suit. Indisputably, the order of status quo was granted by the Courts below by order dated 2.09.1997 till the final disposal of the suit though suit was dismissed for default by order dated 21.10.2003. However, the fact remains that on the date of execution of the second sale deed on 27.09.2003 the order of status quo was in force. The parties to the aforesaid sale deed were in knowledge of the order of status quo inasmuch as mutation entry no.2874 was on revenue record which was otherwise entered on 6.2.2003 reflecting the fact of order of status quo by the competent Court in respect of suit land. In view of the aforesaid facts, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent nos. 6 to 9 to contend that the appellants herein cease to hold any right, title or interest in the suit property. With regard to the contention of the learned Senior Advocates of the respective parties that their title to the suit land was to be ignored as being void ab-initio being executed in breach of Section 43 of the Tenancy Act is concerned, the locus as plaintiffs was not restricted to the holding of title but it had traversed to the stage where the plaintiffs have become the aggrieved persons complaining about breach of status quo order. It is a settled legal position that even the transactions in violation of interim orders of court are to be treated as void ab-initio but at the same time such transactions are required to be declared so by the competent Court. It would be appropriate to look into the relevant provision under the Specific Relief Act. It is a settled legal position that even the transactions in violation of interim orders of court are to be treated as void ab-initio but at the same time such transactions are required to be declared so by the competent Court. It would be appropriate to look into the relevant provision under the Specific Relief Act. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, reads as under : “Section 31 : When cancellation may be ordered : (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) if the instrument has been registered under the Indian registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officers in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his book the fact of its cancellation.” 10.3 The plain reading of the aforesaid provision clearly applies not merely to the case of an instrument which is voidable but also one that is void, which under the law need to be set aside. Indisputably, the original owners have been unsuccessful in challenge to the first sale deed executed in favour of the appellant. So far the subsequent purchasers are concerned, they have not challenged the first sale deed executed by the original owner in favour of present appellants. It is not even pleaded before us by the subsequent purchaser – respondents herein that the original owners (defendant nos. 1 to 5) have committed fraud in collusion with the appellant by concealing the fact of sale deed of 1994. The question falls for consideration whether the sale deed executed in favour of the respondents can stand on its own foot ignoring the pending suit of the plaintiffs and the interim order passed therein. 10.4 The pleadings are to be read as it is and are to be accepted to be true, whether by virtue of possessory rights claimed under unlawful title is to be protected until an order of competent court for handing over of possession is passed. 10.4 The pleadings are to be read as it is and are to be accepted to be true, whether by virtue of possessory rights claimed under unlawful title is to be protected until an order of competent court for handing over of possession is passed. Undoubtedly, once the requirement of a ‘transfer’ as provided under section 54 of the Transfer of property Act is complied, the sale stands concluded. Whether the title of the plaintiffs stands validated in light of the dismissal of the civil suit no. 711 of 1996 filed at the instance of original owners, which was not entertained under order VII rule 11 of the Code. What consequences follow if eventually the court arrives at the conclusion that the transaction entered upon by the plaintiffs was treated void, in violation of section 43 and section 63 of the Tenancy Act or the transactions entered upon by the respondents to be declared void, which were in violation of interim orders. In peculiar facts of the case, the question arises what effect would it lead to the title of the parties to the litigation in the present suit. Section 48 of the Transfer of property Act provides that the transaction earlier in point of time would prevail over subsequent transactions. Whether the plaintiffs are actually in possession of suit land and if yes, whether the plaintiffs can be ousted from the suit land in absence of any challenge to their sale deeds by the respondents. Looking at the complexity of the facts of the case, various issues fall for consideration which require proper adjudication by full fledged trial. 10.5 It is noticed as evident from the reading of cause of action that the prayer was also sought for seeking declaration of the ownership right to the suit land which was also pending adjudication in the earlier suit being Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996, both the subsequent transaction entered upon by the original owners and his predecessor in title is subject to lis pendens. The question arises what would be the effect of those sale deeds being executed in violation of the interim order of status quo which otherwise was in force till the final disposal of the suit and was in existence on the date when both the impugned sale deeds were entered upon by the respondents. The question arises what would be the effect of those sale deeds being executed in violation of the interim order of status quo which otherwise was in force till the final disposal of the suit and was in existence on the date when both the impugned sale deeds were entered upon by the respondents. The provision in the form of Order 39 Rule 2(A) of the Code clearly provides consequences of disobedience of the breach of the injunction order on such transactions pendente lite. Prima facie, the title derived by the subsequent purchasers in violation of the order of status quo does not confer better right, title and interest in the suit land than the original owners. Indisputably, the original owners have divested their right, title and interest in the suit land by executing the registered sale deed in favour of the appellants- original plaintiffs. 