JUDGMENT : R. MAHADEVAN, ACJ. 1. The appellant is the sixth respondent in Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2023. The said writ petition was filed by the sixth respondent in this appeal praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records relating to the order in MA5/9452/2023 dated 21.09.2023 of the second respondent, quash the same and consequently direct the third respondent to renew the FL-2 License issued to the writ petitioner. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition No. 30238 of 2023, it was stated that the writ petitioner is a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, registered on 05.09.1994 and from that date, they have taken up the property bearing Door No.6, Kushkumar Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai - 600 034 on lease from the erstwhile owners. The writ petitioner also obtained FL 2 license from the third respondent and running a bar in their club premises and also a permit room from 1994 itself. It is further stated that the writ petitioner club has more than 1500 members on their roll. It is also stated that the lease was periodically renewed and as per the registered lease agreement dated 17.10.2018, registered as document No. 784 of 2018 on the file of Sub-Registrar, Chennai Central Joint - II, executed by Mr. Basantkumar and others, the lease rent was Rs.35,000/- per month. The lease was for a period of ten years from 01.10.2018 to 30.09.2028. According to the writ petitioner, in the lease agreement, there is a specific clause to the effect that in the event of transfer of scheduled property by purchase or mortgage, the lease shall stand attorned in the name of the transferee/purchaser on the same terms and conditions as contained in the renewed lease deed. It is stated that subsequent to the lease agreement, the writ petitioner had spent enormous amount for putting up a building in their club premises. The writ petitioner further states that they came to know that in the year 1980, an agreement for sale of the aforesaid property was entered into by the owner of the property with the sixth respondent in the writ petition for Rs.5,40,000/- and received a sum of Rs.1 lakh as advance. The writ petitioner further states that they came to know that in the year 1980, an agreement for sale of the aforesaid property was entered into by the owner of the property with the sixth respondent in the writ petition for Rs.5,40,000/- and received a sum of Rs.1 lakh as advance. Since a sale deed was not executed, the sixth respondent in the writ petition filed a suit for specific performance and it culminated in an order passed by the Honourable Supreme Court, pursuant to which the sixth respondent deposited Rs.1.25 crores on 18.08.2021 before the Registrar General of this Court. 3. As far as the currency of FL2 license No.7/2002-2003 is concerned, the license was periodically renewed on 1st April of every year till 31st March of the succeeding year. Similarly, during March 2023, the writ petitioner submitted an application seeking renewal of FL2 license and it was kept pending. While so, the writ petitioner received a notice in writ petition No. 17387 of 2023 filed by the sixth respondent before this Court, in which a counter affidavit was also filed by the writ petitioner. During the pendency of the writ petition, the licensing authority sent a communication dated 21.09.2023 for temporary stoppage of supply of liquor to the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner thereafter came to know that on the basis of objection given by the sixth respondent, the communication dated 21.09.2023 was sent by the second respondent suspending the license issued to the writ petitioner. In the communication dated 21.09.2023, it was stated that the writ petitioner has not produced any agreement with the present owner of the property, namely the sixth respondent. Pursuant to the communication dated 21.09.2023, on 05.10.2023, the writ petitioner submitted a representation to the third and fourth respondents stating that they are ready to shift the permit room to the adjacent building and undertook to submit the consent and/or arrangement with the owner of the building and requested to pass appropriate order for revocation of license till such shifting is completed. However, no order has been passed and therefore, challenging the order dated 21.09.2023, suspending the FL2 license issued to the writ petitioner, WP No. 30238 of 2023 has been filed. 4. However, no order has been passed and therefore, challenging the order dated 21.09.2023, suspending the FL2 license issued to the writ petitioner, WP No. 30238 of 2023 has been filed. 4. When the writ petition was listed for hearing on 17.10.2023, the learned Judge observed that the lease deed in favour of the writ petitioner with the erstwhile owner contains a clause that even if the property is sold to the sixth respondent, the sixth respondent cannot disturb the possession of the writ petitioner till the expiry of the lease period. It was further observed that if the sixth respondent- owner of the property is aggrieved by such clause contained in the lease agreement, it is for them to challenge those terms before the appropriate forum and not by way of writ petition before this Court. Therefore, it was observed by the learned Judge in the order dated 17.10.2023 that until the cancellation of the lease agreement in favour of the writ petitioner is confirmed by the Court of law, the writ petitioner is entitled for renewal of the license till 30.09.2028 i.e., completion of lease period. 5. Assailing the order dated 17.10.2023 of the learned Judge, the appellant, who is the sixth respondent in the writ petition, has filed this intra-court appeal. 6..... (i) Mrs. Kavitha Nithyanandan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would vehemently contend that the appellant is the owner of the land and building in question in which the writ petitioner/sixth respondent is in unauthorised occupation. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, on 12.06.1980, the appellant had entered into an agreement of sale with the original owner of the property for a total sale consideration of Rs.5,40,000/- out of which Rs.1,00,000/- was paid as sale advance. As per the agreement, the appellant has to pay the balance sum of Rs.4,40,000/- and get the sale deed executed in their favour. However, the original owner avoided to execute the sale deed and therefore, a suit in C.S. No. 130 of 1981 was filed before this Court. After full-fledged trial, the suit was decreed on 15.03.1991. As per the agreement, the appellant has to pay the balance sum of Rs.4,40,000/- and get the sale deed executed in their favour. However, the original owner avoided to execute the sale deed and therefore, a suit in C.S. No. 130 of 1981 was filed before this Court. After full-fledged trial, the suit was decreed on 15.03.1991. Aggrieved by the same, O.S.A. No. 93 of 1991 was filed and it was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court on 29.01.2007 with a direction to the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.2 crores to the plaintiff, in discharge of their entire liability and such amount has to be deposited on or before 31.03.2007. As against the judgment in O.S.A. No. 93 of 1991, Civil Appeal No. 13516 of 2015 was filed in which an order dated 12.10.2020 was passed setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court and restoring the judgment and decree passed in the suit. Seeking to review the judgment dated 12.10.2020 passed by the Honourable Supreme Court, Review Application (C) No. 1978 of 2020 was filed and it was dismissed. Even thereafter, the vendors of the appellant did not execute the sale deed and therefore, Contempt Petition (C) No. 302 of 2021 was filed before the Honourable Supreme Court and it was dismissed on 23.07.2021 inter alia directing the appellant to deposit Rs.1.25 crores before the Registrar General of this Court, within a period of two weeks. Accordingly, the appellant deposited Rs.1.25 crores on 30.07.2021. Subsequently, this Court executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant and it was registered as document No. 838 of 2021 dated 19.08.2021 on the file of the Sub-Registration District of Joint-II, Central Chennai. Thus, the appellant became the absolute owner of the property in question which is in unauthorised and illegal occupation by the sixth respondent/writ petitioner. (ii) According to the learned counsel for the appellant, even after execution of the sale deed in favour of the appellant and inspite of repeated representations made, the writ petitioner/6th respondent refused to budge. The appellant therefore, submitted a representation cum objection dated 10.02.2023 to the respondents 1 to 4 not to grant or renew the FL2 license in favour of the writ petitioner/6th respondent. The appellant therefore, submitted a representation cum objection dated 10.02.2023 to the respondents 1 to 4 not to grant or renew the FL2 license in favour of the writ petitioner/6th respondent. On receipt of the representation, the third respondent forwarded the same to the second respondent and directed to file a detailed report after carrying out an inspection of the premises by the Deputy Commissioner (Excise) Chennai. Thereafter, the appellant also approached the second respondent as well as the Deputy Commissioner (Excise), Chennai on several occasions and objected to the renewal of FL2 license in favour of the sixth respondent. However, the appellant did not hear anything from the official respondents and therefore, WP No. 17387 of 2023 was filed for