JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 374(2) of the CrPC, the sole appellant herein has preferred this criminal appeal calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.11.2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratappur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No.20/2016 by which she has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-; in default of payment of fine additional rigorous imprisonment for 1 year. 2. Case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that on 12.07.2016 at about 3:00 am, at village Manpur, Police Station Pratappur, District Surajpur, Chhaattisgarh, in furtherance of their common intention appellant herein along with Sanjay Paikara (now acquitted) assaulted her husband Rambhagat (now deceased) by sharp edged weapon by which he (deceased) suffered grievous injuries and died, pursuant to which Sukhlal (PW-1), father of the deceased, reported the matter to the police. It is further case of the prosecution that the marriage of the appellant and Rambhagat was solemnized in the month of April, 2016 and on the date of offence i.e. 12.07.2016, at about 9:30 pm, after having dinner, they (appellant and the deceased) were sleeping in separate room by closing the door from inside and in the late night, Dhankunwar (PW- 13), mother of the deceased, had informed Sukhlal (PW-1) that appellant had informed her that Rambhagat was lying unconscious, then he (PW-1), Dhankunwar (PW-13), Shyam Bhagat (PW-2), brother of the deceased, and the appellant herein went inside the room and found that light was not illuminating and Rambhagat was found dead in naked condition and blood had spread on the bed sheet. Merg and FIR were registered vide Exs. P/1 & P/2, respectively. Nazari naksha was prepared vide Ex.P/13. Crime details form was prepared vide Ex.P/3. Inquest proceedings (Ex.P/5) were conducted and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. As per postmortem report (Ex.P/19), proved by Dr. A.K. Vishwakarma (PW-14) cause of death was hemorrhagic shock and homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of Sanjay Paikara (acquitted) (Ex.P/6), axe has been seized vide Ex.P/7. Clothes of the appellant herein were seized vide Ex.P/11. As per postmortem report (Ex.P/19), proved by Dr. A.K. Vishwakarma (PW-14) cause of death was hemorrhagic shock and homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of Sanjay Paikara (acquitted) (Ex.P/6), axe has been seized vide Ex.P/7. Clothes of the appellant herein were seized vide Ex.P/11. Seized articles were sent for chemical analysis to FSL and in FSL report (Ex.P/27) on articles A (axe), D1, D2, E1, E2 & E3 (clothes of the appellant herein) stains of blood was found. 3. After due investigation, appellant herein was charge- sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant / accused abjured her guilt and entered into defence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 28 documents and defence in support of its case has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. The statement of the appellant / accused was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC in which she denied the circumstances appearing against her in the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded innocence and false implication. 5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant herein questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 6. Mr. Sunil Tripathi and Ms. Varsha Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, submit that appellant has falsely been implicated in crime in question and she has been convicted by recording a finding which is perverse to the record. 6. Mr. Sunil Tripathi and Ms. Varsha Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, submit that appellant has falsely been implicated in crime in question and she has been convicted by recording a finding which is perverse to the record. They also submit that the appellant has been convicted only on the basis of that she was staying alone along with her husband (deceased) in the house and she has not explained in her statement under Section 313 of the CrPC that as to how and under what circumstance her husband died, whereas the incident took within three months from the date of marriage of the appellant and the relationship between the appellant and her husband was quite cordial and in the same house, father of the deceased (PW-1), mother of the deceased (PW-13) and brother of the deceased (PW-2) were also residing, therefore, it is not case where Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'the Evidence Act') could have been applied and only on the basis of sole incriminating circumstance that she (appellant) and her husband (deceased) were residing together on the date and time of offence, appellant has been convicted, which is liable to be set aside and she is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Arvind Dubey, learned State counsel, supports the impugned judgment and submits that prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He also submits that the appellant herein in her statement under Section 313 of the CrPC has failed to explain as to how and under what circumstances her husband died and, as such, the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offence after applying Section 106 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, the appellant is not entitled to be acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt and the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. Now, the first question is, whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature? 10. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. Now, the first question is, whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature? 10. In this regard, the learned trial Court has recorded the finding in affirmative that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature on the basis of postmortem report (Ex.P/19) proved by Dr. A.K. Vishwakarma (PW-14), which is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the appellant is the author of crime in question? 