ORDER: V R K KRUPA SAGAR, J. 1. This Criminal Revision Case, under sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC, is filed by the petitioners impugning the order dated 11.07.2018 in Crl.A.No.80 of 2015 on the file of the learned VII Additional Sessions Judge, West Godavari Division, Eluru. 2. For delivering justice, law is made. Justice is required to be delivered in accordance with the law. Certain times, grievances are raised that in the process of evaluation for justice law is violated. The case before this court is one such instance as argued before this court. 3. Sri Krishna Murthy and Smt.Rajani got married on 12.05.1990. During their wed lock, they were blessed with a female child by name Posamma. It was a normal happy life. Sri Krishnamurthy purchased Ac.1.71 cents of land in R.S.No.700/1 in MM Puram Village under a registered sale deed dated 11.08.1993. Thereafter, it was on 10.02.1997 he died intestate. Thus, he was survived by his wife Smt.Rajani and his daughter Posamma. 4. The above referred Sri Krishna Murthy is son of Sri Gangaraju. The wife of Sri Gangaraju is Smt. Venkata Lakshmi. After the death of Sri Krishna Murthy, the above referred Ac.1.71 cents of land has been under the possession and enjoyment of Sri Gangaraju and his family. After the death of her husband, Rajani and her daughter Posamma shifted their residence to Annadevarapeta feeling that Siri Ganga Raju and his family have not been looking after their welfare. 5. It is in such fact situation, Smt.Rajani and her daughter Posamma filed DVC.No.46 of 2012 before the learned Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Special Mobile Court, Eluru, West Godavari District. They sought certain directions under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 seeking her father-in-law, mother-in-law and other family members must account for the yield over the land and deliver the land to Smt.Rajani. There were certain fixed deposits standing in the name of Posamma. They were lying with Union Bank of India, Pulla Branch, Bhimadole Mandal. Therefore, a direction was sought as against the Branch Manager permitting Posamma to withdraw the amount standing in her name. The applicants further prayed for monthly maintenance of Rs.2,000/- to each of the applicants payable from the date of filing of their applications and also sought compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-. Therefore, a direction was sought as against the Branch Manager permitting Posamma to withdraw the amount standing in her name. The applicants further prayed for monthly maintenance of Rs.2,000/- to each of the applicants payable from the date of filing of their applications and also sought compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-. Father-in-law and mother-in-law are shown as respondent Nos.1 and 2 and their family members are shown as respondent Nos.3,4 and 5 and the Branch Manager is shown as R6. R1 who is the father-in-law to the first applicant filed a counter and his family members/ R2 to R5 filed a memo adopting the same. They contended that the petition is unjust and cannot be maintained and it has to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate framed the following points for consideration. 1. Whether the husband of P.W.1 by name Epuri. Krishnamurthy, had right, title and interest with respect to Ac.1-77 cents of land situated in R.S.No.700-1 of Malikimohamadpuram by virtue of Ex.P.6 and if so, whether PW.1 and her daughter are entitled to seek restitution into the property by virtue of section 8 of Hindu Succession Act 1956 coupled with section 26 of DVC Act, 2005. 2. Whether the second applicant is entitled to withdraw the fixed deposits from the Union bank of India, Bhimadole which stand in her name. 3. Whether the respondents caused mental, physical and emotional stress to P.W.1 in the shared household and if so, whether she is entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent by living separately. 4. Whether the applicant is entitled for compensation for mental and emotional trauma. 6. On behalf of the applicants, first applicant Smt.Rajani testified as PW.1 and she got examined two witnesses as PW.2 and 3. Exs.P1 to P6 were marked. Ex.P6 is the photocopy of the sale deed pertaining to the agricultural land. The mother-in-law of the first applicant testified as RW.1 and two other witnesses were examined on behalf of the respondents as RW.2 and 3. No documents were adduced in evidence for respondents. During the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Magistrate Sri Gangaraju/R1 died. After analysis of the evidence and the contentions on both sides, learned Magistrate granted the relief pertaining to Ac.1.71 cents of land and directed the father of late Krishnamurthy/ father-in-law of the first applicant to deliver Ac.1.71 cents of land to the first applicant. During the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Magistrate Sri Gangaraju/R1 died. After analysis of the evidence and the contentions on both sides, learned Magistrate granted the relief pertaining to Ac.1.71 cents of land and directed the father of late Krishnamurthy/ father-in-law of the first applicant to deliver Ac.1.71 cents of land to the first applicant. Learned Magistrate further directed R2 to handover original fixed deposits receipts (copies of fixed deposits are Ex.P5) to the second applicant within 3 months and directed the bank/R6 to allow the same applicant to withdraw the fixed deposits. A further direction was granted by the learned Magistrate to the effect that all the respondents were directed not to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Ac.1.71 