issuing a Writ of Mandamus forbearing the respondents from granting or renewing FL2 license of the sixth respondent by considering the representation dated 24.04.2023. By order dated 13.06.2023, this Court directed the third respondent to file an inspection report as directed in the letter dated 03.04.2023 and adjourned the hearing of the writ petition to 14.07.2023. Pursuant to such direction, the second respondent, by proceedings dated 21.09.2023, ordered to stop the supply of liquor to the sixth respondent-writ petitioner club. Subsequently, when WP No. 17387 of 2023 was listed for hearing on 13.10.2023, this Court dismissed it as having become infructuous. (iii) The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that inspite of the suspension of FL2 license, the sixth respondent/writ petitioner illegally continued the supply of liquor in the bar functioning in the premises in question. When the appellant caused enquiries, it came to light that the sixth respondent/writ petitioner has filed the instant Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2023 before this Court challenging the order dated 21.09.2023 and this Court disposed of the writ petition on 17.10.2023 even without hearing the appellant herein. (iv) The learned counsel for the appellant would vehemently contend that the learned Judge, at the time of admission of the writ petition, without hearing the appellant-sixth respondent in the writ petition, has passed the order dated 17.10.2023 to the effect that the lease deed in favour of the writ petitioner/sixth respondent herein, with the erstwhile owner contains a clause that even if the property is sold to the appellant/sixth respondent, the appellant/sixth respondent cannot disturb the possession of the writ petitioner/sixth respondent herein till the expiry of the lease period. It was further observed that if the sixth respondent-owner of the property is aggrieved by such clause contained in the lease agreement, it is for them to challenge those terms before the appropriate forum and not by way of writ petition before this Court. (v) The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Judge passed the order dated 17.10.2023 on the basis of misrepresentation of facts made by the sixth respondent/writ petitioner. The writ petitioner/sixth respondent, as one of the owners of the property, had executed the sale deed dated 19.08.2021 in favour of the appellant herein. Therefore, the sale deed dated 19.08.2021 will bind the writ petitioner/sixth respondent and they have no right to remain in occupation of the premises. (vi) The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that before passing the order dated 17.10.2023, the learned Judge ought to have given an opportunity to the appellant to put forth the facts involved in this case. On the other hand, behind the back of the appellant, who is the lawful owner of the property and in the absence of any lease or license between the appellant and the sixth respondent, the order dated 17.10.2023 was passed directing the official respondents to renew the license in favour of the sixth respondent until the expiry of the lease with the erstwhile owner. In this case, the appellant filed EP No. 59 of 2023 pursuant to which the Court had executed the sale deed in favour of the appellant and the sixth respondent is one of the signatories to the sale deed. Thus, during the pendency of the litigation, the erstwhile owner had executed the lease deed in favour of the sixth respondent and when once the appellant purchased the property, they are entitled to seek for vacation of the sixth respondent from the property. (vii) In support of the above contentions, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Jugalkishore Gilda vs. Ramanlal Udhoji Tanna (dead) through legal heirs and others, 2013 (10) Supreme Court Cases 258 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court observed as follows:- "12. We have narrated the facts in detail to indicate as to when the rights had been accrued to Gangabai. We have narrated the facts in detail to indicate as to when the rights had been accrued to Gangabai. Gangabai, as already stated, became a mortgagee of the property as early as in 1953 by a registered mortgage deed and the suit filed by Gangabai for enforcing the mortgage deed was decreed by the civil court on 01.09.1956 and that the preliminary decree later became final as against the share of Vijaysingh Mohta. Gangabai purchased 1/2 share in the mortgaged property from Mohta on 02.03.1960 which was confirmed in her favour by the civil court and was placed in joint possession by the executing court on 25.11.1960. Facts would clearly indicate that the first respondent was inducted as a tenant while all these proceedings were pending before the court and that the entry of the first respondent into the suit property was not with the consent and knowledge of Gangabai even though she was a mortgagee of a portion of the property from 1953 onwards. Several civil suits were also pending between the mortgagor and the mortgagee and it is during the course of those proceedings, evidently, first respondent was inducted as a tenant. The question is - whether such induction was in violation of Sections 52 and 65 of the TPA and to the prejudice of the mortgagee Gangabai. On facts, we are convinced that the induction of the respondent was during the subsistence of the mortgage and pendency of court proceedings and the legality of that action has to be tested on the touchstone of above statutory provisions and the precedents set by this Court. ........... 15. Section 52 deals with cases of transfer of anything otherwise dealing with any immovable property after any suit or proceeding in which any right to such immovable property is directly and specifically in question has been filed. Section 65A of the TPA deals with the powers of the mortgagor to grant a lease of immovable property, while the mortgagor remains in lawful possession of the same. Section 65A of the TPA deals with the powers of the mortgagor to grant a lease of immovable property, while the mortgagor remains in lawful possession of the same. In Dev Raj Dogra and others v. Gyan Chand Jain and others MANU/SC/0500/ 1981 ; (1981) 2 SCC 675 , following the judgment in Mangru Mahto and others (supra) this Court held that if the mortgagor grants a lease during the pendency of a suit for sale by the mortgagee, the lessee is bound by the result of the litigation." (viii) In the case of The All India Film Corporation Limited and others vs. Gyan Nath and others, 1969 (3) Supreme Court Cases 79 , relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows:- "8. The first question to consider is this : Did the tenancy created by the mortgagee in possession survive the termination of the mortgagee interest so as to be binding on the purchaser? A general proposition of law is that no person can confer on another a better title than he himself has. A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing repayment of a loan. A mortgage's interest lasts only as long as the mortgage has not been paid off. Therefore on redemption of the mortgage the title of the mortgagee comes to an end. A derivative title from him must ordinarily come to an end with the termination of the mortgage's title. The mortgagee by creating a tenancy becomes the lessor of the property but his interest as lessor is coterminous with his mortgagee interest. Section 111 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a lease of immovable property determines where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same, extends only to the happening of any event - by the happening of such event. The duration of the mortgagee's interest determines his position as the lessor. The relationship of lessor and lessee cannot subsist beyond the mortgagee's interest unless the relationship is agreed to by the mortgagor or a fresh relationship is created. This the mortgagor or the person succeeding to the mortgagor's interest may elect to do. But if he does not, the lessee cannot claim any rights beyond the term of his original lessor's interest. This the mortgagor or the person succeeding to the mortgagor's interest may elect to do. But if he does not, the lessee cannot claim any rights beyond the term of his original lessor's interest. These propositions are well-understood and find support in two rulings of this Court in Mahabir Gope and others vs. Harbans Narain Singh, MANU/SC/0059/1952 : (1952) 1 SCR 775 and Asaram and others vs. Mst. Ram Kali (1958) S.C.R. 986 ................ 10. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find that the property, the subject of the lease, was a house in the city of Jullundur suitable for acinema theater. This was leased for five years on a rent of Rs.250/- p.m. This sum included the use of a passage for which the rent was Rs.100/- p.m. In effect the rent of the building was Rs.150/-. This was lower rent than the rent it had fetched before. The mortgagee further agreed to renewal of the lease on the same terms for a further period of 10 years. It is in evidence that a plot only 89 marlas formed the passage and the rent was Rs.100/- and on that basis land of 3 kanals and 17 marlas with a building fit for cinema ought to have fetched much more. Such a building in a growing city ought not to have been tied down for a period of fifteen years, to a rent of Rs.150/- or even Rs.250/- pm. The learned subordinate Judge pointed out that the annual rent of the building was assessed at Rs.10,800/- for the years 1950-55. This shows how low as the actual rent. The history of the building in the hands of the head lessee shows that after an investment of Rs.60,000/- the rent went upto Rs.1,250/- p.m. with additional rights to the head lessee. The building without the fittings and the land of the passage fetched Rs.65,000/-. Therefore a tenant willing to pay a better rent could easily have been found. The history of the building in the hands of the head lessee shows that after an investment of Rs.60,000/- the rent went upto Rs.1,250/- p.m. with additional rights to the head lessee. The building without the fittings and the land of the passage fetched Rs.65,000/-. Therefore a tenant willing to pay a better rent could easily have been found. The case is thus not covered by the exception because we cannot hold that such a long lease on such a small rent was an act of prudence, whether it was a bona fide act or not, and whether the exception can apply to urban property." (ix) Further reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Mangru Mahto and others vs. Shri Thakur Taraknathji Tarakeshwar Math and others, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1390 wherein it was held thus:- "10. On behalf of the appellants it was argued that the leases might not be binding on Kashinath while he was the mortgagee, but after he purchased the property he ceased to be a mortgagee, and he could not thereafter assert that the leases were not binding on him. This novel argument is ingenious but unsound. An auction-purchaser at a sale held in execution of a mortgage decree buys not only the interest of the mortgagor but also the interest of the mortgagee. If the lease does not 'bind the mortgagee, it does not equally bind the auction-purchaser. It is interesting to notice that in Rust v. Goodale (1957) 1 cH 33, Harman, J. held that the right of the mortgagee to treat a tenant of the mortgagor as a trespasser was a right which passed on sale or foreclosure to his assignee. 11. A lease granted by the mortgagor, out of the ordinary course of management, though not binding on the mortgagee, is binding as between the mortgagor and the lessee. Such a lessee acquires an interest in the right of redemption and is entitled to redeem. If such a lease is created before the institution of a suit relating to the mortgage, the lessee must be joined as a party lo the suit under 0 34, r.1 CPC; otherwise he will not be bound by the decree passed in the suit and will continue to retain his right of redemption. If such a lease is created before the institution of a suit relating to the mortgage, the lessee must be joined as a party lo the suit under 0 34, r.1 CPC; otherwise he will not be bound by the decree passed in the suit and will continue to retain his right of redemption. But in view of s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the mortgagor grants such a lease during the pendency of a suit for sale by the mortgagee, the lessee is bound by the result of the litigation. If the property is sold in execution of the decree passed in the suit, the lessee cannot resist a claim for possession by the auction- purchaser. The lessee could apply for being joined as a party to the suit and ask for an opportunity to redeem the property. But if he allows the property to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree and they have now lost the present case, the lessees allowed the suit lands to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree and they have now lost the right of redemption. They cannot resist the claim of the auction purchaser of recovery of possession of the lands. 12. If a mortgagor in possession of the mortgaged property executes a lease of the property in the ordinary course of management as the agent or bailiff of the mortgagee during the pendency of a suit by the mortgagee to enforce the mortgage, a question may arise whether such a lease is in the eye of the law a lease granted by the mortgagee through his agent and therefore binding on him. But in the present case, that question does not arise as the leases were not granted by the mortgagor in the ordinary course of management as the bailiff or agent of the mortgagee." (x) Reliance is also placed on R. Rajangam vs. The Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise Chepauk (06.12.2007 - MADHC) : MANU/TN/9897/2007, in which, it was observed as follows: "While dealing with a case as to whether the landlord has given any consent to create sub tenancy, in P. John Chandy and Co. (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas reported in MANU/SC/0382/2002 : [2002]3SCR549 , the Supreme Court, after extracting the observations made in Bell v. Alfred Franks and Barlett Co. (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas reported in MANU/SC/0382/2002 : [2002]3SCR549 , the Supreme Court, after extracting the observations made in Bell v. Alfred Franks and Barlett Co. Ltd. reported in 1980 (1) A.E.R. 356, further added that the observations made in the above reported judgment, though no doubt made in reference to a particular provision, yet they throw some light on the question of implied consent that there has to be something more than mere inaction or lack of initiation on the part of the landlord. 20. In P. John Chandy's case, the suit property was rented out to the appellant company on the basis of an oral lease, by original landlord (grandfather of respondent) in 1949. The appellant created sub-leases and allowed the tenants from time to time. The landlord served a notice in 1981 to terminate the sub lease, but the tenant had failed to comply with the notice. The respondent/landlord filed eviction petition on the ground that the appellant-company had transferred his rights by creating sub leases in favour of other persons without his consent. The Rent Controller, accepted the contentions of the landlord that there was no consent to create sub tenancy. But the appellate authority has reversed the decision of the Rent Controller and recorded the finding to the effect that, in the absence of any evidence either oral and documentary, the terms of tenancy have to be gathered from the long course of conduct of the parties even since commencement of the tenancy in 1949. The revision filed by the landlord was allowed holding that the tenant had failed to establish the case in terms of lease that they were entitled to sub lease the accommodation and mere inaction or failure on the part of the landlord to initiate any action in the matter would not amount to conferment of right on the tenant. The Supreme Court, accepting the contentions of the landlord, held that the consent has to be with positive action on the part of the landlord so that the tenant can be said to have had the authority to sub-lease his lease rights. Mere silence may not be enough. 21. "Consent" as defined under Section 13 of the Contract Act is as follows: Two or more persons are said to consent with they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. 22. Mere silence may not be enough. 21. "Consent" as defined under Section 13 of the Contract Act is as follows: Two or more persons are said to consent with they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. 22. "Consent" as per OxFord Dictionary means that "to acquiescence" or "to agree". To understand the difference between acquiescence and consent, the observations of their Lord ship Shaw, L.J., in Bell v. Alfred Franks and Barlett Co. Ltd. reported in 1980 (1) A.E.R. 356, would be relevant for the purpose of deciding this case as to whether the landlord had expressed any consent or not. What is meant by acquiescence? It may involve no more than a merely passive attitude, doing nothing at all. It requires as an essential factor that there was knowledge of what was acquiesced in. In this case it is not in controversy that there was such knowledge on the part of the plaintiff's predecessor in title that the garage was used in the way in which it was If acquiescence is something passive in the face of knowledge, what does "consent" mean? In the context of the contract implicit in the subsection, the only practical and sensible distinction that can be drawn is that if acquiescence can arise out of passive failure to do anything, consent must involve a positive demonstrative act, something of an affirmative kind. It is not to be implied, because the resort to implication betokens an absence of express affirmation. The only sense in which there can be implied consent is where a consent is demonstrated, not by language but by some positive act other than words which amounts to an affirmation of what is being done and goes beyond mere acquiescence in it. 23. In The Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Hotel Radha (Pvt.) Ltd., reported in 2007(2) CTC 164, the Division Bench, taking into consideration the expression "Public Interest", and Rule 19(A)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (Licence and Permit) Rules, held that the licence could be granted only on the consent or No Objection Certificate from the land owner and upheld the orders of the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise or the Government, as the case may be, returning the application filed by the licencee for want of consent from the owner of the land. On facts of that case, when the licence was granted in the year 1984, since there was no objection from the appellant and the licence being periodically renewed for 14 years till the orders of the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise in 1999, the Division Bench held that there was an implied consent given by the owner of the land for running a bar and for renewal of licence. However, the Division Bench made it clear that in future, if