ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The present appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 05.04.2019 passed by the learned Single in dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellants herein, challenging the common order and decision of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat Division, State of Gujarat in Applications Nos. 26/13/2014, 36/16/2014 and 36/17/2017 dated 27.12.2018. Pertinent is to note that these applications were filed by the President of the Trust, viz. Gram Samast Leuva Patidar Samaj, Saroli, respondent no. 2 herein under Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950) (in short as the 'GPT Act' 1950), seeking permission to deal with certain properties of the Trust. The said applications came to be rejected vide impugned order dated 27.12.2018, but further directions had been issued by the Joint Charity Commissioner invoking powers under Section 41 of the GPT Act, 1950 to initiate process to cancel all the agreements, rent notices, etc. by issuing appropriate notices and resume possession of the trust properties, which are reflected in the Public Trust Register. 3. The challenge by the petitioners before the Writ Court was that the petitioners have been occupying the premises, belonging to the trust as tenants and they were admitted and accepted legally as tenants in the said premises owned by the Trust. As a result of the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner dated 27.12.2018 the petitioners have been subjected to forcible eviction without any previous notice and no opportunity whatsoever has been provided by the Joint Charity Commissioner to the occupants of the Trust property, viz. the petitioners herein. 4. The learned Single Judge, taking note of the submissions made by the learned counsels for the petitioners, has proceeded to make an inquiry into the merits of the claims of the petitioners being tenants of the properties owned by the Trust. We may note the observations made by the learned Single Judge in paragraph ‘12.1’ of the judgment impugned, as under: “12.1 The only process by which Trust properties were to be alienated is the present applications before the Charity Commissioner, which, admittedly is after the transaction and handing over of the properties. Some of the properties have been disposed after permission under Section 36, but these properties are not subject matter of these petitions. Some of the properties have been disposed after permission under Section 36, but these properties are not subject matter of these petitions. Therefore, from the facts on record, Court may conclude that the transactions in question are not pursuant to permission under Section 36 of the Act.” 5. The observation in the abovenoted paragraph is that some of the properties have been disposed of after permission under Section 36, but the transactions in question in relation to the properties in question, which are subject matter of Writ petition are not pursuant to permission under Section 36 of the Act. It is noted by the learned Single Judge that only process by which the Trust properties were to be alienated was the applications under Section 36 of the GPT Act, 1950 before the Charity Commissioner, which admittedly had been made after the transaction and handing over of the properties. 6. This observation made by the learned Single Judge has been placed before us by the learned counsel for the respondent Trust to submit that the inquiry into the claim of the petitioners to occupy the property in question as tenant has already been concluded by the learned Single Judge and none of the petitioners herein could prove that they are occupying the property of the Trust as tenants in compliance of Section 36 of the GPT Act, 1950. There is a discussion in the judgment impugned about the requirement of permission under Section 36 before dealing with the Trust property and the observation is that such permission is a sine qua non. 7. It is further noted by the learned Single Judge that the petitioners were aware of the proceedings pending before the Charity Commissioner pertaining to Trust properties and nothing prevented the petitioners to approach the Charity Commissioner in those proceedings. It was observed that no submissions were made by any of the petitioners to make an offer to receive necessary permission inspite of the fact that principle of post facto permission was recognised. It was, thus, concluded by the learned Single Judge that when the petitioners thought it fit to give go-by to the provisions of law, the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not come to the rescue of such petitioners. 8. With the observations in the judgment impugned, the learned Single Judge has finally concluded in paragraph ‘27’ as under: “27. 8. With the observations in the judgment impugned, the learned Single Judge has finally concluded in paragraph ‘27’ as under: “27. In the facts of this case, which give rise to highly disputed questions of facts and where claims of both sides are equally poised, threadbare examining of facts upon being established with due process of law would be necessary. Therefore, in such case, this Court is not inclined to brush aside alternative remedy and overlook contentious issues to issue a prerogative writ. Section 36 of the Act provides for remedy of an appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal within 30 days from the date of its publication. This Court is of the view that an appeal is an efficacious remedy made available under the Act. To appreciate the contentions raised and evidence produced, the appeal forum cannot be bypassed. The Act provides under Section 76 applications of the Civil Procedure Code to all proceedings under the Act.” 9. A further perusal of the finding returned by the learned Single Judge relegating the petitioners to avail alternative remedy of appeal under Section 36 (3) of the GPT Act, 1950 would indicate that the learned Single Judge himself has come to a conclusion finally that the facts of the case give rise to highly disputed questions of facts and claims of both sides require threadbare examination of facts upon being established with due process of law. The result is that the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment impugned would have no bearing on the claim of the petitioners, if agitated before the appellate authority under Section 36(3) of the GPT Act, 1950. 