cents of land by the applicants and if they deviate penal consequences would be faced by them under section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act. 7. Aggrieved by the orders of the learned Magistrate, R2 to R5 preferred Crl.A.No.80 of 2015 before the learned Judge, Family Court - cum – VII Additional Sessions Judge, West Godavari, Eluru. By a judgement dated 11.07.2018, the learned Family Court found no merit in the appeal and confirmed the order of the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal. 8. When the appeal was pending before the Family Court, the appellants filed Crl.M.P.No.544 of 2016 and 148 of 2018 for additional evidence and they stated that Sri Gangaraju executed a will dated 21.06.2000 and they also stated that O.S.No.387 of 2015 was filed seeking partition of the properties including the property involved in this case and therefore to receive a copy of the plaint. It may be recorded here itself that during the hearing of proceedings before the trial court as well as appellate court one question that came up was whether Smt. Venkata Lakshmi/RW.1 who is the wife of Sri Gangaraju is the natural mother or the stepmother for late Krishnamurthy. Courts below held that she was only a stepmother. Learned appellate court after recording reasons dismissed those applications while dismissing the appeal. 9. Aggrieved by the adverse orders passed by both the courts below, the original respondent Nos.2 to 5 preferred this revision. Courts below held that she was only a stepmother. Learned appellate court after recording reasons dismissed those applications while dismissing the appeal. 9. Aggrieved by the adverse orders passed by both the courts below, the original respondent Nos.2 to 5 preferred this revision. On 24.07.2024, the submission on both sides was recorded which reads as below: “It is submitted by the learned counsel on both sides that one of the reliefs granted by the orders impugned is with reference to delivery of fixed deposit receipts. Both the learned counsel submit that, that part of order was already complied with and that does not fall for consideration in this revision.” Therefore, that part of the order concerning fixed deposit receipts does not survive any more. Therefore, the only question that remained is about Ac.1.71 cents of agriculture land. 10. Sri Kambampati Ramesh Babu, the learned counsel for petitioners and Sri B.Chandra Sekhar, the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 submitted their arguments. On behalf of the revision petitioners, learned counsel submits that the learned Magistrate acting as a civil court and deciding the dispute in the manner that was adjudicated is illegal and this court has to upset the same. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2/ applicants in DVC submits that the aggrieved woman was entitled to seek all the reliefs and the DVC was before the learned Magistrate and the law is that questions that are raised in DVC were civil in nature and therefore what was held by the learned Magistrate as well as the appellate court are truly in accordance with the law as they served the cause of justice. In this regard, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 cited Kunapareddy Alias Nookala Shanka Balaji V. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari , [ (2016) 11 SCC 774 ]. In the said case, the applicant sought various reliefs before the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, the applicant moved an application seeking amendment of the application for addition of certain new reliefs and deletion of certain existing reliefs. The question that fall for consideration was whether the proceedings in DVC are governed by CrPC or CPC. It was found that principles such as amendment of pleadings contained in Order 6 Rule 7 CPC are not available in CrPC. Section 28 of the DVC Act shows that all the proceedings are to be held following CrPC. The question that fall for consideration was whether the proceedings in DVC are governed by CrPC or CPC. It was found that principles such as amendment of pleadings contained in Order 6 Rule 7 CPC are not available in CrPC. Section 28 of the DVC Act shows that all the proceedings are to be held following CrPC. It was in that context, their Lordships had expounded the principles and held that some of the proceedings under the Act including section 18 and 20 are essentially of civil nature. Though there were no specific provisions provided in CrPC or in DVC about the method for amendment of application, the courts, with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation, were entitled to allow such amendments if such amendments do not cause prejudice to the other side. It was also held that if the amendments are related to curable infirmity such amendments could be permitted. However, if the proposed amendment, if permitted, is likely to cause prejudice to the other side then such amendment cannot be allowed. 11. Taking cue from the above ruling the stout submission of the learned counsel for respondents/applicants in DVC is that in terms of section 26 of the DVC Act, 2005, the learned Magistrate is empowered to act as a civil court and decide title disputes and can grant all the reliefs that a civil court can grant. 12. Therefore the questions that fall for consideration in this revision are: 1. Whether a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class while considering an application under section 12 of protection of women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 acts as a civil court by virtue of section 26 of the said Act, 2005? 