10.6 Even though the term ‘cause of action’ has been cited in several instances under the CPC, it has no proper definition under the Code. Collins Dictionary defines it as ‘the facts alleged in a complaint, upon which is based the plaintiff’s right to a legal remedy in a court of law’. In other words, the cause of action can be said to be those facts that entitle a person to seek legal remedy against a wrongdoer. An individual is entitled to have certain legal rights and liabilities under relevant provisions, which, if infringed by another individual, will lead to a legal remedy being arisen. Thus, the moment an individual infringes any right, the cause of action arises, and the injured party can seek remedy for the same from a court of law. This is where Rule 11 (a) comes into play. 10.7 Once the averment as regards breach of interim order of injunction was pointed out, prevailing in a suit filed at the instance of the appellants, the plaint ought not to have been rejected on the ground that it does not disclose any cause of action. 10.8 In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that it was the appellants only who could be treated as most affected and aggrieved persons to challenge the subsequent execution of the sale deed in respect of the same land by the original owners. 10.8 In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that it was the appellants only who could be treated as most affected and aggrieved persons to challenge the subsequent execution of the sale deed in respect of the same land by the original owners. Thus, the cause of action survives for the appellants to urge before the trial Court to point out their case by leading the evidence. 11. This brings us to the issue of plea of res judicata which is now pressed by the learned Senior Advocates for the respective respondents. Learned Senior Advocates have heavily relied upon the fact of rejection of the Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 being not entertained by the competent Court leading to the unsuccessful challenge to their sale deed dated 27.09.2003. Indisputably, the aforesaid Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 was not decided on merits as the Court has rejected the plaint on the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause to pursue the proceedings to challenge the title of the subsequent purchasers (defendant nos. 6 to 10 herein) as the title of the plaintiffs to the suit land was not clear as the sale deed was executed in breach of Sections 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act and hence, the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 leading to the dismissal of the Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004. On bare comparison of the prayer clause of the respective suits i.e. Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 as against the prayer sought for in the present suit being Special Civil Suit No.320 of 2014, it is apparent that in the present suit apart from seeking cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 27.09.2003, the plaintiffs have also pressed for declaration of their right, title and interest in the suit property on the basis of their sale deed being executed prior in point of time, whereas, earlier suit being Regular Civil Suit No.47 of 2004 filed was confined to seeking cancellation of registered sale deed dated 27.09.2003. As rightly pointed out by learned Senior Advocates for the respective respondents that the aforesaid order of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 was not challenged in appeal by the present appellants, however in our view would not preclude the present appellants as indisputably the suit was not decided on merits and was dismissed on technical ground of locus. 11.2 The decision relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants in the case of Srihari Hanumandas Totala (supra) is required to be taken into consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the guiding principles for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 while dealing with a situation, whereby, the Court below had rejected the plaint on the plea of res judicata. The facts of that case goes to suggest that the party had filed the suit for declaration, partition, possession and consequential relief of injunction on the ground that the suit property was inherited by the respondent and his brother had mortgaged the suit property with KSFC without his consent. Subsequent suit was filed challenging the sale deed executed by KSFC in favour of the auction purchaser. In light of such facts, the plea was raised by the defendants that the suit instituted by the first respondent was barred by res judicata as the grounds relating to validity of sale deed and issue of title were raised in the previous suit. On reading of the plaint, the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed that it was evident that the first respondent had not concealed the aforesaid fact that a suit regarding property was pending before the Civil Court. It was also noticed that the specific issues were framed which were not adjudicated. In such circumstances, in absence of any facts being disclosed about the conclusion, the principle of res judicata was not attracted. It was also noticed that the specific issues were framed which were not adjudicated. In such circumstances, in absence of any facts being disclosed about the conclusion, the principle of res judicata was not attracted. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while rejecting the plaint on the ground of res judicata laid down guiding the principle to decide such application which are summarized as under : “(i) To reject a plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by any law, only the averments in the plaint will have to be referred to; (ii) The defense made by the defendant in the suit must not be considered while deciding the merits of the application; (iii) To determine whether a suit is barred by res judicata, it is necessary that (i) the ‘previous suit’ is decided, (ii) the issues in the subsequent suit were directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (iii) the former suit was between the same parties or parties through whom they claim, litigating under the same title; and (iv) that these issues were adjudicated and finally decided by a court competent to try the subsequent suit; and (iv) Since an adjudication of the plea of res judicata requires consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the ‘previous suit’, such a plea will be beyond the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 (d), where only the statements in the plaint will have to be perused.” 11.3 It would be appropriate to also take into consideration further observations noticing the peculiar facts of the case, which reads thus : “21. In the present case, a meaningful reading of the plaint makes it abundantly clear that when the first respondent instituted the subsequent suit, he had been impleaded as the second defendant to the earlier suit (OS No. 103/2007) that was instituted on 13 March 2007. The first respondent instituted the subsequent suit, OS 138/2008 though he had knowledge of the earlier suit. The plaint in the subsequent suit which was instituted by the first respondent indicates that the he was aware of the mortgage executed in favour of KSFC, that KSFC had executed its charge by selling the property for the recovery of its dues and that the property had been sold on 8 August 2006 in favour of the predecessor of the appellant. As a matter of fact, the plaint contains an averment that there was every possibility that the first respondent may suffer a decree for possession in OS 103/2007 which “has forced” the first respondent to institute the suit for challenging the legality of the sale deed. Given the fact that an argument was raised in the previous suit regarding no challenge having been made to the auction and the subsequent sale deed executed by the KFSC, it is possible that the first respondent then decided to exercise his rights and filed the subsequent suit. Be that as it may, on a reading of the plaint, it is evident that the first respondent has not made an attempt to conceal the fact that a suit regarding the property was pending before the civil court at the time. It is also relevant to note that at the time of institution of the suit (OS No. 138/2008) by the first respondent, no decree had been passed by the civil court in OS No. 103/2007.Thus, the issues raised in OS No. 103/2007, at the time, had not been adjudicated upon. Therefore, the plaint, on the face of it, does not disclose any fact that may lead us to the conclusion that it deserves to be rejected on the ground that it is barred by principles of res judicata. The High Court and the Trial Court were correct in their approach in holding, that to decide on the arguments raised by the appellant, the court would have to go beyond the averments in the plaint, and peruse the pleadings, and judgment and decree in OS No. 103/2007. An application under Order 7 Rule 11 must be decided within the four corners of the plaint. The Trial court and High Court were correct in rejecting the application under order 7 Rule 11(d). 22. For the above reasons, we hold that the plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) and affirm the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. We clarify however, that we have expressed no opinion on whether the subsequent suit is barred by the principles of res judicata. 22. For the above reasons, we hold that the plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) and affirm the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. We clarify however, that we have expressed no opinion on whether the subsequent suit is barred by the principles of res judicata. We grant liberty to the appellant, who claims as an assignee of the bona fide purchaser of the suit property in an auction conducted by KSFC, to raise an issue of the maintainability of the suit before the Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum in OS No. 138/2008. The Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum shall consider whether a preliminary issue should be framed under Order XIV, and if so, decide it within a period of 3 months of raising the preliminary issue. In any event, the suit shall be finally adjudicated upon within the outer limit of 31 March 2022.” 11.4 Applying the aforesaid principle in the facts of the present case, the rejection of plaint on the ground that the earlier suit was barred by provision of Sections 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act were required to be examined in the light of the averments made in the said suit being Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004. The aforesaid issue goes to the root of the matter inasmuch as it challenges the locus standi of the plaintiff to challenge the subsequent transaction affecting their rights to the suit land. The order of dismissal of the plaint of Special Civil Suit No.47 of 2004, in our opinion, does not lay down the correct legal position. Though, the locus standi of the plaintiffs would always be a matter of concern for the relief sought for vis-a-vis the maintainability of the suit. However, the learned Judge while accepting the contention of the defendants dismissing the suit at threshold under order VII rule 11 without any full fledged trial, about the title of the plaintiffs being hit by Sections 43 & 63 of the Tenancy Act ipso facto does not put finality to the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit land, more particularly, when a substantive suit prior in point of time being regular civil suit no. 711 of 1996 seeking declaration of ownership right and permanent injunction was pending wherein interim order of status quo qua the suit land was passed and the sale deed under challenge was executed in violation of such interim order of court. Nothing is pointed out by learned senior counsels for the respective respondents with regard to any proceedings being undertake by the revenue authority under Section 84 C of the Tenancy Act, which otherwise would lead to vesting of the suit land into State Government in case of violation of Sections 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act. At the same time, the dismissal