JUDGMENT : Vaibhavi D. Nanavati, J. 1. Heard Mr. R.R. Vakil, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Ms. Suman Motla, learned A.G.P. appearing for the respondent nos.1 and 2. Mr. S.M. Kikani, learned advocate for Mr. D.H. Bharwad, learned advocate for the respondent no.3 is not present when the matter is taken up for hearing. 2. The petitioner herein – Zarola Kelavni Mandal is a registered trust and is running Shri H.J. Parikh and Smt. U.M.H. Patel Secondary School at Zarola, Taluka: Borsad, District: Anand. The petitioner is a president of Zarola Kelavni Mandal. 2.1. The petitioner herein is constrained to approach this Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order dated 13.06.2017 passed by the respondent no.1. 2.2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 13.06.2017 mainly on the ground that the petitioner approached the respondent no.1 on 17.12.2015 for granting approval to the proposed punishment of dismissal pursuant to the departmental inquiry initiated by the petitioner wherein, it was held by majority opinion that the respondent no.3 was required to be dismissed from service upon holding departmental inquiry. The said proposal dated 17.12.2015 is duly produced at Annexure-I. Upon the said proposal being communicated to the respondent no.1, respondent no.1 – District Education Officer. That the respondent no.1 has issued notice for hearing after completion of 45 days and the petitioner – school passed the order of dismissal on the basis of deemed approval as per Section 36(2) of the Act. 2.3. After acquittal by the learned Sessions Court by judgment dated 25.01.2017, the respondent no.3 made an application to the petitioner - school for taking him back in the services however, as the school had already passed order of dismissal dated 16.03.2016, in view thereof, refused to allow the respondent no.3 to join the services. The respondent no.3 approached the respondent no.1 and the respondent no.1, by impugned order dated 13.06.2017, rejected the proposal of the petitioner – school dated 17.12.2015 for dismissing the respondent no.3 from the services. Upon an application preferred by the respondent no.3 on 27.04.2017, the respondent no.3 was acquitted by the learned Sessions Court by judgment dated 25.01.2017. By impugned order dated 13.06.2017, the proposal forwarded by the petitioner herein on 17.12.2015 for dismissing the respondent no.3 was rejected by the respondent no.1. Upon an application preferred by the respondent no.3 on 27.04.2017, the respondent no.3 was acquitted by the learned Sessions Court by judgment dated 25.01.2017. By impugned order dated 13.06.2017, the proposal forwarded by the petitioner herein on 17.12.2015 for dismissing the respondent no.3 was rejected by the respondent no.1. The said order dated 13.06.2017 is duly produced at Annexure-A. 3. Mr. R.R. Vakil, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the said order dated 16.03.2016 and the consequential order dated 13.06.2017 passed by the respondent no.1 are beyond the period of 45 days and are violative of the provisions of Section 36(2) of the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Act, 1972 (for short, “the Act”). Mr. Vakil, learned advocate submitted that Section 36(2) of the Act provides that the respondent no.1 is required to take a decision as provided under the Section wherein, the proposal which is placed before the respondent no.1 is required to be either accepted or declined. 3.1. It is submitted that to decline the petitioner’s application by order dated 13.06.2017, after the order of acquittal is passed in favour of the respondent no.3, is beyond the scope of the provisions of Section 36(2) of the Act. 3.2. In light of the aforesaid, it is submitted that for the charges levelled against the respondent no.3, the same being grave in nature, the petitioner herein, upon framing of charges and holding departmental inquiry in accordance with the Rules and Regulations, passed an order of dismissal. After the said order was passed, representative of the respondent no.3 communicated to the petitioner on 16.03.2016 to withdraw the consent. It was also submitted by the said representative that the same was signed by the representative because of the pressure put on him forcefully. 3.3. To substantiate the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Vakil, learned advocate placed reliance on the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Ambalal Motibhai Patel, Chairman, New English School Trust vs. Smt. Hansaben Dinmanishanker Shastri and another reported in 1991 (2) GLR 713 more particularly, clause – 2 in paragraph 7 thereof. 3.4. Mr. Vakil, learned advocate also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Satsangi Shishuvihar Kelavani Trust vs. P.N. Patel reported in 1977 GLR 615 . 4. Ms. 3.4. Mr. Vakil, learned advocate also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Satsangi Shishuvihar Kelavani Trust vs. P.N. Patel reported in 1977 GLR 615 . 4. Ms. Suman Motla, learned A.G.P. appearing for the respondent – State placed reliance on the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent no.1 and submitted that the respondent no.1 has duly complied with the provisions of Section 36(2) of the Act. It is submitted that as per the provisions of Section 36(2) of the Act, the respondent herein addressed the communications from time to time i.e. on 17.12.2015, 21.01.2016 and 08.02.2016. It is submitted that the requirement of Section 36(2) of the Act was communicated to the petitioner – Trust in consonance with Section 36 of the Act and in view thereof, for the aforesaid communications issued by the respondent no.1, the respondent no.1 is in compliance of Section 36 of the Act. 4.1. It is submitted that the petitioner herein never objected to the aforesaid communications issued by the respondent no.1 and in view thereof, has acquiesced the right to object with respect to non-compliance of Section 36(2) of the Act. It is submitted that in light of the aforesaid, the present petition be dismissed. 