the land belonging to the appellant therein is to be used either for retail vending or for running a bar for IMFL, the Government shall not issue licence, unless No Objection Certificate is produced or consent is obtained from the appellant-Corporation. Pleadings disclose that FL3 licence to possess and sell liquor in the hotel was granted, pursuant to the lease agreement dated 20.03.2000 and it was periodically renewed till 19.03.2007 and there was no objection from the land owner. The conduct of the landlord coupled with the restricted covenant certainly gives an inference that there was an implied consent for the grant of licence as well as its renewal till the expiry of the lease period, 19.03.2007. Therefore, when there was a positive act of not objecting to the renewal of licence during the period of lease, it could be reasonably inferred that there is an element of implied consent. But in the case on hand, when the landlord has made a specific objection for renewal of licence, then there cannot be any inference of implied consent, just because he has failed to return the advance amount and take back possession, or for that matter failed to appear for the enquiry. Mere inaction or lack of initiation on the part of the landlord will not partake the character of implied consent, when there is an objection for renewal.” (xi) She also relied on S. Mohan Sambasivam vs. The Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise (02.02.1997 - MADHC) : MANU/TN/0111/1998, wherein, it was held as follows: “Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submitted that for the purpose of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, the only question that has to be considered is 'lawful possession.' In this case, the petitioner cannot be said as in wrongful possession. If he is originally a tenant, merely because the title changes, he cannot be termed as a person in unlawful possession. If he is originally a tenant, merely because the title changes, he cannot be termed as a person in unlawful possession. I think that the said submission also cannot be accepted for a moment. Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (Retail Vending) Rules, 1989, deals with Grant of licence'. The said Rule was amended as per G.O.Ms. No. 999, Home, Prohibition and Excise (XV) Dept., dated 27.11.1990. After the amendment, sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 of the Rules reads thus:- "(1) Within seven days of receipt of the order of confirmation of the sale of the privilege in Form V, the auction purchaser shall make an application in Form VI to the licensing authority for the grant of the licence together with the application fee specified in sub-rule (3) a certificate in Form III from the Excise Officer or an officer or an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Tahsildar duly authorised by the Collector regarding suitability and also ownership or lease of the building for not less than a year of the shop from where he intends to sell liquor, and a xerox copy of the document showing that the auction purchaser himself is the owner of the building or a xerox copy of the lease agreement executed with the landlord of the building wherein the proposed shop is to be located." Column (9) in Form VI also insists either ownership or lease for a minimum period of one year. Even in the case of renewal, Column (8) in Form VIII also contemplates lawful possession. The word that is used is "further period of one year." We have to rely on the word 'further', which is referred to in column (9) in Form VI. That means the possession must be as a lessee. 22. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice the decisions reported in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P. and others, MANU/SC/0035/1996 : AIR1996SC140 which was a case Under the Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Rules. The question that came up for consideration in that case was what is meant by 'lawful possession' under that Act. 22. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice the decisions reported in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P. and others, MANU/SC/0035/1996 : AIR1996SC140 which was a case Under the Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Rules. The question that came up for consideration in that case was what is meant by 'lawful possession' under that Act. Their Lordships followed an earlier decision of that Court, which came under the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, reported in M.C. Chockaligam and others v, V. Manickavasagam and others, MANU/SC/0338/1973 : [1974]2SCR143 wherein, their Lordship at para 15 of the judgment, held thus:- "Turning to Rule 13, even in the first pan if the applicant for the licence is the owner of the property he has to produce before the licensing authority the necessary records not only relating to his ownership but also regarding his possession. It is implicit, that the owner having a title to the property, if he can satisfy the licensing authority with regard to his possession also, will indeed be in 'lawful' possession, although the word 'lawful' is not used in the first part. It is in that context that the word 'possession' is even not necessary to be qualified by 'lawful' in the first part of Rule 13. If, however, the applicant for the licence is not the owner, there is no question of his showing title to the property and the only requirement of the law is to produce to the satisfaction of the authority documentary evidence with regard to his lawful possession of the property. The word 'lawful', therefore naturally assumes significance in the second part while it was not even necessary in the first part. The fact after expiry of the lease the tenant will be able to continue in possession of the property within the meaning of Rule 13. Lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. This Court in Lalu Yeshwant Singh's case, had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected by taw against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession." (Italics Supplied) The above passage was extracted in the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Chockalingam's case, 1914 (1) SCC 48. Their Lordships declared that the relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. I have already considered and held that without the consent of respondents 5 and 6, they cannot be declared as landlords of the petitioner and if there is no landlord the petitioner cannot be treated as a tenant. The Rent Control Act also may not have any application in such cases. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice certain civil litigations pending before the Civil Court and his possession should be protected. I do not think that on the basis of interim orders or the Judgment of Civil Court, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. Juridical possession is a possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession. As was held in Chockalingam's case, MANU/SC/0338/1973 : [1974]2SCR143 and the decision R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P., . MANU/SC/0035/1996 : AIR1996SC140 relied on by the counsel for the petitioner, the same cannot be equated with the lawful possession. In this case, lawful possession alone will not be sufficient. Possession must be either as a owner or as a tenant, which the petitioner has miserably failed to prove. The order of injunction only prevents respondents 5, 6 and others from disturbing his possession. In this case, lawful possession alone will not be sufficient. Possession must be either as a owner or as a tenant, which the petitioner has miserably failed to prove. The order of injunction only prevents respondents 5, 6 and others from disturbing his possession. It cannot declare that the petitioner is a tenant under Respondents 5 and 6.” (xii) By placing reliance on the above decisions, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that when the appellant has become the owner of the property in question on the basis of the sale deed executed by the Court, the sixth respondent has no right to place reliance on the lease agreement which they entered into with the erstwhile owner. In any event, the erstwhile owner lost the legal battle and the sixth respondent was inducted as a lessee during the subsistence of the litigation. The result of the litigation in favour of the appellant binds the sixth respondent and therefore, the sixth respondent can no longer place reliance on the covenants contained in the lease deed they have entered into with the erstwhile owner. While so, the learned Judge ought not to have passed the order dated 17.10.2023 at the stage of admission of the writ petition without hearing the appellant. If the appellant was heard, they could have placed the above facts for consideration of the Writ Court. (xiii) Above all, the learned counsel for the appellant invited the attention of this Court to the order dated 13.10.2023 passed in WP No. 17387 of 2023 filed by the appellant. The said Writ Petition was filed praying for issuing a Writ of Mandamus, forbearing the official respondents from granting or renewing the FL.2 License of Haddows Club, Chennai i.e., the 5th respondent herein by considering their representation dated 24.04.2023. When the said Writ Petition was taken up for hearing on 13.10.2023, it was submitted on behalf of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent herein that the FL2 license has been suspended and therefore nothing survives for consideration. By recording the same, WP No. 17387 of 2023 filed by the appellant was dismissed as having become infructuous. However, within four days, the writ petitioner-sixth respondent has filed the instant writ petition No. 30238 of 2023 by suppressing the order dated 13.10.2023 in WP No. 17387 of 2023, filed the instant Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2023 before the very same Court. However, within four days, the writ petitioner-sixth respondent has filed the instant writ petition No. 30238 of 2023 by suppressing the order dated 13.10.2023 in WP No. 17387 of 2023, filed the instant Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2023 before the very same Court. In WP No. 30238 of 2023, it was contended by the writ petitioner-sixth respondent as though the lease deed in their favour is subsisting and it is valid till 30.09.2028. It is on the basis of such representation, the order dated 17.10.2023 was passed by the learned Judge, which is assailed in the present Writ Appeal. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the writ petitioner-sixth respondent has approached this Court with unclean hands and the learned Judge ought not to have passed the order dated17.10.2023 at the admission stage. In such circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant prayed for setting aside the order dated 17.10.2023 passed in WP No. 30238 of 2023 and to allow the writ appeal as prayed for. 7...... (i) Opposing the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel for the contesting sixth respondent in this appeal, invited the attention of this Court to the amenities/lease agreements dated 05.09.1994, 05.07.2000, 04.12.2002, 21.02.2008 and 02.04.2013 entered into with the original owner. As per the lease agreements, the lease period will be in force till the year 2028, and therefore, the terms and conditions with which the sixth respondent had entered into a lease agreement with the erstwhile owner will bind the appellant in all respects. Even though the appellant is one of the co-sharers of the subject property and had signed the sale deed in favour of the appellant, the fact remains that the sixth respondent is a registered society having more than 1500 members. The sixth respondent is therefore a legal entity and can never be identified with the individuals or erstwhile owners of the subject property. At the time of execution of the sale deed in favour of the appellant, the appellant was fully aware of the fact that the sixth respondent is running a club having 1500 members on its roll. The sixth respondent is therefore a legal entity and can never be identified with the individuals or erstwhile owners of the subject property. At the time of execution of the sale deed in favour of the appellant, the appellant was fully aware of the fact that the sixth respondent is running a club having 1500 members on its roll. However, based on the sale conferred in https://www.mhc.tnf.agovvo.inu/jurd isof the appellant, the appellant is attempting to arm twist the sixth respondent and using all force to evict the sixth respondent club, which is running for the past more than three decades. In any event, the currency of the lease executed in favour of the sixth respondent is in force and it is valid upto the year 2028. The appellant was fully aware of the same at the time of the execution of the sale deed in their favour. The appellant, without seeking to take possession of the property in occupation of the sixth respondent by following the due process of law, submitted a representation to the official respondents and suspended the liquor licence issued to the sixth respondent. Thus, the appellant is attempting to achieve something which they could not achieve by following the due process of law. It is in those circumstances, the learned Judge has rightly held that the remedy of the appellant lies elsewhere to take possession of the demised premises and if the appellant desires, they can approach the competent Civil Court for appropriate remedy. The learned Senior counsel therefore submitted that such a conclusion reached by the learned Judge is justified given the facts and circumstances of the present case. (ii) The learned Senior counsel for the sixth respondent further submitted that the official respondents did not conduct any enquiry with the sixth respondent pursuant to the order passed by this Court in WP No. 30238 of 2023. On the other hand, by merely referring to the directions issued in WP No. 30238 of 2023, the official respondents have suspended the FL2 license issued to the sixth respondent. Therefore, challenging the order of suspension, the sixth respondent has filed the writ petition. The learned Judge, on considering the entire facts concluded that the order of suspension has been passed without putting the sixth respondent on notice and accordingly directed the official respondents to revoke the order of suspension passed against the sixth respondent. Therefore, challenging the order of suspension, the sixth respondent has filed the writ petition. The learned Judge, on considering the entire facts concluded that the order of suspension has been passed without putting the sixth respondent on notice and accordingly directed the official respondents to revoke the order of suspension passed against the sixth respondent. (iii) The learned Senior counsel further submitted that even though the sixth respondent was one of the signatories of the sale deed in favour of the appellant, the sixth respondent has filed the Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2023 in her capacity as Secretary of the Club. Further, the sale deed dated 19.08.2021 was executed in favour of the appellant in compliance of the order passed by the Executing Court and not by the sixth respondent individually. (iv) As far as the order dated 17.10.2023 passed in WP No. 30238 of2023 is concerned, the learned Senior counsel for the sixth respondent submitted that in WP No. 30238 of 2023, the sixth respondent has challenged the validity of the order of suspension of FL2 license and taking note of the narrow scope of the prayer sought for, the learned Judge has rightly allowed the writ petition on the ground that the suspension of FL2 license was not preceded by any notice or enquiry. Therefore, the learned Judge went on to hold that even if the property is sold to the appellant, still, they are bound by the registered lease agreement in favour of the sixth respondent and if the appellant has any grievance, it is for the appellant to work out their remedy before the competent Civil Court. The appellant, without doing so, has come forward with the present Writ Appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Judge in WP No. 30238 of 2023. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel for the sixth respondent submitted that the order dated 17.10.2023 passed by the learned Judge is proper and it calls for no interference by this Court. Accordingly, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-sixth respondent herein prayed for dismissal of the writ appeal and to confirm the order dated 17.10.2023 passed in WP No. 30238 of 2023 by the learned Judge. Accordingly, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-sixth respondent herein prayed for dismissal of the writ appeal and to confirm the order dated 17.10.2023 passed in WP No. 30238 of 2023 by the learned Judge. In support of his contention, the Learned counsel placed reliance on on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Dev Raj Dogra and others vs. Gyan Chand Jain and others, (1981) 2 Supreme Court Cases 675 wherein at para Nos.10 and 11, it was held as under:- "10. Rule 95 and 96 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure makes provisions for enabling a purchaser of immovable property in a court sale after obtaining the necessary certificate from the court in terms of the provisions contained in Rule 94 of the Code to apply for delivery of possession of the immovable property purchased by him at the court sale. Rule 95 provides for actual physical possession and Rule 96 provides for symbolic possession. A plain reading of Rule 95 which we have earlier set out, clearly establishes, that the purchaser will be entitled to physical possession of property purchased and the court will direct delivery of actual possession of the property sold to him by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same, if need be, if the following conditions are satisfied; (1) The property sold must be in the occupation of the judgment debtor (2) The property sold must be in the occupancy of some person on behalf of the judgment debtor (3) The property sold must be in the occupation f some person claiming under a title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to the attachment of the property. 11. Rule 96 on the other hand makes it clear that where the property sold is in the occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same, symbolic possession of the property in the manner provided in the said rule is to be made over to the purchaser after the purchaser has obtained the necessary certificate under Rule 94 of the Code." 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents 1 to 4, the learned Standing counsel for the fifth respondent and the learned Senior counsel appearing for the contesting sixth respondent. We have perused the records placed before us for our consideration. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents 1 to 4, the learned Standing counsel for the fifth respondent and the learned Senior counsel appearing for the contesting sixth respondent. We have perused the records placed before us for our consideration. 