JUDGMENT : K. Babu, J. The prayers in this writ petition are as follows:- “i) To issue a Writ of Certiorari and quash Exhibit P5 order/communication of the 3rd respondent as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. ii) To issue a Writ of Mandamus commanding the 1st and 2nd respondents to register FIR and commence investigation forthwith upon Exhibit-P1 petition without waiting for previous approval contemplated under section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. iii) To dispense with filing of the translation of vernacular documents. iv) To issue any other writ, orders or directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit on the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The petitioner seeks enquiry/investigation into the allegations of misappropriation and corruption in the educational institution by the name ‘Nazreth Pharmacy College’. The petitioner alleges a conspiracy among the members of a charitable society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955, which runs the college. The petitioner arraigned nine persons as suspects in Ext.P1 complaint submitted before the Director of Vigilance. It is alleged that the suspected persons, in furtherance of their common intention, denied admission to eligible students in the Pharmacy College in the seats allotted to the Government and sold the said seats to private students after receiving a huge capitation amount and misappropriated the amount so obtained to their credit causing wrongful loss to the society and wrongful monetary gain to them. It is further submitted that the above-said acts are in violation of the provisions of the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee & Other Measures to Ensure Equity & Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006. They are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Section 5 read with Section 15 of the Act, Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 406 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. They are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Section 5 read with Section 15 of the Act, Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 406 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. When the Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau (VACB) refused to take action on the complaint, the petitioner filed a complaint before the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kottayam, under Sections 190 and 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and prayed for conducting an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. or for a direction to conduct investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the Legal Advisor for the VACB, the Special Judge posted the matter for report from the VACB. The VACB took the stand that as approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the PC Act') is required, they are not in a position to enquire or investigate into the allegations. 4. The petitioner thereafter filed an application seeking investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Special Court dismissed the prayer and adjourned the matter, instructing the petitioner/complainant to produce Section 17A approval under the PC Act from the competent authority. The Vigilance submitted an application seeking prior approval from the competent authority. The Government, on that application, decided that as the allegations are pending consideration of the Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education, no vigilance enquiry is required in the matter. 5. The petitioner essentially challenges the legality of the order passed by the Government (Ext.P5). 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader (Vigilance). 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though this educational institution is managed by a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955, as the Director Board members are ‘public servants’ they discharge ‘public duty’ as defined in the P.C. Act. The learned counsel further argued that prior approval under Section 17A of the P.C. Act is required only when the acts alleged are relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by public servants in the discharge of their official duties. 8. Admittedly, Nazreth Pharmacy College is managed by a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955. The persons arraigned as accused in Ext.P1 complaint manage the educational institution. 9. 8. Admittedly, Nazreth Pharmacy College is managed by a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955. The persons arraigned as accused in Ext.P1 complaint manage the educational institution. 9. The College was originally affiliated with the Mahatma Gandhi University and is now affiliated with the Kerala University of Health Sciences, Thrissur. The Health and Family Welfare Department of the Government of Kerala issued a ‘No Objection Certificate’ for conducting the self-financing college. The society also obtained sanction from the All India Council for Technical Education for establishing the institution. It is not in challenge that Nazreth Pharmacy College started its functioning in accordance with the norms fixed by the Government for admission. 10. It is submitted that the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee & Other Measures to Ensure Equity & Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006 is applicable to the scheme of admission of students in the college. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the persons arraigned as accused in Ext.P1 are not ‘public servants’ as defined in the P.C.Act. The learned Special Government Pleader further submitted that the persons arraigned as accused in Ext.P1 cannot be attributed with the offences under the P.C. Act. 11. A decision on this writ petition is based on the interpretation of the terms ‘public duty’ and ‘public servant’ under the P.C. Act to see whether the acts alleged would come within the ambit of the discharge of ‘public duty’ for the purpose of the P.C. Act. 12. Section 2(b) of the P.C. Act defines ‘public duty’ as follows:- “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest.” 13. Section 2(c) defines ‘public servant’. Section 2(c) reads thus: “2. Definitions. 12. Section 2(b) of the P.C. Act defines ‘public duty’ as follows:- “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest.” 13. Section 2(c) defines ‘public servant’. Section 2(c) reads thus: “2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-xxx (c) “public servant” means,- (i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty; (ii) any person in the service or pay of a local authority; (iii) any person in the service or pay of a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); (iv) any Judge, including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions; (v) any person authorised by a Court of justice to perform any duty, in connection with the administration of justice, including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner appointed by such Court; (vi) any arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by a Court of justice or by a competent public authority; (vii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election; (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty;…...” 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised the term ‘public servant’ with reference to clause (viii) under Section 2(c) of the P.C. Act. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that a joint reading of ‘public duty’ as defined under Section 2(b) and the definition of the ‘public servant’ with reference to Section 2(c)(viii) of the P.C. Act indicates that those who are in the affairs of the society which is managing the Nazreth Pharmacy College discharge ‘public functions’, and therefore, the acts alleged would come under the definition of ‘public duties’ rendering them liable as ‘public servants’ under the P.C. Act. 16. 16. An analysis of the terms ‘public function’ and ‘public duty’ is required to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. In the analysis of ‘public function’ and ‘public duty’, the jural relations coined by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and the jurists who followed him are relevant. In the context of governance or discharge of governmental function, “duty” (public duty) is a correlative of “right” (public right). The position of a person engaged in a “public calling” is under a liability correlative to his power. Powers with privileges are correlative with the duties attached to them. ‘Public right’ in the context of the discharge of government function is synonymous with ‘legal obligation’. The “public right” or “legal obligation” cannot exist in a vacuum. The right or legal obligation must be relatable to law or an authorized function by the government. In a constitutional democracy, the Constitution confers the person in power the authority (power) to control, reduce and expand the entitlement of the person or body of persons upon whom the power is imposed. In a constitutionally governed system, with the expansion of State activities, the State has the power to control the activities of the private bodies also. This is a sovereign power of the State. The ‘public duty’ is a ‘public function’ or a legal obligation discharged by a ‘public servant’ under the command of ‘public right’, which presupposes the existence of the law of the State or valid governmental directions. In the discharge of ‘public duty’ by an organ of the State or a private body, there is an element of ‘State function’ or ‘public function’. If the ‘State function’ or ‘public function’ is discharged under a legal obligation or by a governmental or statutory direction, such ‘State function’ is treated as ‘public duty’. [(See – (1) Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning – Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (The Yale Law Journal, Nov. 1913, Vol. 23); (2) Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to a Conceptual and Practical Understanding of the Nature of Rights ((2005) MurUEJL 9); (3) Hohfeld: A Reappraisal (University of Queensland Law Journal Vol. 11); (4) A Review of Hohfeld’s Fundamental Legal Concepts (Cleveland State Law Review, Vol.16))]. 18. The provisions of the PC Act are to be constructed based on the legal concepts mentioned above. 11); (4) A Review of Hohfeld’s Fundamental Legal Concepts (Cleveland State Law Review, Vol.16))]. 18. The provisions of the PC Act are to be constructed based on the legal concepts mentioned above. ‘Public duty’ as defined in Section 2(b) of the PC Act, means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest. Thus a ‘public servant’ must be under the positive command of a State law or valid executive direction to discharge such a ‘public duty’. If a body or a corporation exercises a State function under the obligation of the existing laws, it is to be treated as a discharge of ‘public duty’. 