Naveen Kumar Rampal, Son of Shri Kishori Lal Rampal v. State of Rajasthan
2024-01-24
MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. This criminal revision petition is directed against the order dated 10.08.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.4, Ajmer (for brevity “the learned trial Court”) in Criminal Case No.275/2004 whereby, while allowing an application filed under Section 319 CrPC by the prosecution, cognizance against the petitioner has been taken under Sections 409, 467, 468 & 471 read with Section 120-B IPC and has been summoned through arrest warrant. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the complainant Smt. Manna Devi submitted a written complaint in the learned trial Court stating therein that she, alongwith her two sons namely Laxman Chand and Mahendra Kumar had gone to State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “the Bank”) on 12.10.2002 for opening of the bank accounts in her sons’ name and handed over a sum of Rs.40,000/- to the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.20,000/- each in the bank accounts in her sons’ name. It was further stated that after completion of paper formalities, the original passbooks were handed over by the co-accused Bhanwar Lal at her home. It was alleged that when she went to withdraw the amount, it transpired that the passbooks were forged and no bank accounts in the names of her sons were ever opened. The complaint was sent for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC whereupon, an FIR No.124/2003 came to be registered. The Police after investigation filed charge-sheet against the co-accused- Bhanwar Lal for offence under Sections 406, 467, 468 & 471 IPC. During the course of his trial, the prosecution moved an application under Section 319 CrPC for summoning the petitioner, which has been allowed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 10.08.2004, impugned herein. 3. Assailing the order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no evidence on record to show his involvement in the offence alleged. He submits that the learned trial Court has passed the order relying upon the statements of Smt. Manna Devi (PW-8), Mahendra Kumar (PW-09) & Laxman Chand (PW-10); however, they have levelled no allegations against him during their deposition. Relying upon a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hardeep Singh versus State of Punjab & Ors.
Relying upon a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hardeep Singh versus State of Punjab & Ors. and other connected appeals: (2014) 3 SCC 92 , learned counsel would submit that the power under Section 319 CrPC should be exercised sparingly and only where strong and cogent evidence is available against a person proposed to be proceeded with which is lacking in the instant case. He, therefore, prays that the criminal revision petition be allowed and the order dated 10.08.2004 be quashed and set aside. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the prayer. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. A perusal of the order dated 10.08.2004 reveals that relying primarily upon the deposition of Smt. Manna Devi, S/Shri Laxman & Mahendra, cognizance against the petitioner has been taken under Section 319 CrPC. This Court has scanned the examinationin- chief of all these three witnesses and does not find a whisper of allegation against the petitioner either of breach of trust or of forgery. Smt. Manna Devi has stated in her deposition that she had handed over a sum of Rs.40,000/- to the Bank Manager, i.e, the petitioner in presence of other staff of the bank, who, in turn, handed over the same to the co-accused-Bhanwar Lal then and there. Except this averment, there is no averment qua the present petitioner in her deposition. Her son-Mahendra Kumar (PW-9) has made the similar statement with slight modification that an amount of Rs.20,000/- was handed over by him to the Bank Manager, who instantly handed over the same to the co-accused-Bhanwar Lal. Another son of the complainant Shri Laxman Chand has stated as PW-10 that he and his brother had given a sum of Rs.40,000/- to the petitioner and Bhanwar Lal, they obtained their signatures for opening the Bank accounts and also assured to hand over the passbooks at their residence. Therefore, it is apparent that the aforesaid statements are bereft of any allegation against the petitioner so as to warrant cognizance against him under Section 409, 467, 468 & 471 read with Section 120-B IPC and do not satisfy the standard laid down in case of Hardeep Singh (supra). Therefore, finding of the learned trial Court in this regard is perverse. 7. There is another important aspect of the matter.
Therefore, finding of the learned trial Court in this regard is perverse. 7. There is another important aspect of the matter. The order passed by the learned trial Court reveals that it has unnecessarily been swayed by the fact that the complaint contains allegations against the petitioner which were reiterated by the complainant in her statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC. The issue what would constitute “evidence” for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C., has succinctly been considered by the Constitution Bench in case of Hardeep Singh (supra) as under:- “(iii) Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? 78. It is, therefore, clear that the word “evidence” in Section 319 Cr.P.C. means only such evidence as is made before the court, in relation to statements, and as produced before the court, in relation to documents. It is only such evidence that can be taken into account by the Magistrate or the Court to decide whether the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised and not on the basis of material collected during the investigation. 79. The inquiry by the court is neither attributable to the investigation nor the prosecution, but by the court itself for collecting information to draw back a curtain that hides something material. It is the duty of the court to do so and therefore the power to perform this duty is provided under Cr.P.C. 80. The unveiling of facts other than the material collected during investigation before the magistrate or court before trial actually commences is part of the process of inquiry. Such facts when recorded during trial are evidence. It is evidence only on the basis whereof trial can be held, but can the same definition be extended for any other material collected during inquiry by the magistrate or court for the purpose of Section 319 Cr.P.C.? 81. An inquiry can be conducted by the magistrate or court at any stage during the proceedings before the court. This power is preserved with the court and has to be read and understood accordingly. The outcome of any such exercise should not be an impediment in the speedy trial of the case.