9. At the outset, it is to be mentioned that the controversy involved in the present writ petition is as to whether the FL2 license issued in favour of the writ petitioner/sixth respondent can be extended in the absence of consent of the land owner/appellant. 10. The writ petitioner-sixth respondent is running a club in the premises in question, where they serve liquor to their members. For the purpose of serving liquor, FL2 license has been obtained and it has been renewed from time to time with the consent of the erstwhile owner. 11. The undisputed facts that are germane for deciding the issues under consideration are that the appellant is the owner of the land situated at Plot No.10, comprised in R.S.No.106/3, Nungambakkam, Chennai to an extent of 8 grounds and 2354 sq.ft (21554 sq.ft.) with building No.6, Kushkumar Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai – 600 034. 12. Initially, a sale agreement has been made between P.Gagarathinam Mudaliar, P. Gopirathinam Mudaliar and P. Lavakumar on 12.06.1980 for the total sale consideration of Rs.5,40,000/-. The appellant had paid a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as an advance amount on the date of the sale agreement and it was agreed that the remaining sale consideration of Rs.4,40,000/- will be paid at the time of execution of sale. 13. The vendors had failed to perform as per the sale agreement and failed to execute the sale deed as per the sale agreement dated 12.06.1980, though the appellant was willing to pay the remaining sale consideration amount of Rs.4,40,000/- as per the terms agreed upon between the parties. As such, the appellant had filed a Specific Performance suit in CS No.130/1981 before this Hon’ble Court on 24.02.1981 against the vendors. After a full- fledged trial, this Hon’ble Court passed final judgment on 15.03.1991 decreeing the suit, as follows:- "i. That the suit is decreed directing the defendants 2 to 6 to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit property infavour of the plaintiff within a period of two months, in default the sale deed shall be executed by court and got registered. ii. ii. That the defendants 2 to 6 will be at liberty to withdraw the sum of Rs.4,40,000/- from court deposit on execution and registration of the sale deed. iii. Defendants 2 to 6 shall pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiff." 14. Against the said judgment the vendors had filed appeal in OSA No.93/1991 before this Hon’ble Court. The Hon’ble Division Bench had disposed of the OSA by order dated 29.01.2007, with following directions:- "In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree of the learned single judge is modified and instead of decree for specific performance of the agreement, we direct that the defendants/appellants shall be liable to pay a sum of Rs.2 Crores to the plaintiff, in discharge of their entire liability. Such amount should be paid or deposited in court on or before 31.03.2007, failing which such amount shall carry interest at the rate of 10% per annum thereafter. The amount deposited by the plaintiff is permitted to be withdrawn by the plaintiff along with the accused interest. The parties shall bear their own costs throughout." 15. Against the judgment and decree dated 29.01.2007 passed in OSA No.93/1991, the appellant had filed Civil Appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.13516/2015 and after hearing both sides the Hon’ble Supreme Court had passed order on 12.10.2020 as follows:- "The conduct of the appellate who is ready and willing throughout to perform its part of the bargain, we think this is a fit case in which the Division Bench judgment should be set aside. As a result, the decree passed by the Single Judge is restored. Since the appellant itself offered a sum of Rs.1.25 crores to the Division bench, it must be made to pay this amount to the respondents within a period of eight weeks from the date of this judgment. The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs." 16. Thereafter the vendors/judgment debtors had filed review petition in RP(C) No.1978/2020 against the order dated 12.10.2020 passed in CA No.13516/2015, and the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The order as follows:- "Delay Condoned. Application for oral hearing is rejected. The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs." 16. Thereafter the vendors/judgment debtors had filed review petition in RP(C) No.1978/2020 against the order dated 12.10.2020 passed in CA No.13516/2015, and the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The order as follows:- "Delay Condoned. Application for oral hearing is rejected. Having carefully gone through the Review Petition, the order under challenge and the papers annexed therewith, we are satisfied that there is no error apparent on the face of the record, warranting reconsideration of the order impugned. The Review Petition is accordingly dismissed." 17. Thereafter the vendors had not executed the sale deed, and therefore the appellant had filed a contempt petition in CP (C) No.302/2021 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on 23.07.2021 was pleased to pass the following orders:- "Having gone through the contempt petition and the reply, we are clear that the alleged contemnors are moving pillar and post to see that the single judge’s order, which was restored by us on 12.10.2020 is rendered ineffective. We, therefore, direct that the single judge, madras High Court execute a sale deed infavour of the contempt petitioner within a period of four weeks from today. We are informed that the contempt petitioner is ready with Rs.1.25 Crores which may be deposited with the Registrar, Madras High Court within a period of two week from today. We close the contempt petition accordingly. The contempt petition and the miscellaneous application stand disposed of." 18. The appellant deposited a sum of Rs.1.25 Crores with the Registrar by Demand Draft dated 29.07.2021 and subsequently this Hon’ble Court directed the Registry to execute sale deed in favour of the appellant herein (plaintiff in the suit) in Appl. No.2601/2021 in CS no.130/1981. This Hon’ble Court had executed a sale deed in Doc No.838/2021 in favour of the appellant and the same was registered on 19.08.2021 before the Sub- Registration District of Joint-II, Central Chennai, to an extent of 8 grounds and2354 square feet (21554 sq.ft.). 19. It is seen that even after the execution of the sale deed, the judgment debtors did not hand over the possession of the property to the appellant. 19. It is seen that even after the execution of the sale deed, the judgment debtors did not hand over the possession of the property to the appellant. The appellant claims that even after 41 years of litigation, and having the sale deed executed through this Hon’ble Court itself, they are trying to evade handing over possession to the appellant, who is now the rightful and lawful owner of the property. Appropriate proceedings for execution of the decree have also been initiated by the appellant herein by filing E.P.No.59/2023 which is pending on the file of this Court. 20. On the subject property, a Club with a Bar cum Restaurant in the th name and style of Haddows Club- 6 respondent is being run, of which the Secretary is one Ms. Shwetha Kumar, who is none other than one of the judgment debtors herself. Under the guise of running the bar, the judgement debtors are evading handing over of possession. It is the further specific claim th of the appellant that though they approached the 6 respondent to vacate the th subject property after they became the owner of the property, the 6 respondent failed to hand over the possession of the property till date and is continuing to run the Bar at the Haddows Club. 21. On knowing that the 6 respondent’s FL.2 licence had expired th and without getting renewal the 6 respondent is running restaurant and bar in the subject property, the appellant made a detailed representation cum th objection before the respondents 1 to 4 not to grant or renew the 6 respondent’s FL.2 licence situated at Plot No.10, RS No.106/3 (New RS No.106/20), Door No.6, Kushkumar Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai, as the property belongs to the petitioner and the appellant has not granted any th permission to the 6 respondent for running business in the above address by entering into any lease or licence agreement. Based on the appellant’s representation dated 10.02.2023, the Commissioner (Prohibition and Excise) had forwarded the representation cum objection to the District Collector, Chennai and directed him to file a detailed report after carrying out inspection of the premises by the Deputy Commissioner (Excise), Chennai. 22. Based on the appellant’s representation dated 10.02.2023, the Commissioner (Prohibition and Excise) had forwarded the representation cum objection to the District Collector, Chennai and directed him to file a detailed report after carrying out inspection of the premises by the Deputy Commissioner (Excise), Chennai. 22. Since the respondents had not passed any order nor conducted any enquiry, the appellant filed a writ petition in WP no.17387/2023 forbearing the official respondents from granting or renewing the FL.2 Licence of Haddows th Club, Chennai i.e., the 5 respondent therein by considering the appellant’s representation dated 24.04.2023. During the pendency of the said writ petition rd this Hon’ble Court passed an order dated 13.06.2023 directing the 3 respondent to file the inspection report as specified in letter dated 03.04.2023, on the next hearing i.e., on 14.07.2023, pursuant to which the Deputy Commissioner (Excise), Chennai conducted the detailed enquiry by letter dated13.09.2023 stating that they are unable to recommend the request of Tvl.Haddows Club for renewal of FL2 licence for the year 2023-2024, and nd thereafter the licence renewal was rejected by the 2 respondent and the FL2 th licence was suspended. At this juncture, the 6 respondent challenged the nd order dated 21.09.2023 passed by the 2 respondent suspending the FL2 licence by way of WP No.30238/2023. The writ petition was allowed and hence, this writ appeal. 