4.2. Ms. Motla, learned A.G.P. placed reliance on the order dated 10.06.2022 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No.24529 of 2006. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the following emerge. 5.1. The petitioner herein, upon receiving the complaints against the respondent no.3 issued notice to the respondent no.3, asking for explanation. The respondent no.3 wrote a letter on 26.02.2015 and accepted the guilt and requested the principal of the petitioner no.1 to condone the misconduct and also submitted that the same would not be repeated. 5.2. On 27.02.2015, news were published in daily newspapers i.e. ‘Gujarat Samachar’ and ‘Divya Bhaskar’ with respect to the misbehaviour of respondent no.3 with girl students of the school. Moreover, it also came to the notice of the school that the complaint was filed by the guardian of one of the girl students being C.R.No.I-21 of 2015 for the offences punishable under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The respondent no.3 was arrested for the said offence and released on bail. 5.3. The respondent no.3 was arrested for the said offence and released on bail. 5.3. On 11.04.2015, the petitioner issued the show-cause notice under Section 36(1) of the Act, which was replied to by the respondent no.3 on 18.04.2015. 5.4. The reply to the said show-cause notice was not satisfactory and in view thereof, the petitioner – school decided to hold departmental inquiry against the respondent no.3 by constituting three members committee i.e. (i) Bharatbhai J. Shah, District Education Officer, Nominee (ii) Jagdishbhai N. Patel, representative of the trust and (iii) Harshadbhai Patel, representative of the respondent no.3. 5.5. In all the meetings, that were held, the respondent no.3 was granted opportunity to prove his innocence. Upon completion of the departmental inquiry, the president of the inquiry committee submitted his report on 04.11.2015 and concluded that the allegation nos.1 to 5 were proved and the representative of the petitioner – school as well as the representative of the respondent no.3 agreed to the said report. 5.6. The report of the inquiry committee was placed in the meeting of the trust held on 07.11.2015 wherein, it was decided to accept the report and inflict proposed punishment of dismissal. 5.7. The second show-cause notice dated 07.11.2015 was issued and the respondent no.3 was asked as to why, the respondent no.3 should not be dismissed from the service. Upon issuance of the said show-cause notice, the representative of the respondent no.3 sent a letter on 20.11.2015 and in the said letter, it was alleged that the signature was taken forcefully and would submit the report separately within 15 days. It is submitted that the separate report was never sent. 5.8. In view of the aforesaid, the petitioner – school on 17.12.2015, sent a proposal to the District Education Officer for getting approval of the proposed punishment of dismissal. 5.9. The respondent no.1 – District Education Officer kept hearing on 08.02.2016 and passed the order on 16.03.2016 that though the District Education Officer had come to the conclusion that the departmental inquiry is conducted as per the Rules but, because of the pendency of a case before the Sessions Court and after the decision of the Sessions Court, decision with regard to according of approval would be considered. 5.10. As the respondent no.1 has passed the order after more than 45 days, as prescribed under Section 36(2) of the Act. 5.10. As the respondent no.1 has passed the order after more than 45 days, as prescribed under Section 36(2) of the Act. the petitioner – school passed an order dated 16.03.2016 on the basis of the deemed approval in absence of any communication from the District Education Officer upon completion of 45 days. After the said order was passed, the petitioner – school received the order dated 16.03.2016. Upon completion of the criminal case pending against the respondent no.3, the respondent no.1 - District Education Officer passed the impugned order dated 13.06.2017, rejecting the proposal of the petitioner – school to dismiss the respondent no.3 dated 17.12.2015. 6. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Section 36 of the Act, which reads as under:- “36. Dismissal, removal and reduction in rank of certain persons. (1) No person who is appointed as a head-master, a teacher or a member of non-teaching-staff of a registered private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the manager until- (a) he has been given by the manager a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and (b) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him has been approved in writing by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board: Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only. (2) The officer referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall communicate his decision within a period of forty-five days from the date of receipt by him of the proposal under the said Clause (b) and if such decision is