JUDGMENT : A.S. SUPEHIA, J. 1. ADMIT. Learned advocates appear and waive service of notice of admission on behalf of the respective respondents. 2. The present Letters Patent Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865, is directed against the judgment and order dated 26.02.2021 passed in the captioned writ petition, wherein the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 23.03.2000 passed by the Gujarat Higher Secondary Schools Services Tribunal at Ahmedabad (in short “the Tribunal”) in Appeal No. 5 of 1995 with Application No. 111 of 1995 and the order dated 10.04.2001 passed in Review Application No. 74 of 2000. BRIEF FACTS: 3. The respondent No. 1-Mr. Vishnushankar Nagindas Bhatt, was appointed as an Assistant Teacher (Secondary School) at K.K. Vidyalaya, Kanod, Panchmahal on 15.06.1970. Thereafter, he served as an Assistant Teacher at Bharti Vidyamandir, Bharuch on 17.06.1974 and finally, he served as an Assistant Teacher (Secondary School) on 10.08.1977 at Sadhna Vidyalaya, Bharuch run by the original respondent Nos.2 and 3 i.e. the present appellants. 4. While the respondent No. 1 was serving as an Assistant Teacher, and on 14.09.1994, an First Information Report (for short “FIR”) being C.R. No. II-364 of 1994 was registered against him before the Bharuch City “A” Division Police Station, Bharuch for the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) and 426 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (for short, “the IPC”), inter alia alleging that on 14.09.1994, the respondent No. 1 barged into the chamber of Principal and assaulted the Principal, in presence of other witnesses and accordingly, he received certain injuries. Subsequently, by the judgment and order dated 14.07.1998, the respondent No. 1 came to be acquitted from the charges levelled against him. 5. It appears that on the basis of the said FIR, an explanation was sought from the respondent No. 1 and accordingly, the Trust decided to initiate a departmental inquiry to the incident along with other charges. The departmental inquiry was conducted for 11 charges. The Inquiry Committee submitted its report dated 25.03.1995, proving 11 charges levelled against him. As a consequence thereof, by the order dated 21.06.1995, the respondent No. 1 informed that he was dismissed from service as an Assistant Teacher. This was resolved in the meeting dated 16.06.1995 by the Trustees of the Trust. The departmental inquiry was conducted for 11 charges. The Inquiry Committee submitted its report dated 25.03.1995, proving 11 charges levelled against him. As a consequence thereof, by the order dated 21.06.1995, the respondent No. 1 informed that he was dismissed from service as an Assistant Teacher. This was resolved in the meeting dated 16.06.1995 by the Trustees of the Trust. An approval for dismissing him from service was sought from the competent state authority. The respondent was dismissed from service by treating the dismissal order as deemed to have been approved by the competent authority under the provisions of Section 14(1)(b) (3) of the Gujarat Higher Secondary School Services Tribunal Act, 1983 (in short “the Act”). The said provision stipulates “deemed approval” of the dismissal order, in case, the Competent Authority does not respond to the approval sought by the Management for dismissing a teacher from the service within a period of 45 days. 6. The respondent No. 1 assailed the action of deemed approval, which is incorporated in the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, by filing an Appeal No. 5 of 1995 before the Tribunal. Along with the said action of deemed approval, the respondent No. 1 also challenged the dismissal order dated 21.06.1995. By the judgment and order dated 23.03.2000, the Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the respondent No. 1. Subsequently, a Review Application No. 74 of 2000 was also filed and the same was also rejected vide order dated 10.04.2001, which was ultimately assailed in the captioned writ petition. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition, while setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal. Hence, the present appeal. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-TRUST: 7. Learned advocate Mr. K.B. Pujara, appearing for the appellants, at the outset, has submitted that the learned Single Judge fell in error in allowing the writ petition since the same is passed without appreciating the serious charges levelled against the respondent No. 1. He has referred to the chargesheet issued to the respondent No. 1 and has submitted that there were 11 charges, which were forming the part of chargesheet and the same were proved. He has referred to the chargesheet issued to the respondent No. 1 and has submitted that there were 11 charges, which were forming the part of chargesheet and the same were proved. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge was primarily impressed upon the acquittal of the respondent No. 1 in the criminal offence, which was by giving benefit of doubt however, it is urged by him that there were other charges also levelled against the respondent No. 1, which have been proved by holding a regular department proceeding. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Pujara, has further contended that the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal was not required to be interfered with as the same was passed after appreciating totality of the facts. It is also contended that the learned Single Judge has also examined the issue of deemed approval as envisaged under Section 14 of the Act, which is impermissible since before the Tribunal, no such contention was raised by the respondent No. 1. It is submitted that in fact, the resolution passed by the Trust on 16.06.1995 reveals that the approval was received by the Joint Director of Education on 27.04.1995 however since it is an old record, no documentary evidence is found. Thus, it is urged that the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is required to be quashed and set aside and the present appeal may be allowed. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-TEACHER: 9. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta, appearing with the learned advocate Mr. Bomi H. Sethna, for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that the respondent No. 1, right from the beginning, was subjected to harassment by the Management and in fact, in the month of January, 1995, he was declared surplus and ultimately, the issue was resolved and hence, the Trust was in inimical terms and wanted to see that the respondent No. 1 was dismissed from the service. It is submitted that the entire issue of dismissal was premised on the criminal complaint, which was registered against the respondent No. 1 however, subsequently he has been acquitted in the said criminal complaint. While referring to the charges, which were levelled against the respondent No. 1, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mehta, has submitted that the same are absolutely vague, and do not fall within the definition of misconduct. While referring to the charges, which were levelled against the respondent No. 1, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mehta, has submitted that the same are absolutely vague, and do not fall within the definition of misconduct. It is submitted that the very first charge refers to the alleged assault on the Principal, which was the subject matter of the criminal case, in which the respondent No. 1 was acquitted. It is submitted that the respondent No. 1 has thereafter been charged for his act of demanding the details of accounts etc., which cannot be said to be misconduct. While referring to the findings of the Tribunal, the learned Senior Advocate Mr.Mehta, has contended that the Tribunal has passed the impugned judgment and order without application of mind to the facts and law. Thus, it is urged that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge setting aside the judgment and order of the Tribunal may not be interfered with. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: 10. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties at length. We have also perused the relevant documents, which are pointed out before this Court. 11. The facts, as narrated hereinabove and as recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order are not in dispute. 12. While the respondent No. 1 was serving as an Assistant Teacher in the school run by the appellants, a criminal complaint alleging physical assault on the Principal was registered on 14.09.1994 at Bharuch City “A” Division Police Station, Bharuch for the offences punishment under Sections 323, 504, 506 and 426 of the IPC. The same culminated into the Criminal Case No. 29693 of 1994. By the judgment and order dated 14.07.1998 passed by the learned 2nd Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bharuch, the respondent No. 1 was acquitted from the charges levelled against him. We have perused the findings recorded by the Trial Court. The Principal/complainant - Mr.Hasmukhbhai Rana, on whom it is alleged that the delinquent had assaulted, was examined. The eyewitnesses to the incident were also examined and the categorical finding is recorded by the Trial Court in paragraph No. 18 that looking to their evidence, there appears to be major contradiction in their testimony. The Principal/complainant - Mr.Hasmukhbhai Rana, on whom it is alleged that the delinquent had assaulted, was examined. The eyewitnesses to the incident were also examined and the categorical finding is recorded by the Trial Court in paragraph No. 18 that looking to their evidence, there appears to be major contradiction in their testimony. The Trial Court has categorically recorded in the FIR, that the complainant has stated that he has received injuries in the left leg, whereas in his deposition before the Trial Court, he has stated that he has suffered injuries in his right leg. Thus, the registration of the FIR narrating the incident was disbelieved by the Trial Court and the eye-witnesses have also not supported the case of the prosecution. After recording such fact, the trial Court has ultimately, referred that since the prosecution is unable to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt, the accused has to be acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. Thus, the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal case was a vital aspect which the Tribunal was required to be considered. Though, it is settled legal proposition that standard of proof in criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings is different, if both of them are premised on a same incident and the witnesses are common, the acquittal of the employee in the criminal proceedings cannot be ignored. The Tribunal was required to examine the effect of acquittal, which has direct nexus with the charge no. 1. 