SHYMOLE PRAKASH D/O PRAKASH v. KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
2024-12-16
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, P.KRISHNA KUMAR
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, J. 1. This original petition is directed against the order of the Tribunal. The petitioners approached the Tribunal challenging their exclusion from consideration for the post of clerk and typist on the ground that after the PSC notification, the Government decided that equivalent qualifications possessed by them would have to be excluded for the appointment to the post. 2. The Kerala Public Service Commission (PSC) invited notification for clerk-typist and typist-clerk for district-wise recruitment. The qualification prescribed is as follows: (1) Pass in SSLC or its equivalent. (2) Lower Grade Certificate in KGTE Malayalam Typewriting or its Equivalent. (3) Lower Grade Certificate in KGTE English Typewriting and Computer Word Processing or its Equivalent. Those who have passed KGTE Typewriting before January 2002, must have acquired separate certificate in Computer Word Processing or its equivalent before the last date for receipt of application for the post fixed by the commission. (G.O. No. 21/2011/P&ARD dated 01.07.2011). All the qualifications for the post must have acquired before the last date of receipt of application. 3. The notification was issued on 27/7/2019. However, the Government by an order dated 30/3/2017, in exercise of the power under Rule 10(a)(ii) of KS&SSR decided to recognize certificates in computer word processing issued by the Central, State Government Departments/Agencies/Societies, Universities after successfully completing course of study not less than 3 months duration as an equivalent qualification. Thus, while issuing notification, PSC also prescribed that the certificate in computer word processing issued in accordance with the Government decision is equivalent. Thereafter, the Government on 15/12/2020 based on a decision of the Expert Committee reviewed the Government's earlier decision and decided not to recognize computer word processing as a higher qualification or equivalent qualification. 4. The PSC published the ranked list on 1/2/2023 excluding candidates who possessed certificates in computer word processing and other similar qualifications in the light of the Government Order dated 15/12/2020. 5. The candidates who have been excluded approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal negated the challenge in a common order. One of the orders was challenged in O.P. (KAT) No. 130/2024. We dismissed the original petition on 30/9/2024. 6. The Government's decision not to recognize a qualification as equivalent is based on an expert committee report.
5. The candidates who have been excluded approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal negated the challenge in a common order. One of the orders was challenged in O.P. (KAT) No. 130/2024. We dismissed the original petition on 30/9/2024. 6. The Government's decision not to recognize a qualification as equivalent is based on an expert committee report. The question is whether such a decision can have a retrospective effect to have an impact on the application made by the candidates who possess such qualifications. As we note, the Government had taken a conscious decision to review the earlier decision to recognize computer word processing as an equivalent qualification to the KGTE. That means, there is no existence to the earlier decision. Thus, the decision of the Government dated 15/12/2020 would have an impact on the rights of candidates who have applied pursuant to the notification issued by the PSC on 27/7/2019 for consideration. 7. The petitioners argue that after the commencement of the selection process, eligibility conditions cannot be altered. The petitioners placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (2008) 3 SCC 512 , Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Others v. Dr. Manu and Another, 2023 SCC Online SC 640, Sureshkumar Lalitkumar Patel and Others v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2023 SCC Online SC 167 and Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, 2024 SCC Online SC 3184. 8. This is not a situation where the selection process has been altered midway. Instead, it involves the withdrawal of eligibility itself. The Apex Court, in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra), in paragraph 14, emphasizes that changes to the rules in midway are evaluated based on rules against arbitrariness. 9. It is appropriate to refer para.14 of the judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) which reads thus: 14. The doctrine prescribing change of rules midway through the game, or after the game is played, is predicated on the rule against arbitrariness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the concept of equality in all matters relating to public employment.
Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the concept of equality in all matters relating to public employment. These two articles strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles alike to all similarly situate and not to be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations. In all its actions, the State is bound to act fairly, in a transparent manner. This is an elementary requirement of the guarantee against arbitrary State action which Article 14 of the Constitution adopts. A deprivation of the entitlement of private citizens and private business must be proportional to a requirement grounded in public interest. And it is concluded in the same judgment in para.42 as follows: 42. We, therefore, answer the reference in the following terms: (1) Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of vacancies. (2) Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness. (3) The decision in K. Manjusree (supra) lays down good law and is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra). Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) deals with the right to be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree (supra) deals with the right to be placed in the Select List. The two cases therefore deal with altogether different issues. (4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-discriminatory/non-arbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. (5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility.
