JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 01.11.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, vide which the appeal filed by the revisionist (accused before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were referred before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short ‘NI Act’). It was asserted that the complainant and the accused had good relations with each other. The accused approached the complainant on 04.01.2007 and demanded Rs.1,00,000/-for some business with an assurance to return the same after a few months. The accused returned the amount of Rs. 50,000/ - on 04.01.2007. He again borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- on 03.05.2007 and assured to return the same together with the earlier amount. The accused returned Rs.30,000/- on 02.12.2007. He again borrowed Rs.1,00,000/- and returned Rs.3,000/-. Thus, he is liable to pay Rs.2,17,000/ - to the complainant. The complainant asked the accused to return the amount of Rs.2,17,000/-. The accused issued a cheque on 03.03.2008 for a sum of Rs.2,17,000/- drawn on his Bank-State Bank of Patiala, Nagrota Bagwan. The complainant presented the cheque before his Bank, namely, Himachal Gramin Bank, Nurpur on 18.03.2008 from where it was sent to the bank of the accused; however, the cheque was returned with an endorsement of ‘funds insufficient’. The complainant issued a notice to the accused asking him to pay the amount but the accused failed to do so. Hence, the complainant filed a complaint against the accused. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the Court, the learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself (CW1), Jagdish (CW2) and Mansa Ram (CW3). 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the case of the complainant. He stated that the cheque was issued as security for purchasing a vehicle. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself (CW1), Jagdish (CW2) and Mansa Ram (CW3). 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the case of the complainant. He stated that the cheque was issued as security for purchasing a vehicle. The amount was paid to the complainant. The complainant stopped the operation of the account. He examined Surjeet Singh (DW1) and himself (DW2). 6. Learned Trial Court held that there is a presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of legal liability. Even if the cheque was issued as a security, the same will fall within the purview of Section 138 of the NI Act. The cheque was dishonoured. The accused failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand, hence, the accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.3,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo imprisonment for 15 days. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala. Learned First Appellate Court held that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed by the accused. He claimed that the cheque was issued as a security. No agreement was produced to substantiate this plea. The accused failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. The cheque was dishonoured and the accused failed to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the notice of demand. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. It was duly proved on record that the cheque was issued as a security, which was misused by the complainant. Learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh and oppressive sentence; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh and oppressive sentence; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.2/State. 10. Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. It was duly proved by the statement of Mansa Ram (CW3) that Ashu Dhiman is the holder of the account, on which the cheque was drawn. The accused had not issued the cheque in an account maintained by him and the essential requirement of Section 138 of the NI Act that the cheque was drawn on an account maintained by the accused is missing. Learned Courts below did not consider this evidence and erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The defence of the accused was highly improbable but the same was wrongly ignored by the learned Courts below; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that this plea was never taken before the learned Trial Court or the First Appellate Court and cannot be taken for the first time before this Court. The learned Courts below had rightly held that the plea taken by the accused was not proved and he had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.2/State adopted the submissions made by Mr. Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and prayed that the revision be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. The present revision has been filed against the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court. Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and prayed that the revision be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. The present revision has been filed against the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not appellate Court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207 “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction alike to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 11. This Court in Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam [Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1015], while dealing with the scope of re-appreciation of evidence by higher Court in criminal revision, observed in paras 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment as under : (SCC pp. 333-34) “9. So far as Issue 1 is concerned i.e. as to whether the appellant got married to Smt Ranju Sarma, is a pure question of fact. 333-34) “9. So far as Issue 1 is concerned i.e. as to whether the appellant got married to Smt Ranju Sarma, is a pure question of fact. All three courts below have given concurrent findings regarding the factum of marriage and its validity. It has been held to be a valid marriage. It is a settled legal proposition that if the courts below have recorded the finding of fact, the question of re-appreciation of evidence by the third court does not arise unless it is found to be totally perverse. The higher court does not sit as a regular court of appeal. Its function is to ensure that law is being properly administered. Such a court cannot embark upon the fruitless task of determining the issues by re-appreciating the evidence. 10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from normal practice. ‘9. … The position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from [the] facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by a violation of any rule of law or procedure.’ (Vide Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad [Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136] , SCC p. 139, para 9) *** 11. Thus, it is evident from the above that this Court being the fourth court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the courts below as the said courts have exercised their discretion in good faith giving due weight to relevant material and without being swayed by any irrelevant material. Even if two views are possible on the question of fact, we, being the fourth court, should not interfere even though we may exercise discretion differently had the case come before us initially. In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact so far as the issue of bigamy is concerned nor the quantum of punishment on this count is required to be interfered with.” 15. The present revision has to be decided as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Mansa Ram (CW3) stated that he was posted as a record clerk in State Bank of Patiala, Nagrota Bagwan. He had brought on record cheque No.567029, which was issued for Rs.2,17,000/-. The present revision has to be decided as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Mansa Ram (CW3) stated that he was posted as a record clerk in State Bank of Patiala, Nagrota Bagwan. He had brought on record cheque No.567029, which was issued for Rs.2,17,000/-. This cheque was drawn by Ashu Dhiman, the account holder in the name of Parveen Kumar. This cheque was received from Himachal Gramin Bank, Nurpur and was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. He produced the record of the cheque ‘Mark M1’, the statement of account in the name of Ashu Dhiman ‘Mark M3’ and a copy of the issuance of the chequebook ‘Mark M2’. The cheque bore the signatures of Ashok Kumar. He stated in his cross-examination that the signatures are only compared when the funds are available in the account. No complaint of the theft of the cheque was ever received. 