ORDER : 1. Rule. Learned A.P.P. Ms. Krina Calla and learned advocate Mr. Yogeshkumar A. Ratanpara, waive service of notice of rule on behalf of respective parties. Rule is fixed forthwith. 2. By way of the above Revision Applications, the applicant-revisionists have challenged the orders dated 15.05.2024 passed below Exhibit-5 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 5 of 2024 and 4 of 2024 by the learned 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Visavadar and further prayer was made to modify the condition no. 1 imposed in Exh.5 application in both the matters. 3. Mr. Ashish M. Dagli, learned advocate for the applicant, referring to the judgment of Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Others, (2023) 10 SCC 446 , submitted that the learned Judge was required to consider the facts of the matter prior to passing any order against the applicants-accused to deposit 20% of the compensation amount. 3.1 Advocate Mr. Dagli submitted that in view of proposition laid in the referred judgment, such an order would even frustrate the order of suspension of sentence and bail granted. The inability to deposit the amount would lend the applicants-appellants in jail. More so, when the applicants as an appellants have urged about the disputed facts, where the cheques were urged to have been lost and the signatures thereupon were 8 years old. The application was moved often for an expert opinion for F.S.L. 3.2 Advocate Mr. Dagli submitted that there was no legal dues payable and the Bank Account was closed and case was urged of misuse of the cheque. 4. Countering the arguments, learned Advocate Mr. Yogeshkumar A. Ratanpara for the respondent no. 2 submitted that the facts of the case have already been agitated before the trial Court, and it was only after recording of evidence and appreciation, the judgment followed, and therefore the same issue cannot be agitated before the appellate Court for any special concession in the matter. 5. Heard learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the records of the case. In the case of Jamboo Bhandari (supra), the case of Surinder Singh Deswal Alias Colonel S.S. Deswal and Others v. Virender Gandhi and Another, (2019) 11 SCC 341 was taken into consideration, wherein observations were referred to. Paragraph-8 of the decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal (supra) reads as under: “8. In the case of Jamboo Bhandari (supra), the case of Surinder Singh Deswal Alias Colonel S.S. Deswal and Others v. Virender Gandhi and Another, (2019) 11 SCC 341 was taken into consideration, wherein observations were referred to. Paragraph-8 of the decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal (supra) reads as under: “8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that even considering the language used in Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, the appellate court “may” order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court and the word used is not “shall” and therefore the discretion is vested with the first appellate court has construed it as mandatory, which according to the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants would be contrary to the provisions of Section 148 of the NI Act as amended is concerned, considering the amended Section 148 of the NI Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the NI Act, the word used is “may” it is generally to be construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amended Section 148 of the NI Act confers power upon the appellate court to pass an order pending appeal to direct the appellant-accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation either on an application filed by the original complainant or even on the application file by the appellant-accused under Section 389 CrPC to suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be construed considering the fact that as per the amended Section 148 of the NI Act, a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court is directed to be deposited and that such amount is to be deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown by the appellant. Therefore, if amended Section 148 of the NI Act is purposively interpreted in Section 148 of the NI Act, but also Section 138 of the NI Act. The Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of the dishonour of cheques. So as to see that due to delay tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of the appeals and obtaining stay in the proceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque, who has to spend considerable time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions. Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the NI Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act and also Section 138 of the NI Act.” 5.1 In the case of Jamboo Bhandari (supra), after noting the observations in Surinder Singh Deswal (supra), it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paragraph 7 as under: “7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. of an accused who has been convicted for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.” 6. The learned appellate Court was not requited to enter into the merits of the case, but had to deal with the facts to decide, whether imposition of condition of 20% of the fine/compensation amount was necessary, to decipher whether it was an exception case. The learned Judge was therefore required to prima facie enter into the details, where the impugned order reflects no such application of mind. The learned Judge has not assigned any reasons to pass such a condition of 20% deposit of the compensation amount. 7. The learned Judge was therefore required to prima facie enter into the details, where the impugned order reflects no such application of mind. The learned Judge has not assigned any reasons to pass such a condition of 20% deposit of the compensation amount. 7. In view of the proposition laid down in the referred judgment, it is not mandatory for the learned appellate Court to pass an order of compulsory deposit of 20% of the cheque amount. The case, as was urged, is of misuse of the cheque. The Bank Account was closed. The condition of deposit of amount would affect the right of the applicants towards their case before the appellate Court. 8. In the decision of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2024) 4 SCC 419 , the Hon’ble Apex Court had dealt with the provision of Section 148 of the N.I. Act and the power which has been entrusted to the learned Appellate Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court thus held that the ground of interim compensation under Section 143A read with Section 148(1) proviso (w.e.f. 1-9-2018) and Sections 138, 139 and 143(1), for grant of interim compensation under Section 143-A is directory in nature. 9. After having considered the submissions and referring to the decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has summarized the conclusion which is reproduced herein-under: “27. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarised as follows: 27.1. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall.” 27.2. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143-A, the court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. 27.3. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143-A are as follows: 27.3.1. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. 27.3.2. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. 27.3.3. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. 27.3.2. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. 27.3.3. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. 27.3.4. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. 27.3.5. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive.” 10. In view of the conclusion of the Hon’ble Apex Court in context of Section 143-A of the N.I. Act, it was observed in discretionary exercise of power, the word “may” used in the petition cannot be considered as “shall” and while deciding the prayer under Section 143-A, the Court must record reasons indicating condition of all relevant factors. It has been noted that the financial distress of the accused can also be considered while referring to the prima facie merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply. It has been noted that the direction to pay interim compensation can be issued only if the complainant makes a prima facie case and if the defence of the accused is found to be plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. 11. The impugned order in both the matters does not reflect any reasons of the learned Judge to come to the conclusion for exercising discretion as referred to in the cases of Jamboo Bhandari (supra) and Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra). The learned Appellate Court is required to apply its mind to observe merits of the case while also considering the defence pleaded and the financial distress of the accused is also to be considered as one of the consideration. It is not mandatory for the learned Appellate Court to direct payment of interim compensation. 12. The learned Appellate Court is required to apply its mind to observe merits of the case while also considering the defence pleaded and the financial distress of the accused is also to be considered as one of the consideration. It is not mandatory for the learned Appellate Court to direct payment of interim compensation. 12. Thus, in view of the facts of the case, as has been urged, the condition of deposit of 20% of the compensation amount in the order dated 15.05.2024 passed by 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Visavadar below Exh.5 in Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2024 and Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2024 stands cancelled. 13. Both the applications are allowed in the above terms. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 14. Office to keep copy of this order in Criminal Revision Application No. 949 of 2024. Direct service is permitted.