Order : GANESH RAM MEENA, J. 1. These criminal revision petitions under Section 397 r/w Section 401 Cr.P.C have been preferred by the accused-petitioners for quashing and setting aside of the order dated 27.03.2023 passed by the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bundi (Raj) (for short the ‘trial Court’) in Sessions Case No.141/2020 titled ‘State v. Sattu @ Satyanarayan and Ors.’, whereby charges have been framed against the petitioners and prayer to discharge them from the charges leveled against them for offences under Sections 148, 341, 323 r/w 149, 325 r/w 149 and 307 r/w 149 IPC has been made. 2. Brief facts of the case as placed before this Court are that; on 07.06.2020, the complainant, Pappu Lal and his nephew Tolachand, were coming back to their village after visiting Ambarani Mataji Dhaneshwar. On their way, right before Dora village, the accused-petitioners, Sattu, Devlal, Rajaram, Nandkishore, Jagdish and Shyopal suddenly got in their way and stopped them. The accused-petitioners hit the complainant on his head, both arms and both legs. They continued to beat him up even after he fell down on the ground, due to which he injured his left eye and nose. When some people, passing by, tried to rescue the complainant and his nephew, the accused-petitioners ran away. On the basis of the parcha bayan of complainant, Pappu Lal, an FIR No. 91/2020 was lodged at Police Station, Dabi. 3. Upon investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet u/s 148, 341, 323 r/w 149, 325 r/w 149 and 307 r/w 149 IPC before the learned Trial Court. Thereafter, the trial Court framed charges for the said offences vide order dated 27.03.2023. Therefore, aggrieved by the framing of charge order dated 27.03.2023, the accused-petitioners have preferred the present Criminal Revision Petition. 4. Counsel appearing for the accused-petitioner submits that the present case is one of falsity and over implication wherein the nature of allegations leveled in the FIR, Section 161 Cr.P.C statements and opinion of the medical jurist are quite different in respect of the nature of injuries. The counsel further submits that the trial Court has not taken into consideration the fact that the evidence related to the medical opinion is biased and incorrect in the absence of the Medical Board. He further submits that the medical examination of the complainant was conducted with a delay of 10 days. The counsel further submits that the trial Court has not taken into consideration the fact that the evidence related to the medical opinion is biased and incorrect in the absence of the Medical Board. He further submits that the medical examination of the complainant was conducted with a delay of 10 days. He further submits that the case of prosecution is at best that of Section 323 and 325 IPC. For these reasons, the Counsel submits that the trial Court has erroneously framed the charge of Section 307 and the impugned order is not legally sustainable in the eyes of law. 5. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor, while opposing the aforementioned submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, submits that the learned trial Court below, after taking into due consideration all the facts and circumstances of the present case and after considering the evidence placed on record before it, has rightly passed the impugned order and further submits that the charges so framed are duly made out against the revisionist-petitioners, which requires no interference by this Court. 6. Considered the submissions made at bar and also perused the order under challenge as well as the charge-sheet concerned and other relevant records placed before this Court. 7. It will be befitting to say that when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. This knowledge is awareness and the same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue. In the context of penal jurisprudence, the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘intention’ require the mere foresight of the consequences of an act, that is to say, the purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a certain end. 8. In terms of the long standing inveterate penal jurisprudence, when an injury is opined to be dangerous to life, the sufficiency of the injury to cause death is the prime consideration. The sufficiency is the high probability of causation of death in the ordinary course of nature of things. For ascertaining the sufficiency of the injury, the Court has to take into account the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body on which the injury is caused, the part on which the injury was intended to be caused and sometimes both are relevant. For ascertaining the sufficiency of the injury, the Court has to take into account the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body on which the injury is caused, the part on which the injury was intended to be caused and sometimes both are relevant. Depending on the nature of weapon used, situs of the injury, medical opinion regarding the injury, the sufficiency of the injury to cause death in the ordinary course of nature can be inferred from the very facts on the face of it and death in fact need not have taken place. 9. It is also pertinent for the Court to note that it is trite law that for conviction for an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, if the offence is committed with an intention to commit the murder of the victim, Section 307 IPC would be attracted. However, in the present case the act of attacking by the respondent, in fact brought about resultant injuries suffered by the complainant-victim. Considering the weapon of offence and the vital parts of the body where the injuries were inflicted the intention of the petitioners to commit murder was evident. 