not communicated to the manager by the said officer within such period the action proposed to be taken under the said Clause (b) shall be deemed to have been approved by the said officer. (3) Where a head-master, a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school is suspended by the manager of the school pending any inquiry proposed to be held against him, the fact of such suspension, together with the grounds therefor, shall be immediately communicated by the manager to an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board, and such suspension shall be subject to ratification by the said officer within a period of forty-five days from the date of the receipt of the communication in this behalf by such officer and if such ratification is not communicated to the manager by the said officer within such period, the suspension under reference shall cease to have effect on the expiry of such period. (4) Where a head-master, a teacher or a member of the non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school desires to submit his resignation, the resignation shall be tendered by him in person to the District Education Officer concerned and shall not be accepted by the manager unless it is so tendered and forwarded to him by such officer duly endorsed. The acceptance of any such resignation tendered in contravention of this sub-section shall be ineffective. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order of the authorised officer under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) may make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date of the decision of the authorised officer.” 7. The aforesaid has been subject matter of consideration in the case of Satsangi Shishuvihar Kelavani Trust vs. P.N. Patel reported in 1977 GLR 615 wherein, in paragraphs 9 and 10, this Court held as under:- “9. The controversy centered round the term "approval" but the legislative intention is clearly expressed in Section 36(1)(b) that it is approval of the action proposed to be taken. The second meaning, which had been suggested while interpreting Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act in The Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen and finally accepted in the Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Govind, would not make the term ambiguous in this case. It is true in the context of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act their Lordships finally concluded in the Straw Board. Mfg. Ltd. v. Govind, would not make the term ambiguous in this case. It is true in the context of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act their Lordships finally concluded in the Straw Board. Mfg. Co.'s case that in the context "approval" suggested that something had been done by the employer as otherwise it would have been quite easy for the legislature to use the word "for approval of the action proposed to be taken" in the relevant proviso. Their Lordships pointed out that if the Tribunal did not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer In such a case no specific provision as to reinstatement was necessary and by the very fact of the Tribunal not approving the action of the employer, the dismissal or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there never was any dismissal or discharge by the employer. In that sense, the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer did not become final and conclusive until it was approved by the Tribunal under Section 33(2) The fetter laid down in the present case in Section 36(1)(b) however is unambiguous and clear in its scope, as the legislature has categorically used the expression of "action proposed to be taken" and, therefore, approval in this context has only one meaning of a previous permission, of-course, such a function of approval must be of an objective approach. In Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. v. Company Law Board, while interpreting Section 326 of approving appointment of managing agent the nature of satisfaction of the Central Government had to be examined. At page 1792 their Lordship pointed out that investment of such power of approval of the managing agents carried with it a duty to act judicially, i.e. to hold an enquiry in a manner consistent with rules of natural justice, to consider all relevant matters, to ignore irrelevant matters and to reach a conclusion without a bias, without prediction and without prejudice. The satisfaction contemplated by Section 326 must, therefore, be the result of an objective appraisal of the relevant materials. The satisfaction contemplated by Section 326 must, therefore, be the result of an objective appraisal of the relevant materials. Because such a provision imposed restriction upon the power of the companies and individuals to carry on business, the order made by the Central Government under Section 326 would result in serious detriment of the company and the proposed managing agent, but in the larger public interest if it was valid, they had to suffer it. Such a power conferred on the Central Government was restrictive of valuable rights of the company and of the proposed managing agent, and severely restricts the liberty of contract. Therefore, as per the settled legal position this approval function is not a mere administrative function but the power has to be objectively exercised considering all the relevant material. The fact still remains that this is a management function, howsoever serious be the restraint it imposes on the power of the management to terminate the services of the employees employed by the school. 