23. A perusal of the order under appeal would indicate that the order had been passed without any notice or opportunity to the appellant at whose very instance, the FL2 licence came to be denied for renewal. In the order of th the District Collector dated 13.09.2023, it was made clear that the 6 respondent is not in possession of any valid sale deed or lease or licence deed and hence, the FL2 licence cannot be renewed. It has also been stated in the said report in clear terms that the present owners of the property are vehemently objecting for renewal of FL2 licence to the Club stating that they have not entered into any Lease Deed with the present owners of the property. The said order also states that while applying for licence renewal, the applicant has to upload several documents, one of which relates to ownership details of the premises in respect of which the licence is sought for. The said order also states that while applying for licence renewal, the applicant has to upload several documents, one of which relates to ownership details of the premises in respect of which the licence is sought for. Such ownership details include details such as whether the property is in lawful occupation of the applicant as their own property, rental or leased out property, and the Patta Copy/Rental Deed/Registered Lease Agreement as the case may be, have to be th submitted. Noting that in the present case the applicant 6 respondent was not in position of any valid document as required by the authorities, the report states as follows:- “…. While things being so M/s Ferdous Estates Private Limited, rep. by its Director, M.H. Ferdous Begum Mohamed Haneefa, G-18, Ground Floor, C Block, marina Square, No.26/27, Santhome High Road, Mylapore, Chennai – 600 004 had submitted petitions stating that they have become the absolute owner of the said premises measuring 08 grounds and 2354 sq.ft. in which the said club is functioning by virtue of a deed of sale registered as document No.838 of 2021. The present owners of the property vehemently objecting for renewal of FL2 licence to the Club authorities stating that they have not entered into any lease deed or partnership deed with the present owners of the property. …………. In this connection, the licenced FL2 Club was inspected by the District Revenue Officer/Deputy Commissioner(Excise), Chennai District on 13.09.2023 along with Taluk Excise Officer. District Revenue Officer/Deputy Commissioner(Excise) in her inspection report had stated that Tvl.Haddow Club (FL2 Licenced Bar 07/2002-2003) is functioning in the above said address from 2002-2003 onwards. The FL2 Licence for the said club was renewed upto 31.03.2023. The FL2 Licenced club authorities had remitted the privilege fee and other fees for renewal of the licence for the year 2023 to 2024 (i.e. from 01.04.2023 to 31.03.2024) and further stated that authorities is not in a possession of the valid land document obtained from the present Land records i.e., Sale deed/Lease deed/Rental agreement etc., from the present land owners i.e., M/s Ferdous Estates Private Limited, M.H. Ferdous Begum Mohamed Haneefa who entered into Sale deed of the above said land vide document No. No.838/2021 dated: 19.08.2021 and not recommended for renewal of FL2 Licence for the year 2023-2024. I wish to further inform that the Licencee Haddows Club has applied online application vide application no.2023-2024/155 dated: 03.05.2023 for renewal of licence for the year 2023- 2024 and the same was returned back to the licencee login for clarifications and want of documents and the same is pending at their end. Hence, based on the Taluk Excise Officer report, District Revenue officer/Deputy Commissioner(Excise) i/c., field inspection report and relevant documents this office is unable to recommend the request of Tvl.Haddows Club for renewal of FL2 Licence for the year 2023-2024.” 24. The Learned Judge has passed the order on the basis of a claim th made by the 6 respondent-writ petitioner therein that they had a right of possession under a lease agreement with the then owner of the property on 17.10.2018 for a period of 10 years. It is seen that the lease deed has been executed by one Basant Kumar, Geetha Kumar and her daughter Shwetha th Kumar. Shwetha Kumar, who is the Secretary of the 6 respondent Club, was one of the vendors as can be seen from the sale deed executed on 19.08.2021 in favour of the appellant herein. 25. A perusal of the lease deed dated 17.10.2018 would show that the schedule annexed to it and that of the sale deed in favour of the appellant is one and the same. When all the parties-judgment debtors were represented before the Supreme Court and also shown as vendors in the sale deed executed by the High Court in favour of the appellant herein, it is not understandable as to how one Shwetha Kumar, her mother, Geetha Kumar and one Basant th Kumar alone had entered into the lease deed with the 6 respondent. Further, the content of the lease deed that the other heir Sathya Ranganathan has died issueless is also factually wrong as the sale deed shows that she is survived by and represented by her two daughters, who were also brought on record before the Supreme Court. The lease deed does not also show the consent of the other parties. Further, the content of the lease deed that the other heir Sathya Ranganathan has died issueless is also factually wrong as the sale deed shows that she is survived by and represented by her two daughters, who were also brought on record before the Supreme Court. The lease deed does not also show the consent of the other parties. In this regard when this issue was raised, the counsel for the respondent produced an adoption deed dated 17.04.1995 whereby it has been stated that the twin daughters of Shri.P.Basant Kumar, S/o. late P.Nagarathnam Mudaliar, had executed a deed of adoption whereby he had given his daughters in adoption to his sister Sathya Ranganathan and her husband Shri P.S.Ranganathan. Thereby a feeble attempt was made by the th counsel for the 6 respondent to prove the correctness of the averment in the Lease Deed that Sathya Ranganathan had indeed died issueless. By any stretch of imagination the said Sathya Ranganathan was survived by her daughters, whether natural or adopted. Similarly the other two legal heirs as shown in the sale deed i.e., Sanjana, daughter of late P.Gopirathnam; and Devina, daughter of late P.Gopirathnam, who were also parties before the Supreme Court and also shown as vendors in the sale deed, are conspicuously absent in the lease deed. 26. The further fact that there was an order of status quo issued by the Supreme Court as early as on 20.07.2007 (SLP(C) No.11161/2007) in the appeal, which ultimately culminated in the appeal being allowed in favour of the appellant herein would indicate that the entering of the lease deed coupled with the determination of the interest in the property of the lessor, is hit by Sections 52 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Sections 52 & 111 of the Transfer of Property Act are extracted hereunder for easy reference:- "52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto .— During the [pendency] in any Court having authority 2 [ 3 [within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir] or established beyond such limits] by 4 [the Central Government 5 ***], of 6 [any] suit or proceeding 7 [which is not collusive and] in. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto .— During the [pendency] in any Court having authority 2 [ 3 [within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir] or established beyond such limits] by 4 [the Central Government 5 ***], of 6 [any] suit or proceeding 7 [which is not collusive and] in. which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. 111. Determination of lease.— A lease of immoveable property determines— (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby: (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event—by the happening of such event: (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event—by the happening of such event: (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right: (e) by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement between them: (f) by implied surrender: (g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re- enter 1***; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; 2 [or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event]; and in 1 [any of these cases] the lessor or his transferee 2 [gives notice in writing to the lessee of] his intention to determine the lease: (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other." 