JUDGMENT : 1. Since both the acquittal appeals are related to same appellant and dismissed by the learned trial Court on jurisdictional ground, they are heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Acquittal Appeal No. 63/2012 filed by the appellant is against order dated 29.11.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod, District- Durg (C.G.) in Criminal Case No. 121/2011, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the ground that the case is not in territorial jurisdiction of Balod Court. 3. Acquittal Appeal No. 65/2012 filed by the appellant is against judgment dated 29.11.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod, District- Durg (C.G.) in Criminal Case No. 122/2011, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for want of territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant filed both the acquittal appeals on the ground that in both the cases, appellant presented the cheques in the Bank of Balod where the cheques got dishonoured due to insufficient amount in the account of the accused. The complainant gave notice in writing to respondents/accused for demand of payment of the cheque amount. Therefore, the Court of Balod has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint but the learned trial Court erred in law in not appreciating the settled proposition of law. The learned trial Court grossly erred in holding that the complainant has failed to prove the offence beyond all reasonable doubts. The learned trial Court in Balod has every jurisdiction to decide the Complaint Case of the appellant. As such, the judgments dated 29.11.2011 passed in Criminal Case No. 121/2011 and in Criminal Case No. 122/2011 are liable to be set aside. 5. To substantiate his arguments, he has placed reliance on the decision in the matter of Bridgestone India Pvt Ltd vs. Inderpal Singh, reported in 2015 LawSuit (SC) 1195. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment. 7. Heard both the counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. 5. To substantiate his arguments, he has placed reliance on the decision in the matter of Bridgestone India Pvt Ltd vs. Inderpal Singh, reported in 2015 LawSuit (SC) 1195. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment. 7. Heard both the counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. It is clear from documents on record and the judgments of the learned trial Court that the appellant filed Complaint Cases against the respondents under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheques and it is also clear that the cheques were presented by the appellant for encashment at the Balod Bank which intimated the appellant about its dishonour. However, the learned trial Court held in para 8 in both the cases that loan transaction took place in Rajnandgaon, therefore, complainant has to file the Complaint Cases before Rajanandgaon Court and Balod Court has no jurisdiction to decide these cases and accordingly dismissed the Complaint Cases and acquitted the respondents. 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in Bridgestone India Pvt Ltd (supra) held in paras 11, 12 and 13 which reads as under:- [11] It is, however, imperative for the present controversy, that the appellant overcomes the legal position declared by this Court, as well as, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, a reference may be made to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, whereby Section 142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act. A perusal of Sub-section (1) thereof leaves no room for any doubt, that insofar as the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, on the issue of jurisdiction, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would have to give way to the provisions of the instant enactment on account of the non-obstante clause in sub- section (1) of Section 142A. Likewise, any judgment, decree, order or direction issued by a Court would have no effect insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case would also not non-suit the appellant for the relief claimed. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case would also not non-suit the appellant for the relief claimed. [12] We are in complete agreement with the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. We are satisfied, that Section 142(2)(a), amended through the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, inter alia in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account). We are also satisfied, based on Section 142A(1) to the effect, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case, would not stand in the way of the appellant, insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from the dishonor of the cheque in the present case arises. [13] Since cheque No. 1950, in the sum of Rs.26,958/-, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, dated 02.05.2006, was presented for encashment at the IDBI Bank, Indore, which intimated its dishonor to the appellant on 04.08.2006, we are of the view that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, would have the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, after the promulgation of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015. The words “… as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times…” used with reference to Section 142 (2), in Section 142A (1) gives retrospectivity to the provision. 10. In the light of the above, it is clear that the disputed cheques were given by the respondents to the complainant in Rajanangaon but the appellant presented both the cheques for encashment at the Punjab National Bank of Balod where the cheques were dishonoured and its intimation was given by the Bank at Balod to the complainant/appellant. Therefore, in the light of the above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is with the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod. 11. Therefore, in the light of the above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is with the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod. 11. For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgments dated 29.11.2011 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod in Criminal Case No. 121/2011 and 122/2011 are set aside and the case is remanded back to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod for deciding the same afresh. However, it is made clear that nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on merits of the case and the trial Court to decide the complaint case on its own merits strictly in accordance with law. 12. The parties are directed to appear before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balod (C.G.) on 02.04.2024.