JUDGMENT : (A. Muhamed Mustaque, J.) The State has filed this original petition challenging an order issued by the Kerala Administrative Tribunal. The primary issue addressed by the Tribunal is whether the respondent, a government employee, is entitled to receive full pay and allowances for the duration of her suspension from service. The period in question spans from October 2, 1998, to January 15, 2006. 2. The respondent, while working as a Physical Education Teacher was arrested by Police on registration of a criminal case. The arrest was made on 02/10/1998. Following the arrest, the respondent was placed under suspension. She was acquitted on the benefit of doubt vide judgment of the Sessions Court on 20/06/2005. Thereafter, the respondent was reinstated in service on 16/01/2006. The period of suspension till reinstatement is the subject matter of the dispute. The respondent claimed full pay and allowances. That was rejected by the Government referring to Rule 56B(3) of Part I of Kerala Service Rules, 1956 (KSR). The Government regularised the above period as a duty for all purposes except for pay and allowance. 3. There were no disciplinary proceedings. The question in this case is more of an interpretation of the relevant rule and applicability of such rule governing the matter. Rule 56B of Part I of KSR deals with the power of the competent authority to order reinstatement and allow or reject pay and allowances to the government servants. Rule 56B(1) refers to a situation where such a government servant retires from service before the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. Rule 56B(2) refers to the situation in which the government servant who is under suspension dies before the disciplinary, or court proceedings instituted against him are concluded. 4. Rule 56B(1) refers to a situation where such a government servant retires from service before the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. Rule 56B(2) refers to the situation in which the government servant who is under suspension dies before the disciplinary, or court proceedings instituted against him are concluded. 4. It is appropriate to refer to Rule 56B(3) Part I KSR, which reads as follows: 3) Where the Authority Competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended: Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the officer had been delayed owing to reasons directly attributable to the officer, it may after giving him an opportunity to make his representation and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the officer shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine. 5. Rule 56B(3) Part I KSR has to be read in the light of Rule 56B(1) and sub-rule 2. That means in any of the situations referred to in 56B(1)&(2) if the authority feels that suspension was wholly unjustified, it can order full pay and allowances to such government servants. On a close reading of the provision of 56B, it can be seen that the above provisions would be applicable in a matter where disciplinary enquiry is initiated against the government servants. 6. Rule 57 Part I KSR refers to a situation where the government servant is placed under suspension consequent upon the commencement of criminal proceedings and further states that if such a government servant is acquitted of blame, he would be entitled to the full amount. That means, on the acquittal of blame, the government servant will be entitled to the full amount after adjusting the subsistence allowance and other allowances already granted under Rule 55 Part I KSR. What is the meaning of the ‘acquittal of blame’ is the next question. 7. That means, on the acquittal of blame, the government servant will be entitled to the full amount after adjusting the subsistence allowance and other allowances already granted under Rule 55 Part I KSR. What is the meaning of the ‘acquittal of blame’ is the next question. 7. This Court in Ramachandran Pillai v. Kerala State Electricity Board ( 1980 KLT 608 ) referred to the purport of Rule 57 Part I KSR and held as follows: The discretion in regard to adjustment of pay and allowances according to the circumstances of the case is only with respect to the cases other than which ends in acquittal; and it does not include cases where the suspension or dismissal was as a result of the operation of the provisions of R. 58, and there was no other process by which the degree of gravity of the situation could be assessed. It may be noted that in the instant case the suspension and dismissal were as a result of the initiation of the criminal proceedings and conviction in the criminal proceedings by the trial court at the first instance. The reinstatement was for no other reason than the case having ended in acquittal. There is, therefore, no other circumstances available for evaluating the degree or gravity of the situation which warrants the exercise of the discretion by the authority concerned. That possibly is the reason why a departure from the procedure contemplated in R.56 is seen to have been made under R.57 so far as the case of a person who is reinstated on acquittal of the case against him. 8. This Court in Mohammed Easa Sahib v. D.I.G. of Police [ 1990 (2) KLT 462 ] held in paragraph 17 as follows: It is true that the expressions "honourably acquitted" and "fully exonerated" are more appropriate to disciplinary proceedings. The expression with which we are concerned is "acquitted of blame" and not merely "acquitted". The expression "acquitted of blame" must, in the circumstances, mean something more than a mere acquittal. It must be such an acquittal that leaves no doubt or trace about the guilt or culpability of the accused officer. Evidently what is intended is absence of any element of blame attaching to the officer, despite the prosecution. Unless this be the intent, the words "of blame" become meaningless. 9. It must be such an acquittal that leaves no doubt or trace about the guilt or culpability of the accused officer. Evidently what is intended is absence of any element of blame attaching to the officer, despite the prosecution. Unless this be the intent, the words "of blame" become meaningless. 