ORDER : Subba Reddy Satti, J. The above writ petition is filed, impugning the proceedings issued by the 2nd respondent vide Rc.No.76/LDM/APTIDCO/Admin/2017 dated 26.06.2024, dispensing with the services of petitioners with effect from 30.06.2024, as illegal and arbitrary. 2. Averments in the affidavit, in brief, are that the petitioners joined the office of the 2nd respondent on different dates on contractual agreements. The services of petitioners were utilized to collect beneficiary allotment data from the Municipality Department and loan allotment data through MEPMA etc. The petitioners further assisted the office of the 2nd respondent in conducting social analysis, social audit and community participation in analyzing the affordability of housing loans to the poor etc. Due to the change of political governance in the State, the 2nd respondent by proceedings impugned (Ex.P1) dispensed with the services of petitioners. The petitioners immediately approached the 2nd respondent and made representations to continue services. The 2nd respondent assured that appropriate action would be taken and intimate to the petitioners. However, nothing was materialized. The impugned order of termination is illegal, arbitrary and irrational. Hence, the writ petition is filed to set aside the impugned proceedings. 3. a) A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of 2nd respondent. It was contended, interalia, that the Andhra Pradesh Township and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (APTIDCO) was established as a Government syndicate to take up the task of integrated township and infrastructure development across the State of Andhra Pradesh. It is a State Level Nodal Agency of Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana-HFA (PMAY) with capabilities of holistic planning, development, financing and implementation of affordable housing in the State under the Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department. It shall look upon to carry out the housing development integrated with the city development plan. As part of the effective implementation of the scheme, APTIDCO has to coordinate and arrange bank loans for the eligible beneficiaries who are selected as eligible candidates. For the said arrangement of bank loans, APTIDCO has appointed one State Coordinator at the Head Office and 13 Assistant Coordinators on a contractual basis and the petitioners are among the 13 Assistant Coordinators. The appointments were made on a contractual basis and have been extended from time to time based on the requirements. b) The State Government has constructed 2.62 lakh houses under the PMAY scheme. The appointments were made on a contractual basis and have been extended from time to time based on the requirements. b) The State Government has constructed 2.62 lakh houses under the PMAY scheme. Out of 2.62 lakh houses, 1.50 lakh houses were already handed over to eligible beneficiaries. Out of the balance of 1.02 lakh houses, some disputes arose regarding allotment due to eligibility criteria etc., and some of them approached the Court challenging the allotment. As such house allotments and processing of bank loans have considerably slowed down. Since there is no activity concerning arranging bank loans, the Government has decided to terminate the services of the contractual employees as a matter of policy decision and hence, the notice impugned in the writ petition was issued. c) The petitioners approached the Court on 30.09.2024 and by the said date the tenure of contract between the 2nd respondent and 8th petitioner was not subsisting and it was completed by 31.08.2024. Insofar as petitioners 2, 3, 5 and 7 are concerned, their contract service was completed by 30.04.2024, 01.05.2024, 18.01.2024 and 31.03.2024 respectively. The petitioners are not employees of the 2nd respondent-Corporation and eventually prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 4. Heard Sri G.V.S.Kishore Kumar, learned counsel for petitioners, Smt.Padmaja Gadiraju, learned standing counsel for 2nd respondent and Sri S.Raju, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-I for 1st respondent. 5. At the hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners in elaboration of arguments, would submit that the project is continuing its activities and hence, dispensing with the services of petitioners is arbitrary and irrational. He would also submit that even after the expiry of the contract period, the services of petitioners were utilized and they were paid salaries till June 2024, except the 9th petitioner. He would submit that dispensing with services of petitioners is malicious due to changes in Government and also unreasonable and biased. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would submit that a major part of the work was completed and hence, notices were issued to dispense with services of petitioners and the Corporation has not shown any discrimination. 7. Now, the point for consideration is: Does the proceedings, vide Rc.No.76/LDM/APTIDCO/Admin/2017 dated 26.06.2024 suffer from illegality, irregularities and in violation of principles of natural justice, actuated with malice? 8. There is no dispute about engaging petitioners on a contractual basis as Assistant Coordinators. 7. Now, the point for consideration is: Does the proceedings, vide Rc.No.76/LDM/APTIDCO/Admin/2017 dated 26.06.2024 suffer from illegality, irregularities and in violation of principles of natural justice, actuated with malice? 8. There is no dispute about engaging petitioners on a contractual basis as Assistant Coordinators. In Paragraph 3 of the writ affidavit by giving tabular form, it was mentioned the tenure of agreement of each of the petitioners. As seen from those particulars the contract of each of the petitioners is subsisting as of the date of filing of writ petition. When the learned standing counsel for the 2nd respondent pointed out that the contract in respect of petitioners is not subsisting, this Court directed the learned counsel for petitioners to file a memo regarding subsistence of contract as on the date of filing of the writ petition. Accordingly, a memo was filed vide USR No.104073 of 2024 dated 18.11.2024, wherein it was indicated that the petitioners 1 to 7 were paid an amount of Rs.24,800/- each. The 8th petitioner was paid Rs.34,800/- in July, 2024. In respect of the 9th petitioner, it was mentioned that the amount was paid on 06.02.2024. 9. Thus, though the 9th petitioner stopped attending work from February, 2024, he also approached this Court along with other petitioners, as if he had been continuing and the services were dispensed with, since his name was also mentioned in Ex.P1. however, it is factually incorrect. The services of petitioners were dispensed with from 30.06.2024 and they approached this Court almost 3 months thereafter. By the date the petitioners approached this Court, the contract of the 8th petitioner was completed by 31.08.2024. Of course, as pointed out by learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, the contract, in respect of petitioners 2, 3, 5 and 7 were completed by 30.04.2024, 01.05.2024, 18.01.2024 and 31.03.2024 respectively. However, as pointed out by the learned counsel for petitioners the petitioners 1 to 8 were paid remuneration till June, 2024 was not disputed. 