13. It appears that on 24.12.1994 in the meeting held by the Trust, the respondent No. 1 was read over the charges. The first charge refers to the very same incident of assault on the Principal. The second charge refers that the details demanded by the respondent No. 1 with regard to the income-tax assessment. The third charge refers that in the year 1994-95, he did not enter notice in the register as a class teacher relating to the fees from standard 1 to 10. The charge No. 4 refers that though he was instructed on 19.08.1994 to put signature in service-book against the entry however, he did not put his signature in the service. The charge No. 5 refers that on 02.09.1994, though the school timings are from 7:10 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., he went early on that day at 12 O’clock. The charge No. 4 refers that though he was instructed on 19.08.1994 to put signature in service-book against the entry however, he did not put his signature in the service. The charge No. 5 refers that on 02.09.1994, though the school timings are from 7:10 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., he went early on that day at 12 O’clock. The charge No. 6 refers that he did not accept the memo as well as the post sent by the Principal. The charge No. 7 refers that from 06.05.1994 to 09.05.1994, he went on leave without informing anyone. The charge No. 8 refers that though his daughter had appeared in the examination of Sanskrit subject in March-1994 from 16.04.1994 to 22.04.1994, he acted as an Evaluator of Sanskrit subject. The charge No. 9 states that though he was asked to sign on the pay-slip of July, 1994, he did not put his signature. The charge No. 10 refers that he used to take down the instructions on Note-Book, which were issued by the Principal. The charge No. 11 alleges that earlier he was not used to put his signature on pay-slip and only after some decision in Application No. 17 of 1993, he started putting his signature on his pay-slip. These charges, as mentioned hereinabove, appear to have been exhumed by the appellants in order to see that the respondent No. 1 is embroiled in unnecessary departmental proceedings. The charge No. 1 stems out of the criminal prosecution, in which he has been acquitted, as mentioned hereinabove. At the time of passing the dismissal order on 16.06.1995, the criminal prosecution was still pending and during the pendency of Appeal No. 5 of 1995, which was filed by the respondent No. 1 challenging the dismissal order, the respondent No. 1 was already acquitted by the judgment dated 14.07.1998. 14. We have perused the judgment dated 23.03.2000 passed by the Tribunal in Appeal No. 5 of 1995. 15. From the perusal, we find that the judgment is very perfunctory and is passed without appreciating the facts, without analysis of the findings of the Inquiry Officer’s report, without appreciating the stand taken by the appellants during the departmental proceedings and also the same is bereft of any findings relating to the provisions of law. 15. From the perusal, we find that the judgment is very perfunctory and is passed without appreciating the facts, without analysis of the findings of the Inquiry Officer’s report, without appreciating the stand taken by the appellants during the departmental proceedings and also the same is bereft of any findings relating to the provisions of law. The Tribunal in the entire judgment has only quoted the number of criminal case and the orders passed by the appellants and thereafter, have referred the citation cited by the appellants and ultimately, the Tribunal has rejected the application by observing that the Tribunal cannot interfere with the order passed by the Disciplinary authorities. 16. It is very shocking to note that because of inquiry proceedings, the names of the children of the respondent No. 1, his younger son and daughter, who were studying in standard 1 and 3 in the very same school were removed from the register of the school and they were directed not to send them to the school from the next day. This fact has been recorded by the Tribunal in the judgment however, the learned Presiding officer has not examined the impact of the disciplinary proceedings and the order of punishment. It was expected from the Tribunal to at least refer to the charges and the nature of allegation levelled against the respondent No. 1 and the manner in which the inquiry proceedings have been conducted with biased attitude. 17. The learned Single Judge with regard to the manner and method in which, the inquiry proceedings were held, has recorded the findings as under: “31. Though petitioner requested the Secretary of the Institution vide communication in writing making grievance about the absence of his representative and permitting replacement thereof by communication dated 21st March, 1995, the petitioner appears to be asked to cross examine the witnesses present despite the absence of his representative on a day of previous meeting dated 12th March, 1995. The Inquiry initiated with the framing of charge on 4th December, 1994, it has concluded its inquiry within a span of 4½ months in 10 meetings. The report of the Inquiry Committee, which is at page No. 175 produced along with additional affidavit of the petitioner, reflects that except few meetings i.e. 1st meeting, the representative of the petitioner was absent to defend the petitioner. The report of the Inquiry Committee, which is at page No. 175 produced along with additional affidavit of the petitioner, reflects that except few meetings i.e. 1st meeting, the representative of the petitioner was absent to defend the petitioner. As recorded in its report itself, on 11th February, 1995, in a 6th sitting of the committee, the petitioner had to cross examine the Presenting Officer on behalf of the Institution under a protest in absence of his representative. Conspicuously, the report of the Committee is silent about the presence of the representative of the petitioner in 7th and 8th meeting, 4th and 5th meeting whereas his presence is noted in the 2nd meeting along with the petitioner. However, in the 3rd meeting for the absence of his representative, the Committee had adjourned the hearing on request made by the petitioner. Thus, it appears that from 3rd meeting to the last meeting, the representative of the petitioner was not present to defend the case of the petitioner and the petitioner had requested the committee to grant time also so that he can even change his representative but it has not been responded to in its true spirit. 