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2024 DIGILAW 1666 (KER)

HDFC BANK STAFF UNION, KOCHI v. BANKING OMBUDSMAN RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

2024-12-17

HARISANKAR V.MENON

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JUDGMENT : HARISANKAR V. MENON, J. 1. Petitioner is stated to be a registered Trade Union representing the employees of the 2nd respondent Bank. The petitioner sought to open an account with the 3rd respondent Branch of the 2nd respondent Bank and since there was delay in processing the request for opening the Bank account, a complaint was filed before the 1st respondent herein, as evidenced by Ext.P6 dated 27.04.2018. In response to Ext.P6, the 2nd respondent submitted Ext.P7 reply dated 31.05.2018 before the 1st respondent herein pointing out that the account cannot be permitted to be opened since the petitioner is seeking opening of account in the name of “HDFC Bank Staff Union” which would amount to an infringement of its registered trade mark. The petitioner submitted Ext.P10 rejoinder dated 13.06.2018 essentially pointing out that it is neither a trader/manufacturer/service provider functioning in competition with the 2nd respondent herein and, therefore, there is no violation of the provisions of the Trade Marks Act. However, by Ext.P1 communication dated 17.07.2018, the 1st respondent informed the petitioner that its complaint could not be entertained. 2. Though an appeal was filed before the Reserve Bank of India by Ext.P12, the afore appeal was rejected holding that no appeal lies against the order at Ext.P1. 3. It is in the afore circumstances that the captioned writ petition is filed by the petitioner challenging Ext.P1 issued by the 1st respondent and also seeking a direction to the 2nd and 3rd respondents to open the account in the name of the petitioner as applied for by it. 4. I have heard Advocate Josna C.F. representing Sri. V.K. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Saji Varghese, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent Bank. 5. The challenge in this writ petition is essentially with reference to the findings in Ext.P1 issued by the 1st respondent. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner is a registered Trade Union representing the employees of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent, on the other hand, is a banking company engaged in banking/financial/monetary activities. The application for opening a bank account in the name of the petitioner Union is resisted by the 2nd respondent with reference to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, contending that it had already obtained registration under the afore Statute as regards the trademark, as evidenced by Ext.P7(A). The application for opening a bank account in the name of the petitioner Union is resisted by the 2nd respondent with reference to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, contending that it had already obtained registration under the afore Statute as regards the trademark, as evidenced by Ext.P7(A). The registration, as above, is obtained by the 2nd respondent under Section 23 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Chapter IV of the afore Act lays down the effect of obtaining a registration. Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, provides for the rights conferred on account of the registration in the following terms: “Section 28. Rights conferred by registration: (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided by this Act.” A reading of the afore provision would show that on account of a registered trade mark, the 2nd respondent gains the exclusive right to use the same in relation to “goods/services” in respect to which the trade mark is registered. As already noticed, the 2nd respondent has obtained registration for the activities noted in Ext.P7(A) registration and there is no case for the 2nd respondent that the petitioner is engaged in any of the afore activities noticed in Ext.P7(A). 6. The 2nd respondent also relies on the provisions of Section 29 of the Act, which read as under: “Section 29. Infringement of registered trade marks: (1) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark. (2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which because of: (a) its identity with the registered trade mark and the similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark. (b) its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark. (c) its identity with the registered trade mark and the identity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark, is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark. (3) In any case falling under clause (c) of Sub-Section (2), the Court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. (4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which: (a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark. (b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered. (c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark. (5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person if he uses such registered trade mark, as his trade name or part of his trade name, or name of his business concern or part of the name, of his business concern dealing in goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.” The provisions of Section 29 are attracted only when the registered trademark is used by the unregistered person like the petitioner herein “in the course of trade.” Therefore, the question as to whether the petitioner is engaged in any trade is to be considered at first. As noticed earlier, the petitioner is only a Union of the employees of the 2nd respondent Bank. It is not engaged in any sort of trading activity. As noticed earlier, the petitioner is only a Union of the employees of the 2nd respondent Bank. It is not engaged in any sort of trading activity. It is only formed for the welfare of the employees in its relationship with the employer. Therefore, the provisions of Sub-Section (1) to Section 29 are not attracted to the case at hand. The provisions of Sub-Section (2) onwards are also not attracted since the petitioner is not involved in any supply of “goods/ services.” As regards the “goods” there is no dispute since the petitioner is not involved in any trading activity. As regards “service” the said term is defined under Section 2(z) as under: “Section 2(z) “service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of services in connection with business of any industrial or commercial matters such as banking, communication, education, financing, insurance, chit funds, real estate, transport, storage, material treatment, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, boarding, lodging, entertainment, amusement, construction, repair, conveying of news or information and advertising.” Therefore, for a particular activity to be termed as “service” the same has to fall within the definition clause, as above. Here the petitioner is not engaged in any service, since the employees cannot be considered as “potential users” as regards the activities of the petitioner. When there is no such service provided, the provisions of Section 29 are not attracted under any circumstances. 7. This Court also notices that the petitioner claims to be registered under the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The term “Trade Union” is defined under Section 2(h) of the Trade Unions Act as under: “Section 2(h) “Trade Union” means any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions.” Thus, the activities of the Trade Union with reference to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, do not amount to a commercial activity, so as to attract Section 29(4)(b) of the Trade Marks Act. Similarly, the name of the Trade Union is registered with reference to Chapter II of the Trade Unions Act. 8. Sri. Similarly, the name of the Trade Union is registered with reference to Chapter II of the Trade Unions Act. 8. Sri. Saji Varghese, learned counsel for the respondents also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in T.V. Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Limited and Another, (2011) 4 SCC 85 in support of his contentions. However, the afore judgment may not be applicable to the facts of the case at hand since the Apex Court was considering a situation where two separate businesses were using the name “Eenadu” and it is in that context the judgment was rendered by the Apex Court, finding that the appellant therein “wanted to ride on the reputation and goodwill of the respondent company.” But here, as already found, the petitioner is not claiming any sort of benefit by virtue of its name and the principles laid down in the afore judgment will not apply in the case at hand. 9. On the whole, I am of the opinion that the findings in Ext.P1 cannot be sustained. 10. Resultantly, this writ petition would stand allowed by setting aside Ext.P1 issued by the 1st respondent and directing respondents 2 and 3 to process the application for opening of account as submitted by the petitioner herein.