17. His statement is duly corroborated by the statement of account (Mark M3) produced by him in which, the name of the holder of the account has been mentioned as Ashu Dhiman. Mark M3 also shows the name of the drawer of the cheque as Ashu Dhiman and the chequebook issuance register (Mark ‘M2’) shows that the chequebook was issued in the name of Ashu Dhiman. 18. This witness was produced by the complainant; therefore, his statement is binding upon the complainant. 19. His statement clearly shows that the cheque was drawn on an account maintained by Ashu Dhiman and not by the accused-Ashok Kumar. 20. A similar situation arose before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi, (2009) 14 SCC 683 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 482 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 218: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1278, wherein the cheque was drawn by the accused not on his account but on an account maintained by S. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the first ingredient of Section 138 of NI Act that the cheque should have been drawn on an account maintained by him was not satisfied. It was observed: 13. It was observed: 13. It is manifest that to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the following ingredients are required to be fulfilled: (i) A person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account; (ii) the cheque should have been issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability; (iii) that the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (iv) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank; (v) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (vi) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice. Being cumulative, it is only when all the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied that the person who had drawn the cheque can be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act. 14. In the case before us, it is clear from the facts, briefly noted above, and in Para 3 of the complaint as extracted, that on receipt of the return memo from the Bank, the complainant is stated to have realised that the dishonoured cheque was issued from an account which was not maintained by Accused 1—the appellant herein, but by one Shilpa Chaudhary. 15. As a matter of fact and perhaps having gained the said knowledge, on 20-1-2001 the complainant filed an FIR against all the accused for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 406 of the Penal Code (IPC). 15. As a matter of fact and perhaps having gained the said knowledge, on 20-1-2001 the complainant filed an FIR against all the accused for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 406 of the Penal Code (IPC). Thus, there is hardly any dispute that the cheque, subject matter of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, had not been drawn by the appellant on an account maintained by him in Indian Bank, Sonepat Branch. That being so, there is little doubt that the very first ingredient of Section 138 of the Act, enumerated above, is not satisfied and consequently, the case against the appellant for having committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act cannot be proved. 21. Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the bare language of Section 138, the cheque should have been drawn on an account maintained by the accused. If the cheque is drawn not on the account maintained by the accused but by some other person, the same will not attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. 22. Both the learned Courts below did not consider this important aspect of the case and erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. 23. It was submitted on behalf of the complainant that this plea was never taken before the learned Trial Court. An application under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. was filed to prove this fact, which was dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court. The order passed by the learned First Appellate Court was not assailed in the present revision and the same has attained finality. Therefore, it is not permissible for the accused to submit before this Court that the cheque was not issued by him on an account maintained by him. This submission cannot be accepted. The complainant is required to prove necessary ingredients for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The first and foremost ingredient required to be proved by the complainant is that the accused has issued a cheque in an account maintained by him. If this ingredient is not satisfied, the accused could not have been convicted. The first and foremost ingredient required to be proved by the complainant is that the accused has issued a cheque in an account maintained by him. If this ingredient is not satisfied, the accused could not have been convicted. The accused has a right to remain silent and the complainant cannot take advantage of the fact that he had not taken any such plea before the learned Trial Court or the learned First Appellate Court. If the necessary ingredients are not proved by the evidence of the complainant, the necessary consequence will be the dismissal of the complaint notwithstanding the silence of the accused. 24. Similarly, the accused was not required to assail the order dismissing the application when other evidence on record established the plea taken by him that the cheque was not issued on an account maintained by him. Therefore, the complainant cannot take any advantage of the dismissal of the application for leading the additional evidence. 25. Thus, the learned Trial Court committed the jurisdictional error in convicting the accused despite the non-fulfilment of the essential ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 26. The learned First Appellate Court ignored the essential requirement of Section 138 and wrongly confirmed the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, the judgments passed by the learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court cannot be sustained. 27. Learned counsel for the complainant has relied upon the judgment of Patna High Court in Purushottam Kumar Sinha versus State of Bihar, 2018 (1) PLJR 367 , of this Court in Pushap Raj versus Ramdhan, 2017 Latest HLJ(1), Suresh Kumar versus Jagvir Singh and Anr, 2016 (3) VCR 466. The Courts were concerned with the essential ingredient that the cheque was drawn on an account maintained by the accused. In Purushhotam Kumar (supra), the High Court of Patna was dealing with the petition for quashing the complaint and it was held that the defence taken by the accused cannot be taken into consideration while deciding the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Since this Court is dealing with the revision and not a petition under Section 482, hence, this judgment does not apply to the present case. 28. 28. In Pushap Raj, the Court held that the defence taken by the accused that he had paid the cheque amount to the complainant was not proved, which is not the case here because the Court is not concerned with the defence of the accused but with the fulfilment of essential ingredients of the commission of the offence. 29. In Suresh Kumar, this Court held that the Court deciding the revision petition cannot appreciate the evidence and reverse the findings of fact. In the present case, the learned Trial Court had committed a jurisdictional error and it is not a mere findings of fact; therefore, this judgment also does not apply to the present case. 30. No other point was urged. 31. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed and judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court are ordered to be set aside. 32. The complaint is ordered to be dismissed and the accused is ordered to be acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act.