JUDGMENT : CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J. 1. This civil revision petition is directed against the orders dated 10.09.2024 in IA No.73 of 2024 in IA No.479 of 2018 in COS No.17 of 2018, on the file of Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes, Vijayawada, by which the Trial Court has rejected the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay of 278 days in filing the application to restore the petition in IA No.479 of 2018. 2. Heard Sri V. Ch. Naidu, learned Counsel for the revision petitioner and none appeared for the respondent. 3. The brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are as follows : (a) This revision petition is preferred by the defendant in suit COS No.17 of 2018, questioning the order dated 10.09.2024, passed in IA No.73 of 2024 in IA No.479 of 2018 in COS No.17 of 2018. This application was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 278 days in filing the restoration application in IA No.479 of 2018. (b) The respondent/plaintiff filed OS No.386 of 2017 for recovery of an amount of Rs.8,26,34,057/- and also for subsequent interest thereon before II Additional District Judge, Guntur. After receiving the summons, the defendant/revision petitioner filed IA No.479 of 2018 for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The suit was thereafter transferred to Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes, Vijayawada, and re-numbered as COS No.17 of 2018. (c) IA No.479 of 2018 has been dismissed for non-prosecution on 13.12.2022. Thereafter, the defendant/revision petitioner filed IA No.73 of 2024 to condone the delay of 278 days in filing the application to restore IA No.479 of 2018, which was dismissed for default by order dated 13.12.2022. The said application has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 10.09.2024, against which the present revision petition is preferred. 4. The Counsel for the revision petitioner primarily challenges the order of the Trial Court on the ground that factum of dismissal of IA No.479 of 2018 by order dated 13.12.2022 for non-prosecution was not informed to the defendant/revision petitioner by his earlier Counsel, as such, due to timely communication of such dismissal order, there occurred a delay of 278 days in filing the application for restoration of the dismissal order. Besides the above, it is also contended that though sufficient cause has been demonstrated for condoning the delay, the Court below has not acceded to the same and dismissed the application. It is further contended that while considering the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court should adopt liberal approach and endeavour to consider the main cause in the case and address the merits of the matter. In support of the said contention, the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Trust Association of CBCNC v. M/s. H.R.R. Constructions Private Limited and others, 2024 (4) ALT 386 (DB) = 2024 SCC OnLine AP 2599 and attention is drawn to Para 8, which reads as under: "8. (i) In Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. State of Haryana, (2014) 14 SCC 127 , the Apex Court while considering the SLPs filed by the appellants against the order of the High Court refusing to condone the delay in filing the letters patent appeals seeking enhanced compensation in land acquisition matters. In that context the Apex Court considered it earlier judgment in Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , wherein it was observed thus : "(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." Considering the above judgment SLPs were allowed and the delay was condoned." 5. The petitioner's Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in R.K. Roja v. U.S. Rayudu and another, (2016) 14 SCC 275 , to buttress his argument that once application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is filed, the Court has to dispose of the same before proceeding with the trial of the matter. Besides, it is also contended that since defendant/revision petitioner's Counsel had concluded his arguments as back as on 12.03.2019, the Trial Court should not have dismissed the application for non-prosecution but rather dealt with the same on merits. 6. Perused the record. 7. Coming to the first submission that as the petitioner was not informed of the dismissal order in IA No.479 of 2018 by the previous Counsel, and because of which petitioner was unaware of the same, the same would not constitute reasonable cause inasmuch as in the affidavit filed in support of IA No.73 of 2024, the petitioner has not stated as to when he acquired knowledge of dismissal of the application and rather, he is silent on the same and that even assuming he was not informed, he owes a duty and responsibility to track the developments in the suit and there is no explanation of whatsoever as to how he has been vigilant of the same. The reasons given in the affidavit are that due to the petitioner's business engagement, he could not instruct his Advocate to conduct the case and thereby, IA No.479 of 2018 was dismissed for non-prosecution on 13.12.2022 and that due to non-communication of the same by the previous Counsel, he could not immediately file the application to restore the same. The relevant paras from the affidavit explaining the above reason read as under : "4. The relevant paras from the affidavit explaining the above reason read as under : "4. The Lower Court failed to appreciate that the delay is not so abnormal and can be condoned for affording opportunity to the petitioner herein to contest and defend his case. 5. The Trial Court ought to have considered the docket proceedings of the main case wherein the case has been adjourned several times during pandemic period and the case has also been dismissed for default though ought to have not been done since the arguments of this petitioner were already completed. Therefore, the cause is sufficiently explained in the condone delay petition." 