of civil suit no. 47 of 2004 does not result in a seal of court on the title of the respondent no.6 to 10 in respect of suit land, in light of the fact that the suit no. 996 of 2003 filed by the original owners challenging the sale deed of plaintiffs- appellants herein was dismissed prior in point, at threshold under Order VII rule 11 of the Code. 11.5 Indisputably, the suit has been dismissed at the threshold without entering into the merits of the case. In such circumstances, the learned Judge while examining the plaint of the subsequent suit being Special Civil Suit No.320 of 2014 had an opportunity to examine the issue of cause of action in light of the averments made in the plaint. In other words, to determine whether a suit is barred by res judicata, the learned Judge ought to have examined whether the previous suit was decided i.e. on the merits of the case. The learned Judge ought to have examined whether the issues in the subsequent suits were directly or substantially in issue in the former suit. The trial Court ought to have also examined the fact that the former suit was between the same parties or parties through whom they claim, litigating under the same title and that these issues were adjudicated and finally decided by a Court competent to try the subsequent suit. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the previous suit was decided on merits. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the previous suit was decided on merits. Though, the issue with regard to cause of action vis-a-vis the locus standi of the plaintiffs was considered at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code in respect of the same subject matter and between the same parties litigating under the same title, however, it cannot be said that the issues raised in the suit stood adjudicated finally. The learned Judge has not entertained the plea of res judicata while dismissing the present suit under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code. However, subsequently the Court has proceeded on the path of rejection of plaint by considering the fact of rejection of earlier suit under Order VII Rule 11(d) as the basis of the rejection of the present suit, which, in our opinion is against the settled legal position as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Srihari Hanumandas Totala (supra). 12. This brings us to the last issue of plea of limitation raised by the respondents while seeking rejection of Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code. The learned Judge has arrived at a conclusion by noticing two dates of execution of subsequent sale deed and the challenge of such sale deed by filing suit in the year 2014 ignoring rest of the prayers of the original plaintiffs. In our view, considering the fact of pendency of the earlier Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 wherein specific prayer was sought for seeking declaration of the ownership right on the basis of the sale deed executed prior in point of time and the injunction orders in operation, various triable issues had arisen for consideration before trial Court in the present suit. The original plaintiffs were pursuing their legal remedy in the form of Regular Civil Suit No.711 of 1996 which was pending for adjudication as on the date of filing of the present suit being Special Civil Suit No.320 of 2014 which was presented on 19.05.2014. In fact, the cause of action of subsequent sale deeds pending the aforesaid Civil Suit were subject to outcome of the said civil suit in light of the principle of lis pendens being attracted. In fact, the cause of action of subsequent sale deeds pending the aforesaid Civil Suit were subject to outcome of the said civil suit in light of the principle of lis pendens being attracted. Even learned trial Court ought to have taken note of the fact that the aforesaid subsequent sale deeds were entered in violation of order of status quo which was in force on the date of execution. In light of the aforesaid peculiar facts, the question of limitation ought not to have been treated as a simple question of law. At most, the trial Court ought to have treated it as a preliminary issue and could not be considered as a pure question of law to exercise the power conferred under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 13. Having held so, we would like to express that this Court has come across cases especially in land matters, the time consuming exercise of full fledged trial where the litigation takes decades to get concluded, there is a growing tendency to sell away the disputed subjudice rights in suit property by executing deeds sometimes even in violation of court’s order. This reminds us of the word of caution put by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh, ( 1995) 6 SCC 50 : “4. … In defiance of the restraint order (of the Court), the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes.” 14. The aforesaid principle has been consistently followed by the various courts. In the case of Keshrevial Jivji Shah v. Bank of Maharashtra, 2004 SCC online Bom 368, the Bombay High Court held : “27. The aforesaid principle has been consistently followed by the various courts. In the case of Keshrevial Jivji Shah v. Bank of Maharashtra, 2004 SCC online Bom 368, the Bombay High Court held : “27. We cannot accept Shri Naphade’s contention that observations of the Supreme Court in Surjit Singh should be read as restricted to proceedings under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and the same cannot be extended to defiance of injunction order issued under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. Once the issue is placed on the pedestal of public policy and the very faith of litigants in rule of law and administration of justice, then it is not possible to make the distinction or bifurcation suggested by Shri Naphade. It would mean that consequences of nullifying such transaction not being provided by the statute, it would not lose its legal efficacy even if it is in utter disregard to or in violation of or breach of prohibitory order or order of injunction issued by a court of law. It would mean that parties can breach and violate court orders openly and with impunity neither they nor the beneficiaries suffer any