27. An analysis of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act indicates that for application of the said section the following conditions have been satisfied:- "1. A suit or a proceeding in which any right to immovable property must be directly and specifically in question, must be pending; 2. The suit or the proceeding shall not be a collusive one; 3. Such property during the pendency of such a suit or proceeding cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the right of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be passed therein except under the authority of Court. In other words, any transfer of such property or any dealing with such property during the pendency of the suit is prohibited except under the authority of Court, if such transfer or otherwise dealing with the property by any party to the suit or proceeding affects the right of any other party to the suit or proceeding under any order or decree which may be passed in the said suit or proceeding. It has to be noted that this section imposes a prohibition on transfer or otherwise dealing with any property during the pendency of a suit provided the conditions laid down in the section are satisfied." 28. In the present case, the litigation had been set in motion in 1981 and the decree of specific performance was issued as early as in 1991. After the order in the Original Side Appeal in 2007, the supreme court passed order of Status quo dated 20.07.2007. Therefore once the order of status quo was passed, the judgment debtors could not have dealt with the property in any manner whatsoever, much less in a manner as to create a leasehold interest in th favour of the 6 respondent which is an entity run by one of the judgment debtors/vendors herself. The order of the supreme court in Civil Appeal No.13516/2015 dated 12.10.2020 had confirmed the decree of specific performance and the review filed by the judgment debtors had also been dismissed immediately thereafter on 15.12.2020. The order of the supreme court in Civil Appeal No.13516/2015 dated 12.10.2020 had confirmed the decree of specific performance and the review filed by the judgment debtors had also been dismissed immediately thereafter on 15.12.2020. Even thereafter the Judgment Debtors had remained steadfast in their disobedience and as such the same had necessitated the following order by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Contempt Petition (C) No.302/2021 dated 23.07.2021:- “Having gone through the contempt petition and the reply, we are clear that the alleged contemnors are moving pillar and post to see that the Single Judge’s order, which was restored by us on 12.10.2020, is rendered ineffective. We, therefore, direct that the single Judge, Madras High Court execute a Sale Deed in favour of the contempt petitioner within a period of four weeks from today. We are informed that the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judcisontempt petitioner is ready with Rs. 1.25 Crores which may be deposited with the Registrar, Madras High Court within a period of two weeks from today. We close the contempt petition accordingly. The Contempt Petition and the Miscellaneous Application stand disposed of.” 29. The above facts make it clear that while the rights of the parties were in a state of animated suspension between 2007 and 2020 and the judgment debtor could not have entered into lease deed during the subsistence of the Status Quo order, their interest in the property finally terminated on 12.10.2020 when the Supreme Court confirmed the decree of Specific performance. Thereafter the manner in which the sale deed came to be executed in favour of appellant has been narrated above. Therefore, seen from any angle the lease in favour of the 6th respondent cannot be used as a document to prove lawful occupation of the premises on the basis of which the FL2 licence can be granted. There is no question of attornment of lease by the present owners in a case of this nature. However, the Learned Judge without th reference to all the background facts and the manner in which the 6 respondent which is an entity owned by the judgment debtor themselves, had obtained the lease, had allowed the writ petition on the strength of the lease deed alone. However, the Learned Judge without th reference to all the background facts and the manner in which the 6 respondent which is an entity owned by the judgment debtor themselves, had obtained the lease, had allowed the writ petition on the strength of the lease deed alone. On the contrary a comprehensive reading of the facts as made out by the documents would prove that the judgment debtors had been wilfully disobeying the orders of this court and the FL2 licence enjoyed by them and now renewed on strength of the order under appeal is nothing short of a fraud being played on the court. As such the licences dated 25.01.2024 (2023-2024) and 12.06.2024 (2024-2025) issued on the strength of the order under appeal th cannot be sustained under law. Therefore, unless the 6 respondent is able to prove lawful occupation of the premises by a valid lease deed obtained by the present owners i.e., the appellant herein, the licences granted cannot stand scrutiny before law. 30. It is also to be noted that in the present Writ Petition No. 30238 of2023, the order dated 13.10.2023 in WP No. 17387 of 2023 has not been referred to. Further, at the time when the order dated 17.10.2023 has been passed, the appellant was not heard and at the stage of admission, the order dated 17.10.2023 has been passed by the learned Judge. Had an opportunity was given to the appellant, the earlier order dated 13.10.2023 in WP No. 17387 of 2023 would have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge and in such event, the learned Judge ought not to have passed the order holding that as long as the lease in favour of the sixth respondent is in force, they are entitled for renewal of the FL2 license. For the purpose of renewal of grant of FL2 license, the consent of the owner of the property is essential. In this case, at the time when Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2023 was taken up for hearing, on behalf of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent it was only contended that the lease in favour of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent contains a clause which prohibits the present owner of the property from disturbing the possession of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent. In this case, at the time when Writ Petition No. 30238 of 2023 was taken up for hearing, on behalf of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent it was only contended that the lease in favour of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent contains a clause which prohibits the present owner of the property from disturbing the possession of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent. If it is so, the appellant, who was arrayed as sixth respondent in WP No. 30238 of 2023, ought to have been heard in the writ petition No. 30238 of 2023. However, without hearing the appellant, at the stage of admission itself, the learned Judge issued a direction to the official respondents to consider renewing the FL2 license in favour of the writ petitioner-sixth respondent. 31. The decisions in R. Rajangam vs. The Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise Chepauk (06.12.2007) and S. Mohan Sambasivam vs. The Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise (02.02.1997), cited and extracted supra, are aptly applicable to the facts of the present case. 32. The decision relied upon by the counsel for the 6 respondent, in Dev Raj Dogra and Ors. Vs Gyan Chand Jain and Ors. 1981 (2) SCC 675 , cited supra, cannot be of any assistance to them as that is a case relating to an auction purchaser wherein it has been specifically mentioned that the appellants therein neither the judgment debtors nor were they in occupation of the property on behalf of the judgment debtors. In such circumstances, the court had held that auction-purchaser who is an outsider and was not a party to the suit resulting in the compromise decree in execution of which the property was put up for sale, is not entitled to recover physical possession from the appellants in view of the provisions contained in O. XXI Rule 95 CPC, and the auction-purchaser must be held to be entitled to symbolic possession in terms of the provisions contained in O.XXI Rule 96 CPC in respect of the portions in occupation of the appellants. In the present case, the appellant had been fighting litigation for ownership and possession of the property for the past 40 years and as such the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as the circumstances stated above would reveal that the lease itself can been created only to defeat the possession of the appellant. 33. 33. A comprehensive reading of the documents and the attendant th circumstances in which the lease deed was executed in favour of the 6 th respondent would show that the 6 respondent is certainly not in lawful occupation of the subject property and such possession under the guise of th having a licence is nothing but evasive tactics adopted by the 6 respondent which is an entity that is not by itself a third party but one run by one of the judgment debtors herself. During the pendency of this appeal, the FL2 licence was also renewed subsequently again and came to be issued on 12.06.2024. 34. In the light of the above discussion and findings, this Court is inclined to set aside the order under appeal on the basis of which the FL2 licence came to be renewed and the proceedings of the respondents rejecting th the request for renewal of licence for FL2 in favour of the 6 respondent, and th the suspension of the FL2 licence is upheld. Further, the 6 respondent is directed to stop operations at the Haddows Club, No.6, Kushkumar Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai forthwith. 35. In the result, the Order dated 17.10.2023 passed in WP No. 30238 of 2023 is set aside. The writ appeal stands allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.