(4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-discriminatory/non-arbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. (5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility. However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in the gaps. (6) Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment. The State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list. 10. The Apex Court in N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157 at Para-11 held as follows: 11. There is yet another aspect of the question. Where advertisement is issued inviting applications for direct recruitment to a category of posts, and the advertisement expressly states that selection shall be made in accordance with the existing rules or government orders, and if it further indicates the extent of reservations in favour of various categories, the selection of candidates in such a case must be made in accordance with the then existing rules and government orders. Candidates who apply, and undergo written or viva voce test acquire vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the advertisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Generally, a candidate has right to be considered in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement as his right crystallises on the date of publication of advertisement, however he has no absolute right in the matter. If the recruitment Rules are amended retrospectively during the pendency of selection, in that event selection must be held in accordance with the amended Rules. Whether the Rules have retrospective effect or not, primarily depends upon the language of the Rules and its construction to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent is ascertained either by express provision or by necessary implication; if the amended Rules are not retrospective in nature the selection must be regulated in accordance with the rules and orders which were in force on the date of advertisement.
The legislative intent is ascertained either by express provision or by necessary implication; if the amended Rules are not retrospective in nature the selection must be regulated in accordance with the rules and orders which were in force on the date of advertisement. Determination of this question largely depends on the facts of each case having regard to the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement and the relevant rules and orders. Lest there be any confusion, we would like to make it clear that a candidate on making application for a post pursuant to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right of selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant rules and the terms contained in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right of being considered for selection is accordance with the rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended rules are retrospective in nature. 11. The judgment of the Apex Court, relied on by the petitioner in Sureshkumar Lalitkumar Patel’s case (supra), is related to a challenge against reducing qualifying marks after publication of the results, to facilitate inclusion of candidates in horizontal reservation. That is a case related to changing the criteria for selection. It has no application in this matter. 12. The Apex Court judgment in Dr. Manu’s case (supra) is related to law interpreting Government order clarifying earlier orders. The Apex Court interpreting subsequent Government orders held that such Government orders cannot be declared as clarifications to have retrospective effect. The above judgment also has no relevance in this matter. 13. There is a clear distinction between altering rules in mid-process and revoking the right to be considered for selection due to amendments in rules or executive orders. In the former scenario, such changes may result in arbitrariness, potentially impacting the selection process by unfairly advantaging some and disadvantaging others. In the latter scenario, where the right to be considered is withdrawn due to amended rules or orders, the validity of such amendments must be examined. A challenge to the rule or order will only succeed if it meets the legal parameters for invalidation; otherwise, it must fail. 14.
In the latter scenario, where the right to be considered is withdrawn due to amended rules or orders, the validity of such amendments must be examined. A challenge to the rule or order will only succeed if it meets the legal parameters for invalidation; otherwise, it must fail. 14. In light of the judgment in N.T. Devin Katti’s case, the Government possesses the authority to make decisions, including implementing them retrospectively, if justified. In this instance, the Government reviewed its earlier decision based on an expert committee's recommendations. Failing to act on such recommendations and reviewing the decision retrospectively would risk admitting candidates lacking the requisite qualifications into public service. The Government, under its power to prescribe equivalencies, also holds the authority to determine that previously recognized equivalent qualifications are no longer equivalent. 15. This case does not involve candidates who have already been appointed through the selection process; rather, it concerns individuals awaiting consideration for selection. Such candidates hold only the right to be considered, not an absolute entitlement. If the Government, for valid reasons, decides not to recognize certain qualifications as equivalent, the candidates cannot demand inclusion in defiance of that decision. Thus, we find no merit in this original petition. It is accordingly disposed of. However, in a connected case, O.P. (KAT) No. 130/2024, we have given liberty to the candidates, who do not possess qualification, to approach the Government to consider their cases as a special case. Therefore, the Government shall consider the said representation submitted by the petitioners in the light of the judgment in O.P. (KAT) No. 130/2024.