JUDGMENT : (Laxmi Narayana Alishetty, J.) 1. The present Second Appeal is filed questioning the judgment and decree, dated 20.01.2023, passed by Principal District Judge, Warangal in AS.No.108 of 2016, whereunder and whereby the judgment and decree dated 27.01.2016 passed by the V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Warangal in O.S. No.465 of 2009 was confirmed. 2. The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondents are the defendants in the suit. For convenience, hereinafter the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit. 3. Succinctly, the facts of the case, which led to filing of the present Second Appeal, are that the suit was filed for permanent injunction in respect of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff averred that he purchased the suit schedule property under a registered document, dated 20.02.2009 from one Syed Hilaluddin Quadri and since then, he has been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. 3.1. It was averred that the vendor of plaintiff by name Syed Hilaluddin Quadri is son of one Ms. Rafia Sulthana, who inherited the property from late Raheemunissa Begum, D/o Peer Pasha Quadri, therefore, the vendor of the plaintiff acquired the suit property as a legal heir of late Syed Peer Pasha Quadri. The name of Raheemunissa Begum was mutated in the Revenue Records and as such, the vendor of the plaintiff was the owner and possessor of suit property, who in turn sold the same to plaintiff. The defendants who are strangers, with an intention to grab the suit property, tried to encroach and occupy the same. Hence, the suit for grant of perpetual injunction. 4. Defendant No. 1 did not choose to appear before the trial Court and hence, he was set ex parte. 4.1. Defendant No. 2 filed his written statement denying the entire averments of the plaint. He stated that the defendant No. 1 works as a videographer under plaintiff, with whose assistance, defendant No. 1 has fabricated false documents. 4.2. It was averred that the suit land is only 303 ¼ square yards in Sy.No.210 of Ursu village and it belongs to his father Poosa Ramulu who has two plots, one is the suit property and another plot is at Kummariwada, Warangal. 4.2. It was averred that the suit land is only 303 ¼ square yards in Sy.No.210 of Ursu village and it belongs to his father Poosa Ramulu who has two plots, one is the suit property and another plot is at Kummariwada, Warangal. That a division took place more than 20 years back in which, defendant No. 2 was allotted the suit property and father of defendant No. 1 by name Poosa Srinivas was allotted the plot situated at Kummariwada. Warangal. The father of defendant No. 1 sold his share of plot and enjoyed the sale proceeds. The defendant No. 2 got mutated the suit plot in the name of his wife in the Municipal records and they migrated to Palvancha about 30 years back for doing business. The suit land is in the name of wife of defendant No. 2-Shashirekha, as such, she is a necessary party to the suit and hence, this suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. Hence, he sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary costs. 5. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the "(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent Injunction as prayed for? (2) To what relief?" 6. To establish the case, the plaintiff examined P.Ws.1 to 4 and marked Exs-A1 to A10 on his behalf and the defendants examined DW1 and got marked Exs.B1 to B-3 on their behalf. 7. The trial Court, upon considering the oral and documentary evidence and the contentions of both the parties, dismissed the suit, vide judgment dated 27.01.2016. The trial Court observed as under:- "In the present suit, since the defendant No. 2 is claiming right, title and possession in respect of suit schedule property, that his father, was the rightful owner who purchased the same under Ex.B-1, by denying the right, title and possession of PW1, the burden is heavily on the plaintiff to establish that his vendor was the lawful owner and he executed Ex.A1, in pursuance of the same, he has got valid title and lawful possession over the suit schedule property." 7.1. The trial Court further observed that defendant No. 1 is working as videographer in the photo studio of P.W-1 and that P.W-4- the maternal uncle of defendant No. 1 was examined as P.W-4 who acted as identifying witness to Ex.A-1 and hence, the transaction is purely in between P.W-1 and the alleged vendor- Syed Hilaluddin Quadri which would create suspicion that there might be collusion in between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. 7.2. The trial Court on further appreciation of the evidence concluded that Ex.B-1 was executed in respect of the suit schedule property and the same is true and valid, and whereas, Ex.A-1 is not valid document in the eye of law and it was a created one. Accordingly, the trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his lawful possession over the suit schedule property and hence, the relief of permanent injunction cannot be granted. 8. On appeal, the first Appellate Court, being the final fact- finding Court, re-appreciated the entire evidence and the material available on record and observed that in this case, it is necessary to look into the title of the property incidentally to decide the lis, but the plaintiff failed to establish as to how the property was acquired by his vendor-Hilaluddin Quadri. 