ORDER : (Arun Monga, J.) 1. Petitioner herein is before this Court seeking appointment on the post of Constable Driver pursuant to an advertisement dated 25.05.2018 (Annex.3). 2. Succinctly speaking, relevant facts, as pleaded in the petition are as follows: 2.1 An advertisement dated 25.05.2018 (Annex.3) was issued by the respondent No.2 for the post of Constable in pursuance of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 (as amended) in Part-III for the Rajasthan Police in various Districts / Units / Battalions for Constable General, Constable Driver, Constable Band, Constable Horse Rider, Constable Swan Dal, and Constable Operator, for a total of 13142 vacant posts. The last date for submitting the online application form was 14.06.2018. 2.2 Pursuant to this, the petitioner, being eligible, applied for the post of Constable Driver and filled in all the required information. In the relevant application form, the petitioner had disclosed, inter alia, that an FIR No. 205 dated 07.07.2007 under sections 323, 341, 447, and 504 IPC, which had been lodged against him at Police Station Bhadra. Thereafter, the respondent department issued an Admit Card to the petitioner for appearing in the written examination. The petitioner successfully cleared the written exam and was called for the physical efficiency test, which was to be conducted on 15.09.2018. Subsequently, the final result was issued by the respondent department, in which the petitioner’s name appeared at S.No. 21 along with his roll number. 2.3 The petitioner later came to know that appointment letters were issued to other candidates; however, the same was not issued to him. He immediately sent a detailed letter / representation dated 17.12.2018 to the concerned respondent authority requesting the issuance of an appointment letter, but to date, the appointment / joining has not been provided to the petitioner. 2.4 The petitioner was later informed orally by the Police Headquarters in Jaipur that the appointment letter had not been issued to him due to the pendency of FIR No. 205 dated 07.07.2007 under sections 323, 341, 447, and 504 IPC, which was lodged at Police Station Bhadra. 2.5 Thereafter, the petitioner again submitted a detailed representation dated 11.01.2019, stating that in the aforesaid case, the petitioner had been exculpated as the matter had been compromised between the parties, and the proceedings had been dropped against him by the learned trial court vide its order dated 27.06.2018. 2.5 Thereafter, the petitioner again submitted a detailed representation dated 11.01.2019, stating that in the aforesaid case, the petitioner had been exculpated as the matter had been compromised between the parties, and the proceedings had been dropped against him by the learned trial court vide its order dated 27.06.2018. However, to date, no action has been taken by the respondents on the said representation. Hence, this petition. 3. Stand taken by the respondents in their reply inter alia is that instant matter was examined by the respondents in light of the circular No.1300 dated 28.03.2017, issued by the Department of Home dated 14.08.2013 and Circular dated 15.07.2016 issued by the Department of Personnel, State Government. That it is not a case of clean acquittal. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner, wherein, the petitioner has been acquitted on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties, which clearly shows that the petitioner has not been cleanly acquitted, but he has been acquitted on technical grounds, therefore, he has not been considered suitable for the appointment as per rules and accordingly he has not been issued appointment letter. Therefore, petition deserves to be dismissed as it is devoid of merit. 4. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the respondents and have gone through the case file. Rival arguments have been addressed on the lines of the respective pleadings of the parties. 5. In sum and substance, what boils down for adjudication lies in a very narrow compass i.e. whether the petitioner is dis-entitled to seek benefit of his performance despite his acquittal in the criminal proceedings owing to which his candidature was withheld? 6. The offences under sections 323, 341, 447, and 504 IPC neither involve moral turpitude or nor can they be termed as heinous/serious in nature. None of the circulars dated 28.03.2017, issued by the Department of Home dated 14.08.2013, Circular dated 15.07.2016 issued by the Department of Personnel, State Government referred to and relied upon by the respondents in their written reply has been produced on record. 6.1 Be that as it may, even otherwise, the petitioner has been acquitted of all charges by a competent court of law. Trite it may sound, but on the principle of presumption of innocence, an acquittal restores the petitioner's status as a law-abiding citizen. 6.1 Be that as it may, even otherwise, the petitioner has been acquitted of all charges by a competent court of law. Trite it may sound, but on the principle of presumption of innocence, an acquittal restores the petitioner's status as a law-abiding citizen. The respondents' stand that the acquittal was not "honorable" is merely speculative. The acquittal remains valid unless set aside in appeal. No such appeal against acquittal was filed by the State. Denying the petitioner an appointment solely due to an FIR/trial, in which he has been acquitted by the competent Court, amounts to punishing him by the respondent/prospective employers. 6.2 An individual acquitted after trial cannot be stigmatized for having been part of a criminal trial in past. Moreover, denying an employment opportunity to an accused who is acquitted is against the principle of reintegration of such individuals into society. Being so I see no reason on what grounds the respondents are pleading that the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit of the acquittal. 