19. The learned Special Government Pleader relied on Karthikeya Varma v. Union of India and Others ( 2015 KHC 567 ) in support of his contention that the office bearers of the charitable society referred to herein are not ‘public servants’ and that they do not discharge ‘public duty’ as defined in the P.C. Act. In Karthikeya Varma, a Single Bench of this Court was seized of allegations of corruption by the office bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association in relation to the construction of a stadium. This Court, following Hohfeldian jurisprudence, held that the office bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association were not discharging public duties. This Court, in paragraph Nos.45, 46 and 49 of the judgment, observed thus:- “45. It is on an analysis of the above legal concepts that the provisions under the PC Act have to be adverted. Thus, public duty under the PC Act refers to discharge of duty in relation to State, public or community at larger interest. Thus, a public servant must be under the positive command under the law to discharge such a duty. If a body or Corporation exercises a State function, without obligation under the existing laws, it is only an exercise of State function and cannot be treated as a discharge of public duty. 46. In the construction of the stadium to hold cricket matches to be viewed by public, no doubt the community at large has interest. By the construction of the stadium, the KCA controls and regulates, entitlement of men to the extent of rules and regulations laid down by them for admission in the stadium. 46. In the construction of the stadium to hold cricket matches to be viewed by public, no doubt the community at large has interest. By the construction of the stadium, the KCA controls and regulates, entitlement of men to the extent of rules and regulations laid down by them for admission in the stadium. The stadium is being constructed for the public; the activities are controlled by KCA; no doubt, the construction has to be styled as a State function or a public function. If the stadium is constructed based on any positive laws or under the direction of the Government, certainly that function would come within the ambit of public duty. However, if the stadium is not constructed under an existing legal obligation or by Governmental direction, that State function cannot be treated as a public duty. XX XX XX XX 49. Coming back to the facts of the case, whether the construction of the cricket stadium would come within the ambit of discharge of a public duty has to be considered in the light of law as above, with reference to the facts in the complaint. The complainant has no case that the stadium is being constructed by the KCA in discharge of legal obligations under any positive law enacted by the State or by the executive direction of the Government. In that view of the matter, construction of the stadium can only be considered as a State function and not in discharge of any public duty.” 20. The conclusion of the Single Bench of this Court in Karthikeya Varma that the office bearers of the Kerala Cricket Association were not ‘public servants’ or that they did not discharge ‘public duty’ was based on the principle that the alleged activities were not based on any positive law of the State or under the directions of the Government. 21. Admittedly, the admission and fixation of fees to the institution in question are governed by the provisions of the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017. 21. Admittedly, the admission and fixation of fees to the institution in question are governed by the provisions of the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017. The specific allegation of the petitioner is that the members of the managing committee, who are arraigned as accused in Ext.P1, received capitation fees, which, as per the Kerala Medical Education Act, 2017 and the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee & Other Measures to Ensure Equity & Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006, means ‘any amount or thing, by whatever name called, whether in cash or kind, paid or collected or received directly or indirectly in addition to the fees fixed under the Act’. As per the provisions of the Act, the empowered Committee shall determine the fees that may be charged by a private medical educational institution considering the relevant factors, and no institution shall fix fees in violation of the prescriptions made by the Committee. 22. Therefore, the duty discharged by the management of the institution is based on the positive law of the State or the governmental directions. 23. In Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell v. Ramesh Gelli and Others [ (2016) 3 SCC 788 ], the Supreme Court observed that it would be more reasonable to understand the expression “public servant” by reference to the office and the duties performed in connection therewith to be of a public character. 24. In P.V.Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) [ (1998) 4 SCC 626 ], the Supreme Court held thus:- “61…….The word ‘office’ is normally understood to mean a position to which certain duties are attached, especially a place of trust, authority or service under constituted authority………..” 25. The Supreme Court in Manish Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan [ (2014) 14 SCC 420 ] illustrated upon the ambit of ‘public servant’ stressing upon the relevance of “office” and observed thus:- “19. The present Act (the 1988 Act) envisages widening of the scope of the definition of the expression “public servant”. It was brought in force to purify public administration. The legislature has used a comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing corruption among public servants. The present Act (the 1988 Act) envisages widening of the scope of the definition of the expression “public servant”. It was brought in force to purify public administration. The legislature has used a comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing corruption among public servants. Hence, it would be inappropriate to limit the contents of the definition clause by a construction which would be against the spirit of the statute. Bearing in mind this principle, when we consider the case of the appellant, we have no doubt that he is a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c ) of the Act. Clause (viii) of Section 2(c) of the present Act makes any person, who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty, to be a public servant. The word “office” is of indefinite connotation and, in the present context, it would mean a position or place to which certain duties are attached and has an existence which is independent of the persons who fill it...” 26. In Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2016) 7 SCC 353 ], the Supreme Court held that imparting education to the public is a welfare activity and hence can be called as an activity done for public good. In K.Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655], the Supreme Court held that there is no requirement of having a master-servant relationship between the competent authority and the public servant. In State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah ( AIR 2020 SC 2203 ), the Supreme Court, in paragraph 37, observed thus:- “37. Additionally, our attention is drawn to the legislative debates which took place prior to the enactment of the PC Act. It was uniform across the party line that the purpose of preventing corruption in educational institutions was emphasised.” 27. On the construction of corruption statutes, in Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [ (2012) 3 SCC 64 ], the Supreme Court observed thus:- “68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of the Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist secular democratic republic. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of the Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our Preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the court is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. That is to say in a situation where two constructions are eminently reasonable, the court has to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks to perpetuate it.” 28. In Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah (supra), the Supreme Court observed thus:- “22. There is no gainsaying that nations are built upon trust. It is inevitable that in a democracy one needs to rely on those with power and influence and to trust them of being transparent and fair. There is no doubt that any action which is driven by the self -interest of these powerful individuals, rather than the public interest, destroys that trust. Where this becomes the norm, democracy, the economy and the rule of law, all take a beating, ultimately putting the whole nation at risk. Corrupt societies often spring from the examples set at the highest levels of Government, but small-scale corruption can be equally insidious. In this regard, the PC Act was formulated to bring about transparency and honesty in public life, as indicated by its Objects and Reasons. We need to keep the aforesaid legislative intention in mind while interpreting the provisions of the PC Act.” 29. In Section 2(c) of the P.C. Act, the legislature intentionally provided a general definition of the term ‘public servant’. While constructing the term ‘public servant’ in Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 34 of the judgment, observed thus:- “34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may observe that the emphasis is not on the position held by an individual, rather, it is on the public duty performed by him/her. While constructing the term ‘public servant’ in Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 34 of the judgment, observed thus:- “34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may observe that the emphasis is not on the position held by an individual, rather, it is on the public duty performed by him/her. In this regard, the legislative intention was not to provide an exhaustive list of authorities which are covered, rather a general definition of “public servant” is provided thereunder. This provides an important internal evidence as to the definition of the term “university”. 30. In Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of the P.C. Act was to shift focus from those who are traditionally called ‘public officials’ to those individuals who perform ‘public duties’. The language of Section 2(b) of the P.C. Act indicates that any duty discharged wherein the State, the public or the community at large has any interest is called a public duty. In the explanation 1 to Section 2 further clarifies that any person who falls in any of the categories stated under Section 2 is a public servant whether or not appointed by the Government. Explanation 2 further expands the ambit to include every person who de facto discharges the functions of a public servant and that he should not be prevented from being brought under the ambit of ‘public servant’ due to any legal infirmities or technicalities. 31. In the present facts, it appears that the persons arraigned as accused are the final authority with regard to the grant of admission, collection of fees etc. The duty discharged by them is ‘public duty’ and hence they are ‘public servants’ as defined under the P.C. Act. 32. The petitioner, in paragraphs 10 to 15 of Ext.P1, raises the following allegations against the persons arraigned as accused:- “10. The 6th accused is also an alien person to the Nazareth Ashramam and he is illegally functioning as the council member in a fraudulent manner. He is not elected by the general body as the council member of the Nazareth Ashramam Society. 11. The accused No. 9 is illegally acting as the Manager cum CEO of the Nazareth Pharmacy college who have no authority to act. The college is own by the society Nazareth Ashramam society, entitled to run the college. He is not elected by the general body as the council member of the Nazareth Ashramam Society. 