8.1. The first Appellate Court further observed as under:- "As per Ex.A-2 to A-5-pahanies, the name of Rahamunissa Begum was shown as pattadar and as per Ex.A-6, the possessor column shows the residential houses. The vendor of the plaintiff is not Rahamunissa Begum, but Moinuddin as per the alleged registered agreement of sale cum GPA Dt.20-2-2009. As contended by the plaintiff, as on Ex.A6 to A10 (pahanies) there were residential houses. The schedule of property is shown as an open house plot out of Sy.No.210. So the possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property as an open plot as on date of the suit is not believable." 8.2. The first Appellate Court ultimately confirmed the impugned judgment of the trial Court by holding as under:- "For the purpose of this suit of mere injunction, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and if it is not discharged, the plaintiff will not get the relief in the suit. The first Appellate Court ultimately confirmed the impugned judgment of the trial Court by holding as under:- "For the purpose of this suit of mere injunction, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff and if it is not discharged, the plaintiff will not get the relief in the suit. Now, the document placed by plaintiff is Ex.Al and in view of the discussion above on the evidence of PWs.1 to PW4, Ex A1/ registered agreement of sale cum GPA, Exs.A2 to A10-pahanies and other documents, the burden of proving physical possession as on the date of filing of suit is not established by the plaintiff." 9. Heard Sri Bankatlal Mandhani, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Hari Prasad Podila, learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani, 2003 INSC 276 : (2003) 7 SCC 350 and in Achintya Kumar Saha Vs. Nanee Printers and others, 2004 INSC 73 : (2004) 12 SCC 368 , and in Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another, 2012 INSC 288 : (2012) 8 SCC 148 and in Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. v. M.Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. & Another, 2003 INSC 718 : (2004) 1 SCC 769 and the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Pramila Modi and others, 2005(4) ALD 105 (DB) and the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Shobha Satyanarayana Birla Vs. Janabai Parshuram Pawar, deceased reptd by her heirs Laxmabai Raghunath Pawar, 2004(2)Mh.L.J. 11. In Ramesh Chand Aradwatiya's case (1st cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Para 34 held as hereunder:- "A contract for sale does not confer title in immovable property. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act provides that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that such a sale shall take place on terms settled between the parties; it does not itself create any interest or charge on such immovable property. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act provides that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that such a sale shall take place on terms settled between the parties; it does not itself create any interest or charge on such immovable property. However, still, if a person has entered into possession over immovable property under a contract for sale and is in peaceful and settled possession of the property with the consent of the person in whom the title vests, he is entitled to protect the possession against the whole world, excepting a person having a title better than what he or his vendor possesses. If he is in possession of the property in part performance of contract for sale and the requirements of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act are satisfied, he may protect his possession even against the true owner." 12. In Achintya Kumar Saha's case (2nd cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein the issue was whether the agreement was a license or a tenancy, at Para 9 held as under:- "the issue was there before the trial court and the agreement was held to be a licence. It was also there before the lower appellate court but it was not adjudicated upon. When the core issue is not adjudicated upon, it results in substantial question of law under Section 100 of CPC. In the case of Santosh Hazari V. Purushotham Tiwarri reported in 2001 INSC 80 : (2001) 3 SCC 179 , it has been held that whether a question of law is a substantial question of law in a case will depend on facts and circumstances of each case, the paramount consideration being the need to strike a balance between obligation to do justice and necessity to avoid prolongation of any dispute." 13. In Ibrahim Uddin's case (3rd cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para 85.3 held as hereunder:- "Presumption under section 90 of Evidence Act in respect of 30 years old document coming from proper custody relates to the signature, execution and attestation of a document i.e., to its genuineness but it does not give rise to presumption of correctness of every statement contained in it. That the content of documents are true or it had been acted upon, have to be proved like any other fact." 14. That the content of documents are true or it had been acted upon, have to be proved like any other fact." 14. In Rame Gowda's case (4th cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Para 11 held as under:- "In the present case, the trial court has found the plaintiff as having failed in proving his title. Nevertheless, he has been found to be in settled possession of the property. Even the defendant failed in proving his title over the disputed land so as to substantiate his entitlement to evict the plaintiff. The trial court, therefore, left the question of title open and proceeded to determine the suit on the basis of possession, protecting the established possession and restraining the attempted interference therewith. The trial court and the High Court have rightly decided the suit. It is still open to the defendant-appellant to file a suit based on his title against the plaintiff- respondent and evict the latter on the former establishing his better right to possess the property." 