32. If the representative of the petitioner remains continuously absent, either petitioner should have been permitted to change his representative or a reasonable opportunity/time should have been granted to him to defend his case. However, it appears that Inquiry Committee was in a high haste to conclude the inquiry, that too, in absence of the representative of the petitioner to defend his case. Prima-facie, the petitioner is not provided with reasonable opportunity of defending his case and inquiry has been conducted in breach of principles of natural justice. 33. The origination of the Inquiry has its roots in an FIR filed by the Principal of the Institution against the petitioner. Not only that, on that very day as also on 21st September, 1994, the Principal had in writing given complaint to the Institution against the petitioner for the act of assault made on him for which, he had already filed an ‘FIR’. If at all, any disciplinary proceedings had to be originated based on such written complaint triggered by the ‘FIR’, it should have been restricted to the act of assault on the Principal. If at all, any disciplinary proceedings had to be originated based on such written complaint triggered by the ‘FIR’, it should have been restricted to the act of assault on the Principal. However, the Institution though issued a notice to him for explaining such complaint by the Principal, they had expanded their scope of such an inquiry alleging nearly 15 charges against the petitioner. Be that as it may, before even police case initiated pursuant to an ‘FIR’ filed by the Principal is concluded, the Institution and the Inquiry Committee within a span of 4½ months’ concluded inquiry and proposed dismissal from service of the petitioner. However, during the pendency of the appeal before ‘the Tribunal’ challenging the act of deemed approval and the order of termination, an order of acquittal in a prosecution filed pursuant to the ‘FIR’ registered by the Principal came to be passed, which has not been even considered at all by the Tribunal.” 18. We may also refer that the learned Single Judge has also examined the provision of Section 14 of the Act. The relevant provision reads as under: “14. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of higher secondary school employee: (1) No employee shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the manager except after: (a) an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of these charges. (b) the action proposed against him is approved by the Director of Higher Education: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any employee who is appointed temporarily for a period less than a year. (2) The Director of Higher Education shall communicate to the manager in writing his approval or disapproval of the action proposed, within a period of forty-five days from the date of the receipt by the Director of Higher Education of such proposal. (3) Where the Director of Higher Education fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within the period of forty-five days specified in sub-section (2), the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the Director of Higher Education.” 19. (3) Where the Director of Higher Education fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within the period of forty-five days specified in sub-section (2), the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the Director of Higher Education.” 19. In the appeal memo, which was filed before the Tribunal, a specific contention has been raised by the respondent No. 1 that before he was dismissed from the services, the school has not taken any approval, as required under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. It is further averred in the application that though 45 days have passed away, the Director has not commenced hearing and no opportunity is given to him and no approval is given, as required under the provisions of Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. As mentioned hereinabove, as per the requirement of the provisions of Section 14(a)(2) & (3) of the Act, if the proposal sent by the Management to the authorized officer seeking any action of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank of a teacher, is either approved or disapproved and the Director/Authorized Officer fails to communicate his decision then such proposal, which is sent by the Management shall be considered as deemed to have been approved. 20. The Tribunal has not examined the aforesaid facet, though a specific contention was raised in the appeal memo by the respondent-teacher. The learned Single Judge has undertaken necessary exercise in this regard and also called for the necessary details. The learned Single Judge, in this regard in paragraph No. 28, has observed thus: “28. Mr. Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that as such, before the Tribunal, Commissioner of Higher Education as a party respondent along with District Education Officer, Bharuch neither they have filed any reply to the proceedings before the Tribunal nor any argument appears to have been advanced on their behalf. Therefore, he is unable to argue anything on facts in the present case. However, he has submitted that provisions made in the Act more particularly, Section 14, does not appear to be followed from the material available on record. He has further submitted that he is unable to show it from the record which was there before the Tribunal whether provisions of Section 14 of the Act is followed or not. However, he has submitted that provisions made in the Act more particularly, Section 14, does not appear to be followed from the material available on record. He has further submitted that he is unable to show it from the record which was there before the Tribunal whether provisions of Section 14 of the Act is followed or not. Therefore, he has submitted that Court may pass the order considering the submissions made by the parties before the Court.” 21. Thus, the learned Assistant Government Pleader has categorically stated that it appears that the provision made in the Act more particularly, Section 14 of the Act, does not appear to have been followed from the material available on record. It is not proved that the communication seeking approval was received by the Joint Director of Education as asserted by the appellants. The Tribunal was under an obligation to arrive on a definite finding on this legal issue which stems out of statutory provisions. It is mandatory for the Management and also for the competent State authority to follow all the requirements of Section 14 of the Act, before dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a higher secondary school employee. The Tribunal has barely referred that the school management has sent the proposal under Section 14(1) (B) of the Act, however there is no definite finding that the competent authority, i.e. the Joint Director has received the same. The provision of section 14(1)(2) of the Act mentions the expression “ from the date of receipt by the Director”. Thus, the Tribunal was required to examine as to whether the proposal was received by the Director or not. 22. It is contended by the appellants before us, that no contention about receipt of the proposal was raised before the Tribunal, and hence, the Tribunal has precisely not examined the issue. In our considered opinion, such an approach, if adopted will be an anathema to justice. Even if no argument is advanced by an employee or his advocate, in this regard before the Tribunal; to do complete justice, it is obligatory for the Tribunal, while performing its judicial functions, to examine the issue of compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 14 of the Act, in cases of dismissal, removal and reduction of rank of a school employee by the Management. In the present case, the respondent-teacher in his appeal memo, has incorporated specific averments relating to the non-compliance of the provision of section 14 of the Act. The Tribunal was alive of the issue, but has very perfunctorily addressed it. It appears that the learned Presiding Officer has failed to even read the Memo, which was of four pages. It was expected from the learned Presiding Officer to examine the legal issues raised in the memo of appeal, and deal with the same in the judgment and order. 23. On an overall analysis of the judgment of the Tribunal, the facts and findings as recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order, we do not find any convincing reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge setting aside the judgment and orders passed by the Tribunal. 24. We are informed that as on today, the respondent No. 1 is more than 78 years of age, and is surviving without any retirement benefits. ORDER AND DIRECTIONS: 25. Under the circumstances, the following directions are issued: (A) The appellants are directed to process the pension papers and also order regarding grant of consequential benefits to the respondent-teacher within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this judgment. The same shall be sent to the competent State authority forthwith. (B) Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 is directed to further pay the pension and all the retiral benefits to the respondent No. 1 within a period of four weeks. Thus, the entire exercise of paying the consequential benefits as directed by the learned Single Judge, which would include the pension and other retiral benefits shall be paid within a period of eight weeks, failing which, the amount will carry an interest of 12% per annum, and the same shall be recovered from the erring officers. (C) It is clarified that in the event of any inter se dispute with regard to the payment of any dues, the State Government shall pay the same to the respondent no. 1, and thereafter, it will be open for the State to adjust/recover such amount from the Appellant-Trust. 26. Resultantly, the Letters Patent Appeal fails. The same stands dismissed. (C) It is clarified that in the event of any inter se dispute with regard to the payment of any dues, the State Government shall pay the same to the respondent no. 1, and thereafter, it will be open for the State to adjust/recover such amount from the Appellant-Trust. 26. Resultantly, the Letters Patent Appeal fails. The same stands dismissed. As a sequel, civil application seeking stay of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge does not survive and the same stands disposed of accordingly.