consequences. It is time that we recognise the principle that transfer of immovable property in violation of an order of injunction or prohibition issued by court of law, confers no right, title or interest in the transferee, as it is no transfer at all. The transferee cannot be allowed to reap advantage or benefit from such transfer merely because he is not party to the proceedings in which order of injunction or other prohibitory direction or restraint came to be issued. It is enough that the transferor is a party and the order was in force. These two conditions being satisfied, the transfer must not be upheld. If this course is not adopted then the tendency to flout orders of courts which is increasing day by day can never be curbed. The court exercises its powers on the foundation of respect and regard for its authority by litigating public. People would lose faith and respect completely if the court does not curb and prevent this tendency. The note of caution of the Supreme Court must be consistently at the back of everybody’s mind. Therefore, Shri Naphade is not right in the distinction which he is trying to make. People would lose faith and respect completely if the court does not curb and prevent this tendency. The note of caution of the Supreme Court must be consistently at the back of everybody’s mind. Therefore, Shri Naphade is not right in the distinction which he is trying to make. Equally untenable is the contention of Shri Naphade that an order of injunction will bind only the transferor in this case. It is his submission that the said order does not bind the world at large. He submits that ownership rights are neither taken away nor restricted in any manner by order of injunction or other preventive directions. He submits that the transfer in favour of his client was thus neither invalid nor illegal, leave alone null and void. For the reasons already recorded above, we find it difficult to accept this contention of Shri Naphade. Decision of the Supreme Court in Krishan Kumar NarulaState of Jammu & Kashmir has no application. There, the Supreme Court was distinguishing an order of stay from an order of injunction. The distinction was made in the context of consequences upon breach and violation of such orders. It is in that context that the Supreme Court observed that the order of stay is qua a Court, whereas an order of injunction reaches and touches a party to the lis. These observations cannot be applied when it is noticed that during the pendency of an order of injunction, immovable property, which is subject-matter of restraint or injunction, is transferred. When this course is admittedly adopted, then there is no choice but to declare the transaction as illegal. There is no question of then deciding the nature and effect of the order of injunction.” 15. Applying the aforesaid legal principles in the facts of the case, the trial court conducted itself in impromptu manner of dismissing the suit at threshold by jumping to the decision that the title of the plaintiff being void was not entitled to substantive relief in the plaint and were also disentitled to seek relief of cancellation of sale deeds which were otherwise executed in teeth of violation of order of status quo granted by the Court. We are conscious of the mandatory provisions of order VII rule 11 of the Code. However, such powers conferred upon the court are to be applied cautiously. We are conscious of the mandatory provisions of order VII rule 11 of the Code. However, such powers conferred upon the court are to be applied cautiously. The underlying main object of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is to reject plaint, where reading of the pleadings it appears frivolous, vexatious, sham. Thus, exercise of such powers at the threshold would save judicial time and resources. In the case of Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi AIR 1986 SC 1253 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the main motive of Order VII Rule 11 is to ascertain that litigation that barely has any meaning or is bound to prove ‘abortive’ is not permitted to occupy the time of the courts and exercise the minds of the defendants. Followed by the landmark decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyani Bhanushali, AIR 2020 SC 3310 , wherein the court held that such remedies are necessary for putting an end to sham litigations to save judicial time. However, in the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that it was a vexatious, frivolous and unmeaningful lawsuit instituted by the plaintiffs. On the contrary, what transpired is that the defendants were the one who created a situation by entering into a sale transaction in violation of status quo order pending the suit, thereby constraining the plaintiffs to knock on the door of the court of justice to seek legal remedy. In our opinion, the learned Judge committed error in invoking order VII rule 11 of the Code, in the facts of the case. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the present First Appeal succeeds. The order dated 29.04.2017 passed by the 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad (Rural) below Exh.14 in Special Civil Suit No.320 of 2014 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Special Civil Suit No.320 of 2014 is directed to restore back to its original file. FURTHER ORDER After the order was pronounced, Mr. Anshin Desai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no.11 has prayed for stay of the order. Mr. Varun Bharda, learned advocate appearing with Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned advocate for the appellants has objected to grant of stay of the order so passed. FURTHER ORDER After the order was pronounced, Mr. Anshin Desai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no.11 has prayed for stay of the order. Mr. Varun Bharda, learned advocate appearing with Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned advocate for the appellants has objected to grant of stay of the order so passed. Considering the submissions made, since the suit will stand restored to its original file pursuant to the order which we have passed today in the present appeal, stay is granted for a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of the order of this Court.