8. Reading of the above paras would disclose that there are absolutely no valid reasons forthcoming explaining the inordinate delay of 278 days, hence, the Trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the defendant/revision petitioner miserably failed to show or explain the cause of delay and the explanation offered that because of his business engagements and non-communication by his previous Counsel, there was a delay does not amount to proper explanation. This Court also finds that the explanation offered above does not explain or sufficiently provided reasons for delay and that too when the matter being conducted by Commercial Courts, the object behind is to expedite and decide the matters in time-bound manner and having regard to the claim made in the suit being for recovery of Rs.8,26,34,057/-, the defendant/revision petitioner should have given utmost priority and be vigilant enough in pursuing the matter. In the judgment relied on by the petitioner's Counsel in the Trust Association of CBCNC's case (supra), also, the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down principles after reviewing various judgments on this aspect, which reads as under : "(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the Counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are : (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the Courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt within a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto." 9. From the principles laid down above, this Court finds that there is an inordinate delay of 278 days which is merely on account of carelessness and negligence on the part of the petitioner which goes unexplained. As sufficient cause being condition precedent for the exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay and as the explanation offered is misappropriate, non-satisfactory, and convincing, the Court below rightly refrained from condoning the delay. The petitioner tries to blame his previous Counsel conducting the matter who alleged to have not informed of the order of dismissal and thereby causing substantial delay. In one such similar case, where the blame was thrown on the head of the Advocate who appeared in the Trial Court as a justification or probable explanation to condone long and inordinate delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajneesh Kumar and another v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380, while rejecting such arguments, held as under : "10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the Advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the Trial Court. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the Advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the Trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their Lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the Court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned Lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the Advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief." Even if assuming for a moment that the lawyer concerned was careless or negligent, the same by itself does not constitute a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his rights. 10. Coming to the other aspect of the petitioner's argument that when an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is filed, the Court cannot proceed with the trial without disposing of the same as enunciated in Trust Association of CBCNC's case (supra), there is no quarrel about this proposition, however, in the present case, the petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 11 came to be dismissed for non-prosecution, hence, the said judgment has no application to the facts of this case. 11. The petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC essentially seems to reject the plaint and the Counsel for the petitioner while addressing this Court on delay has also tried to address the matter on the merits of the said application and contended that there is no proper cause of action for entertaining the suit. This Court is afraid that in the present revision, the merits of the matter cannot be gone into and at any rate, the dismissal of the petitioner's application for condoning the delay of 278 days would not pre-close the petitioner's defense in the suit as it is stated that written statement has already been filed. 12. This Court is afraid that in the present revision, the merits of the matter cannot be gone into and at any rate, the dismissal of the petitioner's application for condoning the delay of 278 days would not pre-close the petitioner's defense in the suit as it is stated that written statement has already been filed. 12. Coming to the last submission, the docket proceedings which are placed before this Court would indicate that the petitioner appeared to have argued IA No.479 of 2018 on 12.03.2019 before II Additional District Judge, Guntur, but subsequently, as issue under adjudication being commercial dispute, the suit has been transferred to Special Court for Trial and Disposal of Commercial Disputes at Vijayawada and the said suit was re-numbered as COS No.17 of 2018. Therefore, it was incumbent on the part of the petitioner to re-argue the IA afresh and cannot proceed on the basis that the arguments advanced earlier would suffice. The Court below had given umpteen number of chances for advancing arguments in I.A., however, as petitioner was not vigilant in concluding his arguments, the Court below rightly was compelled to dismiss the application for default. At any rate this can't be ground of sufficient cause to condone the delay. 13. In that view of the matter, this Court does not find any merits and accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. 14. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending for consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed.