JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, C.J. 1. The only issue raised in these appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act’ 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1996’), is to the propriety of the order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rajula passed under Section 34 of the Act’ 1996 while setting aside the Arbitral award holding that the Arbitrator had passed the award without considering the substantive laws and the evidence on record, the Court has proceeded to decide two issues pertaining to the claim of the applicant for additional compensation on merits by appreciation of evidence on record. 2. A perusal of the judgment and order dated 03.01.2022 passed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 indicates that the Court framed nine issues as under: “4. Following issues have been framed vide Exh. 22 for determination of present applications. 1. Whether applicants can point out that impugned order passed by the learned arbitrator case No. 118/2019, Dt. 04/06/2021 is erroneous, capricious and perverse and or is required to set aside on the ground of patent illegality? 2. Whether the applicants / appellants prove that, the disputed arbiter award is in conflict with the public policy of India? 3. Whether the applicants proves that he is entitled to get the additional claim as prayed in to the prayer Ex. 1 & 12 vide Para No. 4 as a additional award? 4. Whether the applicants appellants prove that the compensation given earlier was not adequate? 5. Whether the applicants / appellants proves that the higher market rate was applied in the award of another land owner for the same types of land in same area and rate for the agriculture land, industrial land and non- agriculture land's rate was different and higher than the present disputed land? 6. Whether the applicants / appellants prove that the compensation given for house / building and trees was not adequate and he is entitled to get additional compensation? 7. Whether the opponent / respondent proves that the award passed by the opponent No. 1 is fare, just, proper and decided judiciously? 8. Whether the opponent No. 1 to 3 proves that the objections raised in to the written statements are lawful and the claim petition is required to be disallowed? 9. What order & what decree?” 3. 7. Whether the opponent / respondent proves that the award passed by the opponent No. 1 is fare, just, proper and decided judiciously? 8. Whether the opponent No. 1 to 3 proves that the objections raised in to the written statements are lawful and the claim petition is required to be disallowed? 9. What order & what decree?” 3. Out of these issues, the Issue No.3, as noted hereinabove, pertains to the additional claim made by the applicants with the prayers for making of an additional award. Other Issue Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6, which have been answered in negative pertain to the plea of the applicant that the arbitral award passed under Section 3 (5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 is erroneous, perverse and suffers from patent illegality, and also is in conformity with the public policy. No appeal has been filed by the claimants / applicants. Further, Mr Maulik Nanavati, learned advocate appearing for the appellant does not challenge the findings on Issue Nos. 7 and 8 on the perversity in the Arbitral award as against the appellants. 4. The only challenge before us is to the findings returned on Issue Nos. 3 and 9, wherein the Court, Additional District Judge has proceeded to hold that the applicants were entitled to higher amount of compensation, treating that the acquired land, though, was agricultural in nature, but since the Government has acquired it for Non-agricultural purposes, the applicants are entitled for compensation at Non-agricultural rates. 5. Upon further perusal of the findings returned by the Court, it is evident that it has reached at a conclusion that the Arbitrator has simply agreed to the value of the land fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer to hold that the compensation granted by the Land Acquisition Officer is adequate and reasonable and does not deserve any enhancement. No attempt was made by the Arbitrator to make an independent assessment of the market value on the date of the Notification, taking into consideration all the relevant factors and evidences produced before him. The award passed by the Arbitrator, thus, has completely negated the provisions of Section 3G(7) having acted as an appellate authority over the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Arbitral award had been held to be patently illegal being in conflict with the public policy. The award passed by the Arbitrator, thus, has completely negated the provisions of Section 3G(7) having acted as an appellate authority over the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Arbitral award had been held to be patently illegal being in conflict with the public policy. So far as this part of the order passed by the Court is concerned, there is no challenge before us. 6. A further perusal of the order impugned indicates that the learned Court has proceeded to consider the Valuation Report of the lands of the applicants produced as Exhibits – 38 to 45, prepared by the Government registered Valuer and has recorded that since the acquired land of all the claimants are of agricultural nature and as per the Government approved Valuer, the market value of the acquired land was at present Rs.10,000/- per sq.mts, which is equivalent to the price awarded in another award of Hindorna Village passed in September 2016, the applicants are entitled for the same amount of compensation at the rate of Rs.9545/- per sq.mts. Apart from this, the applicants have also been held entitled to 10% increase in the price of the land and the total amount of compensation was worked out at the rate of Rs.15,758/- per sq.mts. 7. At this juncture, we may note that we find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Court has travelled beyond its jurisdiction conferred under Section 34 of the Act’ 1996 in appreciation of the evidence brought forth by the applicants by acting as the court of appeal. The submission, that the Court under Section 34 of the Act’ 1996 cannot look into the merits of the award as a court of appeal, is found to be in conformity with the settled position of law pertaining to the scope of jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 of the Act’ 1996. 