10. The other controversy raised is as to the period of 45 days because under Section 36(2) the officer referred to in Section 36(1)(b) is required to communicate his decision within a period of forty-five days from the date of receipt by him of the proposal and if such decision is not communicated to the manager within the said period, the action proposed to be taken under the said Clause (b) shall be deemed to have been approved by the said officer. The term 'communicate' would have of course two ordinary literal meanings, both of transmission by the authorised officer and receipt by the management. In Banarasi Devi v. Income Tax Officer, a similar controversy as regards the expression "issuing of a notice" had been considered by their Lordships because that expression also could have both the meanings, of mere sending and actual serving, and their Lordships held that only that meaning must be given which earned out the intention of the legislature and fitted into the context or the setting in which it appeared. In the present case the scheme of this deemed fiction in Section 36(2) is of the same nature as Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code where also the said deemed fiction of a deemed permission for N.A. use is created by the legislature. In Shivpal Singh v. Secretary of State 26 Bom. In the present case the scheme of this deemed fiction in Section 36(2) is of the same nature as Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code where also the said deemed fiction of a deemed permission for N.A. use is created by the legislature. In Shivpal Singh v. Secretary of State 26 Bom. L.R. 371 at page 374, their Lordships clearly held that the time-limit had been set out by the legislature for reaching a decision after due enquiry. Therefore, if there was no order after due enquiry within three months, further proceedings of the Collector would be defective and must be taken to have been entirely beyond" his powers. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha A.IR. 1969 S.C. 1297, at page 1301, interpreting this identical provision in Section 65 their Lordships pointed out that under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector did not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted This section showed that a period of three months was considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature thought that the matter was so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Their Lordships also insisted upon a reasoned order in such cases. The same would be true even under the present scheme where legislature must be deemed to have treated the matter as so urgent that approval in the form of previous permission is deemed to be granted to the management, if the authorised officer does not communicate his decision within this 45 days' period from the date of the receipt of the proposal by him. He must also hold an enquiry and communicate his reasoned decision within this statutory period. As this is the period provided by the legislature for the operation of this fiction, there must bean element of certainty of the period of 45 days. He must also hold an enquiry and communicate his reasoned decision within this statutory period. As this is the period provided by the legislature for the operation of this fiction, there must bean element of certainty of the period of 45 days. One terminal is already fixed of the receipt of the proposal and the other terminal must also be fixed viz of the communication of the order by sending this order to the management' irrespective of the fact when it actually reaches the management Any other interpretation would curtail this 45 days' period which the legislature has advisedly allowed to this authorised officer and an element of uncertainty shall be introduced because of the time taken for dispatch by reason of postal delay or otherwise. This fiction of the legislature reveals the whole object of this provision that the enquiry which this authorised officer must make for granting his previous approval must be finished up within this 45 days' period as the matter is considered of that urgent nature and as the management has to shoulder the responsibility of continuing the concerned employee in service during this period. The legislature having achieve a just balance between the conflicting interests of the management and the concerned teacher, and the expeditious disposal of this approval action being the true object of this provision, the legislative fiction must be given its full play and effect. Such a provision would not be capable of any waiver by the management because on the expiry of statutory period of 45 days fiction would operate by its own force. No doctrine of waiver could be invoked against statutory provision. Therefore, merely because the management participated in the further enquiry or it seeks to avoid the enquiry by prolonging the same; this statutory period cannot be extended. There is also ample evidence in this relevant statutory scheme which leaves no doubt that the approval function is only of a limited enquiry because the final dispute on merits would still be raised and decided under Section 38(1) when actual termination takes place where a very wide jurisdiction, even wider than the newly enacted Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been provided. Therefore, this limited enquiry must be held to be a restricted summary enquiry where the doctrine of management function must apply not only before the