7. In this context reference may be had to judgment dated 13.05.2024 rendered by me in somewhat similar circumstances in case titled Rajendra Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan,[Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur – S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15957/2021]. Relevant part thereof, being apposite, is reproduced hereinbelow: “12. Having regard to the aforesaid, there is no quibble about the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in as much as a person who wishes to join the police force must be having an impeccable character and integrity and if the offence committed involves any moral turpitude, then the employer is entitled to reject the candidature given the sensitive nature of job which the disciplinary forces are meant for. 13. However, here is a case where the petitioner was involved in an FIR much later after initiation of his selection process. As it turned out due to the delay on the part of the respondents, before he could be appointed, he was struck with the misfortune of being implicated in the FIR in question. 14. Assuming there was no delay on issuing him appointment letter, he would have been in service and in such a situation, naturally, mere registration of an FIR would not have resulted in his ouster subject, of course, to the discretion of the employer to institute appropriate disciplinary proceedings. 15. 14. Assuming there was no delay on issuing him appointment letter, he would have been in service and in such a situation, naturally, mere registration of an FIR would not have resulted in his ouster subject, of course, to the discretion of the employer to institute appropriate disciplinary proceedings. 15. Trite it is that an employer has the discretion to simultaneously proceed against an employee and regardless of the acquittal, in case, the employee is indicted in the civil proceedings, the outcome thereof may render him in a situation where the defence of being acquitted in the criminal proceedings is insignificant. 16. There is no gainsaying to observe that mere registration of an FIR does not reduce a citizen to the status of either a convict or not having a good character. Every citizen is presumed innocent unless proved guilty. In the case in hand it so transpires that the alleged role attributable to the petitioner is not of such a nature so as to either impinge on the nature of duties to be performed by him or otherwise, even bordering moral turpitude. It is stated that the role attributed to petitioner was that merely a cartridge was found in his pocket. It was not a case as if he were carrying the gun, which concededly was in possession of the principal accused. 17. XXXX 18. XXXX 19. Furthermore, in the present case, the petitioner has simply been rejected on the ground that his acquittal is not an honourable acquittal. 20. The controversy in this respect has already been put to rest by my earlier judgment in a case titled Sukhjit Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (CWP No. 9808 of 2003), decided on 13.08.2019, which I rendered while being puisne Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court, which in turn is based on Division Bench judgments rendered by both Punjab and Haryana as well as Madras High Court. For ready reference, relevant thereof is reproduced hereinbelow:- “12. Every acquittal is honourable acquittal. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code nor is there any rule of criminal jurisprudence for treating the effects and consequences of an honourable acquittal from an acquittal on failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Shashi Kumar Vs. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code nor is there any rule of criminal jurisprudence for treating the effects and consequences of an honourable acquittal from an acquittal on failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and another, 2005 (1) SCT 576 relying in turn on another Division Bench of Madras High Court has held that the terms honourable acquittal or fully exonerated unknown in the Criminal Jurisprudence. His Lordship S.S.Nijjar, J. (as he then was of this Court) speaking for the Division Bench observed as below:- 7. In any event, the terms "honourable acquittal" or "fully exonerated" are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325. Rajammannar, C.J. Delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under:- There is no conception like "honourable acquittal" in Criminal Procedure Code The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental Inquiry. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. To such a case Article 193(b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and Haryana 422 (punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, buthis period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and Haryana 422 (punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, buthis period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3,7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.I Part-1, it was observed as follows:- (2) XXX XXX XXX The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted'. The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this" the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.” 8. Same view was taken by me in Shankar Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and other SB Civil Writ Petition No. 756/2022 decided on 18.11.2024. 9. In the light of above discussion, the question framed in para 5 is answered in the negative. It is held that following the acquittal in the criminal proceedings, owing to which the petitioner’s candidature was withheld, he is entitled to seek benefit of his performance. 10. As an upshot, the instant petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to issue appointment letter to the petitioner on the post of driver within a period of 30 days of his approaching the respondents with a web-print of the instant order. 11. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.