9. In Gangadharan v. State of Kerala [ 2009 (1) KLT 713 ], the learned Single Judge of this Court again considered the purport of Rule 57 and held that on the acquittal of blame, the suspended officer is entitled to full pay and allowances during the period of suspension, and Rule 57 would apply and not Rule 56(3). 10. A Division Bench of this Court in Kuttappan Nair v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Others [I.L.R. 2021(4) Kerala 415] in paragraph 16 held as follows: It has been held by this Court in decisions as in Gangadharan v. State of Kerala that in a criminal case, where there is no evidence against the accused and he shall be acquitted by the criminal court then such as case will come into the expression "acquitted of blame" appearing in Rule 57 of Part I KSR. In such a case, the incumbent will be entitled to get pay and allowances for the period of suspension undergone by him by treating such period as duty for all purposes. This Court has also held in decisions as in Santhosh Kumar, S. v. State of Kerala that the proper consideration for exercise of the discretion under Rule 57 of Part I KSR is to determine as to whether the delinquent accused has been acquitted of blame by the criminal court and in that regard whether the finding of the criminal court would amount to mere acquittal as contemplated by the provisions of Cr.P.C., or is amount to exonerate the petitioner of the blame as contemplated in Rule 57 Part I KSR. In the case in Mohammed Easa Sahib v. D.I.G of Police, it has been held by this Court that in terms of Rule 57 Part I KSR, full amount of pay and allowances during the period of suspension only in the event of officer being acquitted of blame and the expression 'acquitted of blame' occurring in Rule 57 Part I KSR means some thing more than mere acquittal. 11. 11. The legal principles established in the above precedents clarify that a mere acquittal on the ground of the benefit of doubt does not automatically entitle a government servant to full pay and allowances. This implies that if there is evidence of involvement, even if it falls short of constituting an offence, the government is justified in denying full pay and allowances. Therefore, the government must evaluate the suspension by examining the employee's involvement in the alleged offence. If the Government concludes that there is no evidence linking the employee to the crime and the employee is entirely innocent of the allegations, full pay and allowances should be granted as provided under Rule 57 Part I KSR. This discretion is limited to determining whether valid reasons exist to indicate the employee's involvement in the alleged incident leading to the registration of the offence. 12. In the present case, the Government should have adjudicated the matter under Rule 57 Part I KSR. However, the decision was made based on Rule 56B(3) Part I KSR. The issue arises as to whether the case should be remanded for reconsideration, as the Government did not address the aspect of “acquittal of blame.” It is noted that the decision-making parameters under Rules 56B(3) and 57 are similar. The above provisions allow the Government to exercise discretion to decide whether the employee should be granted full pay and allowances. Under Rule 56B(3), the focus is on whether the suspension was justified in light of the disciplinary proceedings, whereas under Rule 57, the inquiry revolves around the reasons for the employee’s involvement in the criminal case, especially when the acquittal is based solely on the benefit of doubt. 13. Under Rule 56B(3), the focus is on whether the suspension was justified in light of the disciplinary proceedings, whereas under Rule 57, the inquiry revolves around the reasons for the employee’s involvement in the criminal case, especially when the acquittal is based solely on the benefit of doubt. 13. It is pertinent to quote the following observations in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan and Others [ (1973) 1 SCC 512 ] wherein it had quoted the observations in regard to the benefit of doubt in Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash [ (1972) 1 SCC 249 ] which reads as follows: “The benefit of doubt to which the accused is entitled is reasonable doubt — the doubt which rational thinking men will reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a timid mind which fights shy — though unwittingly it may be — or is afraid of the logical consequences, if that benefit was not given; or as one great Judge said it is ‘not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has not the moral courage to decide but shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism.” 14. We perused Ext.P2 judgment. Absolutely, no iota of evidence has been on record to indict the government servant, who is the respondent. Though the judgment concluded that the accused in the case including the respondent have been acquitted on the benefit of doubt, there is a dearth of evidence in the matter to indict the government servant. There is nothing to connect to the involvement of government servants in the incident related to the offence. In such circumstances, the Government cannot hold otherwise. Therefore, there is no reason for us to remand back the matter for reconsideration. 15. The constitutional court has the necessary power to examine the materials that would have been done by a primary authority. If the materials available on record indicate that such a government servant was indicted for no reason and he is completely innocent of the allegations attributed against him, this Court is very well competent to hold that the government servant is entitled to full pay and allowances. We note that the Tribunal examined this matter regarding Rule 57 Part I KSR and found that the respondent is entitled to full benefit. We note that the Tribunal examined this matter regarding Rule 57 Part I KSR and found that the respondent is entitled to full benefit. In the exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, we need not upset the findings rendered by the Tribunal. In such circumstances, we are of the view that there is no scope for interference in this matter and we direct the Government to comply with the directions of the Tribunal within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. This original petition stands dismissed as above.