2. Was there ‘economic abuse’ and whether the impugned orders are illegal requiring interference? POINT Nos.1 and 2: - 13. A person is entitled to present an application to the Magistrate under section 12 of the Act, 2005 praying for various reliefs. ‘Domestic Violence’ is defined in section 3. It is in various forms. For the present, it is relevant to notice one form of domestic violence which is ‘economic abuse’. POINT Nos.1 and 2: - 13. A person is entitled to present an application to the Magistrate under section 12 of the Act, 2005 praying for various reliefs. ‘Domestic Violence’ is defined in section 3. It is in various forms. For the present, it is relevant to notice one form of domestic violence which is ‘economic abuse’. Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 reads as below Definition of domestic violence .—For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it— (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section,— (i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force; (ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman; (iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes— (a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and (b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested; (iv) “economic abuse” includes (a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited 5 to, house hold necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared house hold and maintenance; (b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and (c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II.—For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration. 14. Before the trial court as well as appellate court, the question depicted was whether in a DVC, rights over agriculture lands among family members could be decided and whether property restoration order could be made. 14. Before the trial court as well as appellate court, the question depicted was whether in a DVC, rights over agriculture lands among family members could be decided and whether property restoration order could be made. Learned Magistrate in emphatic terms stated that in terms of section 26, the court inquiring into a domestic violence case is vested with the jurisdiction that is available to a civil court and is entitled to grant all the reliefs that can be granted by the civil courts in respect of any property matters. This was confirmed by the appellate court. In the opinion of this court such conclusions were reached on complete erroneous appreciation of the statute and the law. Since both the courts below referred to section 26 it is appropriate to see what this provision says 26 .Relief in other suits and legal proceedings. ( 1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19,20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief. 15. The purport of the said provision is only this. An application of an aggrieved woman complaining domestic violence is to be entertained by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. Thus, the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class holds the primary jurisdiction to decide such disputes. Furthermore the experience had shown that between the warring spouses or their families, there could be other cases such as matrimonial cruelty, divorce, child custody and such other issues. The reliefs in such cases are provided before other courts. For instance, a case of divorce between spouses cannot be adjudicated by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. Furthermore the experience had shown that between the warring spouses or their families, there could be other cases such as matrimonial cruelty, divorce, child custody and such other issues. The reliefs in such cases are provided before other courts. For instance, a case of divorce between spouses cannot be adjudicated by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. In a situation where a divorce case is pending before a court competent such as Family court or District Court and pending such proceedings, if the aggrieved woman believes that she deserved certain reliefs that are provided under the Act, 2005, she need not file a separate application before a learned Magistrate and she is empowered to move such necessary application before that court where her divorce case is pending. Then the court is permitted under law not only to decide a case pending before it but also to decide an application moved for the reliefs permissible under the Act, 2005. That is the only purport of Section 26. It is in that context, the legislature stated that what a learned Magistrate could grant under the Act, 2005, can also be granted by a Civil Court or a Family Court or a Criminal Court where between an aggrieved person and the respondent the other proceedings are pending. The courts below read the provision incorrectly. This provision does not confer powers of a civil court on a Magistrate. On the other hand, this provision conferred powers of a Magistrate under DVC on a Civil Court as an when application under section 12 is moved by the aggrieved person. Therefore, the premise on which both the courts below went on to assume jurisdiction is wholly incorrect and against the written mandate of the statute. Be that as it may. 16. The approach of the learned Magistrate which was approved by the learned appellate Court are to the affect that a final decision on rights, title and possession over immovable properties are well within the jurisdiction of a learned Magistrate while exercising powers under the Act, 2005. Thus, this approach shows that any such dispute does not require any civil suit to be filed by the parties in a dispute. That