8. As per the settled position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the catena of decisions, the award can be set aside only if it is against the public policy of India or if the award is found to be contrary to :- a) Fundamental policy of Indian Law; or b) the interest of India; or c) justice or morality; or d) if it is patently illegal. 9. 9. In its limited scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act’ 1996, the Court though has power to set aside the award being patently illegal, if any of the ground stated above is made out, but it would not be open for the Court in the proceedings under Section 34 to modify the award. It is settled that if the award is found patently illegal, the appropriate course to be adopted in such an event is to set aside the award. [Reference: National Highways Authority Of India Vs. P. Nagaraju Alias Cheluvaiah And Another [ (2022) 15 SCC 1 ] 10. As held by the Apex court in Kinnari Mullick VS Ghanshyam Das Damani [ (2018) 11 SCC 328 ] and in I-Pay Clearing Service Private Limited Vs. ICICI Bank Limited [2022 SCC Online 4] only two options are available to the Court considering the appeal under Section 34 / 37 of the Act, 1996 :- i) either to relegate the parties for fresh arbitration; or ii) to consider the appeal on merits on the basis of material available on record within the scope of the jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act, 1996. 11. It is settled that once the Court has reached at the conclusion on consideration of illegality and validity of the award passed by the Arbitrator within the limited jurisdiction available under Sections 34 / 37 of the Act, 1996, that the award suffers from patent illegality, it has to set aside the award passed by the Arbitrator and leave the parties to pursue their remedies in accordance with law. 12. As there is no challenge to the findings returned by the Court on the validity of the Arbitral award, we confirm the order passed by the Court in setting aside the Arbitral award holding that the Arbitrator has passed the award without considering the substantive laws and the evidence produced by both the sides. 13. We further affirm the findings returned by the Court that the Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) cannot act as an appellate authority to the Land Acquisition Officer, rather he was required to make an independent assessment of the market value of the land on the date of the notification by taking into consideration all the documents provided by the parties independently. We further affirm the findings returned by the Court that the Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) cannot act as an appellate authority to the Land Acquisition Officer, rather he was required to make an independent assessment of the market value of the land on the date of the notification by taking into consideration all the documents provided by the parties independently. We also affirm the findings returned by the learned Court that the Arbitral award is a non-speaking, capricious and random order and in absence of any reasoning assigned by the Arbitrator, the award is illegal, unjust and improper. We affirm the answer to Issue Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6 given by the Court in affirmative, holding that in view of the patent illegality, the interference of the Court under Section 34 was necessary. 14. The result is that the order impugned dated 03.01.2022 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rajula in setting aside the arbitral award dated 04.06.2021 in Arbitration Case Nos. 117/2019 to 124/2019 is liable to be upheld to the above extent. However, on Issue Nos. 3 and 9 the Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction and hence, findings on those issues are hereby set aside. 15. Now the question is whether on the claim of the applicants to higher amount of compensation, the matter is required to be remitted for re-consideration by the Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act’ 1956. 16. The arguments of Mr Maulik Nanavati, the learned counsel for the Appellant – NHAI that this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act’ 1996 cannot remand the matter to the same Arbitrator is based on the decisions of the Apex Court in Kinnari Mullick (supra) and Dr. A Parthasarathy and others (supra). 16. The arguments of Mr Maulik Nanavati, the learned counsel for the Appellant – NHAI that this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act’ 1996 cannot remand the matter to the same Arbitrator is based on the decisions of the Apex Court in Kinnari Mullick (supra) and Dr. A Parthasarathy and others (supra). We may note the legal position stated in Kinnari Mullick (supra), that under Section 34 of the Act’ 1996 no power has been invested by the Parliament in the Court to remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings as provided under Sub- Section (4) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996, was when it was noted that the Court under Section 34 had set aside the award on the ground that it was completely lacking in reasons and the parties were left free to pursue their remedies in accordance with law. On an appeal preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court, under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 though the Court was agreeable to the order of setting aside the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, but had decided to relegate the parties before the same Arbitral Tribunal by sending the award back with the direction to assign reasons in support of its award. In view of these directions issued by the Division Bench in the suo motu exercise of power in the appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996, it was held by the Apex Court in Paragraphs ‘15’ and ‘16’ as under: “15. On a bare reading of this provision, it is amply clear that the Court can defer the hearing of the application filed under Section 34 for setting aside the award on a written request made by a party to the arbitration proceedings to facilitate the Arbitral Tribunal by resuming the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. The quintessence for exercising power under this provision is that the arbitral award has not been set aside. Further, the challenge to the said award has been set up under Section 34 about the deficiencies in the arbitral award which may be curable by allowing the Arbitral Tribunal to take such measures which can eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. Further, the challenge to the said award has been set up under Section 34 about the deficiencies in the arbitral award which may be curable by allowing the Arbitral Tribunal to take such measures which can eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. No power has been invested by Parliament in the Court to remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in sub-section (4) of Section 34. This legal position has been expounded inMcDermott International Inc.