10. In the case of Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh) (2021) 20 SCC 24 , a three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that it is important to note that for the purpose of constituting an offence under Section 307 IPC, there are two ingredients that a Court must consider; first, whether there was any intention or knowledge on the part of accused to cause death of the victim, and, second, whether such intent or knowledge was followed by some overt actus rea in execution thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to whether or not any injury is inflicted upon the victim. The Courts may deduce such intent from the conduct of the accused and surrounding circumstances of the offence, including the nature of weapon used or the nature of injury, if any. The manner in which occurrence took place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim. It is thus not necessary that a victim shall have to suffer an injury dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307 IPC. 11. The manner in which occurrence took place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim. It is thus not necessary that a victim shall have to suffer an injury dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307 IPC. 11. As reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a plethora of judgments, some of which are named hereinafter; State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao (2003) 10 SCC 434 ; Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand (2004) 12 SCC 220 ; Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka (2022) 7 SCC 521 , the essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 are: (i) that the death of a human being was attempted; (ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and (iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as : (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury. 12. Intention is different from motive. It is the intention with which the act is done that makes a difference in arriving at a conclusion. Section 307 IPC consists of two parts. Under the first part it must be proved that there was an intention or knowledge which is necessary to constitute murder and under the second part an act done which falls short of the complete commission of murder on account of circumstances independent of the will of the author of the act. In both these cases it is clearly apprehensible that the prosecution must prove (1) that a bodily injury is present, (2) that in terms of Section 300, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, (3) that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury and it was not accidental or unintentional and not that some other kind of injury was intended. 13. 13. The present case is one where there has been long-standing enmity between the 2 sides, dating back to an incident relating to some previously held Sarpanch elections. Upon a perusal of the charge-sheet, it is manifest that on 07.06.2020, an altercation took place between the 2 parties’, wherein the accused-petitioners ambushed and attacked the complainant when he was on his way back to his village and roughed him up. Multiple sorties went up from the accused-persons side and several injuries were inflicted on the complainant, amounting to a total of 22 injuries. Injuries no. 1,7,17,18,20 were opined to be grievous in nature. The MLO formed an opinion as to the cumulative effect of all the injuries and declared them to be dangerous to life. It is also discernible from the incidents so narrated that the specific acts attributed to the various accused-persons are as follows: i) Accused-Devlal attacked and hit the complainant with an iron pipe, aiming at his head, with the intention of killing the complainant. When the complainant made an attempt to stop the strike so effected, with his left hand, the pipe hit his hand and his left arm broke. ii) Accused-Shyopal attacked and hit the complainant with an iron pipe, aiming at his head, with the intention of killing the complainant. When the complainant made an attempt to stop the strike so effected, with his right hand, the pipe hit his hand and his right arm broke. iii) Accused-Sattu hit my right leg with an axe handle, thereby breaking and injuring his right leg. iv) Accused-Rajaram hit my left leg with an axe handle, thereby breaking and injuring his left leg. v) While the complainant had fallen down and was lying on the ground injured, accused-Jagdish hit the complainant on his left leg and accused-Nandkishore hit the complainant on his left arm. And all the accused-persons hit him, collectively, while he was on ground, thereby injuring him near his left eye and breaking his nose. 14. On the basis of the discovery statement u/s 27 Indian Evidence Act, made by the accused-persons, the following were recovered from the various accused-persons: i) An axe each from accused-Sattu and Rajaram. ii) An iron rod each from accused-Devlal, Nandkishore, Jagdish and Shyopal. 15. 14. On the basis of the discovery statement u/s 27 Indian Evidence Act, made by the accused-persons, the following were recovered from the various accused-persons: i) An axe each from accused-Sattu and Rajaram. ii) An iron rod each from accused-Devlal, Nandkishore, Jagdish and Shyopal. 15. It is also to be taken into consideration that the independent eye-witnesses, Tolachand, Arpit, Manoj Bhaat and Sonu Bhaat, in their statements u/s 161 CrPC, have also attested to the factum of attack initiated by the accused-petitioners. They have categorically named the accused-petitioners as the aggressors of the attack and to have seen them attack the complainant and inflict bloody injuries on them by beating them with sticks and rods. Thus, nothing substantial was elicited from the witnesses to discredit the complainant’s testimony. The statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure disclose the petitioner’s acts of attacking and hitting and their intention to kill. When these witnesses stepped down from their car and ran towards the complainant in order to help him, the accused-persons retreated. They then helped the complainant up and realised that both his arms, hands and legs were broken and he had several visible injuries on his body. 16. Thus being the aggressor party, the accused-petitioners, armed with iron rods and axes, played an active role in the alleged attack. It can certainly be gathered that all the accused- petitioners had a common intention to continually attack the complainant, such that their intention to cause his death can easily be gathered from the same. As a result of this attack, the complainant party suffered multiple injuries, both grievous and simple in nature. 