appears to be wholly incorrect. One may notice what is mentioned in section 12 under which every application seeking any relief under the Act, 2005 is possible. Section 12 reads as below. Thus, this approach shows that any such dispute does not require any civil suit to be filed by the parties in a dispute. That appears to be wholly incorrect. One may notice what is mentioned in section 12 under which every application seeking any relief under the Act, 2005 is possible. Section 12 reads as below. Application to Magistrate. — ( 1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act: Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider. (2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent: Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set off. (3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto. (4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court. (5) The Magistrate shall Endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing. 17. One would notice from the above provision that while the learned Magistrate decides questions of compensation or damages under the Act, 2005, the aggrieved woman was not debarred from suing for compensation and damages on the same facts. 17. One would notice from the above provision that while the learned Magistrate decides questions of compensation or damages under the Act, 2005, the aggrieved woman was not debarred from suing for compensation and damages on the same facts. Therefore, it is mentioned in the provision itself that in the event, a suit for compensation or damages is filed that court which is dealing with such suit in the event of passing a decree in favour of that aggrieved woman has to consider the amount of compensation or damages that was already granted by the learned Magistrate and then shall give set off to it and then grant the remaining relief. If really the legislature thought that the leaned Judicial Magistrate of the First Class when considering the case of an aggrieved woman under the Act, 2005 is transformed into a civil court, then there was no need to make provision for a suit as is adumbrated above. Therefore, statute itself has given an indication that what can be adjudicated in a civil suit is still preserved. In other words, a decision arrived at in a summary proceedings of a DVC case does not divest the jurisdiction of a civil court. Merely because the cause urged is civil in nature does not convert a criminal court into that of a civil court. 18. In Satish Chander Ahuja V. Sneha Ahuja , [ (2021) 1 SCC 414 ], their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in effect held that interim or final orders passed in domestic violence case by itself is no bar for maintaining a civil suit where the dispute is with reference to immovable property. In the case at hand, it is undisputed on both sides that concerning the subject matter immovable property O.S.No.387 of 2015 is pending before competent civil court. Therefore, the revision petitioners can urge their rights before the civil court. Further, as to whether Smt.E.Venkata Lakshmi is natural mother or stepmother for the deceased Sri Krishnamurthy can also be urged before the civil court. 19. Restoration of immovable property to an aggrieved woman in a domestic violence case fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and the learned Judge concluded that such restoration order is valid vide Sapna V. Pravin Ishwarbhai Patel , 2019 SCC Online Bom 760. 20. 19. Restoration of immovable property to an aggrieved woman in a domestic violence case fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and the learned Judge concluded that such restoration order is valid vide Sapna V. Pravin Ishwarbhai Patel , 2019 SCC Online Bom 760. 20. In the case at hand, both the courts below observed that property was found registered in the name of Sri late Krishna Murthy, and on his death, the wife and her daughter rightly claimed their succession. As against that, the father of Krishna Murthy contended that his son did not expend money for purchase of that property and he as a father supplied the total sale consideration and obtained sale deed in the name of his son and therefore his daughter-in-law and granddaughter cannot claim rights over that property. Thus, the question arose between the parties as to who owns the property. Be it noted both the courts below recorded that possession of that agricultural land was with the father of late Krishna Murthy. While Mr.Krishna Murthy was alive, there was no dispute between him and his father about ownership of that property. After Krishna Murthy died, as his wife and daughter started living elsewhere and as the land remained in the possession and enjoyment of Krishna Murthy’s father and family members, the disputes had arisen. Evidence on both sides indicates that the respondents in this revision were prevented from having access to these lands. Thus, they are deprived of their financial resources through this land. Precisely that is economic abuse. Economic abuse is domestic violence. Relief in cases of domestic violence were rightly prayed before the learned Magistrate. The relief granted is in terms of law. 21. In summation, it is to be stated that there was economic abuse. Both courts below were competent to grant restoration order. A criminal court dealing with a domestic violence case is still a criminal court and does not transform itself into a civil court. The impugned orders are no bar for prosecuting civil litigation. Therefore, both the points are held accordingly. There are no merits in this revision. 22. In the result, this criminal revision case is dismissed.