A Infrastructure Ltd. (Earlier Shree Pipes Ltd. ) v. Asst. Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhilwara
2024-12-04
REKHA BORANA
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The present revision petition has been preferred against the order dated 12.03.2003 passed by the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer in Appeal No. 1423/1998/BHL whereby the learned Tax Board, while rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner-Company, affirmed the order dated 15.07.1998 passed by Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Commercial Taxes, Ajmer in Appeal No. 91/96-97/RST. The Dy. Commissioner, vide its order dated 15.07.1998, affirmed the order dated 16.01.1997 passed by the Assessing Authority. 2. The facts are that work order dated 15.01.1994 was issued in favour of the petitioner-Company by Public Health Engineering Department of Government of Rajasthan for supply of A.C. pressure pipes. Although, the rates of supply of the said pipes were initially fixed as per the work order but as the rates of AC pipes reduced subsequently, the Finance Committee of the State Department, in its meeting dated 17.11.1994, decided that for supply of A.C. pressure pipes, the lowest of the three rates as considered therein, would be payable to the suppliers including the petitioner. In compliance of the said Committee decision, after negotiation, the PHED notified the reduced rates and also recovered/adjusted the excess price paid earlier to the petitioner-Company. 3. The fact of the rates been reduced and the Company been paid reduced rates and further the excess amount paid earlier been recovered/adjusted is not disputed on record. 4. In terms of the above, the petitioner-Company filed its revised returns under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act of 1994’) qua the year 1994 and claimed that the recovery of excess amount of Rs.11,96,126.05/- by PHED Department amounted to reduction in sale price/turnover and hence, the sales tax liability on the said amount to the tune of Rs.1,79,418.91/- was also liable to be reduced. 5. The Assessing Authority however, rejected the above contention of the petitioner and vide its order dated 16.01.1997 (Annex.7) held that reduction in rates and consequent recovery from the assessee by the PHED Department for supplies, cannot amount to reduction of any taxable turnover. 6. The first appeal against the order dated 16.01.1997 was preferred by the Company to the Dy.
The Assessing Authority however, rejected the above contention of the petitioner and vide its order dated 16.01.1997 (Annex.7) held that reduction in rates and consequent recovery from the assessee by the PHED Department for supplies, cannot amount to reduction of any taxable turnover. 6. The first appeal against the order dated 16.01.1997 was preferred by the Company to the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) and the First Appellate Authority, vide its order dated 15.07.1998, while rejecting the appeal, held that the reduction was not on account of the reduction in supplies but was a deduction from the outstanding payment and hence, the taxable turnover cannot be termed to have been reduced. 7. The second appeal as preferred before the Tax Board against the order dated 15.07.1998 was also dismissed vide order dated 12.03.2003 (Annex.9) with the finding that the amount was qua the liquidated damages for delay in supply of pipes and therefore, the same could not amount to reduction in the taxable turnover. 8. It is against the above order dated 12.03.2003 as passed by the Tax Board that the present revision petition has been preferred. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Company submits that the finding as recorded by the learned Tax Board is totally erroneous as it was no one’s case that the amount of Rs.11,96,126.05/- was qua the liquidated damages for delay in supply of the material. Learned counsel submits that neither there was any delay nor was any penalty/damages payable qua the same. Further, it was not even the case of the Revenue/Department that there was any delay in supply of pipes. Therefore, the finding as recorded suo motu by the Tax Board being bereft of the context deserves to be set aside. 10. Learned counsel further submits that Clause 13 of the Contract did not even apply to the present matter and further that, it was admitted on record that the amount was paid to the petitioner-Company only at the reduced rates and hence, the same could only have been termed to be the value of the goods. 11. Learned counsel, while referring to the definition of “sale price” as provided under Section 2(39) of the Act of 1994, submitted that the same includes any sum allowed by way of any discount or rebate.
11. Learned counsel, while referring to the definition of “sale price” as provided under Section 2(39) of the Act of 1994, submitted that the same includes any sum allowed by way of any discount or rebate. Meaning thereby, it is the final price at which a commodity is sold out by dealer after deducting the discount or rebate, if any, allowed by the dealer. Admittedly, the final consideration amount as received by the petitioner-Company was at the reduced rates and hence, the said was only the taxable turnover in terms of Section 2 of the Clause 42 of the Act of 1994. 12. Learned counsel submits that it is the settled position of law that a dealer can be taxed only for the amount which it has in fact received and which forms part of its turnover. 13. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court: 1. Southern Motors vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2017) 3 SCC 497 2. Central Wines, Hyderabad and Ors. vs. Special Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 611 14. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent-Department, while supporting the judgment as passed by the learned Tax Board, submitted that the tax was payable on the agreed rates of Contract and the rates if reduced subsequently, could not apply to the earlier quarter. Learned counsel submits that once the return had been filed by the petitioner-Company on agreed rates of Contract and the tax had been paid on the same, the same could not have been refunded because of subsequent reduction of rates by the parties by way of negotiation. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 16. After consideration of the above pleadings and submissions, the following questions of law arise in the present revision petition: (i) Whether the Tax Board was justified in holding that the recovery by PHED Department from the petitioner on account of reduction in rates, was recovery of liquidated damages under cl.13 of the Agreement dt.15.1.1994 (Ann.1) and therefore did not amount to reduction in taxable turnover of the petitioner assessee for the year in question?