17. It is thus established that to justify a conviction under section 307, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to discharge an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were regarded as not on a vital part. 18. Moreover, it is to be noted that in the instant case, the intention to kill can be gathered by the act of the accused- petitioners of giving repeated blows to the complainant alongside the fact that it seemed to be a pre-planned attack. The accused- petitioners had come with the motive to kill the complainant and the accused-persons were all armed, they could have easily ensured the death of the Complainant, as can be inferred from the fact that they attempted to attack the victim on his head. 19. It is a settled proposition of law that the nature or extent of injury suffered, are irrelevant factors for the conviction under section 307 IPC, so long as the injury is inflicted with animus. The same has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the recent judgment dated 25.09.2024 in the case of Shoyeb Raja v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2624 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted hereinunder: “13. It is well recognized that intention may not always be proved by hard evidence and instead may be required to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. If the doctor who conducted the examination posits the possibility of throttling, then under what circumstances, without rigorous cross- examination, could it be concluded that the injuries sustained were simple? That apart, even if the injuries were taken as simple, the extent of the injuries, as observed supra in Hari Mohan Mondal, are not relevant, if the intent is present. If the doctor who conducted the examination posits the possibility of throttling, then under what circumstances, without rigorous cross- examination, could it be concluded that the injuries sustained were simple? That apart, even if the injuries were taken as simple, the extent of the injuries, as observed supra in Hari Mohan Mondal, are not relevant, if the intent is present. We are not in agreement with the learned Courts below that intent was absent, as the Doctor’s report itself records throttling to be reasonably suspected. 14. The third criterion as in Kashirao (supra) could also arguably be met. Whether or not it is met, is a matter of determination at trial. The question of intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of Section 307, IPC is a question of fact and not one of law.” 20. In the present case, the weapons used and the manner in which the attack was made and the fact that the injuries were inflicted due to premeditation clearly establish that the petitioners intended to cause the injuries. The Court has noted that the injury report of the victim indicated life-threatening injuries on his person, and the weapons used in the attack were recovered from the accused-persons, suggesting prima facie evidence under Section 307 IPC. On taking into consideration the surrounding facts and circumstances, it is established that the accused-persons intentionally inflicted the injury. 21. This Court is conscious of the settled proposition of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the Trial Court is not required to conduct a conscientious appreciation of evidence or an intricate inquiry into the same. This position of law has received the judicial approval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court through various judgments as has been laid down in the judgments pronounced in State of NCT of Delhi v. Shiv Charan Bansal (2020) 2 SCC 290 ; State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294; Vishnu Kumar Shukla & Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2023 INSC 1026 21 . The ratio decidendi laid down by the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sudhir Bordiya Versus State (2022 SCC OnLine Raj 765) would make a relevant mention here. The Court observed as follows:- “13. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2023 INSC 1026 21 . The ratio decidendi laid down by the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sudhir Bordiya Versus State (2022 SCC OnLine Raj 765) would make a relevant mention here. The Court observed as follows:- “13. Thus, this Court is of the firm opinion that if a strong suspicion exists in the mind of the court at the stage concerned, then the same is sufficient for the court to proceed with the framing of the charge against the accused person(s). And if a prayer for discharge has been made before a revisional court, then the same may only be allowed if the court finds that the materials on record are wholly insuficient for the purpose of trial.” 22. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum, juxtaposed with our view expressed hereinbefore, we are satisfied that as to what is ‘strong suspicion’, it is the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence. 23. It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. 24. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a multitude of cases including K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. ( 2024 INSC 642 ), Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ( 2024 INSC 258 ) has adjudicated on the scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts u/s 397 CrPC (now 438 BNSS). ( 2024 INSC 642 ), Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ( 2024 INSC 258 ) has adjudicated on the scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts u/s 397 CrPC (now 438 BNSS). The dictum as laid down is that revisional jurisdiction shall be exercised where the exercise of revisional power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts. The High Court, under statutory obligation, ought to be loath in interfering at the stage of framing the charges against the accused, merely on hypothesis, imagination and far-fetched reasons which in law amount to interdicting the trial against the accused person. Thus, self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice staring the Court in the face. 26. The contents made out from the chargesheet, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do prima- facie make out a case against the accused-petitioners. The contents of the chargesheet in conjunction with the unimpeachable oral evidence of the independent witnesses which is amply corroborated by the medical evidence and other subsidiary facts appearing expressly or by implication from the material which was before the lower Court at that concerned stage the intention of the accused to commit the offence becomes clearer and hence it was sufficient to show that there were grounds for presuming that the accused-petitioner had committed offences under the relevant provisions. 26. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the learned Trial Court proceeded correctly, in exercise of its powers, to frame charges against the revisionist-petitioners. The materials on record give rise to strong suspicion that the revisionist- petitioners committed the offences for which the charges were framed against them by way of the impugned order. 27. Consequently, there exist no circumstances to warrant interference with the impugned order by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 28. Accordingly, this revision petition is dismissed. 29. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.