authorised officer but also before the Tribunal while exercising the appellate jurisdiction of a limited nature only against fie order sought to be passed under Section 36 (1)(b) as to whether that fetter on the management's right to fire an employee should be removed or not. The whole scheme, as earlier pointed, is a complete, exhaustive scheme providing for the special rights and this efficacious remedy to help the weaker section of the teachers by imposing this fetter on the management so that until this bar was removed by independent application of mind by the authorised officer of the Board, the employee continued in service. Time-limit has been set up to ensure expeditious disposal and not with the object as urged by Mr. Mehta to enable an employee to continue in service and to fight till the entire dispute was finally decided on merits by the Tribunal even as to whether the discharge was wrongful, unlawful and unjustified or not. A bare comparison of Section 36(2) and Section 36(3) would bring out the true import of this provision. So far as termination of service is concerned, the deemed fiction under Section 36(2) is that if authorised officer fails to communicate his decision within the prescribed 45 days' period to the manager, the action proposed shall be deemed to have been approved. Under Section 36(3) in the context of suspension pending enquiry, failure to communicate ratification of such suspension by the authorised officer within the period of 45 days would result in the suspension ceasing to have any effect on the expiry of such period. In case of action of termination of service previous permission was contemplated and subsequent ratification is contemplated in suspension pending enquiry, but in both the cases the deemed position comes into operation on the expiry of this 45 days' statutory period from the date of the receipt of the concerned proposal or action of suspension. In case of suspension, such suspension ceases to have effect on the expiry of 45 days' period and thereafter no further appeal is provided, because Section 36(5) is limited to orders of approval under Section 36(1)(b) alone. In case of suspension, such suspension ceases to have effect on the expiry of 45 days' period and thereafter no further appeal is provided, because Section 36(5) is limited to orders of approval under Section 36(1)(b) alone. An identical scheme must have a similar interpretation in both these cases and, therefore, the fiction must have full statutory operation and there would be no question of any waiver or any extension or enlargement of the statutory period by unilateral action of the authorised officer or even by any waiver or consent.” 8. It is apposite to refer to the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Ambalal Motibhai Patel, Chairman, New English School Trust vs. Smt. Hansaben Dinmanishanker Shastri and another reported in 1991 (2) GLR 713 . Paragraph 7 thereof, read as under:- 7. Based on the strength of the above authority, Mr. Shelat submits that the jurisdiction of the authorised officer under Sec. 36(1)(b) of the present Act is also limited and so is the jurisdiction of the appellate authority under Sec. 36(5) of the said Act. I am in full agreement with Mr. Shelat, and I am of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the authorised officer under Sec. 36(1)(b) of the Act has a positive content and negative content. In its positive content he can inquire into : (i) whether prima facie case based on legal evidence adduced before the Enquiry Committee had been made out by the employer for the dismissal of the employee; (ii) whether proper domestic enquiry into the alleged misconduct of the employee is held in accordance with the rules of natural justice; (iii) whether proposed dismissal of the employee amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice. In its negative content the authorised officer/Tribunal - (i) cannot consider whether the penalty proposed to be passed is adequate/proper or inadequate/disproportionate; (ii) cannot grant approval subject to certain conditions which the authorised officer may deem just and proper; (iii) cannot act as a Court of Appeal so as to reappreciate evidence and to substitute its own judgment for that of the management. 9. In the aforesaid context and in light of the ratio laid down by this Court in order dated 15.09.2009 passed in Special Civil Application No.2025 of 2009, Section 14 of the Gujarat Secondary Schools Services Tribunal Act, 1983 is pari-materia to Section 36 of the Act. 9. In the aforesaid context and in light of the ratio laid down by this Court in order dated 15.09.2009 passed in Special Civil Application No.2025 of 2009, Section 14 of the Gujarat Secondary Schools Services Tribunal Act, 1983 is pari-materia to Section 36 of the Act. It is apposite to refer to paragraphs 14,15 and 16 of the said order, which read as under:- “14. On considering Sec.14 of the Act of 1983, it is clear that it does not confer any power upon the Director of Higher Education to consider the legality and validity of the order of dismissal. Under sec.14 of the Act of 1983 the Director of Higher Education is to take an appropriate decision as to whether the proposed action of dismissal/removal or reduction in rank is to be approved or not and if the Director of Education Higher fails to communicate either approval or disapproval of the proposed action, within a period of 45 days, the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the Director of Higher Education. Therefore what is required to consider by the Director of Higher Education under sec.14 is the proposed action and once the final order is passed by the management, the only remedy available to the aggrieved employee is to challenge the same before the Higher Secondary Education Tribunal as provided under sec.8 of the Act of 1983. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 on the application submitted by the respondent No.3 challenging the order of dismissal passed by the petitioner and in exercise of the powers under sec.14 of the Act of 1983 is absolutely without jurisdiction and illegal. The Director of Higher Education and/or the respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction at all under sec.14 of the Act of 1983 to consider the legality and validity of the order of dismissal. To consider the legality and validity of the order of dismissal vests only with the Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1983. Under the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 cannot be sustained. 15. Even otherwise, it appears that while passing the impugned order the respondent No.2 has observed that the School Management has not acted as per the communication dtd.8/12/2008. Under the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 cannot be sustained. 15. Even otherwise, it appears that while passing the impugned order the respondent No.2 has observed that the School Management has not acted as per the communication dtd.8/12/2008. However, it is to be noted that the communication dtd.8/12/2008 was the subject matter of Special Civil Application No. 90 of 2009 and this Court quashed the said communication dtd.8/12/2008 and remanded the matter to the respondent No.2. Therefore, once the communication dtd.8/12/2008 was set aside, there was no question of complying with the same by the petitioner management. The aforesaid shows non-application of mind on the part of the respondent No.2 and the respondent No.2 has not even considered the order passed by this Court dtd.4/2/2009 in Special Civil Application No. 90 of 2009 properly. 16. Now, so far as the objections and submissions of Mr. Jasani, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.3 to the effect that the petitioner has an alternative statutory remedy by preferring an appeal before the Tribunal under sec.14(6) of the Act of 1983 and, therefore, present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not required to be entertained is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted. What is provided under sub-sec.(6) of Sec.14 of the Act of 1983 is that against the order passed by the Director of Higher Education approving the action proposed by the management, as provided under sec.14(1)(b), an appeal is provided to the Tribunal. In the present case, the impugned decision of the Higher Education and/or the respondent No.2 is not an order under Clause (b) of sub-sec.(1) of sec.14 i.e. approving the action proposed against the respondent No.3. Therefore, it cannot be said that against the impugned decision, the petitioner has a remedy by way of an appeal as provided under sub-sec. (6) of sec.14.” 10. In view thereof, Section 36(2) of the Act provides that the respondent no.1 is required to take a decision either to accept or decline the proposal made by the petitioner – school. It is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent no.1 to deviate from the aforesaid and consider the other merits. It is a statutory provision whereby, upon expiry of 45 days, the applicability of same would cease to operate. The proceedings are summary in nature. 11. It is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent no.1 to deviate from the aforesaid and consider the other merits. It is a statutory provision whereby, upon expiry of 45 days, the applicability of same would cease to operate. The proceedings are summary in nature. 11. In the facts of the present case, any decision taken by the respondent - District Education Officer subsequent to 45 days would be nonest in eye of law. The respondent no.1 instead of granting or rejecting the petitioner’s proposal of dismissal, informed the petitioner on 50th day i.e. on 16.03.2016 that the decision would be taken by the respondent no.1 upon conclusion of the criminal case pending against the respondent no.3 herein. The aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court, is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent no.1, while exercising the powers under Section 36(2) of the Act. 12. The petitioner – school, upon completion of 45 days, on the basis of deemed approval, passed the order of dismissal, which requires no interference. The District Education Officer passed the order of reinstatement on 13.06.2017, rejecting the proposal of dismissal is nonest in the eye of law. Further, upon completion of 45 days, it was well within the right of the petitioner to consider deemed approval and take appropriate decision wherein, in the facts of the present case, the petitioner – school ordered dismissal of the respondent no.3. 13. In view of the settled legal position, exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, impugned order dated 13.06.2017 passed by the respondent no.1 is quashed and set aside, once upon completion of the period of 45 days, no order was passed by the respondent no.1 and in view thereof, the question of relegating the petitioner to avail statutory alternative remedy under Section 36(5) of the Act does not arise. 14. For the foregoing reasons, the present petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.