10. However, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants that the remedy under Section 36 (3) of the GPT Act, 1950 is not available to the petitioners, inasmuch as, the application under Section 36 filed by the President of the Trust, as noted hereinabove, was not pertaining to the properties in question, occupied by the petitioners herein. 10. However, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants that the remedy under Section 36 (3) of the GPT Act, 1950 is not available to the petitioners, inasmuch as, the application under Section 36 filed by the President of the Trust, as noted hereinabove, was not pertaining to the properties in question, occupied by the petitioners herein. In fact, the Joint Charity Commissioner while rejecting the application under Section 36, which pertained to different properties, had invoked powers under Section 41A of the GPT Act, 1950 to make an inquiry as to the manner in which the Trust has been administered to further issue directions to the trustees of the public trust for proper administration and accounting of the Trust's assets. The submission that the alternative remedy under Section 36(3) of the GPT Act, 1950 would not be available to the petitioners herein, is found to have substance. 11. The fact remains that before passing the order of eviction of all the occupants of the trust property invoking power under Section 41A of the GPT, 1950, including the property in question, no opportunity of hearing has been granted to the petitioners herein, who are admittedly occupants of the Trust property even on the date of passing of the order impugned. 12. It was the case of the petitioners before the learned Single Judge that they had entered into the property of the Trust lawfully by executing rent note under the provisions of the Rent Act and standard rents were fixed from time to time with the consent of the parties. 13. The fact remains that none of the petitioners who were the occupants of the Trust property on the date of the decision, were granted opportunity of hearing by the Joint Charity Commissioner before ordering their eviction from the property in question invoking power under Section 41A. The fact that opportunity of hearing has not been granted to any of the petitioners herein has been admitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Trust. It is, however, submitted that the petitioners were granted due opportunity by this court in the Writ petition and placed their agreements to substantiate that they are lawful occupants of the Trust property. All the agreements produced were found to be void. It is, however, submitted that the petitioners were granted due opportunity by this court in the Writ petition and placed their agreements to substantiate that they are lawful occupants of the Trust property. All the agreements produced were found to be void. In view of the findings returned by the learned Single Judge on the plea of the petitioners being lawful occupants of the Trust property, no useful purpose would be served in relegating the matter back, inasmuch as, it would not be possible for the petitioners to plead otherwise. Relegation of the matter before the Charity Commissioner would, thus, be a futile exercise. The submission is that whatever were defects in the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner have been removed with the hearing granted by the learned Single Judge in the Writ petitions filed by the petitioners who claim to be the lawful occupants of the property in question belonging to the Trust. 14. These submissions are found to suffer from inherent fallacy, inasmuch as, the plea of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 that the defect as found in the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner stood cured with the hearing afforded by the learned Single Judge, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the learned Single Judge was not in a position to make any factual inquiry. The observations in paragraph 27' of the order as noted hereinbefore makes it evident that even the learned Single Judge was conscious that the factual inquiry was not possible before the Writ Court. 15. The observations made by the Writ Court on the validity of the agreements or the right of the petitioners to occupy the property in question would, therefore, have no bearing on the rival claims of the parties. Moreover, the principle of doctrine of merger do not apply to the Writ proceedings. The infirmities pointed out in the order of the Joint Charity Commissioner in passing the order of eviction without granting opportunity of hearing to the occupants who would otherwise be treated as “aggrieved persons” under the GPT Act' 1950, cannot be said to have been cured with the hearing afforded by this Writ Court within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. None of the observations made by the learned Single Judge while relegating the petitioners to avail alternative remedy under Section 36(3) can come in the way of the petitioners herein. 16. In this scenario, once it is admitted that the petitioners who were occupants of the Trust property have not been afforded opportunity of hearing by serving notice by the Joint Charity Commissioner before passing the order of eviction, we find it fit and proper to set aside the order dated 27.12.2018 qua the petitioners herein and relegate the matter for fresh consideration before the Joint Charity Commissioner on the plea of the rival parties. 17. It is submitted by the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 Trust that a proper application along with a copy of this order will be moved before the Joint Charity Commissioner within a period of three weeks from today. On such application being filed, the Joint Charity Commissioner shall issue notice to all the petitioners/occupants of the property in question and pass a reasoned and speaking order, strictly in accordance with law, after giving opportunity of hearing to all concerned including the petitioners herein, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the application. All the contentions raised in the Writ petition, by both the parties, are left open for consideration. It is further clarified that fresh decision be taken without being influenced by any of the observations made hereinabove. 18. With the above observations, the judgment and order dated 05.04.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. All the connected appeals stand disposed of. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. 19. Consequently, connected Civil Applications are also disposed of accordingly.