(ii) Whether the authorities below have erred in not appreciating that it is only the actual consideration passing from the purchaser to the seller for transfer of property in the goods that constitutes the taxable sale price? (iii) Whether even after raising of invoice and supply, if price is later on reduced and agreed to by both the parties to the contract, it may not amount to trade discount and would not reduce the taxable turnover of the seller? 17. Regarding the 1st question, this Court is of the clear opinion that the finding of the Tax Board to the effect that the amount was qua the liquidated damages in terms of Clause 13 of the Agreement dated 15.01.1994, is clearly erroneous and totally out of context. There is nothing available on record to show that the material was supplied to the State Department with delay and any penalty was imposed on the petitioner-Company for the said delay. Therefore, Clause 13 of the Agreement had no relevance so far as the present issue was concerned. How the learned Tax Board took into consideration the said clause and how it concluded that there was a delay in supply of the material is incomprehensible. The finding of the learned Tax Board therefore, being totally erroneous is hereby quashed and set aside. Question No. 1 is answered in the said terms. 18. Coming on to question Nos. 2 & 3, Section 2(39) of the Act of 1994 defines ‘sale price’ as under: “(39) “sale price” means the amount paid or payable to a dealer as consideration for the sale less any sum allowed by way of any kind of discount or rebate according to the practice normally prevailing in the trade, but inclusive of any sum charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods at the time of or before the delivery thereof.” Section 2 (42) defines ‘taxable turnover’ as under: “(42) “taxable turnover” means that part of turnover which remains after deducting therefrom the agregate amount of the proceeds of sale of goods: (i) on which no tax is leviable under this Act. (ii) which have been exempted from tax or which have suffered tax under this Act, subject to other provisions in the Act.
(ii) which have been exempted from tax or which have suffered tax under this Act, subject to other provisions in the Act. (iii) which are taxable at a point of sale within the State subsequent to the sale by the dealer and such sale is covered by a declaration as may be required under any provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder.” 19. A bare perusal of the above definitions makes it clear that any sum allowed by way of any kind of discount or rebate is permitted to be subtracted from the sale consideration as paid or payable to a dealer. It is not disputed on record that the actual agreed rates were reduced by the State Department by subsequent negotiation. It is also not disputed that the petitioner-Company was paid the consideration amount at the reduced rates. As per Section 2(42), the taxable turnover is the turnover which remains after deducting the aggregate amount of proceeds of the sale or goods. Meaning thereby, the taxable turnover in the present matter would definitely be the turnover after deducting the proceeds of the sale/goods. Admittedly, the proceeds of the sale/goods in the present matter was at the reduced rates. On a joint reading of the definitions of ‘sale price’ and ‘taxable turnover’ the natural conclusion which can be drawn is that the taxable turnover in the present matter would be the remaining amount after deduction of the sales proceeds and the sale proceeds would be the amount actually received by the petitioner-Company qua consideration. 20. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Southern Motors (supra), the deduction/reduction has to be construed in relation to the transaction resulting in the final sale/purchase price and not limited to the original sale sans the trade discount. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Bombay Tyres International (P) Ltd. (2005) 3 SCC 787 , the trade discount cannot be disallowed only because those were not payable at the time of each invoice or deducted from the invoice price. Therein, the Court specifically observed that it is not essential that the discount in order to be eligible for exemption must be reflected in the invoice itself. 21.
Therein, the Court specifically observed that it is not essential that the discount in order to be eligible for exemption must be reflected in the invoice itself. 21. Meaning thereby, what is collected by the vendor from the vendee by way of consideration for passing the property in the goods to the vendee is the price charged by him and not the tax collected by him from the purchaser. The amount of money which goes from the pocket of the vendee to the pocket of vendor as a condition or consideration for passing of the property in the goods is thus the sale price and not the tax. [Central Wines (supra)]. 22. The fact that a return had earlier been filed on the actual agreed rates and the tax was already paid on it, would be of no consequence as the law provides for filing of revised return claiming refund of the tax amount paid in excess. It is not the case of the Revenue that the petitioner-Company was not authorized or entitled to file revised return or that law does not provide for refund of the tax if found to have been paid in excess. Therefore, the finding as recorded by the learned Tax Board to the effect that once the tax had been paid on the agreed rates, the same could not have been refunded does not hold much water. 23. In view of the above analysis and the settled position of law, questions No. 2 & 3 are answered in favour of the petitioner and it is hereby held that the income of Rs.11,96,126.05/- of the petitioner-Company cannot be termed to be the sale price so as to be liable for tax. The tax amount of Rs.1,79,418.91/- as paid by the petitioner-Company on the above valuation is thus liable to be refunded to it with interest. 24. The revision petition is hence, allowed. The order impugned dated 12.03.2003 passed by the Tax Board is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner-Company is held entitled for refund of Rs.1,79,418.91/- with interest @ 6% per annum.