[McDermott International Inc.v.Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 ] In para 8 of the said decision, the Court observed thus : (Bhaskar Industrial case[Bhaskar Industrial Development Ltd.v.South Western Railway, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 8330] , SCC OnLine Kar) “8. …Parliament has not conferred any power of remand to the Court to remit the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Act. The object of sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Act is to give an opportunity to the Arbitral Tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings or to enable it to take such other action which will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.” 16. In any case, the limited discretion available to the Court under Section 34(4) can be exercised only upon a written application made in that behalf by a party to the arbitration proceedings. It is crystal clear that the Court cannot exercise this limited power of deferring the proceedings before it suo motu. Moreover, before formally setting aside the award, if the party to the arbitration proceedings fails to request the Court to defer the proceedings pending before it, then it is not open to the party to move an application under Section 34(4) of the Act. For, consequent to disposal of the main proceedings under Section 34 of the Act by the Court, it would become functus officio. In other words, the limited remedy available under Section 34(4) is required to be invoked by the party to the arbitral proceedings before the award is set aside by the Court.” 17. A careful reading of the aforesaid paragraphs indicates that it was held by the Apex Court that after formally setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 by the Court, it would become functus officio. A careful reading of the aforesaid paragraphs indicates that it was held by the Apex Court that after formally setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 by the Court, it would become functus officio. The limited remedy available under Section 34(4) of the Act, 1996 keeping it open for the party to move an application to adjourn the proceedings to give the Arbitral Tribunal an opportunity to resume the Arbitral proceedings and take such other action to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the Arbitral award, had not been exercised by the parties in the said case. The remedy available under Section 34 (4) is required to be invoked by the party to the Arbitral proceedings before the award is set aside by the Court. It was noted that no formal application was filed by the respondent therein before the Division bench invoking its jurisdiction under Section 34 (4) of the Act, 1996 before the Court under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 had set aside the award and the Division bench under Section 37 had rejected the appeal. The Division Bench, thus, could not have adverted to the Section 34 (4) of the Act, 1996, which is a repository of power invested in the Court. 18. It was, thus, held by the Apex Court in Kinnari Mullick (supra) that after the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal has been quashed in its entirety and the appeal under Section 34 was no more pending before the Court, invocation of jurisdiction under Section 34 (4) suo motu by the Division bench in appeal under Section 37 of the Act’ 1996 was a wrong exercise of power conferred under the Act’ 1996. 19. Taking note of the above decision, the Apex Court in Dr. A Parthasarathy (supra) has further observed, that the High Court has no jurisdiction to remand the matter to the same Arbitrator unless it is consented by both the parties that the matter be remitted to the same Arbitrator. 20. We find it pertinent to note that under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, the appointment of Arbitrator is made by the Central Government and the parties to the dispute namely the land holders or the National Highways Authority are not even consulted in the matter of appointment of arbitrator. 20. We find it pertinent to note that under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, the appointment of Arbitrator is made by the Central Government and the parties to the dispute namely the land holders or the National Highways Authority are not even consulted in the matter of appointment of arbitrator. The Court may also take note of the fact that generally or normally the Collector of the District concerned is being appointed as an Arbitrator by the notifications issued by the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. The result is that the parties have no choice in the matter of appointment of arbitrator. There is, thus, no question of seeking consent of the parties in the matter of remitting the claim put up by the claimant to the same Arbitrator. The fact remains that the Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government is a Statutory Arbitrator, who happens to be the Collector, Amreli, in the instant case, before whom the claim was put forth by the applicants / land holders herein to the additional compensation of their lands, by invoking the provisions of Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. The Arbitrator and Collector had not considered the facts of the case and the evidence on record, which has resulted in setting aside the arbitral award suffering from patent illegality. 21. Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 provides for determination of amount payable as compensation. Sub-section (7) of Section 3G provides the manner in which the competent authority or the arbitrator shall determine the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), as the case maybe, taking into consideration all the factors provided in Clauses ‘(a)’ to ‘(d)’ of sub-section (7). 