JUDGMENT : VIJU ABRAHAM, J. Petitioner has approached this Court challenging Ext.P7 order issued by the 1st respondent and for a consequential direction to the 2nd respondent to treat the period of suspension from 9.9.2016 to 31.05.2018 as duty for all purposes with all consequential benefits. 2. The petitioner is a retired Assistant Registrar (Exams) in the 2nd respondent University, who retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2018 while in suspension. By Ext.P1, the 3rd respondent passed an order compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service and also directing to recover an amount of Rs.19,70,791/- with interest from the pensionary benefits equally from the delinquent officers. An appeal was preferred challenging Ext.P1 order before the 1st respondent Chancellor and the said respondent set aside Ext.P1 order granting liberty to the 2nd respondent University to recommend and continue the disciplinary proceedings. Later, by Ext.P2 order the very same punishment imposed on the petitioner as per Ext.P1 was imposed, which was challenged by the petitioner before the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent essentially taking into consideration the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the disciplinary proceedings are being dragged from 2016 onwards and that the petitioner has since attained the age of superannuation and the ends of justice require that a quietus is made to the proceedings so that he can get his retirement benefits and on the suggestion by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that even if the allegation against the petitioner is found to be sustainable the appellant is only liable for imposition of a minor penalty, took a lenient view and by Ext.P3 order modified the punishment imposed on the petitioner as withholding of one increment without cumulative effect and directed the University to issue appropriate orders modifying the punishment. By Ext.P4 order the 2nd respondent modified the punishment to that of withholding of one increment without cumulative effect and directed to treat the period of suspension from 9.9.2016 to 31.05.2018 as eligible leave. Petitioner again represented before the University aggrieved by the treating of the period of suspension as eligible leave, and the same was repelled by the University as per Ext.P5. Petitioner again represented before the University aggrieved by the treating of the period of suspension as eligible leave, and the same was repelled by the University as per Ext.P5. Against which the petitioner approached the 1st respondent by filing Ext.P6 and the 1st respondent rejected the request of the petitioner on finding that treating the period of suspension from 9.9.2016 to 31.05.2018 as eligible leave appears to be in order. It is in the said circumstance, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that except withholding of one increment, no other stigma can be imposed on the petitioner and naturally the period during which the petitioner was kept out of service illegally should be treated as duty for all purposes. It is further contended that when the 1st respondent passed an order modifying the penalty and held that the petitioner is entitled for consequential benefits the respondent University has no authority to sit over Ext.P3 order and find that the petitioner's period of suspension should be treated as eligible leave and ought to have treated as duty for all purposes. It is further contended that Ext.P7 order violates principles of natural justice as the same is issued in violation of Rule 56 of Part I KSR. 4. The 2nd respondent University has filed a detailed counter affidavit contended that the issuance of Ext.P7 order is perfectly legal and valid and no interference is called for. It is contended that even as per Ext.P3 order of the Chancellor, the petitioner has not been fully exonerated and the punishment of a major penalty of compulsory retirement imposed was modified to that of barring of one annual increment without cumulative effect. Since the petitioner has not been fully exonerated he cannot claim that the period of suspension should be treated as duty for all purposes. It is further contended that the intervention of Chancellor in the disciplinary proceedings was only to the extent of modifying the major penalty to that of a minor penalty and Ext.P7 order passed by the University is not a modification of Ext.P3, but only a consequential order. It is contented that the period of suspension of the petitioner was treated as eligible leave adhering to the provisions of Chapter VII of Part-I KSR (dismissal, removal and suspension) and is governed by Rule 56 of Part-I KSR. It is contented that the period of suspension of the petitioner was treated as eligible leave adhering to the provisions of Chapter VII of Part-I KSR (dismissal, removal and suspension) and is governed by Rule 56 of Part-I KSR. Since the petitioner has not been fully exonerated and the major punishment imposed was only modified to that of a minor penalty, the case of the petitioner clearly come within the purview of Sub Rule 5 r/w Sub Rule 4 of Rule 56 of Part I KSR. 5. I have heard the rival contentions on both sides. 6. Relevant portion of Rule 56 of Part-I KSR coming under Chapter-VII dealing with dismissal, removal and suspension reads as follows: “[56 (1) When an officer who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired including an officer who has been compulsorily retired under Rule 60A, is reinstated as a result of appeal or review or would have been so re-instated, but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension or not, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order-(a)regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the officer for the period of his absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty, and (c) in the case of an officer who was compulsorily retired under Rule 60A and subsequently reinstated, for the recovery of the relevant benefits, if any, already paid to him. (2) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of opinion that the officer who had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, has been fully exonerated, the officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (6) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsorily retirement, as the case may be: Provided that where such authority is of opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the officer had been delayed for reasons directly attributable to the officer, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the officer shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule(7), be paid for the period of such delay, only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine. (3) In a case falling under sub-rule(2), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement as the case may be, shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (3) In a case falling under sub-rule(2), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement as the case may be, shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (4) In cases other than those covered by sub-rule(2) including cases where the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service is set aside by the appellate or reviewing authority solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of clause(2) of Article 311 of the constitution and no further enquiry is proposed to be held the officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules(6) and (7) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement as the case may be, as the Competent Authority may determine, after giving notice to the officer of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period as may be specified in the notice: Provided that except in the case of such officers as are governed by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Central Act 4 of 1936), any payment under this sub-rule shall be restricted to a period of three years immediately preceding reinstatement or retirement on superannuation, as the case may be. (5) In a case falling under sub-rule (4), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or Compulsory Retirement, as the case may be, shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose: Provided that if the officer so desires such authority may direct that the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the officer. ---------------------- ----------------------- (underline supplied) Rule 56(2) mandates that where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of opinion that the officer who had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, has been fully exonerated, the officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (6) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsorily retirement, as the case may be and in such cases, going by Rule 56(3) the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement as the case may be, shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. Rule 56(4) deals with cases other than covered under Sub-rule(2), which is applicable in the present case, and provides that the delinquent may be paid such amount (not being all the pay and allowances) to which he would have been entitled, had he not been removal or compulsory retired as the case may be, as the Competent Authority may determine, after giving notice to the officer of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period as may be specified in the notice. Clause(5) of Rule 56 also mandates that in a case falling under sub-rule (4), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or Compulsory Retirement, as the case may be, shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose. There is no doubt that the case of the petitioner comes under Rule 56(4) of Part-I KSR. The counter affidavit of the University also admits that the case of the petitioner should be considered going by clauses(4) and (5) of Rule 56 of Part-I KSR. Further going by Mahathma Gandhi University Statutes 1994, Kerala Service Rules is applicable to all non teaching staff of the University other than the University teachers in respect of the service condition of the University employees. Further going by Mahathma Gandhi University Statutes 1994, Kerala Service Rules is applicable to all non teaching staff of the University other than the University teachers in respect of the service condition of the University employees. If that be so, before treating the period of suspension as eligibility leave as was done by Ext.P4 order, it was incumbent on the part of the 2nd respondent to have issued notice to the petitioner and to give an opportunity of hearing before taking a decision on the same. Having not done so, I am of the opinion that the impugned orders are liable to be interfered with. 7. Therefore, Exts.P4 and P7 order to the extent it treat the period of suspension from 9.9.2016 to 31.05.2018 as eligible leave is set aside. Consequentially, there will be a direction to the 2nd respondent to consider the case of the petitioner and take a decision as to how the period of suspension from 9.9.2016 to 31.5.2018 shall be treated and pass fresh order after affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and taking into consideration any representation filed by the petitioner in this regard, without any delay, at any rate, within an outer limit of 2 months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The above writ petition is disposed of accordingly.