15. In Pramila Modi's case (5th cited supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Paras 55 and 57 held as under:- "55. It is thus clear that Pattadar means a person, who possesses a title to the land whether he is in possession of the land or not, is responsible to the Government for payment of land revenue. Pattadar is one whose title to the land has been recognised. 57. This Court after referring to its carlier decisions rendered under the Land Revenue Act in Anthya v. Gattadu, AIR 1950 Hyderabad 58; Phoola Bhunna v Rekha Deva, AIR 1957 Hyderabad 23; and Syed Jalal v. Targopal, AIR 1970 AP 19 , and relevant provisions of the Land Revenue Act, observed: "It is thus recognised that transfer of a patta of a holding would amount to transferring of all that is necessary to effectually transfer agricultural land and vest a title in the person to whom it is transferred. Transfer of patta is thus nothing but a transfer of title itself. It is thus clear that patta is nothing but a title itself so far as the agricultural land is concerned in Telangana area of State of Andhra Pradesh. Transfer of patta is thus nothing but a transfer of title itself. It is thus clear that patta is nothing but a title itself so far as the agricultural land is concerned in Telangana area of State of Andhra Pradesh. The Division Bench in Syed Jalal Vs Targopal reported in AIR 1970 AP 19 , while construing various provisions of the Land Revenue Act and the scheme of the Act observed that "indubitably, the patta of agricultural land itself is a evidence of right of the holder, a transfer of which is also deemed to be a permanent alienation." 16. In Shobha Satyanarayan Birla's case (5th cited supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay at Para 6 held as under:- "Section 90 of Evidence Act enables the court to draw a presumption where any document purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper. It was further held that the presumption in Section 90 of Evidence Act is of due execution and attestation of an old document. The presumption does not extend to the truth of the contents of the document." 17. From the aforesaid judgments, it is evident that it is settled law that a person who entered into possession over immovable property under a contract for sale and is in peaceful and settled possession of the property with the consent of the person in whom the title vests, he is entitled to protect the possession against the whole world, except a person having a title better than what he or his vendor possesses. 18. In the instant case, the trial Court upon appreciating the evidence on record observed that there is litigation from the date of execution of Ex.A-1 itself, thus, the alleged possession of P.W-1 cannot be said to be lawful, continuous and uninterrupted possession. The first Appellate Court also concurred with the said observation of the trial Court. In the light of the said findings, the judgment rendered in Ramesh Chand Aradwatiya's case (1st cited supra) is not helpful to the appellant. 19. The other judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant relates to drawing of presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, which are no way applicable to be facts of the instant case. 20. 19. The other judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant relates to drawing of presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, which are no way applicable to be facts of the instant case. 20. Learned counsel for appellant argued that the trial Court decreed the suit without proper appreciation of the evidence and the first Appellate Court also committed an error in confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 21. However, learned counsel for appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law to be decided by this Court in this Second Appeal. In fact, all the grounds raised in this appeal are factual in nature and do not qualify as the substantial questions of law in terms of Section 100 C.P.C. 22. A perusal of the record discloses that both the Courts below concurrently held that the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties goes to show that the plaintiff failed to prove his lawful possession over the suit schedule property and thus, he is not entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for. 23. It is well settled principle by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in the Second Appeal filed under Section 100 C.P.C., this Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings on facts arrived at by the Courts below, which are based on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record. 24. Further, in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, 2006 INSC 231 : (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 546, the Apex Court held that the High Court sitting in Second Appeal cannot examine the evidence once again as a third trial Court and the power under Section 100 C.P.C. is very limited and it can be exercised only where a substantial question of law is raised and fell for consideration. 25. Having considered the entire material available on record and the findings recorded by the trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court, this Court finds no ground or reason warranting interference with the said concurrent findings, under Section 100 C.P.C. Moreover, the grounds raised by the appellant are factual in nature and no question of law much less a substantial question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. 26. 26. Hence, the Second Appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. 27. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.