JUDGMENT : (K.V. Jayakumar, J.) This Writ Appeal is preferred by the petitioner impugning the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P(C).No.20106/2021 dated 19.06.2024. 2. The petitioner/appellant, Sasidharan O.V., retired from the service of the 3rd respondent, the Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (FACT) on 28.02.2014 on attaining the age of 58 years. 3. The petitioner is a member of Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme as well as the Employees’ Pension Scheme 1995 formulated under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. In both the Schemes, he has nominated his wife as his nominee. 4. After his retirement, the petitioner, Sri.Sasidharan O.V., was blessed with three children. The petitioner made an application on 03.08.2021 for the change of nomination and sought nomination of his newly born children in place of his wife as nominees in the pension scheme. 5. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Employees’ Provident Fund Organization has rejected the above said nomination as per Ext.P7 order. Impugning Ext.P7 order, the petitioner approached the writ court. 6. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that Ext.P7 order is legally sustainable. 7. Impugning the judgment of the learned Single Judge and challenging Ext.P7 order, the petitioner preferred this writ appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents Adv. T.C.Krishna, the Deputy Solicitor General of India in Charge supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the provisions with regard to nomination in the EPF scheme 1952 are clear and once an employee retires when he attains the age of superannuation, he cannot further nominate a person as his nominee. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is illegal and incorrect. He submitted that the petitioner has included his wife as nominee, as he had no children at the time of retirement. The rejection of nomination facility to his children born after his retirement is illegal. By denying children’s pension, the 2nd respondent has denied the legislative intention of the Employees’ Pension Scheme. 10. We have heard the rival submissions of the counsel and perused the paper book. 11. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the 2nd respondent ought to have permitted the petitioner to nominate his children in the pension scheme. 10. We have heard the rival submissions of the counsel and perused the paper book. 11. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the 2nd respondent ought to have permitted the petitioner to nominate his children in the pension scheme. The refusal and rejection of nomination of his children born after his retirement tantamounts to the denial of pension to the children. It is his case that the Employees’ Pension Scheme is a beneficial piece of legislation and therefore, it is to be interpreted liberally so as to achieve the aims and objectives of the Scheme. 12. However, the learned counsel for the respondent would submit that, whenever the wordings of provisions is plain and clear and there is no ambiguity, the liberal and grammatical rule of interpretation is to be applied. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the wordings of the relevant provisions are plain and clear. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant placed reliance on a decision reported in Peirce Leslie India Ltd. v. Secretary, C.I.T.U [2006 KHC 269]. In Peirce Leslie’s case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court opined that the rule making authority is not empowered to take away the substantive right by limiting the liability of the employer to one year, which is beyond the scope of rule making power and hence ultra vires the parent Act. In other words, the rule making authority cannot take away the substantive right of the beneficiaries of a legislation. The dictum laid down in Peirce Leslie’s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Peirce Leslie’s case (supra) was decided in connection with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1957. 14. Before further discussion, it may be useful to refer the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in this regard. 15. In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [ AIR 1957 SC 907 ], the Honourable Apex Court observed that the words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act, whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. 16. In the Institute of Chartered Accountants v. Price Waterhouse and Another [ 1997(6) SCC 312 ] the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: “50. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a Statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, 1980 (1) All ER 529 (HL) p. 551 : "It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if Judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the Court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to public interest." 17. In Vinod Kumar v. District Magistrate, Mau and Others [2023 SCC OnLine SC 787], the Honourable Supreme Court opined that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation, for example, the mischief rule/purposive construction, etc. can only be resorted to when the words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or, if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistakes. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency. 18. The learned Single Judge, after referring the relevant provisions of the EPF Pension Scheme and find that Ext.P7 order is legally sustainable. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted hereunder: ‘6. I have considered the submissions. 18. The learned Single Judge, after referring the relevant provisions of the EPF Pension Scheme and find that Ext.P7 order is legally sustainable. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted hereunder: ‘6. I have considered the submissions. Sub-paragraph (5) of Paragraph 61 of the EPF Scheme, 1952 reads as under; “61. Nomination (5) A nomination made under sub-paragraph (1) may at any time be modified by a member after giving a written notice of his intention of doing so in Form [2] annexed hereto. If a nominee predeceases the member, the interest of the nominee shall revert to the member who may make a fresh nomination in respect of such interest.” 7. Definition of ‘member’ is provided in paragraph 2 Clause 9 of the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995 which would read as under; 2. Definitions “(ix) "Member" means an employee who becomes a member of the Employees' Pension Fund in accordance with the provisions of this Scheme.” Paragraph 6A of the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 is also provides as under; "6 A Retention of membership A member of the Employees' Pension Fund shall continue to be such member till he attains the age of 58 years or he avails the withdrawal benefit to which he is entitled under para 14 of the Scheme, or dies, or the pension is vested in him in terms of para 12 of the Scheme, whichever is earlier.” 8. Considering the aforesaid provisions, I do not find that the impugned order in Exhibit P-7 suffers from any illegality or perversity which requires an interference by this Court. The writ petition therefore fails, which is hereby dismissed.’ 19. On perusal of paragraph 6A of the Employees’ Pension Scheme, it is crystal clear that a member of Employees’ Pension Scheme has to continue as such till the attainment of the age of 58 years or availment of the withdrawal benefits or died or the pension vested in him under the Scheme, whichever is earlier. 20. On going through paragraph 6A of the Employees’ Pension Scheme, we are of the view that, there is no ambiguity in the provision and the wordings of the said provision is plain and clear. Upon hearing the rival submissions across the Bar, we do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. The impugned order is legally sustainable. W.A.No.1051/2024 fails and it is dismissed.