22. A careful reading of sub-section (1) and subsection (5) in conjunction with sub-section (7) of Section 3G makes it evident that the jurisdiction of the Competent authority or the Arbitrator in the matter of determination of compensation for the land acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 is concurrent. The Statutory Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government under Section 3G(5) is required to give an independent consideration to the claim of the parties for redetermination of the amount of compensation, on a dispute raised by either of the parties, about the determination made by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). 23. The Statutory Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government under Section 3G(5) is required to give an independent consideration to the claim of the parties for redetermination of the amount of compensation, on a dispute raised by either of the parties, about the determination made by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). 23. As noted hereinabove, in the instant case, the Statutory Arbitrator namely the Collector had rejected the claim of the land holders, considering itself as an appellate authority without going into the details of the evidence adduced before it. 24. In this scenario, if the land holders are left to invoke the provisions of Section 3G(5) by moving a fresh application again for putting up their claim before the Collector, who is a Statutory Arbitrator appointed by the notification of the Central Government, it would cause serious injustice to them. 25. We may take aid of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of National Highways Authority Of India Vs. P. Nagaraju Alias Cheluvaiah And Another [ (2022) 15 SCC 1 ] wherein while observing the Arbitral award under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 being patently illegal as appropriate reasons had not been indicated by the Arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion to uniformly adopt the value in respect of the acquired land and that the National Highways Authority of India did not have sufficient opportunity before the Arbitrator to controvert the material sought to be relied upon by the Arbitrator, the Apex Court has held the award being contrary to Section 28(2) and Section 31(3) of the Act, 1996. And further remitted the matter to the Arbitrator for fresh consideration on the aspects of the appropriate market value fixed for the lands, which were subject matter of acquisition, based on appropriate evidence available before it and on assigning reasons for conclusion to be reached by the Arbitrator. 26. In these facts and circumstances of the instant case, considering the manner in which the Statutory Arbitrator is appointed under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, we find that the rationale of the decision of the Apex Court in Kinnari Mullick (supra) and Dr. 26. In these facts and circumstances of the instant case, considering the manner in which the Statutory Arbitrator is appointed under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, we find that the rationale of the decision of the Apex Court in Kinnari Mullick (supra) and Dr. A. Parthasarathy (supra) cannot be applied to hold that the parties herein cannot be remitted back to the same Arbitrator, who is the Collector, Amreli appointed as Arbitrator by the Central Government for fresh consideration on merits. 27. There is another aspect of the matter. In the instant case, the arbitral award was passed on 04.06.2021 and the appeal under Section 34 filed by the National Highways Authority of India has been decided vide judgment and order dated 03.01.2022. This appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 was registered on 19.02.2022 and is being decided today i.e. 24.07.2024 holding that the Court under Section 34 of the Act’ 1996 was incompetent to appreciate the evidence to allow the claim of the land holders for higher compensation. If, in the above circumstances of the present case, the matter is not relegated to the Statutory Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government for fresh consideration, it would cause serious prejudice to the land holders as their fresh applications may not be considered on the ground of delay. 28. In view of the above discussion, we are not convinced with the arguments of Mr Maulik Nanavati, learned advocate for the appellant that the claim of the land holders cannot be remitted to the Statutory Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government for fresh consideration. 29. Considering the law stated by the Apex Court in the case of Kinnari Mullick (supra), we find that the said decision was rendered in the fact situation where Arbitrator was appointed under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act’ 1996. The procedure for appointment of the Arbitrator under the National Highways Act’ 1956 is completely different from the Arbitration Act’ 1996. The observation of the Apex Court in Dr. A. Parthasarathy (supra) that the matter cannot be relegated to the same Arbitrator without the consent of the parties also, therefore, does not come in our way. 30. The procedure for appointment of the Arbitrator under the National Highways Act’ 1956 is completely different from the Arbitration Act’ 1996. The observation of the Apex Court in Dr. A. Parthasarathy (supra) that the matter cannot be relegated to the same Arbitrator without the consent of the parties also, therefore, does not come in our way. 30. We cannot leave the land holders to pursue their remedies under Section 3G(5) by filing a fresh applications under Section 3G(5) to invoke the jurisdiction of the Statutory Arbitrator for consideration of their claim for higher amount of compensation. Once have reached at the conclusion that the Arbitrator namely Collector, Amreli committed a manifest illegality in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, while setting aside the award dated 04.06.2021 in Arbitration Case Nos. 117/2019 to 124/2019, we find it fit and proper in the interest of justice to relegate the matter to the Collector, Amreli appointed as Arbitrator under the notification issued by the Central Government under Section 3G(5), for fresh consideration on merits of the claim of the applicants / land holders after giving due notice and opportunity to all the concerned parties including the appellant NHAI herein. 31. With the above observations and directions, the appeals stand disposed of. All the contentions of the parties on the merits of their claim are left open to be put forth before the Arbitrator. 32. In view of the disposal of the main matters, the connected civil applications also stand disposed of.