12. The trial has answered the above question in affirmative while acquitting the co-accused Sanjay Paikara. The trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act to base the conviction of the appellant and recorded the following finding after considering the evidence available on record:- (i) the death of Rambhagat was homicidal in nature and apart from death being homicidal in nature, the injuries inflicted on the neck of the deceased could have been caused by the said axe, as per query report (Ex.P/20), whereas, the said axe has been seized pursuant to memorandum statement of the co-accused Sanjay Paikara (now acquitted); on the weapon of offence i.e. axe only blood was found and no human blood was found and the blood group has also not been determined, however, since the appellant was in the company of the deceased, she could have explained blood found on her clothes (saree, blouse, peticot, etc.) but she did not explain the same. (ii) on the date of offence the appellant herein along with her husband (deceased) sleeping in the room of the deceased as shown in sketch map (Ex.P/3) and she has failed to explain in her statement under Section 313 of the CrPC as to how and under what circumstances her husband (deceased) died, whereas, in the same house premises father of the deceased (PW-1), mother of the deceased (PW-13) and brother of the deceased (PW-2) were also sleeping though in separate rooms and there is no evidence with regard the relationship being strained of the appellant and the deceased and also there is no evidence with regard to quarrel between them (appellant and the deceased) on the date and time of offence; (iii) the appellant did not abscond after the death of her husband (deceased) and her conduct was not unnatural. 13. A careful perusal of the aforesaid finding would show that the trial Court has proceeded to convict the appellant on the basis that the appellant and the deceased was in the house and the appellant was in company of her husband on the date and time of offence which the prosecution has also proved, but since she has not explained in her statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, therefore, it has to be taken that the appellant is that author of the crime in question after invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 14. Now, the question would be whether the Section 106 of the Evidence Act has rightly been made applicable by the trial Court while convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC ? 15. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: - “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 16. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 17. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: - “11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).” 18. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).” 18. Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 19. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “19. In this case, as mentioned above, neither the prosecution witnesses have deposed to that effect nor any other material has been placed on record to show that the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was strained in any manner. Moreover, the appellant was not the only person residing in the house where the incident took place and it is brought on record that the parents of the appellant were also present on the date of the incident in the house. The fact that other members of the family of the appellant were present shows that there could be another hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded. Therefore, it can be said that the facts established do not rule out the existence of any other hypothesis. The facts established cannot be said to be consistent only with one hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant. *** *** *** *** *** 22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 20. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 , while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 21. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence. 22. 22. In the matter of Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626 relying upon the Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 14 SCC 415 their Lordships have held that when the husband and wife remaining within four walls of a house and death taking place, it would be a strong circumstance, but that by alone in absence of any evidence of violence on the deceased cannot be held to be conclusive and observed in paragraph 20 as under:- “20. That leads us to the reliance placed by the High Court as well as the trial court on the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In Subramaniam (supra), this Court had occasion to consider the similar case of the husband and wife remaining within the four walls of a house and death taking place. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court:- “23. So far as the circumstance that they had been living together is concerned, indisputably, the entirety of the situation should be taken into consideration. Ordinarily when the husband and wife remained within the four walls of a house and a death by homicide takes place it will be for the husband to explain the circumstances in which she might have died. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that although the same may be considered to be a strong circumstance but that by alone in the absence of any evidence of violence on the deceased cannot be held to be conclusive. It may be difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the husband and the husband alone was responsible therefor.”” 23. Similarly, their Lordships in Shivaji Chintappa Patil (supra) have relied upon the decision of Gargi v. State of Haryana, (2019) 9 SCC 738 and observed in paragraphs in 22 & 23 as under:- “22. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Gargi (supra):- “33.1. Insofar as the “last seen theory” is concerned, there is no doubt that the appellant being none other than the wife of the deceased and staying under the same roof, was the last person the deceased was seen with. However, such companionship of the deceased and the appellant, by itself, does not mean that a presumption of guilt of the appellant is to be drawn. However, such companionship of the deceased and the appellant, by itself, does not mean that a presumption of guilt of the appellant is to be drawn. The trial court and the High Court have proceeded on the assumption that Section 106 of the Evidence Act directly operates against the appellant. In our view, such an approach has also not been free from error where it was omitted to be considered that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. This Court has explained the principle in Sawal Das (supra) in the following: “10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused.”” 23. It could thus be seen, that it is well-settled that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.” 24. Further, relying upon the decision of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 their Lordships further have concluded that by now it is well settled that principle of law, that false explanation or non- explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain of circumstances. 25. However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain of circumstances. 25. Similarly, in the matter of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier decision on the point of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, have held that Section 106 has to be applied in criminal cases with care and caution and held in paragraphs 41 to 48 as under:- “41. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 42. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the of- fence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden of the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimateburden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. 43. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. 43. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused gives an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circum- stance which may well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams: “All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence.” 44. To recapitulate the foregoing : What lies at the bottom of the various rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If the accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams—Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion—para 527 negative averments and para 528—“require affirmative counter-evidence” at page 438 and foil, of Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958. 45. If the accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams—Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion—para 527 negative averments and para 528—“require affirmative counter-evidence” at page 438 and foil, of Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958. 45. But Section 106 has no application to cases where the fact in question having regard to its nature is such as to be capable of being known not only by the accused but also by others if they happened to be present when it took place. From the illustrations appended to the section, it is clear that an intention not apparent from the character and circumstances of the act must be established as especially within the knowledge of the person whose act is in question and the fact that a person found travelling without a ticket was possessed of a ticket at a stage prior in point of time to his being found without one, must be especially within the knowledge of the traveler himself : see Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, illustrations (a) and (b). 46. A manifest distinction exists between the bur- den of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reason- able doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with countervailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might have been rebutted. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edn. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 2 p. 37 and foil). Leland v. State reported in 343 U.S. 790=96 L.Ed. 1302, Raffel v. U.S. reported in 271 U.S. 294=70 L.Ed. 1054. WHAT IS “PRIMA FACIE CASE” IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT? 47. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view", or "based on first impression". According, to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evi-Ideuce sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. 48. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death.” 26. Thereafter, recently, in the matter of Santosh @ Bhure v. State (G.N.C.T.) of Delhi, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 418 it has been held that even if the accused fails to explain as to how the dead body of the deceased was found in his apartment, an inference of his guilt cannot be drawn. Thereafter, recently, in the matter of Santosh @ Bhure v. State (G.N.C.T.) of Delhi, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 418 it has been held that even if the accused fails to explain as to how the dead body of the deceased was found in his apartment, an inference of his guilt cannot be drawn. In nutshell, in any case the prosecution has to elevate its case from the realm of “may be true” to the plane of “must be true” as is indispensably required for conviction on the criminal charge. 