81. An inquiry can be conducted by the magistrate or court at any stage during the proceedings before the court. This power is preserved with the court and has to be read and understood accordingly. The outcome of any such exercise should not be an impediment in the speedy trial of the case. Though the facts so received by the magistrate or the court may not be evidence, yet it is some material that makes things clear and unfolds concealed or deliberately suppressed material that may facilitate the trial. In the context of Section 319 Cr.P.C. it is an information of complicity. Such material therefore, can be used even though not an evidence in stricto sensu, but an information on record collected by the court during inquiry itself, as a prima facie satisfaction for exercising the powers as presently involved. 82. This pre-trial stage is a stage where no adjudication on the evidence of the offences involved takes place and therefore, after the material alongwith the charge-sheet has been brought before the court, the same can be inquired into in order to effectively proceed with framing of charges. After the charges are framed, the prosecution is asked to lead evidence and till that is done, there is no evidence available in the strict legal sense of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The actual trial of the offence by bringing the accused before the court has still not begun. What is available is the material that has been submitted before the court along with the charge-sheet. In such situation, the court only has the preparatory material that has been placed before the court for its consideration in order to proceed with the trial by framing of charges. 83. It is, therefore, not any material that can be utilised, rather it is that material after cognizance is taken by a court, that is available to it while making an inquiry into or trying an offence, that the court can utilize or take into consideration for supporting reasons to summon any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the Court, who may be on the basis of such material, treated to be an accomplice in the commission of the offence.
The inference that can be drawn is that material which is not exactly evidence recorded before the court, but is a material collected by the court, can be utilised to corroborate evidence already recorded for the purpose of summoning any other person, other than the accused. This would harmonise such material with the word “evidence” as material that would be supportive in nature to facilitate the exposition of any other accomplice whose complicity in the offence may have either been suppressed or escaped the notice of the court. 84. The word “evidence” therefore has to be understood in its wider sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed earlier, even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The court, therefore, should be understood to have the power to proceed against any person after summoning him on the basis of any such material as brought forth before it. The duty and obligation of the court becomes more onerous to invoke such powers cautiously on such material after evidence has been led during trial. 85. In view of the discussion made and the conclusion drawn hereinabove, the answer to the aforesaid question posed is that apart from evidence recorded during trial, any material that has been received by the court after cognizance is taken and before the trial commences, can be utilised only for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The “evidence” is thus, limited to the evidence recorded during trial.” 8. In case of Brijendra Singh & Others versus: State of Rajasthan (2017) 7 SCC 706 , their Lordships have held as under:- “13. In order to answer the question, some of the principles enunciated in Hardeep Singh case (Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 ) may be recapitulated: power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the trial court at any stage during the trial i.e. before the conclusion of trial, to summon any person as an accused and face the trial in the ongoing case, once the trial court finds that there is some “evidence” against such a person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered that he appears to be guilty of the offence. The ‘evidence’ herein means the material that is brought before the Court during trial.
The ‘evidence’ herein means the material that is brought before the Court during trial. Insofar as the material/evidence collected by the IO at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. No doubt, such evidence that has surfaced in examination-in-chief, without cross-examination of witnesses, can also be taken into consideration. However, since it is a discretionary power given to the Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and is also an extraordinary one, same has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrants. The degree of satisfaction is more than the degree which is warranted at the time of framing of the charges against others in respect of whom chargesheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the Court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity.” 9. From the conjoint reading of the aforesaid precedential law, the picture which emerges is that the material collected by the Investigating Agency does not fall within the mischief of “evidence” for exercising power under Section 319 CrPC; but, can be used only for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the Courts. However, in the present case, as already held, none of the prosecution witnesses relied upon by the learned trial Court to summon the petitioner has levelled even a whisper of allegation against him to constitute any of the offence including the offence under Section 409, 467, 468 & 471 read with Section 120-B IPC. Since, no evidence has surfaced during trial to warrant summoning of the petitioner under Section 319 CrPC, the order impugned dated 10.08.2004 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 10. Resultantly, this criminal revision petition is allowed and the order dated 10.08.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.4, Ajmer in Criminal Case No.275/2004 is quashed and set aside.