11. The accused No. 9 is illegally acting as the Manager cum CEO of the Nazareth Pharmacy college who have no authority to act. The college is own by the society Nazareth Ashramam society, entitled to run the college. Transferring the ownership of a society is illegal and crime violation of the Societies Act. 12. There was a complaint raised over the social media by the 6th accused regarding the malpractices in the admission proceedings by forming 3 member admission committee by A3 to A5 etc. and an enquiry is conducted by Advocate Sandeep Abraham Thamarappallil and Fr. PT Mathews Payyanatt and A7. The said 3 member commission made 14 sittings and a commission report is made evidencing violation of Professional Education Act on admission, violation of Government orders, violation of Government policies, denial of admission for the eligible candidates declared by the Government and pumping out of huge money from the society, creation of fraudulent PAN card and siphoning out of money from the society, criminal conspiracy for siphoning out of money from the college etc. This Petitioners filed application before the Secretary, Nazareth Ashramam for issuing copy of the said enquiry commission report and he is hesitated to issue the same. 13. There are several instances for the criminal conspiracy committed by A1 to A6 along with A9. The admission for the year 2019-20 shows gross violation of the Education Act 2006, Government policy and illegal receipt of huge capitation from the students. One of the student Gauri S Pillai was a candidate for Pharm D course admission and an amount of Rs.50,000/- as the capitation for admission received by A9 in conspiracy with A1 to A6. Similarly Amritha Biju obtained admission by paying Rs.50000/- to the same persons as capitation. Similarly Bincy Daniel a student paid Rs.1.5 Lakhs capitation for B Pharm admission and Hanna Leela John paid Rs.4 Lakhs for an admission for Pharm D for the year 2019-20. During the year 2016-17 an amount of Rs.57.75 Lakhs collected by cash as capitation from the students as reported by the Sandeep Abraham commission after verifying the records. Similarly during the year 2017-18 an amount of Rs.1.36 Crores received as capitation and remitted in the Knanaya Samudayam in which the 1st defendant is the Metropolitan and head of the Samudayam. During the year 2016-17 an amount of Rs.57.75 Lakhs collected by cash as capitation from the students as reported by the Sandeep Abraham commission after verifying the records. Similarly during the year 2017-18 an amount of Rs.1.36 Crores received as capitation and remitted in the Knanaya Samudayam in which the 1st defendant is the Metropolitan and head of the Samudayam. Similarly for the year 2018-19 an amount of Rs.80 Lakhs is received from the students as capitation by the defendants 1 to 7 and 9. In 2019-20 an amount of Rs.54.25 Lakhs was received from the student as capitation by cash by the defendants 1 to 7 and 9. 14. Similarly Mor Clemis school is also in defacto control of the 1st accused. He also fraudulently had withdrawn an amount of Rs.30 Lakhs in the year 2019-20. It will come to light huge money was siphoning out from the NGO to other sources by violation of Societies Act tantamount to crime. The acts of the accused tantamount to hijacking of institutions from the society for with the statutory approvals, sanction and affiliation were issued to the society only and managing by Elians. The Nazareth Ashramam societies as well as the defendants are conspired together for pumping out money violating the statutes, making undue profits contrary to the Government policies and the determent of the poor students and denying admission for the eligible candidates etc. 15. The Accused are conspired together to accept capitation fee from the students in violation to Education Act, siphoned out money for making unlawful gain, from the Nazareth Pharmacy College and Climis School the Society in violation of Society Act, and policy of education Act, which amount to misappropriation of office and matter, which is to be investigated to unearth the gravity of offence. The Accused violated the undertaking given by the Society to the Government of Kerala, University and AICTE by transferring the management of the education institutions of the Society.”(sic) 33. The acts alleged do not come under the ambit of Section 17A of the P.C. Act as they are not relatable to any recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant in the discharge of his official functions or duties. 34. The acts alleged do not come under the ambit of Section 17A of the P.C. Act as they are not relatable to any recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant in the discharge of his official functions or duties. 34. This Court in Sankarabhat and Others v. State of Kerala ( 2021 (5) KHC 248 ) and Venugopal V. and Others v. State of Kerala and Another ( 2021 KHC 565 ) has made it clear that the approval under Section 17A arises only when the offence is relatable to any recommendation made or it is a decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties. So, this Court is of the view that prior approval, as provided in Section 17A of the PC Act, is not applicable in the present facts. 35. Coming to Ext.P5 decision of the Government. As per Ext.P5, the Government decided that as the allegations have been referred to the Admission Supervisory Committee for Medical Education, no vigilance enquiry is to be conducted. The petitioner alleges cognizable offences against the persons arraigned as accused. Considering the relevant materials, this Court concludes that approval under Section 17A is not required for conducting a preliminary enquiry in the matter. 36. Resultantly, Ext.P5 order stands quashed. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are directed to conduct a preliminary enquiry into the matter and proceed in accordance with the law. The writ petition is allowed as above.