10. The agreement of contract entered into between the petitioners and the 2nd respondent is for 12 months. Clause No.7 of the terms and conditions of the agreement states that the Corporation reserves its right to terminate the contract at any time without giving any notice. 10. The agreement of contract entered into between the petitioners and the 2nd respondent is for 12 months. Clause No.7 of the terms and conditions of the agreement states that the Corporation reserves its right to terminate the contract at any time without giving any notice. In Ex.P1 proceedings, while dispensing with the services of petitioners, it was mentioned that “on reconciliation of bank loans processing with the various banks, it has been observed that the process of bank loaning is not encouraging and there is no considerable progress in sanction of bank loans to the beneficiaries. Moreover, out of 2.62 lakh houses, nearly 1.50 lakh houses were already handed over to the beneficiaries and the processing of bank loans to the remaining one lakh houses is slowed down considerably and registration of houses also not happening rapidly due to various administrative reasons”. 11. Due to the aforementioned reason, the services of petitioners were dispensed with. As seen from Ex.P2, the petitioners made representations. Learned counsel for petitioners mainly relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.C. Joshi Vs. Union of India and others, (1985) 3 SCC 153 and would contend that dispensing with or termination is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In K.C. Joshi’s case, the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the issue of an employee appointed regularly and the termination of employee by issuing one month’s notice. In that context, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the termination of an employee without any inquiry or by following the principles of natural justice, it overlooks the well-established principle that where State action affects livelihood or attaches stigma, the punitive action can be taken after holding an enquiry according to the principles of natural justice. 12. In GRIDCO Limited and another Vs. Sadananda Doloi and others , (2011) 15 SCC 16 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus: “A writ Court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority even in contractual appointment. 12. In GRIDCO Limited and another Vs. Sadananda Doloi and others , (2011) 15 SCC 16 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus: “A writ Court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority even in contractual appointment. … A writ Court is entitled to judicially review the action and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter the action is in the realm of contract.” At the same time, the Hon’ble Apex Court cautioned that – “The Court cannot sit in the arm chair of the Administrator to decide whether a more reasonable decision or course of action could have been taken in the circumstances. So long as the action taken by the authority is not shown to be vitiated by the infirmities and so long as the action is not demonstrably in outrageous defiance of logic ...” 13. In the case at hand, some of the petitioners’ contract is subsisting on the date of filing of writ petition, however, while dispensing with the services of petitioners, reasons were assigned in the proceedings impugned. It was specifically mentioned that the process of bank loaning is not encouraging and there is no considerable progress in sanctioning bank loans to the beneficiaries. Out of 2.62 lakh houses, nearly 1.50 lakh houses were already handed over to beneficiaries and the processing of bank loans to the remaining one lakh houses is slowed down considerably and registration of houses also not happening rapidly due to various administrative reasons. Though it was contended the work is perennial, nothing was placed to substantiate the said contention. 14. As discussed supra, though the contract was not extended in respect of certain petitioners, their services were utilized till June, 2024 and remuneration was paid as per contractual terms. It is up to the government to continue services on contract on the need. Since it is the policy decision taken by the 2nd respondent, normally this Court will not interfere with the same, unless it suffers from any illegality. 15. In Directorate of Film Festivals & Ors. Vs. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors (2007) 4 SCC 737 , Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: "16. The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well defined. 15. In Directorate of Film Festivals & Ors. Vs. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors (2007) 4 SCC 737 , Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: "16. The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well defined. Courts do not and cannot act as Appellate Authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the Government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available.” 16. In Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. Vs. Indian Railway Major and Minor Caterers Association and Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 792 , the Apex Court held: "2. By the impugned order, the High Court has interfered with the Catering Policy of 2005 in respect of reservations. By now it is a well-settled principle of law that policy decisions of the Government should not be interfered with in a routine manner unless the policy is contrary to the provisions of statutory rules or of the Constitution. Nothing has been brought to our notice that the Policy is contrary to the provisions of the statutory rules or the Constitution. For this simple reason, we set aside the order of the High Court impugned herein." 17. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle in Jacob Puliyel Vs. Union of India and Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 533. The relevant part of the same reads thus: "21. We shall now proceed to analyse the precedents of this Court on the ambit of judicial review of public policies relating to health. It is well settled that the Courts, in exercise of their power of judicial review, do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. Indeed, arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fide will render the policy unconstitutional. It is well settled that the Courts, in exercise of their power of judicial review, do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. Indeed, arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fide will render the policy unconstitutional. It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the Government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary." 18. Thus, given the discussion supra coupled with expressions of the Apex Court, dispensing with the services of the petitioners, is neither illegal, arbitrary or irrational. There are no merits in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. However, this order will not preclude the authority to engage the services of the petitioners as and when the need arises. 19. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. However, no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.