27. Returning to the facts of the present case in the light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships in the above-mentioned judgments, it is quite vivid that the prosecution has only proved that the death of appellant's husband Rambhagat (deceased) was homicidal in nature and he was found dead in his house in which apart from appellant as per sketch map (Ex.P/3) proved by Sukhlal (PW-1), besides the appellant's room, Dhankunwar (PW- 13), mother of the deceased, Sukhlal (PW-1), father of the deceased, and Shyam Bhagat (PW-2), brother of the deceased, were staying and they were present in the house and immediately reached to the spot on the same date and time of offence, therefore, it is not a case that the entire house shown in Ex.P/3 (sketch map) was in exclusive possession of the appellant herein as apart from the appellant and deceased three other persons were also residing in the same premises with a common courtyard. Furthermore, though injury was found over the neck of the appellant as per postmortem report (Ex.P/19), but the weapon of offence i.e. axe was seized from the possession of the co-accused Sanjay Paikara (now acquitted) pursuant to his memorandum statement (Ex.P/7) and only blood has been found and it has not been demonstrated to be human blood and in the light of decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and another, (2019) 7 SCC 781 in absence of human blood on the weapon of offence, recovery of no use to the prosecution and there is no eye witness to the incident to prove that it is the appellant herein who has caused the injury over the neck of the deceased. Furthermore, the marriage of the appellant and the deceased was solemnized in April, 2016 and the incident took place on 12.07.2016 and the trial Court in para 29 of its judgment has recorded clear and specific finding that relationship between the appellant and the deceased was not strained in any manner on the date and time of offence and the appellant did not abscond from the spot after the incident and her conduct was quite natural and, as such, in the matter of Nagendra Shah (supra) their Lordships have clearly held that the fact that other members of the family were present would show that there could be another hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded. The fact that the appellant was staying with the deceased which she is required to explain as to how and under what circumstances her husband (deceased) died, but she has not explained. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Subramaniam (supra) followed in the Shivaji Chintappa Patil (supra) may be a strong circumstance, but that by alone in absence of any evidence of violence on the deceased cannot be held to be conclusive. It has also been held their Lordships of the Supreme court in the matter of Gargi (supra) that the companionship of the deceased and the appellant therein, by itself, does not mean that a presumption of guilt of the appellant is to be drawn by relying upon the Sawal Das (supra) and as per decision of Sawal Das (supra) neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the incriminating circumstance which the appellant did not explain, since she was staying with her husband (deceased) and the husband was found dead in the house which she has not explain, would be an additional circumstance as held in Sharab Birdhichand Sarda (supra) followed in Shivaji Chintappa Patil (supra) would constitute as additional circumstance, but it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain of circumstances. However, on the clothes of the appellant herein stains of blood was found in FSL report (Ex.P/27), but in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 SCC Online SC 67 only on the basis of FSL report, the accused/appellant cannot be convicted for offence under Section 302 of IPC. Our attention has also been drawn to the fact that the trial Court excluding the application of Section 34 of the IPC, acquitting the co-accused Sanjay Paikara, the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC. In the matter of Sohan Lal and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1971) 1 SCC 498 where it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in absence of evidence to show which act of the accused caused the death of the murdered man, it would neither be proper to convict the accused person under Section 302 of the IPC simpliciter, nor under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, particularly when the High Court acquitted the co-accused of charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and the State did not prefer an appeal against the acquittal which is absolutely similar to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, in the present case by excluding the application of Section 34 of the IPC and acquitting the co-accused Sanjay Paikara, the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC and the evidence on record, particularly statement of Dr. A.K. Vishwakarma (PW-14) in which he said that the cause of death was haemorrhagic shock due to injury on the lower part of the neck and on account of which he (deceased) died, but there is no evidence on record to show that the present accused/appellant herein inflicted the neck injury to her husband (deceased) by which he died. Similarly, the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Sohan Lal (supra) has followed in Sawal Das (supra). Since there is no evidence available on record that the appellant herein has caused the neck injury, her (appellant herein) conviction under Section 302 of the IPC simpliciter would not be justified that too when other corroborating pieces of incriminating circumstances are missing. Since there is no evidence available on record that the appellant herein has caused the neck injury, her (appellant herein) conviction under Section 302 of the IPC simpliciter would not be justified that too when other corroborating pieces of incriminating circumstances are missing. In that view of the matter, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted from the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. 28. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 29.11.2016 passed by the trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of IPC, is hereby set aside/quashed and the appellant is acquitted from the said offence on the basis of principles of benefit of doubt. Appellant is stated to be in jail since 14.07.2016, we direct that she be released from the jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter. 29. This criminal appeal is allowed. 30. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and the copy of this judgment be supplied to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where she is lodged and suffering jail sentence, forthwith for information and necessary action, if any.